Thursday 11 December 2014

The End of White America : It's Comin' Down Fast....





"CIVILIZATION’S GOING TO PIECES,” he remarks. He is in polite company, gathered with friends around a bottle of wine in the late-afternoon sun, chatting and gossiping. “I’ve gotten to be a terrible pessimist about things. Have you read The Rise of the Colored Empires by this man Goddard?” They hadn’t. “Well, it’s a fine book, and everybody ought to read it. The idea is if we don’t look out the white race will be—will be utterly submerged. It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.”
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State of the Union: Race

Hua Hsu and Ta-Nehisi Coates discuss Obama, football, hip-hop, and the elusive notion of a "post-racial" society.
He is Tom Buchanan, a character in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, a book that nearly everyone who passes through the American education system is compelled to read at least once. Although Gatsby doesn’t gloss as a book on racial anxiety—it’s too busy exploring a different set of anxieties entirely—Buchanan was hardly alone in feeling besieged. The book by “this man Goddard” had a real-world analogue: Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy, published in 1920, five years before Gatsby. Nine decades later, Stoddard’s polemic remains oddly engrossing. He refers to World War I as the “White Civil War” and laments the “cycle of ruin” that may result if the “white world” continues its infighting. The book features a series of foldout maps depicting the distribution of “color” throughout the world and warns, “Colored migration is a universal peril, menacing every part of the white world.”
As briefs for racial supremacy go, The Rising Tide of Color is eerily serene. Its tone is scholarly and gentlemanly, its hatred rationalized and, in Buchanan’s term, “scientific.” And the book was hardly a fringe phenomenon. It was published by Scribner, also Fitzgerald’s publisher, and Stoddard, who received a doctorate in history from Harvard, was a member of many professional academic associations. It was precisely the kind of book that a 1920s man of Buchanan’s profile—wealthy, Ivy League–educated, at once pretentious and intellectually insecure—might have been expected to bring up in casual conversation.
As white men of comfort and privilege living in an age of limited social mobility, of course, Stoddard and the Buchanans in his audience had nothing literal to fear. Their sense of dread hovered somewhere above the concerns of everyday life. It was linked less to any immediate danger to their class’s political and cultural power than to the perceived fraying of the fixed, monolithic identity of whiteness that sewed together the fortunes of the fair-skinned.
From the hysteria over Eastern European immigration to the vibrant cultural miscegenation of the Harlem Renaissance, it is easy to see how this imagined worldwide white kinship might have seemed imperiled in the 1920s. There’s no better example of the era’s insecurities than the 1923 Supreme Court case United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, in which an Indian American veteran of World War I sought to become a naturalized citizen by proving that he was Caucasian. The Court considered new anthropological studies that expanded the definition of the Caucasian race to include Indians, and the justices even agreed that traces of “Aryan blood” coursed through Thind’s body. But these technicalities availed him little. The Court determined that Thind was not white “in accordance with the understanding of the common man” and therefore could be excluded from the “statutory category” of whiteness. Put another way: Thind was white, in that he was Caucasian and even Aryan. But he was notwhite in the way Stoddard or Buchanan were white.
The ’20s debate over the definition of whiteness—a legal category? a commonsense understanding? a worldwide civilization?—took place in a society gripped by an acute sense of racial paranoia, and it is easy to regard these episodes as evidence of how far we have come. But consider that these anxieties surfaced when whiteness was synonymous with the American mainstream, when threats to its status were largely imaginary. What happens once this is no longer the case—when the fears of Lothrop Stoddard and Tom Buchanan are realized, and white people actually become an American minority?
Whether you describe it as the dawning of a post-racial age or just the end of white America, we’re approaching a profound demographic tipping point. According to an August 2008 report by the U.S. Census Bureau, those groups currently categorized as racial minorities—blacks and Hispanics, East Asians and South Asians—will account for a majority of the U.S. population by the year 2042. Among Americans under the age of 18, this shift is projected to take place in 2023, which means that every child born in the United States from here on out will belong to the first post-white generation.
Obviously, steadily ascending rates of interracial marriage complicate this picture, pointing toward what Michael Lind has described as the “beiging” of America. And it’s possible that “beige Americans” will self-identify as “white” in sufficient numbers to push the tipping point further into the future than the Census Bureau projects. But even if they do, whiteness will be a label adopted out of convenience and even indifference, rather than aspiration and necessity. For an earlier generation of minorities and immigrants, to be recognized as a “white American,” whether you were an Italian or a Pole or a Hungarian, was to enter the mainstream of American life; to be recognized as something else, as theThind case suggests, was to be permanently excluded. As Bill Imada, head of the IW Group, a prominent Asian American communications and marketing company, puts it: “I think in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, [for] anyone who immigrated, the aspiration was to blend in and be as American as possible so that white America wouldn’t be intimidated by them. They wanted to imitate white America as much as possible: learn English, go to church, go to the same schools.”
