JFK50: Henry Cabot Lodge

Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell, Washington, May 27, 1964, 10:55 p.m.

Johnson: One of our big problems there, Dick, the biggest, between us and I don't want this repeated to anybody, is Lodge. 

Russell: I know it. 

Johnson: He ain't worth a damn. 

Russell: Why, of course. 

Johnson: And he can't work with anybody. He won't let anybody else work. We get the best USIA man to put all on all the radios and try to get them to be loyal to the government and to be fighting and quit deserting. 

Russell: He thinks he's the emperor out there. 

Johnson: And he calls in USIA and says: "I handle the newspapers and the magazines and radio myself, so hell with you." So that knocks that guy out. So then we send out the best CIA man we've got and he says, "I handle intelligence, to hell with you." 

Then he wants a new Deputy Chief of Mission and we get him to give us some names, and we pick one, the best one we've got, send him out there to run the damn war, and he gets where he [Lodge] won't speak to the Deputy Chief of Mission. 

Then we get General Harkins out there, we thought he was a pretty good man, and he gets where he can't work with him. So we send Westmoreland out there. It's just a hell of a mess. 

You can't do anything with Lodge, and that is where McNamara gets so frustrated. They go out and get agreements and issue orders, and sends his stuff in there, and then Lodge takes charge of it himself, and he is not a take-charge man. And he just gets stacked up. 

Russell: He never has followed anything through to a conclusion since I've known him, and I've known him for 20 odd years. He never has. I went out with him around the world in '43, the only committee that went out during the war, we went everywhere. And Lodge was on there, he's a bright fellow, intelligent fellow, but he is not a man that persists. 

And he thinks he is dealing with barbarian tribes out there, and that he's the emperor, and he is going to tell them what to do. And there isn't any doubt in my mind that he had old Diem killed out there, himself, so he could. 

Johnson: That was a tragic mistake. 

Russell: Oh, it was horrible, awful. 

Johnson: And we've lost ever since. 

Russell: You have to go get someone that's more pliant than Lodge, that would do exactly as he said right quick. He's living up on cloud nine, it's a bad mistake. I don't know but the best thing you could do is ask Lodge if he don't think it's about time that he coming home? 

Johnson: Well, he'd be home campaigning against us on this issue every day. 

Russell: Well, God Almighty, he's goin' to come back anyway, when time comes. I'd give him a reason for doing it. He is going to come back. If you bring him back now, everybody going to say, "hell, he's coming back cause Johnson removed him from out there." 

MacArthur with all his power couldn't hurt Truman because everybody would said, well, hell, he just mad cause he got removed, though millions sympathized with him in it. And you needn't worry. Lodge will be in here, in my judgment, he'll be on that ticket some way. 

I don't think they'll nominate him for President, but they may put him on there for Vice President. But whether they do or don't, he'll be back here campaigning before that campaign's over. 

I don't know, I best take that back. This thing is so hopeless for the Republicans. He has certainly got enough critical sense to know that and not get his head chopped off. It would be foolish. 

Johnson: Has Clay got any judgment on a thing like this? 

Russell: Yeah, he has, even though he inclined . . . 

Johnson: He's off in another part of the world, mostly, isn't he. 

Russell: I think Clay knows. I'd take his judgment on most anything if he separates himself from his predilections. And he don't have any out there in that part of the world. 

I think that people generally have a good deal of respect for Clay's judgment too. And there's a great deal of affection and respect for old man Bradley, he's not in his dotage yet by a hell of a lot. I had him up here the other day getting some advice on some matters and I found him very alert. He's so humble, I don't know, he could tend to be a doormat for Lodge out there. 

But he's an intelligent man. Now Clay wouldn't. Clay would stand up to anybody if he felt he had support from high up places. 

I just don't know, it's a tragic situation, it's one of those places were you just can't win. Anything you do is wrong. 

Johnson: Well, think about it and call me. 

Russell: All right, sir. I have thought about it and worried about it and prayed about it. 

Source: U.S., Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 52

(Original Source: Johnson Library, Recording and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between the President and Russell, Tape F64.27, Side B PNO 121 and F 64.28, Side A PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)

Russell: And he thinks he is dealing with barbarian tribes out there, and that he's the emperor, and he is going to tell them what to do. 

And there isn't any doubt in my mind that he had old Diem killed out there, himself, so he could. 

Johnson: That was a tragic mistake. 

Russell: Oh, it was horrible, awful. 

Johnson: And we've lost ever since. 

Trouble Brewing.

Johnson: How important is it to us? 

Russell: It isn't important a damn bit for all this new missile stuff. 

Johnson: I guess it is important. 

Russell: From a psychological standpoint. 

Johnson: I mean, yes, and from the standpoint that we are a party to a treaty. And if we don't pay any attention to this treaty I don't guess that they think paying attention to any of them. 

Russell: Yeah, but we are the only ones paying attention to it. 

Johnson: Yeah, I think that is right. 

Russell: You see the other people are just as bound to that treaty as we are. 

Johnson: Yes, that's right. 

Russell: I think there are some twelve or fourteen other countries. 

Johnson: That's right. Yeah, there are fourteen of them. 

Russell: I don't know much about the foreign policy but it seems to me that there were several of them that were parties to it. 

And other than the question of our word and saving face, that's the reason that I said that I don't think that anybody would expect us to stay in there. 

Some old freebooter down in there, I've forgotten his name, I haven't heard about him lately, but he is still there, sort of a hellraiser and he don't know exactly what he wants, but I think he is the most dangerous thing to the present regime. I think that if he were to take over, he would ask us to get out. 

And, of course, if he did, with our theory of standing by self-determination of people, I don't think how we could say we not going to go if he is in charge of the government. 

It's going to be a headache to anybody that tries to fool with it. You've got all the brains in the country, Mr. President, you better get a hold of them. I don't know what to do about this. 

I saw it all coming on, but that don't do any good now, that's water over the dam and under the bridge. And we are there.

Richard Russell was racist (as was Johnson) and as conservative and stubborn as all Hell.

But he was an extremely bright guy, even in his 70s, that's why he was President Johnson's first phone call and an most trusted (Southern) advisor.

And everything from my research, and the research of many, many who have come before me leads be to conclude that Russell's analysis was absolutely dead on the money.

I have seen people excerpting another LBJ phone all out-of context where Johnson says "we (meaning America) took out Diem in '63", to suggest that he did it, he planned it and he wanted it (because he's so cold-blooded and stuff).

Nonsense. I have all meetings tapes made prior to and during the November 2nd Coup weekend and LBJ wasn't in on even one of the meetings.

The one constant unknown variable at all stages of the pre-coup was that of everyone in the room (Colby was briefing Jack, Bobby, McNamarra, Helms, Bundy, Maxwell Taylor and others), between the lot of them, they had absolutely no clue what Lodge was up to or what his intentions were, because he was running his own policy out there.