False News

Kaiser (to 1917 Recruit). 

"And don't forget that your Kaiser will find a use for you—alive or dead."

Punch, 25 April 1917

"We pass through Evergnicourt. There is a dull smell in the air, as if lime were being burnt. We are passing the great Corpse Utilization Establishment (Kadaververwertungsanstalt) of this Army Group. The fat that is won here is turned into lubricating oils, and everything else is ground down in the bones mill into a powder, which is used for mixing with pigs' food and as manure."

 "Historians have concluded that soap was not made from human fat. 

When so many people deny the Holocaust ever happened, why give them something to use against the truth?," 

Shmuel Krakowski

Yad Vashem Official, 1990

In 1377 King Edward died and was replaced by his grandson Richard, who was only ten years old. 

But the statutes went on.

1379: 
‘For punishment of devisers of false news and reporters of horrible and false lies concerning prelates, dukes, earls, barons and other nobles and great men of the realm, whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm if due remedy be not provided.’

Due remedy was of course provided. 
Brandings, and burnings, and imprisonments.

This last law was directed, not at the investigative reporters of that time, for there were none, but against the people who carried the news by word of mouth to meeting places in village after village. 

These were religious people, working within the framework of religion but attacking the way in which religion was being carried out. 

Excommunicated monks and priests were beginning to challenge the power of the church over people’s minds, over how people thought.

In 1985, German-Canadian Publisher Ernst Zündel was prosecuted by The Crown in Canada on charges originating with the Statute of 1379 : 

That he "did publish a statement or tale, namely, "Did Six Million Really Die?" that he knows is false and that is likely to cause mischief to the public interest in social and racial tolerance, contrary to the Criminal Code."


"...false news and report[s] of horrible and false lies concerning prelates, dukes, earls, barons and other nobles and great men of the realm, whereof great peril and mischief might come to all the realm and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm if due remedy be not provided.’


Due remedy was of course provided. 

Zündel was imprisoned, deported [albeit many years later] and the Jewish Defence League (JDL) torched his house and burnt all his books.


 Zündel was originally found guilty by two juries but was finally acquitted upon appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada which held in 1992 that section 181 (formerly known as section 177) was a violation of the guarantee of freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Zundel

Analysis

1. Section 181 : Its History, Purpose and Ambit

Section 181  dates from the Statute of Westminster in 1275, which introduced the offence De Scandalis Magnatum or Scandalum Magnatum.  It provided "[t]hat from henceforth none be so hardy to tell or publish any false News or Tales, whereby discord, or occasion of discord or slander may grow between the King and his People, or the Great Men of the Realm".  The criminal offence was enforced by the King's Council, and later by the Court of Star Chamber, until the 17th century when its enforcement was taken over by the common law courts.  It had as its primary aim the prevention of "false statements which, in a society dominated by extremely powerful landowners, could threaten the security of the state": see R. v. Keegstra, supra, at p. 722, per Dickson C.J.; and F. R. Scott, "Publishing False News" (1952), 30 Can. Bar Rev. 37, at pp. 38-39.  As Holdsworth recounts, "[t]his was no vain fear at a time when the offended great one was only too ready to resort to arms to redress a fancied injury": A History of English Law (5th ed. 1942), vol. III, at p. 409.  Nonetheless, De Scandalis Magnatum is not thought to have been a very effective instrument.  Holdsworth refers to a "thin stream of . . . cases" from the 16th century onwards; by the time of its repeal in 1887 (Statute Law Revision Act, 1887 (U.K.), 50 & 51 Vict., c. 59) it had long been obsolete.

Although the offence of spreading false news was abolished in England in 1887, and does not survive in the United States, it was enacted in Canada as part of the 1892 Criminal Code .  The reason for the offence's retention in Canada is unknown.  Scott suggests that it may have been no more than oversight, with no one in Canada being aware that the English provision had been repealed four years previously: see Scott, supra, at p. 40.  Certainly Burbridge, the drafter of the 1892 Code, was no enthusiast of the offence, commenting in his 1890 Digest of the Criminal Law in Canada that its "definition is very vague and the doctrine exceedingly doubtful": see Scott, supra, at p. 39.  Be that as it may, the offence was retained, originally under the rubric of "Seditious Offences" (Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 126; R.S.C. 1927, c. 36, s. 136) and more latterly as a species of "Nuisance" (S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 166).  Until its revision in 1955, the Criminal Code  provision read:

136.  Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to one year's imprisonment who wilfully and knowingly publishes any false news or tale whereby injury or mischief is or is likely to be occasioned to any public interest.

The substantive elements of the offence remained the same after Parliament's 1955 transfer of the provision to the "nuisance" section of the Code, but the potential sentence was increased to two years.  Neither documentary nor viva voce evidence has been proffered to explain why the section was retained in Canada when it had been dropped elsewhere or why it was moved from the offences dealing with "Sedition" to those dealing with "Nuisance".  What is now s. 181  has been judicially considered only three times in Canada, excluding this case; the jurisprudence on it is virtually non-existent.

After considering the rather sparse history of the provision, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. conclude at p. 000 that:

. . . a review of the historical development of the law's response to false news reflects its role in prohibiting the dissemination of false information which strikes at important interests of society as a whole.  Section 181  perpetuates one of the central functions of De Scandalis in prohibiting public alarm and internecine hostilities between and among social groups.

With the greatest respect, I find no support in the history of the provision for such a conclusion.  The only lesson to be gleaned from the history of s. 181  is that the offence was aimed at protecting the rule of law and the security of the state, in the guise of the head of power whether that be the monarchy or later the government: see Drouin J. in R. v. Carrier (1951), 16 C.R. 18, 104 C.C.C. 75 (Que. K.B. (Criminal Side)).  The fact that provocative racial statements have been, on the odd occasion in the past two hundred years, prosecuted as other criminal offences such as "public mischief" and "criminal libel" sheds no light on the objective behind the enactment of the "false news" provision.  Moreover, as discussed below, the very cases referred to by Cory and Iacobucci JJ. to support their conclusions actually reveal the overinclusiveness of the provision.