Today, the picture is far more complex. To take the most obvious example, whiteness is no longer a precondition for entry into the highest levels of public office. The son of Indian immigrants doesn’t have to become “white” in order to be elected governor of Louisiana. A half-Kenyan, half-Kansan politician can self-identify as black and be elected president of the United States.
As a purely demographic matter, then, the “white America” that Lothrop Stoddard believed in so fervently may cease to exist in 2040, 2050, or 2060, or later still. But where the culture is concerned, it’s already all but finished. Instead of the long-standing model of assimilation toward a common center, the culture is being remade in the image of white America’s multiethnic, multicolored heirs.
For some, the disappearance of this centrifugal core heralds a future rich with promise. In 1998, President Bill Clinton, in a now-famous address to students at Portland State University, remarked:
 Today, largely because of immigration, there is no majority race in Hawaii or Houston or New York City. Within five years, there will be no majority race in our largest state, California. In a little more than 50 years, there will be no majority race in the United States. No other nation in history has gone through demographic change of this magnitude in so short a time ... [These immigrants] are energizing our culture and broadening our vision of the world. They are renewing our most basic values and reminding us all of what it truly means to be American.
Not everyone was so enthused. Clinton’s remarks caught the attention of another anxious Buchanan—Pat Buchanan, the conservative thinker. Revisiting the president’s speech in his 2001 book, The Death of the West, Buchanan wrote: “Mr. Clinton assured us that it will be a better America when we are all minorities and realize true ‘diversity.’ Well, those students [at Portland State] are going to find out, for they will spend their golden years in a Third World America.”
Today, the arrival of what Buchanan derided as “Third World America” is all but inevitable. What will the new mainstream of America look like, and what ideas or values might it rally around? What will it mean to be white after “whiteness” no longer defines the mainstream? Will anyone mourn the end of white America? Will anyone try to preserve it?
ANOTHER MOMENT FROM The Great Gatsby: as Fitzgerald’s narrator and Gatsby drive across the Queensboro Bridge into Manhattan, a car passes them, and Nick Carraway notices that it is a limousine “driven by a white chauffeur, in which sat three modish negroes, two bucks and a girl.” The novelty of this topsy-turvy arrangement inspires Carraway to laugh aloud and think to himself, “Anything can happen now that we’ve slid over this bridge, anything at all …”
For a contemporary embodiment of the upheaval that this scene portended, consider Sean Combs, a hip-hop mogul and one of the most famous African Americans on the planet. Combs grew up during hip-hop’s late-1970s rise, and he belongs to the first generation that could safely make a living working in the industry—as a plucky young promoter and record-label intern in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as a fashion designer, artist, and music executive worth hundreds of millions of dollars a brief decade later.
In the late 1990s, Combs made a fascinating gesture toward New York’s high society. He announced his arrival into the circles of the rich and powerful not by crashing their parties, but by inviting them into his own spectacularly over-the-top world. Combs began to stage elaborate annual parties in the Hamptons, not far from where Fitzgerald’s novel takes place. These “white parties”—attendees are required to wear white—quickly became legendary for their opulence (in 2004, Combs showcased a 1776 copy of the Declaration of Independence) as well as for the cultures-colliding quality of Hamptons elites paying their respects to someone so comfortably nouveau riche. Prospective business partners angled to get close to him and praised him as a guru of the lucrative “urban” market, while grateful partygoers hailed him as a modern-day Gatsby.
“Have I read The Great Gatsby?” Combs said to a London newspaper in 2001. “I am the Great Gatsby.”
Yet whereas Gatsby felt pressure to hide his status as an arriviste, Combs celebrated his position as an outsider-insider—someone who appropriates elements of the culture he seeks to join without attempting to assimilate outright. In a sense, Combs was imitating the old WASP establishment; in another sense, he was subtly provoking it, by over-enunciating its formality and never letting his guests forget that there was something slightly off about his presence. There’s a silent power to throwing parties where the best-dressed man in the room is also the one whose public profile once consisted primarily of dancing in the background of Biggie Smalls videos. (“No one would ever expect a young black man to be coming to a party with the Declaration of Independence, but I got it, and it’s coming with me,” Combs joked at his 2004 party, as he made the rounds with the document, promising not to spill champagne on it.)
