THE FUTURISTS

"Who is Man? Is He a rational being?

If He is, then The Goals can be achieved.

But if He isn't, there seems little point in attempting  The Effort."

Robert McNamarra,

Montreal, 1967

“I believe that in 130-200 years, if things go all well, 95% of The World’s Population will be living at higher than current American Standards of Living

Young Men will come from everywhere  poor, everywhere in danger of hunger and starvation to a Life where The Technology largely insulates you from The State of Nature.”

— Herman Kahn, 

RAND Corporation Futurist, 

1965

My Armor was never a distraction or a hobby, it was a cocoon, and now I'm a Changed Man. 

You can take away My House, all My Tricks and Toys, but one thing you can't take away - 

I am Iron Man.

— Tony Stark,

Futurist, 2013

So let Us infect Them.
Infect Them to the point where They Become Us.
Where there’s nothing left in This World, but Us.

And then Some Kid’ll come up and fuck that as well.
And that’ll be Exactly What We Need at the time.

And that’s me finished, so thank you very much. 

 

  

The Futurist : 

I see, a Suit of Armour around The World.

The Doctor : 

Sounds like Pretty Cold World, Tony

Orion, The Huntsman : 

The Futurist, gentlemen! 

The Futurist is here! 

He sees ALL ! 

He sees ALL ! 

He knows What's Best for You, 

Whether your like it or not.

The Futurist : 

Give me a break, Barton. 

I had no idea they'll put you here. Come on.

Orion, The Huntsman :

[spits] 

Yeah, well, you knew they'd put us somewhere, Tony.

The Futurist : 

Yeah, but not some super-max floating ocean pokey. 

You know, this place is for maniacs. 

This is a place for . . .

Orion, The Huntsman :

Criminals? 

[He stands up.] 

Criminals, Tony. 

Think that's The Word you're looking for. 

[He eyes Tony through the bars.] 

Right? That didn't used to mean Me. 

Or Sam, or Wanda. 

But Here We Are.

The Futurist : 

Because you broke The Law.

Orion, The Huntsman :

Yeah.

The Futurist  : 

I didn't make you.

Orion, The Huntsman :

La, la, la, la, la . . .

The Futurist : 

You Read it, you Broke it.

Orion, The Huntsman :

La, la, la, la la…

The Futurist : 

Alright, you're all grown up, you got a wife and kids. 

I don't understand, why didn't you think about them before you chose The Wrong Side? 

[He walks away.]

Orion, The Huntsman :

You gotta watch your back with This Guy. 

There's a chance he's gonna break it.

The Little Guy : 

Hank Pym always said, you never can Trust a Stark.

The Futurist : 

Who are you?

The Little Guy : 

Come on, man!

The Other Side of the USS Liberty Incident : Dimona

List of fabrications, outright and suspected

List of outright fabrications either by Israel directly or via agents/authors who are linked to the "accident theory".

1) The first "gun-camera picture" from the IDF History Report in 1982 does not show the USS Liberty.

2) The second "gun-camera picture" of 1984 has been photo-shopped, and is almost certainly an American photograph taken weeks after the incident.

3) The 1984 claim, much repeated, that there was a "friendly-fire" incident by the Israelis on their own armoured column the previous day (6th June 1967) Hirsh Goodman and Ze'ev Schiff, "The Attack on the Liberty," Atlantic Monthly, (September 1984). This claim has been dropped from the JVL source once depended on by Wikipedia.

4) Numerous claims made by AJ Cristol, particularly some details of his "13 inquiries exonerate Israel", see above. Cristol calls the rushed Naval Court of Inquiry "remarkably competent (and) thorough", while the veterans call it "a doctored sham". Cristol stresses that 14 seamen spoke at the hearing. Ship’s officers Ennes, Painter, Golden, and others charge that in dozens of cases, sworn testimony damaging to Israel’s case was not allowed or, if allowed, not entered into evidence or made part of the transcript. Ennes avers not only that his testimony went unentered but also that deck and weather log entries in his hand were altered. Former cryptologic technician Joe Lentini stated that the naval hearing helped Israel "get away with murder" a view not contradicted by any known survivor.

While convincing to some, some evidence/assertions by defenders of Israel cannot be conclusively proven to be fabrications. However, where evidence is strong and could easily be falsified, then an assumption of outright and deliberate falsification seems justified.

"Thursday, June 8 [1967] began in a note of tragedy. A morning news bulletin reported that a U.S. Navy communications ship, the Liberty, had been torpedoed in international waters off the Sinai coast. For seventy tense minutes we hadn't idea who was responsible, but at eleven o'clock we learned that the ship had been attacked in error by Israeli gunboats and planes. Ten men of the Liberty were killed and a hundred were wounded. This heartbreaking episode grieved the Israelis deeply, as it did us. There was a possibility that the incident might lead to even greater misfortune, and it was precisely to avoid further confusion and tragedy that I sent a message to Chairman Kosygin on the hot line. I told him exactly what had happened and advised him that carrier aircraft were on their way to the scene to investigate. I wanted him to know, I said, that investigation was the sole purpose of these flights, and I hoped he would inform the proper parties. Kosygin replied that our message had been received and the information had been relayed immediately to the Egyptians.

