Sunday, 8 September 2013

From PsyOp to Mind War: Snowden, Assange, Greenwald and Blagojevich

Remember - Daniel Ellsberg worked for Henry Kissinger.

"Total imagery control of any terrain is a primary sector of modern warfare"
- US Navy Website

Excerpt from September Clues, highlighting the fact that every single "amateur video" of the second planstrike on 9/11 was provided and supplied by photographic or special effects professionals or digital retouch artists working within the coorporate media.

from Spike1138 on Vimeo.

", in fact, the strategy to which tactical warfare must conform if it is to achieve maximum effectiveness.

The MindWar scenario must be preeminent in the mind of the commander and must be the principal factor in his every field decision.

Otherwise he sacrifices measures which actually contribute to winning the war to measures of immediate, tangible satisfaction. (Consider the rational for 'body counts' in Vietnam).

"In its strategic context, MindWar must reach out to friends, enemies, and neutrals alike across the globe -- neither through primitive "battlefield" leaflets and loudspeakers of PSYOP nor through the weak, imprecise, and narrow effort of psychotronics - but through the media possessed by the United States which have the capabilities to reach virtually all people on the face of the Earth.

These media are, of course, the electronic media -- television and radio. State of the art developments in satellite communication, video recording techniques, and laser and optical transmission of broadcasts made possible a penetration of the minds of the worlds such as would have been inconceivable just a few years ago. 

Like the sword Excalibur, we have but to reach out and seize this tool; and it can transform the world for us if we have the courage and the integrity to civilization with it. If we do not accept Excalibur, then we relinquish our ability to inspire foreign cultures with our morality. If they then desire moralities unsatisfactory to us, we have no choice but to fight them on a more brutish level...

Unlike PSYOP, MindWar has nothing to do with deception or even with 'selected' -- and therefore misleading -- truth. Rather it states a whole truth that, if it does not now exist, will be forced into existence by the will of the United States. The examples of Kennedy's ultimatum to Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hitler's stance at Munich might be cited.

A MindWar message does not have to fit conditions of abstract credibility as do PSYOP there; its source makes it credible.

As Livy once said: 'The terror of the Roman name will be such that the world shall know that, once a Roman army had laid siege to a city, nothing will move it -- not the rigors or winter nor the weariness of months and years -- that it knows no end but victory and is ready, in a swift and sudden stroke will not serve, to preserve until that victory is achieved.'

"For the mind to believe in its own decisions, it must feel that it made those decisions without coercion. Coercive measures used by the operative, consequently, must not be detectable by ordinary means.

There is no need to resort to mind-weakening drugs such as those explored by the CIA; in fact the exposure of a single such method would do unacceptable damage to MindWar's reputation for truth.

Existing PSYOP identifies purely-sociological factors which suggest appropriate idioms for messages. Doctrine in this area is highly developed, and the task is basically one of assembling and maintaining individuals and teams with enough expertise and experience to apply the doctrine effectively.

This, however, is only the sociological dimension of target receptiveness measures.

There are some purely natural conditions under which minds may become more or less receptive to ideas, and MindWar should take full advantage of such phenomena as atmospheric electromagnetic activity (12), air ionization (13), and extremely low frequency waves (14).

from Spike1138 on Vimeo.

"MacArthur believes it would be a mistake to fight in Laos. It would suit the Chinese Communists whom he feels we should have destroyed at the time of the Korean War. 

He thinks we should fight a rear-guard action in the southeast of Asia. 

He does not feel we should interviene at this time in Cuba because it does not represent a military danger to us although the time may come when we may have to do so. 

He thinks our line should be Japan, Formosa, and the Phillipines. 

He feels it important that we take the initiative with regard to peace with the Russians as they always make us appear to be the aggressor.

He said that the "chickens are coming home to roost" from Eisenhower's years and I live in the chicken coup....

that Eisenhower should have done something about Cuba sooner."

President Kennedy seeks counsel from General Douglas A. MacArthur
First hand witness to the folly of the Guns of August, 1914
Recorded August 16, 1962, White House Oval Office.