I turn from history to the wording of s. 181  and the ambit of the section upon whose constitutionality this Court is asked to pronounce.  The construction of s. 181  is not at issue in these proceedings, leave to appeal on those issues having been denied.  The analysis of the constitutionality of s. 181  must therefore be based on the section as it was interpreted by the courts below.

As interpreted by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal below, the actus reus of the offence is the publication of "a statement, tale or news" that is false and that "causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest . . .".  The mens rea lies in the knowledge that the statement is false.  Thus the Crown, to succeed, must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the following propositions:

1. That the accused published a false statement, tale or news;

2. That the accused knew the statement was false; and

3. That the statement causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest.

Each of the three elements of the offence created by s. 181  is capable of giving rise to considerable difficulty of application in the context of a trial.  The question of falsity of a statement is often a matter of debate, particularly where historical facts are at issue. (Historians have written extensively on the difficulty of ascertaining what actually occurred in the past, given the difficulty of verification and the selective and sometimes revisionist versions different witnesses and historians may accord to the same events; see, for example, the now famous treatise of E. H. Carr, What is History? (1961)).  The element of the accused's knowledge of falsity compounds the problem, adding the need to draw a conclusion about the accused's subjective belief as to the truth or falsity of the statements.  Finally, the issue of whether a statement causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to the public interest requires the identification of a public interest and a determination of whether it has been or is likely to be injured.  In the case of each of the three elements of the offence, the not inconsiderable epistemological and factual problems are left for resolution by the jury under the rubric of "fact".  Thus, both in its breadth and in the nature of the criteria it posits, s. 181  poses difficulties not usually associated with criminal prohibitions, which traditionally demand no more of a jury than common sense inferences from concrete findings on matters patent to the senses.

At pages 000-000, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. summarize and interpret in detail the s. 181  trial process in the case at bar, the goal being to show that s. 181  did not theoretically or practically preclude the accused Zundel from raising a reasonable doubt on each element of the offence -- a basic requirement of fundamental justice.   The argument, as I understand it, would appear to be that if s. 181  occasioned no unfairness in this case, it never will.  One doubts the validity of such an inference, given the acknowledgement that this was a clear, simple case on the facts.  But that aside, I do not share my colleagues' view that as a practical matter the Court can be certain, even in this instance, that the defendant was accorded procedural justice.  On the contrary, it is my view that the difficulties encountered in this case underline the inherent vices of s. 181 .

Difficulties were encountered at trial with respect to all three elements of the offence -- with respect to what constitutes a "statement, tale or news", interpreted as constituting an assertion of fact as opposed to opinion; what constitutes injury or mischief to a public interest; and what constitutes proof of knowledge of falsity of the statement.  The courts below resolved the difficult issue of the distinction between a statement and an opinion by treating it as a question of fact for the jury to resolve.   While this is true in a technical legal sense, in a practical sense the jury was told that the publication at issue was a false statement. By applying the doctrine of judicial notice and telling the jury that "[t]he mass murder and extermination of Jews in Europe by the Nazi regime" was an (historical) fact no "reasonable person" could dispute, the judge effectively settled the issue for them.  Moreover, I am unable to agree with my colleagues (see p. 000) that the trial judge instructed the jury that the "onus of differentiating fact from opinion" lay with the Crown.  Judge Thomas's direction that the Crown must prove "that the pamphlet, in essence, is a false statement of fact" does not impose upon the Crown the more difficult burden of first explaining to and then convincing a jury of the distinction between historical fact and historical opinion regarding events almost fifty years old.  This might be forgiven, given the elusiveness of distinguishing historical fact from historical opinion.  But it shows the danger in criminalizing "false statements".  The contention is that expressions of opinion are not caught by s. 181 .  The reality is that when the matter is one on which the majority of the public has settled views, opinions may, for all practical purposes, be treated as an expression of a "false fact".

The question of knowledge of falsity was similarly left as a question of fact for the jury to decide.  But this too was not a question of fact in the usual sense.  The jury was instructed that it was entitled to infer from the judge's instruction that because the Holocaust must be regarded as proven, the accused must have known it to be proven and must be taken to have published his pamphlet deliberately for personal motives, knowing the falsity of his assertion to the contrary.  Judge Thomas added, albeit as only one factor in this assessment, the principle that the "more unreasonable the belief, the easier it is to draw the inference that the belief is not honestly held".  In the context of a sexual assault trial such an instruction would be unlikely to mislead the jury, both because questions of consent and perceptions of consent are far more common place than questions of the sincerity of an accused's belief in esoteric or outlandish historical "facts", and because the jury is likely to have the assistance of the viva voce evidence of both the complainant and accused in determining whether the inference that the accused's unreasonable belief in the complainant's consent was not an honest one ought to be drawn. But in the context of a prosecution under s. 181  a jury is, in the face of such instructions, unlikely to be able to evaluate or accept the accused's assertion that he believed the truth of his publications.  The logic is ineluctable: everyone knows this is false; therefore the defendant must have known it was false.

On the final question of injury or mischief to a public interest, the trial judge told the jury that it was sufficient if there is a likelihood of injury or mischief to a particular public interest and directed the jury on the "cancerous effect of racial and religious defamation upon society's interest in the maintenance of racial and religious harmony in Canada."  Judge Thomas further instructed the jury that "[t]here can be no doubt . . . that the maintenance of racial and religious tolerance is certainly a matter of public interest in Canada".  Once again, the jury's conclusion may have flowed inevitably from the trial judge's instruction.