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson reported, after his return to Moscow, that this particular exchange had made a deep impression on the Russians. Use of the Hotline For this purpose, to prevent misunderstanding, was exactly what both parties had envisioned.

*********

On the morning of June 10 we thought we could see the end of the road. But new word from Moscow brought a sudden chill to the situation. I was told that the hot line was active again and that "Mr. Kosygin wants the President to come to the equipment as soon as possible." I hurried to the Situation Room. Already there were McNamarra, Rostow, Clifford, Bundy, Katzenbach, Thompson and CIA Director Helms. At 9:05 AM I received the first rough translation of the Kosygin message.

The Soviets accused Israeli of ignoring all Security Council resolutions for a ceasefire. Kosygin said a "very crucial moment" had now arrived. He spoke of the possibility of "independent decision " by Moscow. He foresaw the risk of a "grave catastrophe", and state that unless Israel unconditionally halted operations within the next few hours, the Soviet Union would take "necessary actions, including military". Thompson, at Rusk's request, read the original Russian text to make certain that the word "military" was indeed the correct translation. Thompson said it was. In an exchange between Heads of government, these were serious words : "very crucial moment," "catastrophe", "independent decision," "military actions".

The room was deathly still as we carefully studied this grave communication. I turned to McNamarra. "Where is the Sixth Fleet now?"

Foxbats Did Fly over Dimona

In their sensational historical detective work, Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets' Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (Yale University Press, 2007), Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez have challenge the widely-accepted idea that the Six Day War happened without anyone wanting it. Instead, they present a theory that the U.S.S.R. instigated the war as a way preemptively to destroy the Israeli nuclear facilities.

I was drawn to the argument (in an analysis at "The Soviets' Six-Day War) but dared not quite fully endorse it, wondering if all the evidence would hold up under critical scrutiny by other experts on this topic.

Today comes confirmation of a critical piece of data, as suggested by the title of David Horovitz' article in the Jerusalem Post, "Russia confirms Soviet sorties over Dimona in '67." The confirmation comes from Col. Aleksandr V. Drobyshevsky, chief spokesman of the Russian Air Force, and it is inadvertent, coming in a completely different context (commemorating the anniversary of the test pilots' school from which one of the pilots who participated in the 1967 flights had graduated). Drobyshevsky wrote, in an article posted on the official Web site of the Russian Defense Ministry in October 2006 but only noticed by Remez and Ginor now:

In 1967, the military valor and high combat training of Col. Bezhevets, A.S. (now a Hero of the Soviet Union, an honorary test pilot of the USSR, [and] retired Air Force major-general), were demonstrated while carrying out combat operation in Egypt, [and] enabled [him] to perform unique reconnaissance flights over the territory of Israel in a MiG-25RB aircraft.

The MiG-25RB would be the "Foxbat" aircraft of the title. Remez and Ginor describe this passage as an "extraordinary disclosure" and as "official confirmation of the book's exhibit A and the source of its title." It comes, they add, "as close to an official document as one can hope for in the foreseeable future, given the prevailing circumstances in Russia."

An aerial view of Israel's Dimona reactor.

Another update: Since the Post first summarized Foxbats over Dimona's findings on May 16, its article (Remez and Ginor report) "was widely reproduced" and "aroused intensive discussion" in the former Soviet Union. Their thesis convinced Komsomolskaya Pravda's military correspondent (and former general staff officer) Col. Viktor Baranets, who has written that "the time has apparently come to set the record straight. So far, the facts have often been replaced by inventions. No one can dispute the obvious: the USSR 'orchestrated' that war... The USSR was prepared for an invasion of Israel. The confessions of our own officers prove this." Komsomolskaya Pravda and other media, Remez and Ginor note, "contacted some of the veterans who were among the main sources for the book, and they reiterated their accounts." In particular, Gen. Vasily Reshetnikov, former commander of the Soviet strategic bombers, confirmed the account.

But the verdict is not unanimous. Bezhevets, the Foxbat pilot over Dimona, continues to deny having undertaken this mission. Remez and Ginor explain this discrepancy by suggesting that Bezhevets is sticking to the old line; in contrast, "Drobyshevsky's [Defense Ministry] statement relied not on the pilot's testimony but rather on the air force's own documentation." This difference illustrates their point that "full and direct documentation of the Soviet role in 1967 is still being suppressed." (August 24, 2007)

Nov. 4, 2007 update: Stanford University Press provides the following description of its forthcoming book, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War, edited by Yaacov Ro'i and Boris Morozov:

Why did the Soviet Union spark war in 1967 between Israel and the Arab states by falsely informing Syria and Egypt that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian border? Based on newly available archival sources, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War answers this controversial question more fully than ever before. Directly opposing the thesis of the recently published Foxbats over Dimona by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, the contributors to this volume argue that Moscow had absolutely no intention of starting a war. The Soviet Union's reason for involvement in the region had more to do with enhancing its own status as a Cold War power than any desire for particular outcomes for Syria and Egypt.

