The Teicher Affidavit

Wobbly Lines in the Sand

By Joseph E. Persico;

Published: May 9, 1993

TWIN PILLARS TO DESERT STORM America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East From Nixon to Bush. By Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher. Illustrated. 418 pp. New York: William Morrow & Company. $23.

HOWARD TEICHER, mad as hell and apparently not going to take it anymore, is caustic about United States Middle East policies. He is scornful of major figures he worked under, principally Ronald Reagan and Caspar W. Weinberger, and angry over his shabby treatment at the hands of a Government he served for 10 years. Mr. Teicher, a member of the National Security Council staff until 1987, registers his discontent in "Twin Pillars to Desert Storm," essentially an insider's notebook revealing how Middle East policy has been shaped, or misshaped, in the past 25 years.

Mr. Teicher's rise was meteoric, from graduate student intern who was taken on the State Department payroll as a clerk-typist in the Carter years to key participant in Middle East policy making in the Reagan White House by age 26.

The title of the book, written with his wife, Gayle Radley Teicher, an attorney in Washington and author of a study on covert actions, derives from this premise: Beginning with the Nixon-Kissinger era, American Middle East policy had two objectives, to keep the oil flowing and to block expanded Soviet influence in the region. The means to these ends was "twin pillars," a strategy of militarily supporting, initially, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which would then presumably do America's bidding. Twin pillars has proved a monumental flop, Mr. Teicher says, and "Operation Desert Storm was the inevitable result of America's flawed vision in the Middle East."

The book makes a convincing case. The Iran pillar collapsed early, with the fall of the Shah in 1979. Washington then began wooing an unlikely, unworthy and unreliable replacement pillar, Iraq, a country on America's terrorism blacklist and ruled by the brutal Saddam Hussein. Support for Iraq was stepped up during the Reagan era when it appeared that Iran might win the Iran-Iraq war, leaving the hostile Khomeini regime in control of the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil. Twin pillars led President George Bush to cozy up even closer to Mr. Hussein, convincing him that the United States would countenance his seizing of Kuwait.

But if the twin pillars are cracked, what is the alternative? Dependence on the region's oil, Mr. Teicher says, "is too great to permit the United States to rely on other countries to protect this vital interest." "For better or for worse," the book argues, "it is a fact that the people of the Middle East, Muslims, Jews and Christians alike, are impressed and persuaded by military action." Consequently, America must be prepared "to use force judiciously when necessary." An example: as the Shah began to collapse, Mr. Teicher urged that "the sooner the United States undertook decisive military action the better." Apparently, America was to prop up by force a leader rejected by his own people. One has a sense that in Mr. Teicher's world other nations exist to fulfill America's interests.

Mr. Teicher is blistering toward Mr. Weinberger, the former Secretary of Defense, who emerges as a star pupil in the school that believes support of Israel explains all the United States' problems with the Arab world. Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Teicher says, unwisely chose to punish Israel for destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 because the attack disturbed United States-Arab relations. He attributes the 1982 Lebanese Phalangist massacre of Palestinian civilians at the Sabra and Shatila camps to Mr. Weinberger's premature withdrawal of United States marines. Responsibility for the deaths in 1983 of 241 United States marines in the truck bombing of their Beirut barracks, Mr. Teicher says, "rests squarely on the shoulders" of Mr. Weinberger, along with Gen. John W. Vessey, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for leaving the troops in an untenable position.

Mr. Teicher was equally appalled by President Reagan's lackadaisical leadership, which allowed the President's subordinates to ignore direct orders and do as they pleased: "Ronald Reagan's failure to exert decisive leadership would lead to America's humiliating defeat in Lebanon in 1984, the 1986 Iran Affair and the blind tilt toward Baghdad, the latter contributing directly to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait." Thus is dismissed the President who supposedly restored America's prestige abroad.

Mr. Teicher's story vividly recalls the bad old days when virtually every friction around the world was inflated to fit the superpower rivalries of the cold war. "Twin Pillars to Desert Storm" describes United States diplomats trying to mediate a quarrel between Lebanon's Christians and its Druze tribesmen, hoping thus to defuse tensions between Syria and Israel so that their respective sponsors, the Soviet Union and the United States, would not be propelled to the nuclear brink. So much for any misplaced nostalgia for the relative stability of the old East-West stalemate.