In this regard, Combs is both a product and a hero of the new cultural mainstream, which prizes diversity above all else, and whose ultimate goal is some vague notion of racial transcendence, rather than subversion or assimilation. Although Combs’s vision is far from representative—not many hip-hop stars vacation in St. Tropez with a parasol-toting manservant shading their every step—his industry lies at the heart of this new mainstream. Over the past 30 years, few changes in American culture have been as significant as the rise of hip-hop. The genre has radically reshaped the way we listen to and consume music, first by opposing the pop mainstream and then by becoming it. From its constant sampling of past styles and eras—old records, fashions, slang, anything—to its mythologization of the self-made black antihero, hip-hop is more than a musical genre: it’s a philosophy, a political statement, a way of approaching and remaking culture. It’s a lingua franca not just among kids in America, but also among young people worldwide. And its economic impact extends beyond the music industry, to fashion, advertising, and film. (Consider the producer Russell Simmons—the ur-Combs and a music, fashion, and television mogul—or the rapper 50 Cent, who has parlayed his rags-to-riches story line into extracurricular successes that include a clothing line; book, video-game, and film deals; and a startlingly lucrative partnership with the makers of Vitamin Water.)
But hip-hop’s deepest impact is symbolic. During popular music’s rise in the 20th century, white artists and producers consistently “mainstreamed” African American innovations. Hip-hop’s ascension has been different. Eminem notwithstanding, hip-hop never suffered through anything like an Elvis Presley moment, in which a white artist made a musical form safe for white America. This is no dig at Elvis—the constrictive racial logic of the 1950s demanded the erasure of rock and roll’s black roots, and if it hadn’t been him, it would have been someone else. But hip-hop—the sound of the post- civil-rights, post-soul generation—found a global audience on its own terms.
Today, hip-hop’s colonization of the global imagination, from fashion runways in Europe to dance competitions in Asia, is Disney-esque. This transformation has bred an unprecedented cultural confidence in its black originators. Whiteness is no longer a threat, or an ideal: it’s kitsch to be appropriated, whether with gestures like Combs’s “white parties” or the trickle-down epidemic of collared shirts and cuff links currently afflicting rappers. And an expansive multiculturalism is replacing the us-against-the-world bunker mentality that lent a thrilling edge to hip-hop’s mid-1990s rise.
Peter Rosenberg, a self-proclaimed “nerdy Jewish kid” and radio personality on New York’s Hot 97 FM—and a living example of how hip-hop has created new identities for its listeners that don’t fall neatly along lines of black and white—shares another example: “I interviewed [the St. Louis rapper] Nelly this morning, and he said it’s now very cool and in to have multicultural friends. Like you’re not really considered hip or ‘you’ve made it’ if you’re rolling with all the same people.”
Just as Tiger Woods forever changed the country-club culture of golf, and Will Smith confounded stereotypes about the ideal Hollywood leading man, hip-hop’s rise is helping redefine the American mainstream, which no longer aspires toward a single iconic image of style or class. Successful network-television shows like LostHeroes, and Grey’s Anatomy feature wildly diverse casts, and an entire genre of half-hour comedy, from The Colbert Report to The Office, seems dedicated to having fun with the persona of the clueless white male. The youth market is following the same pattern: consider theCheetah Girls, a multicultural, multiplatinum, multiplatform trio of teenyboppers who recently starred in their third movie, or Dora the Explorer, the precocious bilingual 7-year-old Latina adventurer who is arguably the most successful animated character on children’s television today. In a recent address to the Association of Hispanic Advertising Agencies, Brown Johnson, the Nickelodeon executive who has overseen Dora’s rise, explained the importance of creating a character who does not conform to “the white, middle-class mold.” When Johnson pointed out that Dora’s wares were outselling Barbie’s in France, the crowd hooted in delight.
Pop culture today rallies around an ethic of multicultural inclusion that seems to value every identity—except whiteness. “It’s become harder for the blond-haired, blue-eyed commercial actor,” remarks Rochelle Newman-Carrasco, of the Hispanic marketing firm Enlace. “You read casting notices, and they like to cast people with brown hair because they could be Hispanic. The language of casting notices is pretty shocking because it’s so specific: ‘Brown hair, brown eyes, could look Hispanic.’ Or, as one notice put it: ‘Ethnically ambiguous.’”
“I think white people feel like they’re under siege right now—like it’s not okay to be white right now, especially if you’re a white male,” laughs Bill Imada, of the IW Group. Imada and Newman-Carrasco are part of a movement within advertising, marketing, and communications firms to reimagine the profile of the typical American consumer. (Tellingly, every person I spoke with from these industries knew the Census Bureau’s projections by heart.)
“There’s a lot of fear and a lot of resentment,” Newman-Carrasco observes, describing the flak she caught after writing an article for a trade publication on the need for more-diverse hiring practices. “I got a response from a friend—he’s, like, a 60-something white male, and he’s been involved with multicultural recruiting,” she recalls. “And he said, ‘I really feel like the hunted. It’s a hard time to be a white man in America right now, because I feel like I’m being lumped in with all white males in America, and I’ve tried to do stuff, but it’s a tough time.’”