Comment: Good to see the topic joined; may the stronger argument prevail.

Feb. 1, 2008 update: Book reviews are pleasingly unpredictable. Here is David Rodman in The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, voice of the Israeli foreign policy establishment:

Though Ginor and Remez marshal a prodigious amount of previously overlooked information to bolster their case, this documentation does not add up to unequivocal evidence of a Soviet-Arab conspiracy. … it is difficult to accept their charge of a conspiracy. … Furthermore, Ginor and Remez do not endow their thesis with a very persuasive rationale as to why the Soviets would launch a war against Israel.

In contrast, Lawrence Freedman writes in Foreign Affairs magazine, the voice of the U.S. foreign policy establishment:

Here is a book that is truly revisionist, challenging what we thought we knew about the origins and conduct of the Six-Day War. ... Ginor and Remez have succeeded to the point where the onus is now on others to show why they are wrong.

And most surprising of all, Mark N. Katz in The Middle East Journal, voice of American Arabism: He started out skeptical but

Long before reaching the book's end … I became convinced that Ginor and Remez have gotten it right.

Sep. 1, 2008 update: Ginor and Remez have published a follow-up paper, "The Six-Day War as a Soviet Initiative: New Evidence and Methodological Issues," in the Middle East Review of International Affairs. It contains what the authors themselves describe as a "welter of minute particulars," but particulars that buttress the Foxbatthesis.

INTERNATIONAL By DAVID HOROVITZ \  08/23/2007 19:21

Russia confirms Soviet sorties over Dimona in '67

Israeli authors: This is proof USSR deliberately engineered 6 Day War to destroy nuclear program.

Russia confirms Soviet sorties over Dimona in '67

(photo credit:Courtesy)

The chief spokesman of the Russian Air Force, Col. Aleksandr V. Drobyshevsky, has confirmed in writing for the first time that it was Soviet pilots, in the USSR's most-advanced MiG-25 "Foxbat" aircraft, who flew highly-provocative sorties over Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona in May 1967, just prior to the Six Day War. 

Gideon Remez and Isabella Ginor, who co-wrote the recent book Foxbats over Dimona, which asserts that the Soviet Union deliberately engineered the war to create the conditions in which Israel's nuclear program could be destroyed, on Thursday described this "extraordinary disclosure" as "official confirmation of the book's exhibit A and the source of its title." 

Published in June by Yale University Press, the Israeli duo's book asserted that the Soviets flew sorties over Dimona in the still-experimental and top-secret Foxbats both to bolster a deliberate Soviet effort to encourage Israel to launch a war, and to ensure that the nuclear target could be effectively destroyed once Israel, branded an aggressor for its preemption, came under a planned joint Arab-Soviet counterattack. Soviet nuclear-missile submarines were said to have been poised off Israel's shore, ready to strike back in case Israel already had a nuclear device and sought to use it. The Soviets were also said to have geared up for a naval landing on Israel's beaches. 

The book, hailed by experts such as the former US ambassador to Israel and Egypt Daniel Kurtzer for marshalling a "compelling argument," nonetheless featured what the authors acknowledged was a dearth of incontrovertible documentation that would back up central aspects of their thesis. They noted at the time that it was "entirely possible that few corresponding documents ever existed," that key documents may have been destroyed, and that "the accounts of numerous Soviet participants refer to orders that were transmitted only orally down the chain of command." 

However, a delighted Remez and Ginor told the The Jerusalem Post that official confirmation of the Soviet Foxbat sorties had now been published by Drobyshevsky in an article posted on the official Web site of the Russian Defense Ministry. The "extraordinary disclosure of a hitherto secret operation," they noted, "apparently was included inadvertently - in a statement that was published in a completely different context": to mark the anniversary of the test pilots' school from which one of the pilots who participated in the 1967 flights graduated. 

The relevant section of Drobyshevsky's article states (in translation): "In 1967, the military valor and high combat training of Col. Bezhevets, A.S. (now a Hero of the Soviet Union, an honorary test pilot of the USSR, [and] retired Air Force major-general), were demonstrated while carrying out combat operation in Egypt, [and] enabled [him] to perform unique reconnaissance flights over the territory of Israel in a MiG-25RB aircraft." Remez and Ginor said this high-level admission of the Soviet sorties, which was first posted on the ministry's Web site last October, "comes as close to an official document as one can hope for in the foreseeable future, given the prevailing circumstances in Russia." 