As for Mr. Teicher's rocket rise, he flamed out over Iran-contra. He had been sent, behind the United States Ambassador's back, to put the arm on Israel for cash for the Nicaraguan contras, an act that won him the undying enmity of State Department careerists. He was ordered to accompany Robert C. McFarlane and Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North on that bizarre 1986 mission to Teheran in a plane full of Hawk missile parts, an incident that was to further tar him with the arms-for-hostages scandal. He was subsequently hounded by unfounded rumors that the F.B.I. was investigating him as a top Israeli spy. The book quotes a Wall Street Journal correspondent's description of him at the time: "He was young, tireless, committed and sometimes cocky. . . . As he rose through the ranks, his religion and his abrasiveness made him a catalyst for the ugly feud between Arabists and supporters of Israel in the U.S. Government." In the winter of 1987, at age 32, Howard Teicher was forced out of Government, a victim of the Reagan White House's scramble to contain the mushrooming Iran-contra scandal.

One of his early lessons, Mr. Teicher says, was the discovery that Middle East policy was not decided on the merits by dispassionate experts. Rather, it was produced by "the human dimension," concocted of the ambitions, jealousies and competing drives of individuals. Not a bad lesson for a young man, or anyone else, who aspires to play in the power games of nations.

The Teicher Affidavit: Iraq-Gate

Following is the sworn court declaration of former NSC official Howard Teicher, dated 1/31/95, regarding 'Iraqgate.' The document is currently under seal by the US District Court, Southern District of Florida. The original document bears Teicher's dated signature.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case

No.:

93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH

CARLOS CARDOEN,

FRANCO SAFTA,

JORGE BURR,

INDUSTRIAS CARDOEN LIMITADA, DECLARATION OF

a/k/a INCAR, HOWARD TEICHER

SWISSCO MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC.

EDWARD A. JOHNSON

RONALD W. GRIFFIN, and

TELEDYNE INDUSTRIES, INC.,

d/b/a,

TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY,

)

Defendents.

_____________________________________________

I. Howard Teicher, hereby state that, to the best of my knowledge

and belief, the facts presented herein are true, correct and complete. I

further state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, nothing stated

in this Declaration constitutes classified information.

1. My name is Howard Teicher. From 1977 to 1987, I served in the

United States government as a member of the national security bureaucracy.

>From early 1982 to 1987, I served as a Staff Member to the United States

National Security Council.

2. While a Staff Member to the National Security Council, I was

responsible for the Middle East and for Political-Military Affairs.

During my five year tenure on the National security Council, I had

regular contact with both CIA Director William Casey and Deputy Director

Robert Gates.

3. In the Spring of 1982, Iraq teetered on the brink of losing its

war with Iran. In May and June, 1982, the Iranians discovered a gap in

the Iraqi defenses along the Iran-Iraq border between Baghdad to the north

and Basra to the south. Iran positioned a massive invasion force directly

across from the gap in the Iraqi defenses. An Iranian breakthrough at the

spot would have cutoff Baghdad from Basra and would have resulted in

Iraq's defeat.

4. United States Intelligence, including satellite imagery, had

detected both the gap in the Iraqi defenses and the Iranian massing of

troops across from the gap. At the time, the United States was officially

neutral in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

5. President Reagan was forced to choose between (a) maintaining

strict neutrality and allowing Iran to defeat Iraq, or (b) intervening and

providing assistance to Iraq.

6. In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States

could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan

decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal

to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized

this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to

this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because

I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The

NSDD, including even its indentifying number, is classified.

7. CIA Director Casey personally spearheaded the effort to ensure

that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to

avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war. Pursuant to the secred NSDD, the United

States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis

with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military

intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third

country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military

weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational

advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat. For example,

in 1986, President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling

him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran. This

message was delivered by Vice President Bush who communicated it to

Egyptian President Mubarak, who in turn passed the message to Saddam

Hussein. Similar strategic operational military advice was passed to

Saddam Hussein through various meetings with European and Middle Eastern

heads of state. I authored Bush's talking points for the 1986 meeting

with Mubarak and personally attended numerous meetings with European and

Middle East heads of state where the strategic operational advice was

communicated.