“I always tell the white men in the room, ‘We need you,’” Imada says. “We cannot talk about diversity and inclusion and engagement without you at the table. It’s okay to be white!
“But people are stressed out about it. ‘We used to be in control! We’re losing control!’”
IF THEY’RE RIGHT—if white America is indeed “losing control,” and if the future will belong to people who can successfully navigate a post-racial, multicultural landscape—then it’s no surprise that many white Americans are eager to divest themselves of their whiteness entirely.
For some, this renunciation can take a radical form. In 1994, a young graffiti artist and activist named William “Upski” Wimsatt, the son of a university professor, published Bomb the Suburbs, the spiritual heir to Norman Mailer’s celebratory 1957 essay, “The White Negro.” Wimsatt was deeply committed to hip-hop’s transformative powers, going so far as to embrace the status of the lowly “wigger,” a pejorative term popularized in the early 1990s to describe white kids who steep themselves in black culture. Wimsatt viewed the wigger’s immersion in two cultures as an engine for change. “If channeled in the right way,” he wrote, “the wigger can go a long way toward repairing the sickness of race in America.”
Wimsatt’s painfully earnest attempts to put his own relationship with whiteness under the microscope coincided with the emergence of an academic discipline known as “whiteness studies.” In colleges and universities across the country, scholars began examining the history of “whiteness” and unpacking its contradictions. Why, for example, had the Irish and the Italians fallen beyond the pale at different moments in our history? Were Jewish Americans white? And, as the historian Matthew Frye Jacobson asked, “Why is it that in the United States, a white woman can have black children but a black woman cannot have white children?”
Much like Wimsatt, the whiteness-studies academics—figures such as Jacobson, David Roediger, Eric Lott, and Noel Ignatiev—were attempting to come to terms with their own relationships with whiteness, in its past and present forms. In the early 1990s, Ignatiev, a former labor activist and the author of How the Irish Became White, set out to “abolish” the idea of the white race by starting the New Abolitionist Movement and founding a journal titled Race Traitor. “There is nothing positive about white identity,” he wrote in 1998. “As James Baldwin said, ‘As long as you think you’re white, there’s no hope for you.’”
Although most white Americans haven’t read Bomb the Suburbs or Race Traitor, this view of whiteness as something to be interrogated, if not shrugged off completely, has migrated to less academic spheres. The perspective of the whiteness-studies academics is commonplace now, even if the language used to express it is different.
“I get it: as a straight white male, I’m the worst thing on Earth,” Christian Lander says. Lander is a Canadian-born, Los Angeles–based satirist who in January 2008 started a blog called Stuff White People Like (stuffwhitepeoplelike.com), which pokes fun at the manners and mores of a specific species of young, hip, upwardly mobile whites. (He has written more than 100 entries about whites’ passion for things like bottled water, “the idea of soccer,” and “being the only white person around.”) At its best, Lander’s site—which formed the basis for a recently published book of the same name (reviewed in the October 2008 Atlantic)—is a cunningly precise distillation of the identity crisis plaguing well-meaning, well-off white kids in a post-white world.
“Like, I’m aware of all the horrible crimes that my demographic has done in the world,” Lander says. “And there’s a bunch of white people who are desperate—desperate—to say, ‘You know what? My skin’s white, but I’m not one of the white people who’s destroying the world.’”
For Lander, whiteness has become a vacuum. The “white identity” he limns on his blog is predicated on the quest for authenticity—usually other people’s authenticity. “As a white person, you’re just desperate to find something else to grab onto. You’re jealous! Pretty much every white person I grew up with wished they’d grown up in, you know, an ethnic home that gave them a second language. White culture is Family Ties and Led Zeppelin and Guns N’ Roses—like, this is white culture. This is all we have.”
Lander’s “white people” are products of a very specific historical moment, raised by well-meaning Baby Boomers to reject the old ideal of white American gentility and to embrace diversity and fluidity instead. (“It’s strange that we are the kids of Baby Boomers, right? How the hell do you rebel against that? Like, your parents will march against the World Trade Organization next to you. They’ll have bigger white dreadlocks than you. What do you do?”) But his lighthearted anthropology suggests that the multicultural harmony they were raised to worship has bred a kind of self-denial.
Matt Wray, a sociologist at Temple University who is a fan of Lander’s humor, has observed that many of his white students are plagued by a racial-identity crisis: “They don’t care about socioeconomics; they care about culture. And to be white is to be culturally broke. The classic thing white students say when you ask them to talk about who they are is, ‘I don’t have a culture.’ They might be privileged, they might be loaded socioeconomically, but they feel bankrupt when it comes to culture … They feel disadvantaged, and they feel marginalized. They don’t have a culture that’s cool or oppositional.” Wray says that this feeling of being culturally bereft often prevents students from recognizing what it means to be a child of privilege—a strange irony that the first wave of whiteness-studies scholars, in the 1990s, failed to anticipate.