One is thus driven to conclude that this was not a criminal trial in the usual sense.  The verdict flowed inevitably from the indisputable fact of the publication of the pamphlet, its contents' divergence from the accepted history of the Holocaust, and the public interest in maintaining racial and religious tolerance.  There was little practical possibility of showing that the publication was an expression of opinion, nor of showing that the accused did not know it to be false, nor of showing that it would not cause injury or mischief to a public interest.   The fault lies not with the trial judge or the jury, who doubtless did their best responsibly to inform the vague words of s. 181  with meaningful content.  The fault lies rather in concepts as vague as fact versus opinion or truth versus falsity in the context of history, and the likelihood of "mischief" to the "public interest".

Against this background, I turn to the question of whether the conviction and imprisonment of persons such as the appellant under s. 181  violate the rights which the Charter  guarantees.  The first question is whether the Charter 's guarantee of free speech protects the impugned publication.  If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the second question arises of whether prohibition of the publication by criminal sanction can nevertheless be maintained as a measure "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".

According to Frank Miele's article "Giving the Devil His Due," in the Skeptic,

"In a later phone conversation, Zündel told me that the UFO book was in fact a ploy. 'I realized that North Americans were not interested in being educated. They want to be entertained. The book was for fun. With a picture of the Führer on the cover and flying saucers coming out of Antarctica it was a chance to get on radio and TV talk shows. For about 15 minutes of an hour program I'd talk about that esoteric stuff. Then I would start talking about all those Jewish scientists in concentration camps, working on these secret weapons. And that was my chance to talk about what I wanted to talk about." '


It seems a pity that Zundel had to turn from seeking the Hole to denying the Holocaust, or as he puts it "I was forced by Germany's enemies to tackle the hoary and fraudulent 'Holocaust' claims". (Zundelsite).

"[" Whereasmuch as there have been aforetimes found in the country ]...devisers of false news and of horrible and false lies, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other noble and great men of the realm, whereby great discord hath arisen, and whereof, great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided...

It is accorded and agreed in this Parliament that when any such deviser is taken and imprisoned and cannot find him by whom the speech is moved, as before is said, that he shall be punished by the advice of the said council, notwithstanding the said statutes. "

"...While as yet the bulk of the nation found a remedy for defamation in the seignorial and ecclesiastial courts, there was still another jurisdiction, during part of this time, open to a limited aristocracy, official or otherwise, and administered by the king's council. 

This was the statutory offence known as De Scandalis Magnatum. The original enacted in 1275, provided:

" Whereasmuch as there have been aforetimes found in the country devisers of tales 

* * * whereby discord or occasion of discord hath arisen between the King and his People or Great Men of this Realm * * * 

it is commanded that none be so hardy as to tell or publish any false news or tales whereby discord or occasion of discord or slander may grow between The King and his People or the great men of the realm; he that doth so shall be taken and kept in prison until he hath brought him into the court which was first author of the tale."

A subsequent act in the reign of Richard II recites the former act against 'devisers of false news and of horrible and false lies, of prelates, dukes, earls, barons, and other noble and great men of the realm, whereby great discord hath arisen, and whereof, great peril and mischief might come to all the realm, and quick subversion and destruction of the said realm, if due remedy be not provided,' and then continues:

" It is accorded and agreed in this Parliament that when any such deviser is taken and imprisoned and cannot find him by whom the speech is moved, as before is said, that he shall be punished by the advice of the said council, notwithstanding the said statutes. "

Clive's Father: 

Culture crash. Culture crash.

Larry Gopnik: 

With all respect, Mr. Park, I don't think it's that.

Clive's Father: 

Yes.

Larry Gopnik: 

No. It would be a culture clash if it were the custom in your land to bribe people for grades.

Clive's Father: 

Yes.

Larry Gopnik: 

So... you're saying it is the custom?

Clive's Father: 

No, this is a defamation. Grounds for lawsuit.

Larry Gopnik: 

Let me get this straight: you're threatening to sue me for defaming your son?

Clive's Father: 

Yes.

Larry Gopnik: 

But it would...

Mr. Brandt: 

Is this man bothering you?

Larry Gopnik: 

Is he bothering me? No. I, uh...

[Larry stares awkwardly at Brandt until he leaves]

Larry Gopnik: 

See... if it were defamation there would have to be someone I was defaming him to, or I... 
all right, I... let's keep it simple. 

I could pretend the money never appeared. 

That's not defaming anyone.

Clive's Father: 

Yes. And a passing grade.

Larry Gopnik: 

Passing grade.

Clive's Father: 

Yes.

Larry Gopnik: 

Or... you'll sue me.

Clive's Father: 

For taking money.

Larry Gopnik: 

So he did leave the money.

Clive's Father: 

This is defamation!

Larry Gopnik: 

It doesn't make sense. 

Either he left the money or he didn't.

Clive's Father: 

Please. Accept the mystery.

Larry Gopnik: 

You can't have it both ways!

Clive's Father: 

Why not?

Criminal Prosecution of 'Holocaust Denial'

by Barbara Kulaszka

In recent years, more and more attention has been devoted to the supposed danger of "Holocaust denial." Politicians, newspapers and television warn about the growing influence of those who reject the Holocaust story that some six million European Jews were systematically exterminated during the Second World War, most of them in gas chambers.