8. I personally attended meetings in which CIA Director Casey or

CIA Deputy Director Gates noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons

such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators in order to stave off the

Iranian attacks. When I joined the NSC staff in early 1982, CIA Director

Casey was adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect "force multiplier"

that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the "human waves" of Iranian

attackers. I recorded those comments in the minutes of National Security

Planning Group ("NSPG") meetings in which Casey or Gates participated.

9. The CIA, including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director

Gates, knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin

military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq. My notes, memoranda

and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew

of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military

weapons, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.

10. The United States was anxious to have other countries supply

assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that

Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel's existence due to the growing

Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the

United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald

Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the

United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq.

The United States agreed. I travelled wtih Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was

present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq

Aziz about Israel's offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the

Israelis' letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that

he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.

11. One of the reasons that the United States refused to license

or sell U.S. origin weapons to Iraq was that the supply of non-U.S. origin

weapons to Iraq was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs. Under CIA DIrector

Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA made sure that non-U.S.

manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq.

In certain instances where a key component in a weapon was not readily

available, the highest levels of the United States government decided to

make the component available, directly or indirectly, to Iraq. I

specifically recall that the provision of anti-armor penetrators to Iraq

was a case in point. The United States made a policy decision to supply

penetrators to Iraq. My notes, memoranda and other documents in my NSC

files will contain references to the Iraqis' need for anti-armor

penetrators and the decision to provide penetrators to Iraq.

12. Most of the Iraqi's military hardware was of Soviet origin.

Regular United States or NATO ammunition and spare parts could not be used

in this Soviet weaponry.

13. The United States and the CIA maintained a program known as

the 'Bear Spares" program whereby the United States made sure that spare

parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet-style weaponry were available to

countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for

defense needs. If the "Bear Spares" were manufactured outside the United

States, then the United States could arrange for the provision of these

weapons to a third country without direct involvement. Israel, for

example, had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition

captured during its various wars. At the suggestion of the United States,

the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries

or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras).

Similarly, Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs

and porvided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other

countries. Egypt also served as a supplier for the Bear Spares program.

The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's manufacturing

capabilities. The United States approved, assisted and encouraged Egypt's

sale of weaponry, munitions and vehicles to Iraq.

14. The mere request to a third party to carry out an action did

not constitute a "covert action," and, accordingly, required no

Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress. The supply of Cardoen

cluster bombs, which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO

aircraft, was a mere extension fo the United States policy of assisting

Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory.

15. My NSC files are currently held in trhe President Ronald

Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley, California. My files will

contain my notes and memoranda from meetings I attended with CIA director

Casey or CIA Deputy Director Gates which included discussions of Cardoen's

manufacture and sale of cluster bombs to Iraq. My NSC files will also

contain cable traffic among various United States agencies, embassies and

other parties relating to Cardoen and his sale of cluster bombs and other

munitions to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states.

16. Under CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates, the CIA

authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of

cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq. My NSC files will contain

documents that show or tend to show the CIA's authorization, approval and

assistance of Cardoen's manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other

muntions to Iraq.

17. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents

that will show that the highest levels fo the United States government,

including the NSC Staff and the CIA, were well aware of Cardoen's arrest

in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night

vision goggles to Cuba and Libya. My files will also show that the

highest levels of the government were aware of the arrest and conviction

of two of Cardoen's employees and his company Industrias Cardoen.

18. CIA Director William Casey, aware of Cardoen's arrest and the

conviction of his employees and his company, intervened in order to make

sure that Cardoen was able to supply cluster bombs to Iraq. Specifically,

CIA Director Casey directed the Secretaries of the State and Commerce

Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be

denied. My files will contain notes, memoranda and other documents

showing or tending to show that CIA Director William Casey's intervention

was in order to maintain Cardoen's ability to supply cluster bombs and

other munitions to Iraq.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and

correct to the best of my memory and recollection.

Executed on 1/31/95

Howard Teicher (signature appears on original)

(end of document)