Of course, the obvious material advantages that come with being born white—lower infant-mortality rates and easier-to-acquire bank loans, for example—tend to undercut any sympathy that this sense of marginalization might generate. And in the right context, cultural-identity crises can turn well-meaning whites into instant punch lines. Consider ego trip’s The (White) Rapper Show, a brilliant and critically acclaimed reality show that VH1 debuted in 2007. It depicted 10 (mostly hapless) white rappers living together in a dilapidated house—dubbed “Tha White House”—in the South Bronx. Despite the contestants’ best intentions, each one seemed like a profoundly confused caricature, whether it was the solemn graduate student committed to fighting racism or the ghetto-obsessed suburbanite who had, seemingly by accident, named himself after the abolitionist John Brown.
Similarly, Smirnoff struck marketing gold in 2006 with a viral music video titled “Tea Partay,” featuring a trio of strikingly bad, V-neck-sweater-clad white rappers called the Prep Unit. “Haters like to clown our Ivy League educations / But they’re just jealous ’cause our families run the nation,” the trio brayed, as a pair of bottle-blond women in spiffy tennis whites shimmied behind them. There was no nonironic way to enjoy the video; its entire appeal was in its self-aware lampooning of WASPculture: verdant country clubs, “old money,” croquet, popped collars, and the like.
“The best defense is to be constantly pulling the rug out from underneath yourself,” Wray remarks, describing the way self-aware whites contend with their complicated identity. “Beat people to the punch. You’re forced as a white person into a sense of ironic detachment. Irony is what fuels a lot of white subcultures. You also see things like Burning Man, when a lot of white people are going into the desert and trying to invent something that is entirely new and not a form of racial mimicry. That’s its own kind of flight from whiteness. We’re going through a period where whites are really trying to figure out: Who are we?”
THE “FLIGHT FROM WHITENESS” of urban, college-educated, liberal whites isn’t the only attempt to answer this question. You can flee into whiteness as well. This can mean pursuing the authenticity of an imagined past: think of the deliberately white-bread world of Mormon America, where the ’50s never ended, or the anachronistic WASP entitlement flaunted in books like last year’s A Privileged Life: Celebrating WASP Style, a handsome coffee-table book compiled by Susanna Salk, depicting a world of seersucker blazers, whale pants, and deck shoes. (What the book celebrates is the “inability to be outdone,” and the “self-confidence and security that comes with it,” Salk tells me. “That’s why I call it ‘privilege.’ It’s this privilege of time, of heritage, of being in a place longer than anybody else.”) But these enclaves of preserved-in-amber whiteness are likely to be less important to the American future than the construction of whiteness as a somewhat pissed-off minority culture.
This notion of a self-consciously white expression of minority empowerment will be familiar to anyone who has come across the comedian Larry the Cable Guy—he of “Farting Jingle Bells”—or witnessed the transformation of Detroit-born-and-bred Kid Rock from teenage rapper into “American Bad Ass” southern-style rocker. The 1990s may have been a decade when multiculturalism advanced dramatically—when American culture became “colorized,” as the critic Jeff Chang put it—but it was also an era when a very different form of identity politics crystallized. Hip-hop may have provided the decade’s soundtrack, but the highest-selling artist of the ’90s was Garth Brooks. Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods may have been the faces of athletic superstardom, but it was NASCAR that emerged as professional sports’ fastest-growing institution, with ratings second only to the NFL’s.
As with the unexpected success of the apocalyptic Left Behind novels, or the Jeff Foxworthy–organized Blue Collar Comedy Tour, the rise of country music and auto racing took place well off the American elite’s radar screen. (None of Christian Lander’s white people would be caught dead at a NASCARrace.) These phenomena reflected a growing sense of cultural solidarity among lower-middle-class whites—a solidarity defined by a yearning for American “authenticity,” a folksy realness that rejects the global, the urban, and the effete in favor of nostalgia for “the way things used to be.”
Like other forms of identity politics, white solidarity comes complete with its own folk heroes, conspiracy theories (Barack Obama is a secret Muslim! The U.S. is going to merge with Canada and Mexico!), and laundry lists of injustices. The targets and scapegoats vary—from multiculturalism and affirmative action to a loss of moral values, from immigration to an economy that no longer guarantees the American worker a fair chance—and so do the political programs they inspire. (Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan both tapped into this white identity politics in the 1990s; today, its tribunes run the ideological gamut, from Jim Webb to Ron Paul to Mike Huckabee to Sarah Palin.) But the core grievance, in each case, has to do with cultural and socioeconomic dislocation—the sense that the system that used to guarantee the white working class some stability has gone off-kilter.