John Kennedy defended the CIA from criticism and said they were doing a good job, 3 days after leaking to the New York Times that the agency was out out of control and perusing an independent Agency foreign policy in Vietnam refusing to carry out his orders "because the agency disagreed with them".

He likened the growth of the CIA "to a malignancy", and he said "if ever there is a coup in this country to seize control of the government of the United States, it will come from the CIA".

He said that on October 3rd 1963. Politicians lie to the public because they have to. Saying you're going to attack Syria DOES NOT mean you have any intention of EVER attacking Syria over a transparent false flag perpetrated by Petraeus' Sunni Death Squads.

The alternative is to assemble the White House press room and declare 

"The Syrian Rebels are Petreaus' Sunni Death Squads from the Iraq Insurgency, 2005-2009 - only, no one bothered to inform me if that before recommending that we begin arming and supplying them, it's a human rights disaster and I want us out of it, right now."

Who was Director of the CIA for much of that period of escalation.... Oh yes...

According to Michael Hastings, the Pentagon have 25,000 full time PR staff crafting the message of the War on Terror.

They influence the President's decision making, and they have PsyOps units deployed in Afghanistan to stage events for visiting Senators to install the need for more troops, and more funding.

That's completely illegal. But that's exactly how they got Frank Church and Congressman Pike, as well.

Hastings wrote a second Rolling Stone article "Another Runaway General" all about CENTCOM running PsyOps on visiting Members of Congress.

Hands up how many people have read it...?

  • Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.

    Sorros, Open Societies, the "Whistleblowers" and Anonymous

    . . . Mr. [Vaughn] Smith set up Frontline by borrowing £3 million ($5.7 million) against his family’s estate in Norfolk, England, and has received financing for its events from the Open Society Institute, a philanthropic organization set up by the billionaire investor and philanthropist George Soros. Though Frontline has yet to break even, Mr. Smith is weighing the possibility of opening a club in New York or Washington, perhaps with a local business partner. . . .
    5. The relationship between Assange and the Frontline Club is detailed in a Guardian article.
    There has been mounting disquiet among some members of the Frontline Club over the relationship forged between its founder, Vaughan Smith, and Julian Assange  of WikiLeaks.
    Now Smith has invited concerned members to an “open forum” tomorrow evening to discuss the issue. It will begin with a conversation between Smith and John Owen, chairman of the club’s board of trustees.
    Smith will explain the decision-making process behind the club’s involvement with Assange. He spent two months working from the club before his arrest in early December. He is facing extradition to Sweden.
    When Assange was refused bail because he had no fixed abode, Smith offered his home in Norfolk as an address in order to secure bail for Assange. He has been staying there since being released. . . .
    6. There are indications that WikiLeaks had intended to enlist the support of Soros all along.
    . . .  Operating a Web site to post leaked documents isn’t very expensive (Young estimates he spends a little over $100 a month for Cryptome’s server space). So when other Wikileaks founders started to talk about the need to raise $5 million and complained that an initial round of publicity had affected “our delicate negotiations with the Open Society Institute and other funding bodies,” Young says, he resigned from the effort. . . .

    Federal law prohibits the military from using propaganda and psychological tactics on U.S. citizens, but that is exactly what may have happened in Afghanistan, according to reporter Michael Hastings, who joins us to speak about his recent exposé for Rolling Stone magazine, "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on U.S. Senators."

    In the article, Hastings writes that Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, the commander of NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, illegally employed psychological operations to manipulate visiting U.S. senators into providing more troops and funding for the war effort.

    “It just shows how far off the rails that entire operation has gone,” Hasting says. “The most important battlefield actually isn’t in Afghanistan, it’s in Washington.”

    JUAN GONZALEZ: Federal law prohibits the military from using propaganda and psychological tactics on U.S. citizens, but that is exactly what may have happened in Afghanistan, according to reporter Michael Hastings. His most recent exposé for Rolling Stone magazine is called "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-ops on U.S. Senators." In the article, Hastings writes that Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the commander of NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, illegally employed psychological operations to manipulate visiting American senators into providing more troops and funding for the war effort.

    According to the article, a military cell devoted to what is known as "information operations" was repeatedly pressured to target visiting senators and other VIPs who met with Caldwell. Hastings says the campaign targeted a variety of policymakers, including Senators John McCain, Joe Lieberman, Jack Reed, Al Franken and Carl Levin.