They noted that it corroborates the personal testimony of Bezhevets's senior colleague, Lt.-Gen. Aleksandr I. Vybornov, who is quoted in the book as having described the missions on several occasions. 

The book's findings were first published by the Post on May 16, under the heading "Soviets engineered Six Day War 'to destroy Israel's nuclear program.'" Remez and Ginor told the Post that this article "was widely reproduced" and "aroused intensive discussion" in the FSU. Several respected news media outlets, notably the Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, they said, "contacted some of the veterans who were among the main sources for the book, and they reiterated their accounts." Among such veterans confirming their stories was Gen. Vasily Reshetnikov, the commander of the Soviet strategic bombers, said to have been given maps for the planned strike at Dimona. 

The "conventional view" of the events leading up to the 1967 war, Remez noted when the book came out, "is that the Soviet Union triggered the conflict via disinformation on Israeli troop movements, but that it didn't intend for a full-scale war to break out and that it then did its best to defuse the war in cooperation with the United States." The book, he said, "totally contradicts everything that has been accepted." Having received information about Israel's progress toward nuclear arms, the book asserts, the Soviets aimed to draw Israel into a confrontation in which their counterstrike would include a joint Egyptian-Soviet bombing of the reactor at Dimona. 

The Soviets' intended central intervention in the war was thwarted, however, by the overwhelming nature of the initial Israeli success, the authors write, as Israel's preemption, far from weakening its international legitimacy and exposing it to devastating counterattack, proved decisive in determining the conflict. Because the Soviet Union's plan thus proved unworkable, the authors go on, its role in stoking the crisis, and its plans to subsequently remake the Middle East to its advantage, have remained overlooked, undervalued or simply unknown to historians assessing the war over the past 40 years. 

The Israeli authors' thesis, they told the Post this week, had now won over Komsomolskaya Pravda's Col. Viktor Baranets, a noted military correspondent and former General Staff officer. 

They quoted him as having written recently that "the time has apparently come to set the record straight. So far, the facts have often been replaced by inventions. No one can dispute the obvious: the USSR 'orchestrated' that war... The USSR was prepared for an invasion of Israel. The confessions of our own officers prove this." The Russian media also recently contacted Bezhevets himself, the authors said, but even though he has now been officially praised by his own Defense Ministry for making the Foxbat flights over Israel, he denied doing so. 

According to Remez and Ginor, this "indicates that Drobyshevsky's [Defense Ministry] statement relied not on the pilot's testimony but rather on the air force's own documentation." This, in turn, they said, "illustrates the point... that full and direct documentation of the Soviet role in 1967 is still being suppressed." 

Remez, a longtime prominent Israel Radio journalist, fought in the Six Day War as a paratrooper. Ginor was born in the Ukraine, came to Israel in 1967 and is a noted analyst of Soviet and post-Soviet affairs.

USS Liberty - US Navy Almost Nuke Cairo, McNamara Denies LBJ Recalled Liberty Rescue Flight from Spike EP on Vimeo.

October Surprise 1968 : The Pueblo Incident

The Puebelo Incident from Spike EP on Vimeo.

Note : 

USS Liberty and USS Pueblo were not US Navy Vessels under the command of the President and the Secretary of the Navy;

They were NSA Vessels operated by a US Navy crew, under the chain of command reporting ultimately to the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms - it's entirely likely in both cases, President Johnson, Secretary McNamarra and most of the Navy and Pentagon  Brass (other than CIA Moles and Bad Insiders) had no inkling where they were or what they were doing prior to their coming under attack in either instance.

"The first operational mission for USS PUEBLO was conceived and tasked by the US Naval Security Group Command. The ship's first mission was to be a period primarily for testing. With no current information available on hostile activities by North Korean forces, the officer in charge at US CINCPACFLT assigned the mission a risk assessment (*see note 1 at bottom of page)
All attempts by Capt. Bucher to upgrade the assessment to hazardous were - denied.

Like USS LIBERTY AGTR-5, USS PUEBLO operated under the assumption that help would be provided if needed. US 7th Fleet, US Forces Korea and US 5th Air Force headquaters, Fuchu, Japan, among others were informed of PUEBLO’s mission. Because of that minimal risk assessment, the US Navy made no specific requests for support. The tasking for similar USS BANNER missions had also been rated minimal, but fighter aircraft were made available on a strip alert status and two US Navy destroyers maintained station within 50 miles of BANNER on some missions. When 5th Air Force Japan personnel questioned the lack of a request for strip alert status for PUEBLO’s mission, they were verbally informed by Commander Naval Forces Japan headquarters that it would not be needed. In addition to the lack of ready protection, the US Navy maintained the same communications procedures and methods for the PUEBLO mission as LIBERTY had operated under during her fateful mission of June 1967. The ships's inability to establish reliable communications with a higher command authority would be a repeat of the problems that contributed to the lack of help for LIBERTY. Unfortunately, it appears nothing was learned from the LIBERTY incident.