In several countries, including Israel, France, Germany and Austria, "Holocaust denial" is against the law, and "deniers" have been punished with stiff fines and prison sentences. Some frantic Jewish community leaders are calling for similar government measures in North America against so-called "deniers." In Canada, David Matas, Senior Counsel for the "League for Human Rights" of the Zionist B'nai B'rith organization, says: (note 1)

The Holocaust was the murder of six million Jews, including two million children. Holocaust denial is a second murder of those same six million. First their lives were extinguished; then their deaths. A person who denies the Holocaust becomes part of the crime of the Holocaust itself.

Often overlooked in this controversy is the crucial question: Just what constitutes "Holocaust denial"?

Six Million?

Should someone be considered a "Holocaust denier" because he does not believe -- as Matas and others insist -- that six million Jews were killed during World War II? This figure was cited by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945-1946. It found that "the policy pursued [by the German government] resulted in the killing of six million Jews, of which four million were killed in the extermination institutions." (note 2)

Yet if that is so, then several of the most prominent Holocaust historians could be regarded as "deniers." Professor Raul Hilberg, author of the standard reference work, The Destruction of the European Jews, does not accept that six million Jews died. He puts the total of deaths (from all causes) at 5.1 million. Gerald Reitlinger, author of The Final Solution, likewise did not accept the six million figure. He estimated the figure of Jewish wartime dead might be as high as 4.6 million, but admitted that this was conjectural due to a lack of reliable information.

Human Soap?

Is someone a "Holocaust denier" if he says that the Nazis didn't use Jewish fat to make soap? After examining all the evidence (including an actual bar of soap supplied by the Soviets), the Nuremberg Tribunal declared in its Judgment that "in some instances attempts were made to utilize the fat from the bodies of the victims in the commercial manufacture of soap." (note 3)

In 1990, though, Israel's official "Yad Vashem" Holocaust memorial agency "rewrote history" by admitting that the soap story was not true. "Historians have concluded that soap was not made from human fat. When so many people deny the Holocaust ever happened, why give them something to use against the truth?," said Yad Vashem official Shmuel Krakowski. (note 4)

Wannsee Conference?

Is someone a "Holocaust denier" if he does not accept that the January 1942 "Wannsee conference" of German bureaucrats was held to set or coordinate a program of systematic mass murder of Europe's Jews? If so, Israeli Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer must be wrong -- and a "Holocaust denier" -- because he recently declared: "The public still repeats, time after time, the silly story that at Wannsee the extermination of the Jews was arrived at." In Bauer's opinion, Wannsee was a meeting but "hardly a conference" and "little of what was said there was executed in detail." (note 5)

Extermination Policy?

Is someone a "Holocaust denier" if he says that there was no order by Hitler to exterminate Europe's Jews? There was a time when the answer would have been yes. Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg, for example, wrote in the 1961 edition of his study, The Destruction of the European Jews, that there were two Hitler orders for the destruction of Europe's Jews: the first given in the spring of 1941, and the second shortly thereafter. But Hilberg removed mention of any such order from the revised, three-volume edition of his book published in 1985. (note 6) As Holocaust historian Christopher Browning has noted: (note 7)

In the new edition, all references in the text to a Hitler decision or Hitler order for the "Final Solution" have been systematically excised. Buried at the bottom of a single footnote stands the solitary reference: "Chronology and circumstances point to a Hitler decision before the summer ended." In the new edition, decisions were not made and orders were not given.

A lack of hard evidence for an extermination order by Hitler has contributed to a controversy that divides Holocaust historians into "intentionalists" and "functionalists." The former contend that there was a premeditated extermination policy ordered by Hitler, while the latter hold that Germany's wartime "final solution" Jewish policy evolved at lower levels in response to circumstances. But the crucial point here is this: notwithstanding the capture of literally tons of German documents after the war, no one can point to documentary evidence of a wartime extermination order, plan or program. This was admitted by Professor Hilberg during his testimony in the 1985 trial in Toronto of German-Canadian publisher Ernst Zündel. (note 8)

Auschwitz

So just what constitutes "Holocaust denial"? Surely a claim that most Auschwitz inmates died from disease and not systematic extermination in gas chambers would be "denial." But perhaps not. Jewish historian Arno J. Mayer, a Princeton University professor, wrote in his 1988 study Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The 'Final Solution" in History': ... From 1942 to 1945, certainly at Auschwitz, but probably overall, more Jews were killed by so-called 'natural' causes than by 'unnatural' ones." (note 9)

Even estimates of the number of people who died at Auschwitz -- allegedly the main extermination center -- are no longer clear cut. At the postwar Nuremberg Tribunal, the Allies charged that the Germans exterminated four million people at Auschwitz. (note 10) Until 1990, a memorial plaque at Auschwitz read: "Four Million People Suffered and Died Here at the Hands of the Nazi Murderers Between the Years 1940 and 1945." (note 11) During a 1979 visit to the camp, Pope John Paul II stood before this memorial and blessed the four million victims.

Is it "Holocaust denial" to dispute these four million deaths? Not today. In July 1990, the Polish government's Auschwitz State Museum, along with Israel's Yad Vashem Holocaust center, conceded that the four million figure was a gross exaggeration, and references to it were accordingly removed from the Auschwitz monument. Israeli and Polish officials announced a tentative revised toll of 1.1 million Auschwitz dead. (note 12) In 1993, French Holocaust researcher Jean-Claude Pressac, in a much-discussed book about Auschwitz, estimated that altogether about 775,000 died there during the war years. (note 13)

Professor Mayer acknowledges that the question of how many really died in Auschwitz remains open. In Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? he wrote (p. 366):

... Many questions remain open ... All in all, how many bodies were cremated in Auschwitz? How many died there all told? What was the national, religious, and ethnic breakdown in this commonwealth of victims? How many of them were condemned to die a 'natural' death and how many were deliberately slaughtered? And what was the proportion of Jews among those murdered in cold blood among these gassed? We have simply no answers to these questions at this time.