    AMY GOODMAN: Although the military has denied Hastings’s allegations, the U.S. command in Afghanistan issued a statement saying General David Petraeus is "preparing to order an investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the issue." Last month, Hastings won the George Polk Award for his article in Rolling Stone last year that led to the dismissal of former NATO commander U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal.

    Michael Hastings is joining us now from Washington, D.C.

    Michael, thank you so much for taking the time from writing your book to do this. Just lay out what you found.

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: No problem. Thanks for having me.

    Well, essentially, what we have here is that an information operations cell, which is a cell that, by definition, is trained to conduct psychological operations and military deception, was asked by Lieutenant General Caldwell and his staff to use their skills on visiting U.S. senators and other VIPs. Now, the cell, this IO cell, was led by a gentleman named Lieutenant Colonel Michael Holmes. Lieutenant Colonel Holmes raised objections to being asked to do this. He said, "Hey, I’m an IO cell. Information operations is only supposed to be used for foreign audiences. It’s a really bad idea to be using my team, because we specialize in psychological operations and whatnot, to be doing this." But the pressure kept on mounting on him to, you know, focus all his efforts not on the Afghans, but on Americans visiting. Finally, he received a written order to this effect: you know, focus all your efforts on essentially manipulating visiting senators.

    He then took that order and went to a lawyer, a JAG lawyer. The lawyer said, "Yes, this is not right. This is illegal." Another lawyer confirmed that opinion. And then Caldwell’s people refined the order to say, "Oh, well, you’re only looking at public records," but then they launched a retaliatory investigation into the whistleblower, Colonel Michael Holmes. And after, he sort of, over a period of months, tried to get his complaints redressed and said, "Hey, I was attacked because I’m a whistleblower. I was investigated because I’m a whistleblower." That also had no impact, and so eventually he decided to go public with his story.

    AMY GOODMAN: Explain what psy-ops are.

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: Sure. Psychological operations and information operations are essentially just ways to influence the population. Now, the key is, is that for IO and psy-ops you’re only supposed to do those on foreign populations, on the enemy. Now, there’s another branch, public affairs, which is — which you’re allowed to then use your information on the American population. The key difference is, is that in information operations and in psy-ops you’re allowed to lie, you’re allowed to mislead, where in public affairs, in theory, at least, you’re not supposed to do that. And by using information operations with — who know how to conduct psychological operations, in the process that would traditionally be held for public affairs, you’re corrupting the entire process. And, you know, one of the interesting things has been to see the reaction from the military.

    Of course, I commend General Petraeus for launching an investigation, but what we also know from a series of anonymous leaks is that the military doesn’t think they’ve done anything wrong here. And that, to me, is truly disturbing and what the actual bigger story is: this very aggressive effort that called what has been at the forefront from to tear down the wall between information and propaganda between public affairs and information operations, to say it’s one giant playing field now and to allow the Pentagon and the military to be able to target not just foreign populations with their propaganda, but target the U.S. populations, whether it’s on Facebook, on social networking sites, or visiting congressmen.

    JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, Michael, your article also indicates that the team was directed to also target Admiral Mike Mullen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


    JUAN GONZALEZ: So, in essence, General Caldwell was trying to do propaganda against one of his bosses.

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: Sure, sure. I mean, I think the way to look at it is that, you know, they’re asked to — why are they being asked to focus on visiting American dignitaries over what their mission is supposed to be, which is focus on the Afghan population and the Taliban? And I think it just shows how far — A, how far off the rails that entire operation has gone, but also the acknowledgment that the most important issue in this war, the most important battlefield in this war, actually isn’t in Afghanistan, it’s in Washington. And by spinning, manipulating and using whatever resources you have to convince the policymakers in Washington, be it Admiral Mullen or Al Franken, that’s where you want to devote your resources to. And that, to me, again, is very troubling.