18 December 1967 0752Z
Sailing Orders
(Declassified 12 September 1968)

SECRET
PRIORITY
P 050512Z JAN 68

FM CTF NINE SIX

TO USS PUEBLO

INFO AIG SEVEN SIX TWO TWO

COMSERVGRU THREE
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
COMUSKOREA
COMNAVFORKOREA LIMDIS NOFORN
PACOMELINT CENTER

SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN

A. CTF 96 OPORD 301-68 NOTAL

B. PACOM ELINT CENTEER 210734Z DEC 67 PASEP NOTAL

C. CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A

D. CINCPACFLTINST 03100.3D

1. ICHTYIC ONE FORMERLY PINKROOT ONE

2. DEPART SASEBO JAPAN WHEN RFS ABOUT 8 JAN 68. CHECK OUT OF MOVREP SYSTEM AND PROCEED VIA TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO ARRIVE OPAREA MARS ABOUT 10 JAN.

3. ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY SOVIET NAVAL UNITS WHILE PROCEEDING TO OPAREA MARS.

4. UPON ARRIVAL MARS, CONDUCT ICHTHYIC OPS IAW PROVISIONS REF A.

A. OPERATE OPAREAS MARS, VENUS AND PLUTO, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS IN AREA(S) WHICH APPEAR MOST LUCRATIVE.

B. DEPART OPAREAS 27 JAN AND IF NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE MAINTAIN STRICT EMCON CONDITION. PROCEED SOUTH ALONG KOREAN COAST TO VICINITY TSUSHIMA STRAITS.

C. INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NASHIMA STRAITS.

D. TERMINATE SURVEILLANCE TO ARRIVE SASEBO 4 FEB 68. EARLIER DEPARTURE AUTHORIZED TO ENSURE TEN PERCENT ON-BOARD FUEL UPON ARRIVAL SASEBO.
5. OPAREAS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

A. EAST/WEST BOUNDARIES ALL AREAS ARE CONTIGUOUS TO KORCOM AST EXTENDING FROM THIRTEEN NM CPA TO LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDE EAWRDO SIXTY NM.

B. NORTHSOUTH BOUNDARIES ARE:

MARS. 40-00N4 TO 39-00N2;
VENUS. 41-00N5 TO 40-00N4;
PLUTO. 42-00N6 TO 41-00N5.

6. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. COLLECT ELINT IAW PROVISIONS REF B, ON NOT TO INTERFERE BASIS WITH BASIC MISSION.

B. CPA TO KORCOM/SOVIET LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS WILL BE THIRTEEN NM.

C. UPON ESTABLISHING FIRM CONTACT WITH SOVIET NAVAL UNITS, BREAK EMCON AND TRANSMIT DAILY SITREP.

D. OPERATE AT LEAST FIVE HUNDRED YDS FROM SOVIET UNITS EXCEPT TO CLOSE BRIEFLY TO TWO HUNDRED YDS AS NECESSARY FOR VISUAL/PHOTO COVERAGE.

E. DO NOT INTERFERE WITH SOVIET EXERCISES BUT MAINTAIN A POSITION ON THE PERIPHERY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES.

F. IF UNABLE TO ESTABLISH OR GAIN CONTACT WITH SOVIET UNITS WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ARRIVAL TSUSHIMA STRAITS AREA, ADVISE ORIG. IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

G. PROVISIONS REF
APPLYING RELIDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.

IF D APPLIES REGARDING CONDUCT IN EVENT OF HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION BY FOREIGH UNITS.

H. INJOLLED DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT SHOULD BE STOWED OR COVERED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO NOT ELICIT UNUSUAL INTEREST FROM SURVEYING/SURVEYED UNIT(S). EMPLOY ONLY IN CASES WHERE THREAT TO SURVIVAL IS OBVIOUS.

GP-3
LIMDIS

Provided by Ralph McClintock

Chronology of the North Korean capture and detention of the U. S. intelligence ship Pueblo and her crew:  (Philadelphia Enquirer, December 23, 1968)

Jan. 23--Four North Korean patrol boats capture the Pueblo in the Sea of Japan off North Korea's eastern coast. U. S. officials describe incident as "a matter of the utmost gravity" and insist ship was 25 miles off coast.

Jan. 24--Secretary of State Rusk describes seizure as "in the category of . . . an act of war" and warns the North Koreans to cool it." North Korean radio broadcasts an alleged confession by Pueblo Capt. Bucher that he deliberately violated North Korean waters.

Jan. 25--President Johnson orders 14,787 Air Force and Navy. reservists to active duty and announces American military forces in and around South Korea will be strengthened.

Jan. 26-UN Security Council meets on Pueblo crisis but finds no solution.

Feb. 6--The United States withdraws the carrier Enterprise from the position it had taken near the North Korean port of Wonson.

Feb. 12--North Korean radio reports Bucher makes second "confession" of  violating North Korean waters.

