The Intentional Fallacy

“The New Critics, rather level-headedly at first, 

sought to dethrone The Author 

by attacking what they called “The Intentional Fallacy.” 

Writers are sometimes wrong about what their texts mean, or sometimes have no idea what they really mean. Sometimes The Text’s meaning even changes for The Writer. 

It doesn’t matter what The Writer means, basically, for The New Critics; 

it matters only what The Text says. 

This critical overthrow of creative intent set the stage for the poststructural show that opened a couple decades later. The deconstructionists (“deconstructionist” and “poststructuralist” mean the same thing, by the way : “poststructuralist” is what you call a deconstructionist who doesn’t want to be called a deconstructionist), explicitly following Husserl and Brentano and Heidegger the same way The New Critics had co-opted Hegel, see the debate over the ownership of meaning as a skirmish in a larger war in Western philosophy over the idea that presence and unity are ontologically prior to expression. There’s been this longstanding deluded presumption, they think, that if there is an utterance then there must exist a unified, efficacious presence that causes and owns that utterance. The poststructuralists attack what they see as a post-Platonic prejudice in favour of Presence over Absence and Speech over Writing. 

We tend to trust Speech over Writing because of the immediacy of The Speaker : he’s right there, and we can grab him by the lapels and look into his face and figure out just exactly what one single thing he means. But the reason why the poststructuralists are in the Literary Theory business at all is that they see Writing, not Speech, as more faithful to the metaphysics of True Expression. 

For Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault, Writing is a better animal than Speech because it is iterable; it is iterable because it is abstract; and it is abstract because it is a function not of presence but of absence : The Reader’s absent when The Writer’s writing, and The Writer’s absent when The Reader’s reading. For The Deconstructionist, then, a writer’s circumstances and intentions are indeed a part of the “context” of a text, but context imposes no real cinctures on The Text’s meaning, because Meaning in Language requires a cultivation of Absence rather than Presence, involves not the imposition but the erasure of consciousness. This is so because these guys — Derrida following Heidegger and Barthes Mallarmé and Foucault God knows who — see Literary Language as not a tool but an environment. 

A Writer does not wield Language; he is subsumed in it. 

Language Speaks Us; Writing Writes; etc. 

Hix makes little mention of Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought or Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy, where all this stuff is set out most clearly, but he does quote enough Barthes — “To Write is… to reach that point where only Language acts, performs,’ and not Me’”— so you get the idea that author-as-owner is not just superfluous but contradictory, and enough Foucault — “The Writing of Our Day has freed itself from the necessity of ‘expression’; [it is] an Interplay of Signs, regulated less by The Content it signifies than by the very nature of The Signifier”— so you can see that even The New Critics’ Holy Text disappears as the unitary lodestone of Meaning and Value. 

For Hix’s Teachers, trying to attribute Writing’s meaning to a static Text 

or a Human author is like trying to knit Your Own Body, Your Own Needles. 

Hix has an even better sartorial image: “Previously, The Text was a cloth to be unraveled by The Reader; if the cloth were unwound all the way, The Reader would find The Author holding the other end. 

But Barthes makes The Text a shroud, and no one, not even a corpse, is holding the other end.”