The Puebelo Incident from Spike EP on Vimeo.
Note :
USS Liberty and USS Pueblo were not US Navy Vessels under the command of the President and the Secretary of the Navy;
They were NSA Vessels operated by a US Navy crew, under the chain of command reporting ultimately to the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms - it's entirely likely in both cases, President Johnson, Secretary McNamarra and most of the Navy and Pentagon Brass (other than CIA Moles and Bad Insiders) had no inkling where they were or what they were doing prior to their coming under attack in either instance.
"The first operational mission for USS PUEBLO was conceived and tasked by the US Naval Security Group Command. The ship's first mission was to be a period primarily for testing. With no current information available on hostile activities by North Korean forces, the officer in charge at US CINCPACFLT assigned the mission a risk assessment (*see note 1 at bottom of page)
All attempts by Capt. Bucher to upgrade the assessment to hazardous were - denied.
Like USS LIBERTY AGTR-5, USS PUEBLO operated under the assumption that help would be provided if needed. US 7th Fleet, US Forces Korea and US 5th Air Force headquaters, Fuchu, Japan, among others were informed of PUEBLO’s mission. Because of that minimal risk assessment, the US Navy made no specific requests for support. The tasking for similar USS BANNER missions had also been rated minimal, but fighter aircraft were made available on a strip alert status and two US Navy destroyers maintained station within 50 miles of BANNER on some missions. When 5th Air Force Japan personnel questioned the lack of a request for strip alert status for PUEBLO’s mission, they were verbally informed by Commander Naval Forces Japan headquarters that it would not be needed. In addition to the lack of ready protection, the US Navy maintained the same communications procedures and methods for the PUEBLO mission as LIBERTY had operated under during her fateful mission of June 1967. The ships's inability to establish reliable communications with a higher command authority would be a repeat of the problems that contributed to the lack of help for LIBERTY. Unfortunately, it appears nothing was learned from the LIBERTY incident.
18 December 1967 0752Z
Sailing Orders
(Declassified 12 September 1968)
SECRET
PRIORITY
P 050512Z JAN 68
FM CTF NINE SIX
TO USS PUEBLO
INFO AIG SEVEN SIX TWO TWO
COMSERVGRU THREE
DIRNSA
DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
COMUSKOREA
COMNAVFORKOREA LIMDIS NOFORN
PACOMELINT CENTER
SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN
A. CTF 96 OPORD 301-68 NOTAL
B. PACOM ELINT CENTEER 210734Z DEC 67 PASEP NOTAL
C. CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24A
D. CINCPACFLTINST 03100.3D
1. ICHTYIC ONE FORMERLY PINKROOT ONE
2. DEPART SASEBO JAPAN WHEN RFS ABOUT 8 JAN 68. CHECK OUT OF MOVREP SYSTEM AND PROCEED VIA TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO ARRIVE OPAREA MARS ABOUT 10 JAN.
3. ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY SOVIET NAVAL UNITS WHILE PROCEEDING TO OPAREA MARS.
4. UPON ARRIVAL MARS, CONDUCT ICHTHYIC OPS IAW PROVISIONS REF A.
A. OPERATE OPAREAS MARS, VENUS AND PLUTO, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS IN AREA(S) WHICH APPEAR MOST LUCRATIVE.
B. DEPART OPAREAS 27 JAN AND IF NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE MAINTAIN STRICT EMCON CONDITION. PROCEED SOUTH ALONG KOREAN COAST TO VICINITY TSUSHIMA STRAITS.
C. INTERCEPT AND CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET NASHIMA STRAITS.
D. TERMINATE SURVEILLANCE TO ARRIVE SASEBO 4 FEB 68. EARLIER DEPARTURE AUTHORIZED TO ENSURE TEN PERCENT ON-BOARD FUEL UPON ARRIVAL SASEBO.
5. OPAREAS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
A. EAST/WEST BOUNDARIES ALL AREAS ARE CONTIGUOUS TO KORCOM AST EXTENDING FROM THIRTEEN NM CPA TO LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDE EAWRDO SIXTY NM.
B. NORTHSOUTH BOUNDARIES ARE:
MARS. 40-00N4 TO 39-00N2;
VENUS. 41-00N5 TO 40-00N4;
PLUTO. 42-00N6 TO 41-00N5.
6. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
A. COLLECT ELINT IAW PROVISIONS REF B, ON NOT TO INTERFERE BASIS WITH BASIC MISSION.
B. CPA TO KORCOM/SOVIET LAND MASS/OFF-SHORE ISLANDS WILL BE THIRTEEN NM.
C. UPON ESTABLISHING FIRM CONTACT WITH SOVIET NAVAL UNITS, BREAK EMCON AND TRANSMIT DAILY SITREP.
D. OPERATE AT LEAST FIVE HUNDRED YDS FROM SOVIET UNITS EXCEPT TO CLOSE BRIEFLY TO TWO HUNDRED YDS AS NECESSARY FOR VISUAL/PHOTO COVERAGE.