March 4--President Johnson receives an open letter purported to be from Pueblo crewmen asking United States to frankly admit the vessel had violated North Korean territory.

March 22--April 2-North Korea circulates series of letters allegedly written by captive men and warns United States failure to apologize could cost lives of crew.

June19--State Department discloses talks on crew release make no progress.

Sept. 13--Japanese newspapers report news conference at Pyongyang at which crewmen allegedly said they had been ordered to intrude in the three-mile limit.

Dec. 19--Congressional sources in Washington say agreement reached for crew release.

Dec. 22-State Department announces crew to be released Sunday night.

gov.archives.arc.12053.mpega

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Oral History Collection

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State -- Interview III, Tape 1 -- 19

Indonesian policy.

"I think the most concern we had over Indonesia had to do with the confrontation with Malaya. They got into a situation where they were sending guerrillas not only into the offshore parts of Malaysia over in Borneo, but also in Malay proper, and we were concerned because Australia and New Zealand had security commitments to Malaysia and had forces there. Under the Anzus Treaty, if New Zealand or Australian forces were attacked in the treaty area, and Malaysia was in the treaty area, that could very likely bring up the obligation of Anzus and involve the United States and our commitment to Australia and New Zealand. We tried to point that out to Sukarno in an effort to cause him to pause. Fortunately with the change in government in Indonesia, the confrontation came to a close; and that was a major step forward in the general political security situation in Southeast Asia.

I’m not one of those who claims that what we were doing in South Viet Nam made it possible for Indonesia to turn its policy around. There are some Indonesians who have commented that the very fact that the United States was present in Viet Nam and that the Seventh Fleet was there between Indonesia and mainland China gave them courage to move strongly against the Chinese Communists who were heavily involved in Indonesia and were participants in that attempted coup d’etat which led to the turnover in government, but I think it would be unfortunate for the United States to claim that what we were doing in Viet Nam was the thing which produced the change in attitude in Indonesia. I think those changes came about for Indonesian reasons and not directly because of what we were doing in Viet Nam.

M:  I was smiling a minute ago not at your answer, but at the fact that you seemed to read my mind on these questions. I was just about to open my mouth to ask the question that you began to answer. Maybe we’ve been at this long enough that I can just turn the machine on and let you go on.  What about Korea? I gather that this is one of the instances where there was a real personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park that contributed a great deal to the success of our relations in Korea. Is that accurate?

R: Yes. President Johnson had a great respect for President

Park and for good reason. President Park, under great difficulties, had brought Korea along in remarkable progress, economically and socially and politically. He was tough in defense of the interests of South Korea but was reasonable and balanced and was not provocative or militant in his general attitude toward North Korea. He took a responsible attitude toward such questions as Southeast Asia. He seemed to be willing to play a role that reflected Korea’s gratitude for the assistance it had had from the United States back in 1950. His willingness to put two divisions of South Korean troops into Southeast Asia was welcomed by President Johnson. South Korea had no treaty obligation to do so. It was not a member of SEATO, and when he made it clear that he was prepared to take part in that struggle down there, this of course touched President Johnson very deeply. And the Koreans turned out to be very good fighters in South Viet Nam, as they turned out to be by the end of the Korean War in their own country. But there was a personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park.

M: When did the renewed tensions along the armistice line in Korea become serious again?

R: I think that we began to be freshly concerned in 1967 when the rate of infiltration seemed to increase significantly.  And when the North Korean leaders began making militant speeches about unifying the country by 1970 and making very bellicose statements about their own policy and attitude, we became very much concerned because we had fifty thousand American troops in Korea.

We had a very flat and direct security treaty with Korea. A renewal of the Korean War would be something that we would look upon with the greatest dismay because we had enough of a struggle going on in Southeast Asia, We didn’t want a second struggle up in Korea. It was rather courageous on the part of President Park to put two divisions of his own troops into South Viet Nam at a time when he was having infiltration problems with the North Koreans, and when the North Koreans were talking in a very belligerent mood, but he went ahead and did it. But throughout ‘67 and ‘68 we were very much concerned about North Korea.

M: Was the Pueblo incident a calculated part of this, do you think, or was that just an aberration that was unrelated to their troubles with South Korea?

R: I will never fully understand just why the North Koreans seized the Pueblo. It’s one of those situations where a small belligerent country can act with a lack of responsibility simply because other countries don’t want war. The Pueblo was in international waters. It was there to do some listening on communications in North Korea. We had an interest in picking up as much intelligence as could out of North Korea because of the belligerency of North Korea towards South Korea and the increase of infiltration into South Korea, but we were relying upon the high seas, the freedom of the seas—

M: There was never a doubt about its location?  R: Oh, no, never a doubt about its location. As a matter of fact, in the communications which the North Koreans themselves flashed back from the scene, they even put the position further out on the high seas than we did so they knew they were on the high seas. And when I say high seas, I mean beyond their own twelve-mile limit.  M: Yes, their definition of high seas.