Gas Chambers

What about denying the existence of extermination "gas chambers"? Here too, Mayer makes a startling statement (on page 362 of his book): "Sources for the study of the gas chambers are at once rare and unreliable." While Mayer believes that such chambers did exist at Auschwitz, he points out that

most of what is known is based on the depositions of Nazi officials and executioners at postwar trials and on the memory of survivors and bystanders. This testimony must be screened carefully, since it can be influenced by subjective factors of great complexity.

Höss Testimony

One example of this might be the testimony of Rudolf Höss, an SS officer who served as commandant of Auschwitz. In its Judgment, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal quoted at length from his testimony to support its findings of extermination. (note 14)

It is now well established that H°ss' crucial testimony, as well as his so-called "confession" (which was also cited by the Nuremberg Tribunal), are not only false, but were obtained by beating the former commandant nearly to death. (note 15) H°ss' wife and children were also threatened with death and deportation to Siberia. In his statement -- which would not be admissible today in any United States court of law -- H°ss claimed the existence of an extermination camp called "Wolzek." In fact, no such camp ever existed. He further claimed that during the time that he was commandant of Auschwitz, two and a half million people were exterminated there, and that a further half million died of disease. (note 16) Today no reputable historian upholds these figures. H°ss was obviously willing to say anything, sign anything and do anything to stop the torture, and to try to save himself and his family.

Forensic Investigations

In his 1988 book, Professor Mayer calls for "excavations at the killing sites and in their immediate environs" to determine more about the gas chambers. In fact, such forensic studies have been made. The first was conducted in 1988 by American execution equipment consultant, Fred A. Leuchter, Jr. He carried out an on-site forensic examination of the alleged gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek to determine if they could have been used to kill people as claimed. After a careful study of the alleged killing facilities, Leuchter concluded that the sites were not used, and could not have been used, as homicidal gas chambers. Furthermore, an analysis of samples taken by Leuchter from the walls and floors of the alleged gas chambers showed either no or minuscule traces of cyanide compound, from the active ingredient of Zyklon B, the pesticide allegedly used to murder Jews at Auschwitz. (note 17)

A confidential forensic examination (and subsequent report) commissioned by the Auschwitz State Museum and conducted by Institute of Forensic Research in Krakow has confirmed Leuchter's finding that minimal or no traces of cyanide compound can be found in the sites alleged to have been gas chambers. (note 18)

The significance of this is evident when the results of the forensic examination of the alleged homicidal gas chambers are compared with the results of the examination of the Auschwitz disinfestation facilities, where Zyklon B was used to delouse mattresses and clothing. Whereas no or only trace amounts of cyanide were found in the alleged homicidal gas chambers, massive traces of cyanide were found in the walls and floor in the camp's disinfestation delousing chambers.

Another forensic study has been carried out by German chemist Germar Rudolf. On the basis of his on-site examination and analysis of samples, the certified chemist and doctoral candidate concluded: "For chemical-technical reasons, the claimed mass gassings with hydrocyanic acid in the alleged 'gas chambers' in Auschwitz did not take place ... The supposed facilities for mass killing in Auschwitz and Birkenau were not suitable for this purpose ..." (note 19)

Finally, there is the study of Austrian engineer Walter Lüftl, a respected expert witness in numerous court cases, and former president of Austria's professional association of engineers. In a 1992 report he called the alleged mass extermination of Jews in gas chambers "technically impossible." (note 20)

Discredited Perspective

So just what constitutes "Holocaust denial"? Those who advocate criminal persecution of "Holocaust deniers" seem to be still living in the world of 1946 where the Allied officials of the Nuremberg Tribunal have just pronounced their verdict. But the Tribunal's findings can no longer be assumed to be valid. Because it relied so heavily on such untrustworthy evidence as the H°ss testimony, some of its most critical findings are now discredited.

For purposes of their own, powerful special interest groups desperately seek to keep substantive discussion of the Holocaust story taboo. One of the ways they do this is by purposely mischaracterizing revisionist scholars as "deniers." But the truth can't be suppressed forever: There is a very real and growing controversy about what actually happened to Europe's Jews during World War II.

Let this issue be settled as all great historical controversies are resolved: through free inquiry and open debate in our journals, newspapers and classrooms.

Notes

1. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 22, 1992.
2. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (IMT "blue series"), Vol. 22, p. 496.
3. IMT "blue series," Vol. 22, p. 496.
4. Globe and Mail (Toronto), April 25, 1990; See also: M. Weber, "Jewish Soap," The Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1991.
5. Canadian Jewish News (Toronto), Jan. 30, 1992.
6. See: Barbara Kulaszka, ed., Did Six Million Really Die: Report of the Evidence in the Canadian 'False News' Trial of Ernst Zndel (Toronto: Samisdat, 1992), pp. 192, 300, 349.
7. "The Revised Hilberg," Simon Wiesenthal Annual, Vol. 3, 1986, p. 294.
8. B. Kulaszka, ed., Did Six Million Really Die (Toronto: 1992), pp. 24-25.
9. A. Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The 'Final Solution' in History (Pantheon, 1988), p. 365.
10. Nuremberg document 008-USSR.; IMT "blue series," Vol. 39, pp. 241, 261.
11. B. Kulaszka, ed., Did Six Million Really Die (Toronto: 1992), p. 441.
12. Y. Bauer, "Fighting the Distortions," Jerusalem Post (Israel), Sept. 22, 1989; Auschwitz Deaths Reduced to a Million," Daily Telegraph (London), July 17, 1990; "Poland Reduces Auschwitz Death Toll Estimate to 1 Million,"The Washington Times, July 17, 1990.
13. J.-C. Pressac, Les Crémetoires d'Auschwitz: La machinerie du meurtre de masse (Paris: CNRS, 1993). See also: R. Faurisson, "Jean-Claude Pressac's New Auschwitz Book," The Journal of Historical Review, Jan.-Feb. 1994, p. 24.
14. IMT "blue series," Vol. 22, p. 485; Nuremberg document 3868-PS (USA-819), in IMT "blue series," Vol. 33, pp. 275-279.
15. Rupert Butler, Legions of Death (England: 1983), pp. 235-237; C. Hitchens, "Whose History is it?," Vanity Fair (New York), Dec. 1993, p. 117.
16. See: R. Faurisson, "How the British Obtained the Confession of Rudolf Höss," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1986-87, pp. 389-403.
17. A deluxe edition of The Leuchter Report is available from the IHR for $20.00, plus $2.00 shipping.
18. The complete text of this report was published in English in The Journal of Historical Review, Summer 1991.
19. G. Rudolf, Gutachten ueber die Bildung und Nachweisbarkeit von Cyanidverbindungen in den 'Gaskammern' von Auschwitz (London: 1993). See: The Journal of Historical Review, Nov.-Dec. 1993, pp. 25-26.
20. "The 'Lüftl Report'," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1992-93.