E. DO NOT INTERFERE WITH SOVIET EXERCISES BUT MAINTAIN A POSITION ON THE PERIPHERY FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES.
F. IF UNABLE TO ESTABLISH OR GAIN CONTACT WITH SOVIET UNITS WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS ARRIVAL TSUSHIMA STRAITS AREA, ADVISE ORIG. IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.
G. PROVISIONS REF
APPLYING RELIDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
IF D APPLIES REGARDING CONDUCT IN EVENT OF HARASSMENT OR INTIMIDATION BY FOREIGH UNITS.
H. INJOLLED DEFENSIVE ARMAMENT SHOULD BE STOWED OR COVERED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO NOT ELICIT UNUSUAL INTEREST FROM SURVEYING/SURVEYED UNIT(S). EMPLOY ONLY IN CASES WHERE THREAT TO SURVIVAL IS OBVIOUS.
GP-3
LIMDIS
Provided by Ralph McClintock
Chronology of the North Korean capture and detention of the U. S. intelligence ship Pueblo and her crew: (Philadelphia Enquirer, December 23, 1968)
Jan. 23--Four North Korean patrol boats capture the Pueblo in the Sea of Japan off North Korea's eastern coast. U. S. officials describe incident as "a matter of the utmost gravity" and insist ship was 25 miles off coast.
Jan. 24--Secretary of State Rusk describes seizure as "in the category of . . . an act of war" and warns the North Koreans to cool it." North Korean radio broadcasts an alleged confession by Pueblo Capt. Bucher that he deliberately violated North Korean waters.
Jan. 25--President Johnson orders 14,787 Air Force and Navy. reservists to active duty and announces American military forces in and around South Korea will be strengthened.
Jan. 26-UN Security Council meets on Pueblo crisis but finds no solution.
Feb. 6--The United States withdraws the carrier Enterprise from the position it had taken near the North Korean port of Wonson.
Feb. 12--North Korean radio reports Bucher makes second "confession" of violating North Korean waters.
March 4--President Johnson receives an open letter purported to be from Pueblo crewmen asking United States to frankly admit the vessel had violated North Korean territory.
March 22--April 2-North Korea circulates series of letters allegedly written by captive men and warns United States failure to apologize could cost lives of crew.
June19--State Department discloses talks on crew release make no progress.
Sept. 13--Japanese newspapers report news conference at Pyongyang at which crewmen allegedly said they had been ordered to intrude in the three-mile limit.
Dec. 19--Congressional sources in Washington say agreement reached for crew release.
Dec. 22-State Department announces crew to be released Sunday night.
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Oral History Collection
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State -- Interview III, Tape 1 -- 19
Indonesian policy.
"I think the most concern we had over Indonesia had to do with the confrontation with Malaya. They got into a situation where they were sending guerrillas not only into the offshore parts of Malaysia over in Borneo, but also in Malay proper, and we were concerned because Australia and New Zealand had security commitments to Malaysia and had forces there. Under the Anzus Treaty, if New Zealand or Australian forces were attacked in the treaty area, and Malaysia was in the treaty area, that could very likely bring up the obligation of Anzus and involve the United States and our commitment to Australia and New Zealand. We tried to point that out to Sukarno in an effort to cause him to pause. Fortunately with the change in government in Indonesia, the confrontation came to a close; and that was a major step forward in the general political security situation in Southeast Asia.
I’m not one of those who claims that what we were doing in South Viet Nam made it possible for Indonesia to turn its policy around. There are some Indonesians who have commented that the very fact that the United States was present in Viet Nam and that the Seventh Fleet was there between Indonesia and mainland China gave them courage to move strongly against the Chinese Communists who were heavily involved in Indonesia and were participants in that attempted coup d’etat which led to the turnover in government, but I think it would be unfortunate for the United States to claim that what we were doing in Viet Nam was the thing which produced the change in attitude in Indonesia. I think those changes came about for Indonesian reasons and not directly because of what we were doing in Viet Nam.
M: I was smiling a minute ago not at your answer, but at the fact that you seemed to read my mind on these questions. I was just about to open my mouth to ask the question that you began to answer. Maybe we’ve been at this long enough that I can just turn the machine on and let you go on. What about Korea? I gather that this is one of the instances where there was a real personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park that contributed a great deal to the success of our relations in Korea. Is that accurate?