Wray is one of the founders of what has been called “white-trash studies,” a field conceived as a response to the perceived elite-liberal marginalization of the white working class. He argues that the economic downturn of the 1970s was the precondition for the formation of an “oppositional” and “defiant” white-working-class sensibility—think of the rugged, anti-everything individualism of 1977’sSmokey and the Bandit. But those anxieties took their shape from the aftershocks of the identity-based movements of the 1960s. “I think that the political space that the civil-rights movement opens up in the mid-1950s and ’60s is the transformative thing,” Wray observes. “Following the black-power movement, all of the other minority groups that followed took up various forms of activism, including brown power and yellow power and red power. Of course the problem is, if you try and have a ‘white power’ movement, it doesn’t sound good.”
The result is a racial pride that dares not speak its name, and that defines itself through cultural cues instead—a suspicion of intellectual elites and city dwellers, a preference for folksiness and plainness of speech (whether real or feigned), and the association of a working-class white minority with “the real America.” (In the Scots-Irish belt that runs from Arkansas up through West Virginia, the most common ethnic label offered to census takers is “American.”) Arguably, this white identity politics helped swing the 2000 and 2004 elections, serving as the powerful counterpunch to urban white liberals, and the McCain-Palin campaign relied on it almost to the point of absurdity (as when a McCain surrogate dismissed Northern Virginia as somehow not part of “the real Virginia”) as a bulwark against the threatening multiculturalism of Barack Obama. Their strategy failed, of course, but it’s possible to imagine white identity politics growing more potent and more forthright in its racial identifications in the future, as “the real America” becomes an ever-smaller portion of, well, the real America, and as the soon-to-be white minority’s sense of being besieged and disdained by a multicultural majority grows apace.
This vision of the aggrieved white man lost in a world that no longer values him was given its most vivid expression in the 1993 film Falling Down. Michael Douglas plays Bill Foster, a downsized defense worker with a buzz cut and a pocket protector who rampages through a Los Angeles overrun by greedy Korean shop-owners and Hispanic gangsters, railing against the eclipse of the America he used to know. (The film came out just eight years before California became the nation’s first majority-minority state.) Falling Down ends with a soulful police officer apprehending Foster on the Santa Monica Pier, at which point the middle-class vigilante asks, almost innocently: “I’m the bad guy?”
BUT THIS IS a nightmare vision. Of course most of America’s Bill Fosters aren’t the bad guys—just as civilization is not, in the words of Tom Buchanan, “going to pieces” and America is not, in the phrasing of Pat Buchanan, going “Third World.” The coming white minority does not mean that the racial hierarchy of American culture will suddenly become inverted, as in 1995’s White Man’s Burden, an awful thought experiment of a film, starring John Travolta, that envisions an upside-down world in which whites are subjugated to their high-class black oppressors. There will be dislocations and resentments along the way, but the demographic shifts of the next 40 years are likely to reduce the power of racial hierarchies over everyone’s lives, producing a culture that’s more likely than any before to treat its inhabitants as individuals, rather than members of a caste or identity group.
Consider the world of advertising and marketing, industries that set out to mold our desires at a subconscious level. Advertising strategy once assumed a “general market”—“a code word for ‘white people,’” jokes one ad executive—and smaller, mutually exclusive, satellite “ethnic markets.” In recent years, though, advertisers have begun revising their assumptions and strategies in anticipation of profound demographic shifts. Instead of herding consumers toward a discrete center, the goal today is to create versatile images and campaigns that can be adapted to highly individualized tastes. (Think of the dancing silhouettes in Apple’s iPod campaign, which emphasizes individuality and diversity without privileging—or even representing—any specific group.)
At the moment, we can call this the triumph of multiculturalism, or post-racialism. But just aswhiteness has no inherent meaning—it is a vessel we fill with our hopes and anxieties—these terms may prove equally empty in the long run. Does being post-racial mean that we are past race completely, or merely that race is no longer essential to how we identify ourselves? Karl Carter, of Atlanta’s youth-oriented GTM Inc. (Guerrilla Tactics Media), suggests that marketers and advertisers would be better off focusing on matrices like “lifestyle” or “culture” rather than race or ethnicity. “You’ll have crazy in-depth studies of the white consumer or the Latino consumer,” he complains. “But how do skaters feel? How do hip-hoppers feel?”
The logic of online social networking points in a similar direction. The New York University sociologist Dalton Conley has written of a “network nation,” in which applications like Facebook and MySpace create “crosscutting social groups” and new, flexible identities that only vaguely overlap with racial identities. Perhaps this is where the future of identity after whiteness lies—in a dramatic departure from the racial logic that has defined American culture from the very beginning. What Conley, Carter, and others are describing isn’t merely the displacement of whiteness from our cultural center; they’re describing a social structure that treats race as just one of a seemingly infinite number of possible self-identifications.
From the archives:

The Freedmen's Bureau (March 1901)
"The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line..."
By W.E.B. DuBois
The problem of the 20th century, W. E. B. DuBois famously predicted, would be the problem of the color line. Will this continue to be the case in the 21st century, when a black president will govern a country whose social networks increasingly cut across every conceivable line of identification? The ruling of United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind no longer holds weight, but its echoes have been inescapable: we aspire to be post-racial, but we still live within the structures of privilege, injustice, and racial categorization that we inherited from an older order. We can talk about defining ourselves by lifestyle rather than skin color, but our lifestyle choices are still racially coded. We know, more or less, that race is a fiction that often does more harm than good, and yet it is something we cling to without fully understanding why—as a social and legal fact, a vague sense of belonging and place that we make solid through culture and speech.
But maybe this is merely how it used to be—maybe this is already an outdated way of looking at things. “You have a lot of young adults going into a more diverse world,” Carter remarks. For the young Americans born in the 1980s and 1990s, culture is something to be taken apart and remade in their own image. “We came along in a generation that didn’t have to follow that path of race,” he goes on. “We saw something different.” This moment was not the end of white America; it was not the end of anything. It was a bridge, and we crossed it.
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/01/the-end-of-white-america/307208/

Wednesday 10 December 2014

Shakespeare Couldn't Write

Tom Stoppard is clearly aware of these problems.
Stupid, Stupid, Lemon Stupid.

Alois Hitler (Junior).

Alois Hitler Senior was illiterate, but had a lot of money.

He was a playboy.

And until the age of 35, he was Alois Shicklgruber.

Shakespeare wasn't Shakespeare and Hitler wasn't Hitler.

"Shakespeare" was Christopher Marlowe 
and "Adolph Hitler"/Hittler/Heidler was Adolph Shicklgruber.

(PROBABLY)
EVERYTHING YOU KNOW IS WRONG.

Slouching Towards Rex-84 : LBJ and the Battle Against Martial Law

Watts, August 1965

Berkley, December 2014

"I'm not going to send anyone out there [to California] that [the] State doesn't ask for - I don't want to completely admit that City government, State Government, County government is impotent in this country and 'I'm a Dictator'... And if the Governor of the State asks me, as Wallace did, 'I'm financially unable,' or 'I have no power to do this', then I'll move in two minutes..." - Lyndon Baines Johnson, August 14th 1965



"The Secretary of the Army was Cyrus Vance... His military attaché was Al Haig, and his chief legal counsel was Joe Califano.