Adam Curtis - The Pope of Team-B at the BBC

"Now, the situation in brotherly Czechoslovakia is normalised."

- Leonid Brezhnev, 1968

You have now found urself trapped in The Incomprehensible Maze - Where's UR Head?

"Our world is strange and often fake and corrupt. 

But we think it’s normal because we can’t see anything else."

HyperNormalisation - The Story of How We Got Here.

Men at sometime, are Masters of their Fates.
The fault (deere Brutus) is not in our Starres,
But in our Selves, that we are underlings.

—Cassius to Brutus,

from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar

It’s a great brainwashing process, which goes very slow[ly] and is divided [into] four basic stages. 

The first one [is] Demoralisation. 

It takes from 15-20 years to Demoralise a nation. 

Why that many years? 

Because this is the minimum number of years which [is required] to educate one generation of students in the country of your enemy, exposed to the ideology of the enemy. 

In other words, Marxist-Leninist ideology is being pumped into the soft heads of at least three generations of American students, without being challenged, or counter-balanced by the basic values of Americanism (American patriotism).

The result? The result you can see. 

Most of the people who graduated in the sixties (drop-outs or half-baked intellectuals) are now occupying the positions of power in the government, civil service, business, mass media, [and the] educational system. 

You are stuck with them. 

You cannot get rid of them. 

They are contaminated; they are programmed to think and react to certain stimuli in a certain pattern. 

You cannot change their mind[s], even if you expose them to authentic information, even if you prove that white is white and black is black, you still cannot change the basic perception and the logic of behaviour. 

In other words, these people... the process of Demoralisation is complete and irreversible. 

To [rid] society of these people, you need another twenty or fifteen years to educate a new generation of patriotically-minded and common sense people, who would be acting in favour and in the interests of United States society.

Griffin: And yet these people who have been ‘programmed,’ and as you say [are] in place and who are favorable to an opening with the Soviet concept... these are the very people who would be marked for extermination in this country?

Bezmenov: Most of them, yes. Simply because the psychological shock when they will see in [the] future what the beautiful society of ‘equality’ and ‘social justice’ means in practice, obviously they will revolt. They will be very unhappy, frustrated people, and the Marxist-Leninist regime does not tolerate these people. Obviously they will join the leagues of dissenters (dissidents).

Unlike in [the] present United States there will be no place for dissent in future Marxist-Leninist America. Here you can get popular like Daniel Ellsberg and filthy-rich like Jane Fonda for being ‘dissident,’ for criticizing your Pentagon. 

In [the] future these people will be simply squashed like cockroaches. 

Nobody is going to pay them nothing for their beautiful, noble ideas of equality. 

This they don't understand and it will be [the] greatest shock for them, of course.

The Demoralisation process in [the] United States is basically completed already. 

For the last 25 years... actually, it's over-fulfilled because Demoralisation now reaches such areas where previously not even Comrade Andropov and all his experts would even dream of such a tremendous success. Most of it is done by Americans to Americans, thanks to [a] lack of moral standards.

As I mentioned before, exposure to true information does not matter anymore. A person who was demoralised is unable to assess true information. The facts tell nothing to him. Even if I shower him with information, with authentic proof, with documents, with pictures; even if I take him by force to the Soviet Union and show him [a] concentration camp, he will refuse to believe it, until he [receives] a kick in his fan-bottom. When a military boot crashes his... then he will understand. But not before that. That's the [tragedy] of the situation of Demoralisation.

So basically America is stuck with demoralization and unless... even if you start right now, here, this minute, you start educating [a] new generation of American[s], it will still take you fifteen to twenty years to turn the tide of ideological perception of reality back to normalcy and patriotism.

The next stage is Destabilisation.

This time [the] subverter does not care about your ideas and the patterns of your consumption; whether you eat junk food and get fat and flabby doesn’t matter any more. This time—and it takes only from two to five years to destabilize a nation—what matters [are] essentials: economy, foreign relations, [and] defense systems. And you can see it quite clearly that in some areas, in such sensitive areas as defense and [the] economy, the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideas in [the] United States is absolutely fantastic. I could never believe it fourteen years ago when I landed in this part of the world that the process [would have gone] that fast.

The next stage, of course, is Crisis. 

It may take only up to six weeks to bring a country to the verge of Crisis. You can see it in Central America now.

And, after crisis, with a violent change of power, structure, and economy, you have [the so-called] period of Normalisation.

It may last indefinitely. 

Normalisation is a cynical expression borrowed from Soviet propaganda. When the Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia in ‘68, Comrade Brezhnev said, 

‘Now the situation in brotherly Czechoslovakia is normalised.’