R: Yes. President Johnson had a great respect for President
Park and for good reason. President Park, under great difficulties, had brought Korea along in remarkable progress, economically and socially and politically. He was tough in defense of the interests of South Korea but was reasonable and balanced and was not provocative or militant in his general attitude toward North Korea. He took a responsible attitude toward such questions as Southeast Asia. He seemed to be willing to play a role that reflected Korea’s gratitude for the assistance it had had from the United States back in 1950. His willingness to put two divisions of South Korean troops into Southeast Asia was welcomed by President Johnson. South Korea had no treaty obligation to do so. It was not a member of SEATO, and when he made it clear that he was prepared to take part in that struggle down there, this of course touched President Johnson very deeply. And the Koreans turned out to be very good fighters in South Viet Nam, as they turned out to be by the end of the Korean War in their own country. But there was a personal rapport between President Johnson and President Park.
M: When did the renewed tensions along the armistice line in Korea become serious again?
R: I think that we began to be freshly concerned in 1967 when the rate of infiltration seemed to increase significantly. And when the North Korean leaders began making militant speeches about unifying the country by 1970 and making very bellicose statements about their own policy and attitude, we became very much concerned because we had fifty thousand American troops in Korea.
We had a very flat and direct security treaty with Korea. A renewal of the Korean War would be something that we would look upon with the greatest dismay because we had enough of a struggle going on in Southeast Asia, We didn’t want a second struggle up in Korea. It was rather courageous on the part of President Park to put two divisions of his own troops into South Viet Nam at a time when he was having infiltration problems with the North Koreans, and when the North Koreans were talking in a very belligerent mood, but he went ahead and did it. But throughout ‘67 and ‘68 we were very much concerned about North Korea.
M: Was the Pueblo incident a calculated part of this, do you think, or was that just an aberration that was unrelated to their troubles with South Korea?
R: I will never fully understand just why the North Koreans seized the Pueblo. It’s one of those situations where a small belligerent country can act with a lack of responsibility simply because other countries don’t want war. The Pueblo was in international waters. It was there to do some listening on communications in North Korea. We had an interest in picking up as much intelligence as could out of North Korea because of the belligerency of North Korea towards South Korea and the increase of infiltration into South Korea, but we were relying upon the high seas, the freedom of the seas—
M: There was never a doubt about its location? R: Oh, no, never a doubt about its location. As a matter of fact, in the communications which the North Koreans themselves flashed back from the scene, they even put the position further out on the high seas than we did so they knew they were on the high seas. And when I say high seas, I mean beyond their own twelve-mile limit. M: Yes, their definition of high seas.
R: And not just beyond our three-mile limit. But that was a very unhappy episode from beginning to end. M: That’s Presidential from the beginning, I expect. What was Mr. Johnson’s reaction to that?
R: He was, of course, furious with the North Koreans, and like me [he] failed to understand just why they went out of their way to be so disagreeable about it. Nevertheless President Johnson did not want a war with North Korea. He made a prompt decision to try to get the ship and its men back by diplomatic means rather than by military means. We were faced with the fact that if you tried to use military force to rescue the men you might pick up dead bodies, but you wouldn’t pick up live men and that you might well start a war at a time when we didn’t want a war between North and South Korea involving American forces. So we decided to swallow hard and try to get these men back by diplomatic means, and that took a great deal of doing. We had meeting after meeting that made no progress; and we finally released the men by a device which I described at the time as being without precedent in international affairs. We signed a statement which the North Koreans insisted we sign, but at the very time we signed it we made a statement saying that we denounced the signature and the statement itself was false.
M: They knew you were going to make this statement? R: They knew in advance that we were going to make that statement. This had been worked out in advance. It’s as though a kidnapper kidnaps your child and asks for fifty thousand dollars ransom. You give him a check for fifty thousand dollars and you tell him at the time that you’ve stopped payment on the check, and then he delivers your child to you. I think probably what happened was that the North Koreans came to the conclusion that they had milked the Pueblo affair for all that was in it, and that there was no particular point in holding on to these men any further. M: The Russians didn’t play any constructive role--? R: I think it’s possible that the Russians played a mediating role in that situation. We have no way of knowing. We asked the Russians on several occasions to use their influence with North Korea to free these men and the ship, but we never knew just what they did by way of follow-up on it.
M: Did we have to act to restrain the South Koreans in that atmosphere [when] under renewed infiltration, the attack on the Blue House, and the seizure of the Pueblo all sort of came together?
R: The South Koreans were interested in what might be called close-in retaliation, but I never got the impression that the South Koreans wanted to go into full-scale war. So to the extent that it was necessary to restrain them, it wasn’t a very difficult job because they were not itching for war, either. They did get very incensed about the Blue House raid and about other types of infiltration that were coming across. There were times when they would carry out retaliation against North Korea by counterraids without our permission, and so we had a little job at times of cooling them down a bit and restraining them from these retaliations which they were inclined to pull off.
M: Mr. Johnson talked about the concept of regionalism in Asia. Was there any basis in Asia for the development of that regionalism, or was that something that we pretty well had to impose ourselves upon them?
R: No, one of the very encouraging developments in Asia during
this period of the South Vietnamese conflict was that the
nations in Asia during this period of the South Vietnamese
conflict was that the nations in Asia themselves began to