R: And not just beyond our three-mile limit. But that was a very unhappy episode from beginning to end.  M: That’s Presidential from the beginning, I expect. What was Mr. Johnson’s reaction to that?

R: He was, of course, furious with the North Koreans, and like me [he] failed to understand just why they went out of their way to be so disagreeable about it. Nevertheless President Johnson did not want a war with North Korea. He made a prompt decision to try to get the ship and its men back by diplomatic means rather than by military means. We were faced with the fact that if you tried to use military force to rescue the men you might pick up dead bodies, but you wouldn’t pick up live men and that you might well start a war at a time when we didn’t want a war between North and South Korea involving American forces.  So we decided to swallow hard and try to get these men back by diplomatic means, and that took a great deal of doing. We had meeting after meeting that made no progress; and we finally released the men by a device which I described at the time as being without precedent in international affairs. We signed a statement which the North Koreans insisted we sign, but at the very time we signed it we made a statement saying that we denounced the signature and the statement itself was false.

M: They knew you were going to make this statement?  R: They knew in advance that we were going to make that statement. This had been worked out in advance. It’s as though a kidnapper kidnaps your child and asks for fifty thousand dollars ransom. You give him a check for fifty thousand dollars and you tell him at the time that you’ve stopped payment on the check, and then he delivers your child to you. I think probably what happened was that the North Koreans came to the conclusion that they had milked the Pueblo affair for all that was in it, and that there was no particular point in holding on to these men any further.  M: The Russians didn’t play any constructive role--?  R: I think it’s possible that the Russians played a mediating role in that situation. We have no way of knowing. We asked the Russians on several occasions to use their influence with North Korea to free these men and the ship, but we never knew just what they did by way of follow-up on it.

M: Did we have to act to restrain the South Koreans in that atmosphere [when] under renewed infiltration, the attack on the Blue House, and the seizure of the Pueblo all sort of came together?

R: The South Koreans were interested in what might be called close-in retaliation, but I never got the impression that the South Koreans wanted to go into full-scale war. So to the extent that it was necessary to restrain them, it wasn’t a very difficult job because they were not itching for war, either. They did get very incensed about the Blue House raid and about other types of infiltration that were coming across. There were times when they would carry out retaliation against North Korea by counterraids without our permission, and so we had a little job at times of cooling them down a bit and restraining them from these retaliations which they were inclined to pull off.

M: Mr. Johnson talked about the concept of regionalism in Asia.  Was there any basis in Asia for the development of that regionalism, or was that something that we pretty well had to impose ourselves upon them?

R: No, one of the very encouraging developments in Asia during

this period of the South Vietnamese conflict was that the

nations in Asia during this period of the South Vietnamese

conflict was that the nations in Asia themselves began to

JFK50: Henry Cabot Lodge

Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell, Washington, May 27, 1964, 10:55 p.m.

Johnson: One of our big problems there, Dick, the biggest, between us and I don't want this repeated to anybody, is Lodge. 

Russell: I know it. 

Johnson: He ain't worth a damn. 

Russell: Why, of course. 

Johnson: And he can't work with anybody. He won't let anybody else work. We get the best USIA man to put all on all the radios and try to get them to be loyal to the government and to be fighting and quit deserting. 

Russell: He thinks he's the emperor out there. 

Johnson: And he calls in USIA and says: "I handle the newspapers and the magazines and radio myself, so hell with you." So that knocks that guy out. So then we send out the best CIA man we've got and he says, "I handle intelligence, to hell with you." 

Then he wants a new Deputy Chief of Mission and we get him to give us some names, and we pick one, the best one we've got, send him out there to run the damn war, and he gets where he [Lodge] won't speak to the Deputy Chief of Mission. 

Then we get General Harkins out there, we thought he was a pretty good man, and he gets where he can't work with him. So we send Westmoreland out there. It's just a hell of a mess. 

You can't do anything with Lodge, and that is where McNamara gets so frustrated. They go out and get agreements and issue orders, and sends his stuff in there, and then Lodge takes charge of it himself, and he is not a take-charge man. And he just gets stacked up. 

Russell: He never has followed anything through to a conclusion since I've known him, and I've known him for 20 odd years. He never has. I went out with him around the world in '43, the only committee that went out during the war, we went everywhere. And Lodge was on there, he's a bright fellow, intelligent fellow, but he is not a man that persists. 

And he thinks he is dealing with barbarian tribes out there, and that he's the emperor, and he is going to tell them what to do. And there isn't any doubt in my mind that he had old Diem killed out there, himself, so he could. 

Johnson: That was a tragic mistake. 

Russell: Oh, it was horrible, awful. 

Johnson: And we've lost ever since. 