VLADIMIR PUTIN: We know how these decisions were taken and who was applying the pressure. But let me stress that Russia is not going to get all worked up, get offended or come begging at anyone’s door. Russia is a self-sufficient country. We will work within the foreign economic environment that has taken shape, develop domestic production and technology and act more decisively to carry out transformation. Pressure from outside, as has been the case on past occasions, will only consolidate our society, keep us alert and make us concentrate on our main development goals.

Of course the sanctions are a hindrance. They are trying to hurt us through these sanctions, block our development and push us into political, economic and cultural isolation, force us into backwardness in other words. But let me say yet again that the world is a very different place today. We have no intention of shutting ourselves off from anyone and choosing some kind of closed development road, trying to live in autarky. We are always open to dialogue, including on normalising our economic and political relations. We are counting here on the pragmatic approach and position of business communities in the leading countries.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: First of all, regarding my view of Ukraine’s sovereignty: I have never disputed that Ukraine is a modern, full-fledged, sovereign, European country.

But it is another matter that the historical process that saw Ukraine take shape in its present borders was quite a complex one. Perhaps you are not aware that in 1922, part of the land that you just named, land that historically always bore the name of Novorossiya… Why this name? This was because there was essentially a single region with its centre at Novorossiisk, and that was how it came to be called Novorossiya. This land included Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Nikolayev, Kherson and Odessa Region. In 1921-22, when the Soviet Union was formed, this territory was transferred from Russia to Ukraine. The communists had a simple logic: their goal was to increase the share of proletariat in Ukraine so as to ensure they had more support in various political processes, because in the communists’ view, the peasantry was a petty bourgeois group that was hostile to their aims, and so they needed to create a bigger proletariat. That is my first point.

Second, what also happened I think is that during the Civil War, nationalist groups in Ukraine tried to seize these regions but didn’t succeed, and the Bolsheviks told their supporters in Ukraine: Look what you can show the Ukrainian people. The nationalists didn’t manage to get hold of this territory, but you have succeeded. But it was all one country at the time and so this was not considered any great loss for Russia when it was all part of the same country anyway.

In 1954, Khrushchev, who liked to bang his shoe at the UN, decided for some reason to transfer Crimea to Ukraine. This violated even the Soviet Union’s own laws. Let me explain what I mean. Under Soviet law at that moment, territory could be transferred from one constituent republic to another only with the approval of the Supreme Soviets in each of the republics concerned. This was not done. Instead, the Presidiums of the Russian and Ukrainian Supreme Soviets rubber-stamped the decision to go ahead, but only the presidiums, not the parliaments themselves. This was a flagrant violation of the laws in force at the time.

In the 1990s, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Crimea pressed for and proclaimed autonomy with wide-ranging powers. 

Unfortunately, the authorities in Kiev then started abolishing these autonomous powers and essentially reduced them to zero, centralising all the political, economic and financial processes. The same goes for southeast Ukraine as well.

As for western Ukraine, perhaps you are not aware that Ukraine gained territory following World War II? Some territory was transferred from Poland and some from Hungary, I think. What was Lvov if not a Polish city? Are you not aware of these facts? Why do you ask me this question? Poland was compensated through the territory it gained from Germany when the Germans were driven out of a number of eastern regions. If you ask around, you will see that there are whole associations of these expelled Germans.

I cannot judge here and now whether this was right or wrong, but this is what happened. In this respect it is difficult not to recognise that Ukraine is a complex, multi-component state formation. This is simply the way historical developments went. The people of Crimea feared for their and their children’s future following a coup d’etat carried out with the support of our Western partners and decided to make use of the right to self-determination enshrined in international law. However, this does not in any way mean that we do not respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. We do respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and will continue to do so in the future.

I hope very much for normalisation and development of Russian-Ukrainian relations and I think this is an inevitable process.

RESEARCH DIRECTOR AT THE GERMAN-RUSSIA FORUM ALEXANDER RAHR: Mr President, a question on energy. Will Europe freeze in the winter if Russia does not sign the agreement with Ukraine that is so important for us?

Also, could you please explain to this audience, which I think is probably aware of all the details, what is the catch in these talks? Why hasn’t there been any success in agreeing with Ukraine on the price for two or three months now, when there are constant meetings?

And another question: how will you build the new energy strategy with the European Union, which has suddenly changed the rules and begun to liberalise its market, and will offer to buy gas from Russia at one price? What are your thoughts on this?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: I will start with the latter part of your question. We have long been in discussion with our colleagues in the European Commission about the Third Energy Package, so this was not born yesterday. We feel that this decision is harmful for Europe. At first glance, it seems like liberalisation, the creation of market conditions. In fact, we believe, it’s nothing of the sort, because everything was liberalised long ago in the oil sector; oil is traded on the exchange, and the price is set at the exchange. Of course, you can partially manipulate the prices for a period by sharply increasing the volume being traded, by increasing production, but that is also impossible to maintain forever, because it will be damaging to shale oil producers and to traditional black gold exporters.

In the gas sector, for example, nothing is more sustainable than long-term contracts that are tied to the market price for oil. This is an absolutely fair pricing system. What can be more liberal than the market price for oil, which is traded on the exchange? There are standard parameters that indicate the calorific value of gas which is comparable to the calorific value of oil, and everything can be easily calculated by experts. And an important factor for our European consumers is that they can be certain that this volume will definitely be delivered according to those rules of setting the price. This creates certainty in European energy security. And Russia has never – I want to stress this – has never failed to abide by its commitments, not a single time.

In 2008, a crisis occurred because Ukraine practically blocked transit. But Russia was not responsible for this. Regardless of what anyone says, the experts are all fully aware of this.

