The New York Times, October 3, 1963
In the Nation
"The Intra-Administration War in Vietnam"
by Arthur Krock
WASHINGTON, Oct 2
The Central Intelligence Agency is getting a very bad
press in dispatches from Vietnam to American newspapers and in articles
originating in Washington. Like the Supreme Court when under fire, the C. I.
A. cannot defend itself in public retorts to criticisms of its activities as
they occur.
But, unlike the Supreme Court, the C. I. A. has no open record of
its activities on which the public can base a judgment of the validity of the
criticisms. Also, the agency is precluded from using the indirect defensive
tactic which is constantly employed by all other Government units under
critical fire.
This tactic is to give information to the press, under a seal of
confidence, that challenges or rebuts the critics.
But the C. I. A. cannot
father such inspired articles, because to do so would require some disclosure
of its activities. And not only does the effectiveness of the agency depend
on the secrecy of its operations. Every President since the C. I. A. was
created has protected this secrecy from claimants Congress or the public
through the press, for examples of the right to share any part of it.
With High Frequency
This Presidential policy has not, however, always restrained other
executive units from going confidentially to the press with attacks on C. I.
A. operations in their common field of responsibility. And usually it has
been possible to deduce these operational details from the nature of the
attacks.
But the peak of the practice has recently been reached in Vietnam
and in Washington. This is revealed almost every day now in dispatches from
reporters in close touch with intra-Administration critics of the C. I. A.
ñ with excellent reputations for reliability.
One reporter in this category is Richard Starnes of the Scripps-Howard
newspapers.
Today, under a Saigon dateline, he related that, "ACCORDING TO A
HIGH UNITED STATES SOURCE HERE, TWICE THE C. I. A. FLATLY REFUSED TO CARRY
OUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE [AND] IN ONE INSTANCE
FRUSTRATED A PLAN OF ACTION MR. LODGE BROUGHT FROM WASHINGTON BECAUSE THE
AGENCY DISAGREED WITH IT." [My emphasis].
Among the views attributed to
United States officials on the scene, including one described as a "very high
American official who has spent much of his life in the service of
democracy" are the following:
THE C. I. A.'S GROWTH WAS "LIKENED TO A MALIGNANCY" WHICH THE "VERY HIGH
OFFICIAL WAS NOT SURE EVEN THE WHITE HOUSE COULD CONTROL ANY LONGER."
"IF THE
UNITED STATES EVER EXPERIENCES [AN ATTEMPT AT A COUP TO OVERTHROW THE
GOVERNMENT] IT WILL COME FROM THE C. I. A. AND NOT THE PENTAGON."
THE AGENCY
"REPRESENTS A TREMENDOUS POWER AND TOTAL UNACCOUNTABILITY TO ANYONE."
Disorderly Government
WHATEVER ELSE THESE PASSAGES DISCLOSE, THEY MOST CERTAINLY ESTABLISH THAT
REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCHES HAVE EXPANDED THEIR WAR AGAINST
THE C. I. A. FROM THE INNER GOVERNMENT COUNCILS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VIA
THE PRESS.
And published simultaneously are details of the
agencyís operations in Vietnam that can come only from the same critical
official sources. This is disorderly government. And the longer the President
tolerates it the period already is considerable the greater will grow its
potential of hampering the real war against the Vietcong and the impression
of a very indecisive Administration in Washington.
The C. I. A. may be guilty as charged.
Since it cannot, or at any rate will
not, openly defend its record in Vietnam, or defend it by the same
confidential press "briefings" employed by its critics, the public is not in
a position to judge.
Nor is this department, which sought and failed to get
even the outlines of the agencyís case in rebuttal. But Mr. Kennedy will have
to make judgment if the spectacle of war within the Executive branch is to be
ended and the effective functioning of the C. I. A. preserved.
And when he
makes this judgment, hopefully he also will make it public, as the appraisal
of fault on which it is based.
Doubtless recommendations as to what his judgment should be were made to
him today by Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on their return
from their fact-finding expedition into the embattled official jungle in
Saigon.