    AMY GOODMAN: Michael Hastings, can you talk about how this fits into the overall issue of the military pushing for 20,000 troops to remain in Iraq beyond the December 2011 withdrawal deadline —


    AMY GOODMAN: — the modest expectations for the July troop drawdown in Afghanistan, how this fits into the catastrophe that is unfolding every day in Afghanistan? I mean, Karzai and Petraeus, starkly different accounts of incidents of Afghan civilian casualties, the response to Tuesday’s attack in which NATO helicopter gunships killed nine young boys.

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: Sure. I mean, clearly, clearly, Afghanistan has gone off the rails, and went off the rails a while ago. And there’s so little they can actually do to influence the battlefield. I mean, they are doing some things. They’re upping their special forces operations. They’re upping air strikes. They’re doing all these kinds of things. But the key is, is to shape the perceptions of Americans back home. I mean, and the point you made about Iraq, right. I mean, I had a — I interviewed a general almost a year ago actually to this day in Baghdad, General Odierno, and I asked him this question: I said, "How many troops are going to be left in Iraq after December 2011?" And he said — he said, "Zero." And I said, "No, you’re kidding me. There’s going to be some more than that." He said, "Well, the most significant would be, you know, 2,000 or 3,000." And here we are a year later, they’re already trying to get 20,000 more troops to stay there.

    So, I think how it all fits in is how this war is being sold. I mean, we have to remember that the Pentagon, God bless them, has about a billion dollars a year to spend on all their sorts of information operations, and they have a lot of allies in the media who are willing to sort of help them sell that story for a variety of reasons. So, I think, whether it’s the civilian casualties, whether it’s this sort of arguing — you know, butting heads of Petraeus and Karzai, to what’s going on in Iraq, there is a huge effort to keep these wars going for as long as they can. And I know that sounds sort of radical, but the evidence speaks for itself.

    JUAN GONZALEZ: Michael, we just have a little more — we just have a little more time. Your piece has drawn intense criticism. Andrew Exum of the Center for New American Security wrote, "Essentially Michael Hastings is doing bad think tank policy analysis with a little character assassination thrown in for extra measure." Your response?

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: Well, if I’m doing bad think tank analysis, they should hire me at the Center for New American Security. But, you know, look, I mean, I don’t see —- I’m not interested in getting into sort of these media-on-media fights. The same thing happened with my story on General McChrystal. The same thing happened with a story I did a couple weeks ago on Afghanistan, as well. I would just say that there’s -—

    AMY GOODMAN: Five seconds.

    MICHAEL HASTINGS: People with vested interest in continuing these wars are going to be critical of the type of work we’re doing at Rolling Stone.

    "With this brief insight into the surrounding areas, I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one, as we -- as I said, proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. 

    Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

    This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy.

    Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

    While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

    Apart from the military need, as I saw It, to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary: 

    first the intensification of our economic blockade against China; 

    two the imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast; 

    three removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria; 

    four removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

    For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    I called for reinforcements but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese Force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

    We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and in an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized its full military potential. I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

    Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I was a warmonger. 

    Nothing could be further from the truth. 

    I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. 

    I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. 

    Indeed, on the second day of September, nineteen hundred and forty-five, just following the surrender of the Japanese nation on the Battleship Missouri, I formally cautioned as follows:
    Men since the beginning of time have sought peace. Various methods through the ages have been attempted to devise an international process to prevent or settle disputes between nations. From the very start workable methods were found in so far as individual citizens were concerned, but the mechanics of an instrumentality of larger international scope have never been successful. Military alliances, balances of power, Leagues of Nations, all in turn failed, leaving the only path to be by way of the crucible of war. The utter  destructiveness of war now blocks out this alternative. We have had our last chance. If we will not devise some greater and more equitable system, Armageddon will be at our door. The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with our almost matchless advances in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past 2000 years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.
    But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end.

    War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

    In war there is no substitute for victory.

    There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

    "Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

    Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. 

    Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. 

    Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

    The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

    Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description.

    They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: 

    "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

    I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

    It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.

    Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

    I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams havelong since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

    3000 people DID NOT die on 9/11/2001

    As told from the Diaries of Alistair Campbell, Tony Blair's Press Secretary

    "To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."

    - Robert H. Jackson

    - Chief Prosecutor, Nuremberg, 1946

    Err.... No, it isn't...

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