What happened in 2008? Ukraine did not want to sign a new contract with Russia, and the old one had expired. And without signing a new contract, they began siphoning certain volumes of gas from the export pipeline in the winter. At first, we tolerated this, simply indicated to them that this was unacceptable. We tolerated it for some time, and then said that every day, we will reduce the amount of gas pumped equal in volume to the amount illegally taken – essentially stolen. They stole one million cubic metres one day, so the next day, we reduced the volume pumped out by a million cubic metres. And we continued this, from day to day. Eventually, we reduced it to zero. But this was not our doing. We cannot deliver free gas. What kind of behaviour is that?

Now over to the existing threats and what is going on there. As you may know, last year, to help Ukraine pay the debt it accrued since 2013 – they stopped paying last July and by November the unpaid debt had added up – to normalise the situation we said, and I have to repeat this: we will lend you $3 billion and we will reduce the price in the first quarter of 2014 to below the lowest limit. However, we will keep this price for the second quarter only if Ukraine uses the loans it receives to pay off its entire debt for 2013 and makes regular payments at the lowest rate - $268.5 for 1,000 cubic metres.

The result is that the debt for the previous year was not paid out and the current payments for the 1st quarter were not made in full. Therefore, in full compliance with its agreements, Gazprom shifted to contractual pricing. As we all remember, the contract was signed in 2009. It has been in effect all this time and was never questioned by our partners in Europe, by us, or by our Ukrainian friends. This contract has been in effect all these years. The Timoshenko government signed it. The current authorities in Kiev, including Energy Minister Prodan attended the signing ceremony and are fully aware of all this. Now it suddenly turns out that this was a bad contract and it needs to be revised. Why? Yet again, they don’t want to pay.

Everybody knows these figures, but I would like to repeat them. Last year we issued a loan for $3 billion. The official debt for this year has already reached $5.6 billion. However, we are willing to revise it with a $100 discount on the gas price. This still adds up to $4.5 billion for last year and this year. Thus, a $3 billion loan plus a $4.5 billion debt adds up to $7.5 billion.

In addition to that, Gazprombank lent its client in Ukraine, a private company, $1.4 billion to buy gas for the chemical industry at the lowest price of $268. The same Gazprombank gave Naftogaz Ukrainy another $1.8 billion to balance current accounts.

Nobody wants to pay off their debts. We undertook a huge responsibility. Now we have agreed on almost everything – the price and the payment procedure. I would like to stress that under the contract and in line with current agreements, Gazprom has switched to advance payment, which means we will only ship as much gas as we are paid for in advance. Under the previous arrangement, we first shipped the gas and they paid a month later. However, since they don’t pay, we cannot carry on in the same way. We said, and this is in strict compliance with the contract, that first they pay and then we ship. Everybody agreed to this as well. Our Ukrainian partners agreed and the members of the European Commission admitted this was fair: they have to repay their debt to us and shift to advance payment.

The IMF and the European Commission have confirmed what our Ukrainian friends are saying. Ukraine now has $3.1 billion to pay its debt. This is not the entire $4.5 billion, only $3.1 billion. Technically, we could assume a tough stance and say we want it all. I had to put some pressure on Gazprom, and I would like to apologise to its shareholders, including foreign shareholders for this, but I asked Gazprom not to insist and to let them pay at least the $3.5 billion and then argue over the balance.

So, they have $3.5 billion, and they say: either we use the entire amount to pay our debt and then we have nothing left to make advance payments, or we prepay future shipments, but then we would not be able to repay the debt. In the latter case, we would ask for an extension of our debt repayment until March or April 2015. What does this mean for us? I can say with a great degree of certainty that if we agree to this, we will get nothing for the last month. This has happened a countless number of times before. Therefore, we said no, we are not doing this anymore.

What did the European Commission suggest – and this was publicly voiced by Mr Ettinger? They suggested that we again lend money to our Ukrainian partners to pay for future transit. Another loan from us, or we can ship without prepayment. This is also a loan – a commodity loan, this time. We told our friends in Ukraine and in the European Commission that we will not do this anymore. Our total loan to Ukraine currently stands at nearly $11 billion. In January, Ukraine is to receive another $3 billion tranche from the IMF. So we told them that we know Ukraine is to get money is January, and we want them to get it, so let us move this payment from January to December. In reply, they said this was impossible due to the complicated decision-making procedure at the IMF. Then I suggested that they provide Ukraine with a bridge loan for a month, since everyone knows that there will be payment in January. The reply was they could not make that decision in the European Union, the European Commission because they have a very complicated lending procedure. All right, we asked for a guarantee from a top class European bank instead. And again, we hear that this is a complicated procedure, they cannot do it right now.

You know, the mentality here in Russia, and in Ukraine is different from Europe. Here if a man invites a woman to a restaurant, he will pay the bill, while you would normally go Dutch, when everybody pays for themselves. However, this is a different situation. The European Union has chosen association with Ukraine and undertook certain commitments. Why don’t you help Ukraine and issue it a bridge loan for a month, only for one month?

We are having a very professional and amicable discussion with our partners both in Ukraine and in the European Commission. We took on a huge responsibility and great risks and we think it would be absolutely fair if we shared these risks with our European or American partners. Why are they humiliating Ukraine with these $40 million handouts? What should them do with them? Give them at least $1.5 billion, and only for a month.

I very much hope that this issue will be resolved shortly, maybe next week. If this is the case, then there is and can be no threat. However, if this does not happen, we will again face the threat of gas siphoning from the export pipeline, which, in turn, could lead to a crisis. We don’t want to see this happen. However, Russia would never cause a crisis. We will comply with all our contractual commitments with great care and ship in a timely manner.