This is the article that Mark Lane contends documents the war between Kennedy and the CIA quite well and predicts a possible coup from them. The agency was receiving frequent and methodical attacks from within the executive branch. I cannot imagine them taking that peacefully.
Mr. Krock was a close friend to Mr. Kennedy and his father and Lane often
states that he believes that the high government official quoted was the
President, himself.
Copy furnished:
We recommend that:1. General Harkins review with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes as:a. A further shift of military emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).b. An increase in the military tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions are ended.c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.d. The expansion of personnel in combat units to full authorized strength.e. The training and arming of hamlet militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.f. A consolidation of the strategic hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.2. A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.3. In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.[emphasis added]
Introduction to National Security Action Memorandum Number 273
By Greg Burnham
Part One: “The DRAFT”
Perhaps the most powerful evidence indicating that select Senior Administration Officials and Senior Military personnel may have had foreknowledge of the plot to assassinate the 35th President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is found in the DRAFT of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) Number 273. There are several smoking guns, but the one that initially stands out as the most obvious is the date of the DRAFT, which was subsequently signed by McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security. The DRAFT was written and dated November 21st, 1963 less than 24 hours before the assassination. It was ostensibly the result of the meetings that took place the previous day at the Honolulu Conference. The text of the DRAFT of NSAM 273:
11/21/63
DRAFTTOP SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. __________
The President has reviewed the discussions of South Vietnam which occurred in Honolulu, and has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge. He directs that the following guidance be issued to all concerned:
1. It remains the central object of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy. The test of all decisions and U.S. actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.
2. The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963.
3. It is a major interest of the United States Government that the present provisional government of South Vietnam should be assisted in consolidating itself and in holding and developing increased public support. All U.S. officers should conduct themselves with this objective in view.
4. It is of the highest importance that the United States Government avoid either the appearance or the reality of public recrimination from one part of it against another, and the President expects that all senior officers of the Government will take energetic steps to insure that they and their subordinates go out of their way to maintain and to defend the unity of the United States Government both here and in the field.
More specifically, the President approves the following lines of action developed in the discussions of the Honolulu meeting of November 20. The office or offices of the Government to which central responsibility is assigned is indicated in each case.
5. We should concentrate our own efforts, and insofar as possible we should persuade the Government of South Vietnam to concentrate its efforts, on the critical situation in the Mekong Delta. This concentration should include not only military but political, economic, social, educational and informational effort. We should seek to turn the tide not only of battle but of belief, and we should seek to increase not only our control of land, but the productivity of this area wherever the proceeds can be held for the advantage of anti-Communist forces.
(Action: The whole country team under the direct supervision of the Ambassador.)
6. Programs of military and economic assistance should be maintained at such levels that their magnitude and effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese Government do not fall below the levels sustained by the United States in the time of the Diem Government. This does not exclude arrangements for economy on the MAP account with respect to accounting for ammunition and any other readjustments which are possible as between MAP and other U.S. defense resources. Special attention should be given to the expansion of the import distribution and effective use of fertilizer for the Delta.
(Action: AID and DOD as appropriate.)
7. With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in the field of action.
(Action: DOD and CIA)
8. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed for military operations up to a line up to 50 kilometers inside Laos, together with political plans for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should provide an alternative method of political liaison for such operations, since their timing and character can have an intimate relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos.
(Action: State, DOD and CIA.)
9. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for South Vietnam, and it is therefore urgent that we should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon that country. In particular, measures should be undertaken to satisfy ourselves completely that recent charges from Cambodia are groundless, and we should put ourselves in position to offer to the Cambodians a full opportunity to satisfy themselves on this same point.
(Action: State)
10. In connection with paragraphs 7 and 8 above, it is desired that we should develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. In short, we need a more contemporary version of the Jordan Report, as powerful and complete as possible.
(Action: Department of State with other agencies as necessary.)McGeorge Bundy
No comments:
Post a Comment