Russell: You have to go get someone that's more pliant than Lodge, that would do exactly as he said right quick. He's living up on cloud nine, it's a bad mistake. I don't know but the best thing you could do is ask Lodge if he don't think it's about time that he coming home? 

Johnson: Well, he'd be home campaigning against us on this issue every day. 

Russell: Well, God Almighty, he's goin' to come back anyway, when time comes. I'd give him a reason for doing it. He is going to come back. If you bring him back now, everybody going to say, "hell, he's coming back cause Johnson removed him from out there." 

MacArthur with all his power couldn't hurt Truman because everybody would said, well, hell, he just mad cause he got removed, though millions sympathized with him in it. And you needn't worry. Lodge will be in here, in my judgment, he'll be on that ticket some way. 

I don't think they'll nominate him for President, but they may put him on there for Vice President. But whether they do or don't, he'll be back here campaigning before that campaign's over. 

I don't know, I best take that back. This thing is so hopeless for the Republicans. He has certainly got enough critical sense to know that and not get his head chopped off. It would be foolish. 

Johnson: Has Clay got any judgment on a thing like this? 

Russell: Yeah, he has, even though he inclined . . . 

Johnson: He's off in another part of the world, mostly, isn't he. 

Russell: I think Clay knows. I'd take his judgment on most anything if he separates himself from his predilections. And he don't have any out there in that part of the world. 

I think that people generally have a good deal of respect for Clay's judgment too. And there's a great deal of affection and respect for old man Bradley, he's not in his dotage yet by a hell of a lot. I had him up here the other day getting some advice on some matters and I found him very alert. He's so humble, I don't know, he could tend to be a doormat for Lodge out there. 

But he's an intelligent man. Now Clay wouldn't. Clay would stand up to anybody if he felt he had support from high up places. 

I just don't know, it's a tragic situation, it's one of those places were you just can't win. Anything you do is wrong. 

Johnson: Well, think about it and call me. 

Russell: All right, sir. I have thought about it and worried about it and prayed about it. 

Source: U.S., Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Washington, DC, Document Number 52

(Original Source: Johnson Library, Recording and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between the President and Russell, Tape F64.27, Side B PNO 121 and F 64.28, Side A PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)

Russell: And he thinks he is dealing with barbarian tribes out there, and that he's the emperor, and he is going to tell them what to do. 

And there isn't any doubt in my mind that he had old Diem killed out there, himself, so he could. 

Johnson: That was a tragic mistake. 

Russell: Oh, it was horrible, awful. 

Johnson: And we've lost ever since. 

Trouble Brewing.

Johnson: How important is it to us? 

Russell: It isn't important a damn bit for all this new missile stuff. 

Johnson: I guess it is important. 

Russell: From a psychological standpoint. 

Johnson: I mean, yes, and from the standpoint that we are a party to a treaty. And if we don't pay any attention to this treaty I don't guess that they think paying attention to any of them. 

Russell: Yeah, but we are the only ones paying attention to it. 

Johnson: Yeah, I think that is right. 

Russell: You see the other people are just as bound to that treaty as we are. 

Johnson: Yes, that's right. 

Russell: I think there are some twelve or fourteen other countries. 

Johnson: That's right. Yeah, there are fourteen of them. 

Russell: I don't know much about the foreign policy but it seems to me that there were several of them that were parties to it. 

And other than the question of our word and saving face, that's the reason that I said that I don't think that anybody would expect us to stay in there. 

Some old freebooter down in there, I've forgotten his name, I haven't heard about him lately, but he is still there, sort of a hellraiser and he don't know exactly what he wants, but I think he is the most dangerous thing to the present regime. I think that if he were to take over, he would ask us to get out. 

And, of course, if he did, with our theory of standing by self-determination of people, I don't think how we could say we not going to go if he is in charge of the government. 

It's going to be a headache to anybody that tries to fool with it. You've got all the brains in the country, Mr. President, you better get a hold of them. I don't know what to do about this. 

I saw it all coming on, but that don't do any good now, that's water over the dam and under the bridge. And we are there.

Richard Russell was racist (as was Johnson) and as conservative and stubborn as all Hell.

But he was an extremely bright guy, even in his 70s, that's why he was President Johnson's first phone call and an most trusted (Southern) advisor.

And everything from my research, and the research of many, many who have come before me leads be to conclude that Russell's analysis was absolutely dead on the money.

I have seen people excerpting another LBJ phone all out-of context where Johnson says "we (meaning America) took out Diem in '63", to suggest that he did it, he planned it and he wanted it (because he's so cold-blooded and stuff).

Nonsense. I have all meetings tapes made prior to and during the November 2nd Coup weekend and LBJ wasn't in on even one of the meetings.

The one constant unknown variable at all stages of the pre-coup was that of everyone in the room (Colby was briefing Jack, Bobby, McNamarra, Helms, Bundy, Maxwell Taylor and others), between the lot of them, they had absolutely no clue what Lodge was up to or what his intentions were, because he was running his own policy out there.