Not one book on the Kennedy Assassination, or the the King Assassination appropriately brings up the relationship of Haig, Vance and Califano..."
- Bro. Steve Cokely







"I give a shout out to the living dead
 Who stood out on Watts as the feds cold centralized...
  
 The sleeping gas, every home was like Alcatraz
 And muthaf*ckas lost their minds!"



Insurrection Act, 1807
§ 333. Interference with State and Federal law
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.


Califano, Haig and Vance want LBJ to go to (Federal) Martial Law without talking to Governor Pat Brown.

They try to go through the Adjutant-General of the California National Guard.

LBJ says "No".

"The Secretary of the Army [by this stage, Acting Secretary of Defense] was Cyrus Vance... His military attaché was Al Haig, and his chief legal counsel was Joe Califano.

Not one book on the Kennedy Assassination, or the the King Assassination appropriately brings up the relationship of Haig, Vance and Califano..."

- Bro. Steve Cokely


"The previous year [1967], over a hundred cities had burned in the United States..."

- William F. Pepper explains the perceived military necessity for the King Assassination within the Pentagon and the JCS.


--Yes, it hurts-- especially this one! / Baldy, [1965 Aug. 21]

1965 Aug. 21

The Clifford Baldowski cartoon depicts a man showing Martin Luther King, Jr. labeled "Non-Violence," a Los Angeles newspaper. King has been stabbed by knives labeled "Mayor Yorty," "White House," and "Gov. Brown." King is pointing to the switchblade labeled "The Mob" in his back.



Operation Garden Plot - September 1968 Version








Brothers and sisters there is a place for you in America
Places are being prepared and readied night and day, night and day
The white boy's plan is being readied night and day, night and day
Listen close to what rap say bout traps like Allenwood P.A.
Already in D.C. to preventatively detain you and me
How long you think it's going to be before even our dreams ain't free
You think I exaggerate check out Allenwood P.A.
And night and day, night and day - the white boy's plotting night and day, night and day
The Jews and Hitler come to mind
The thought of slavery far behind
But white paranoia is here to stay
The white boy's scheming night and day, night and day
What you think bout the King Alfred Plan
You ain't heard; where you been man

If I may paraphrase the government notice reads:



"Should there at anytime become a clear and present danger initiated by any radical element threatening the operation of the government of the United States of America, members of this radical element shall be tranported to dentention centers until such time as their threat has been eliminated - code KING ALFRED"

Bullshit I bet you say there ain't no Allenwood P.A.
And people ain't waiting night and day, night and day, night and day
There will be without the Motown sound and thunderbird
Wollowing in the echoes of Mlcolm's words
There must be black unity, there must be black unity
For in the end unity will be thrust upon us and we upon it and each other
Lock in cages penned, hemmed in shoulder to shoulder - arms out-stretched
For just a crust of bread,watermelon, mirages and oasis that does not exist
Cuntured up by the bubbling stinch of unwash bodies and unsanitary quarters
Concrete and bobbed-wire, babies screaming
Stumbling around in a mental circle because you never cared enough to be black
In the end unity will be thrust upon us - lanketed, stipled
A salty taste in your mouth from blood oozing from cracks and wooly heads
Red pools becoming thicker than syrup slow down your face
Spurs matte from the life force sprung loose from wells
Welled deep by the enforcers of mock justice of the red, white and blue
In the end unity will be thrust upon us
Let us unite because of love and not hate
Let us unite on our own and not because of bobbed-wired death
You dare not ignore the things I say
Whitey's waiting night and day, night and day, night and day, night and day





The MLK Civil Trial Opening Arguments by Dr. William F Pepper, Attorney at Law.

In November 1999, trial commenced in King v. Jowers, a wrongful death civil action filed by Dr. Pepper on behalf of Dr. King's wife and children. Jowers was the only defendant and thus the only other party to the lawsuit. At the conclusion of the nearly four week trial, the jury adopted a verdict offered by the parties finding that Jowers and "others, including government agencies" participated in a conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King. 

Wendy's : "Dave is On the Square"


TROWEL

An implement of Operative Masonry, which has been adopted by Speculative Freemasons as the peculiar working-tool of the Master's Degree. By this implement, and its use in Operative Masonry to spread the cement which binds all the parts of the building into one common mass, we are taught to spread the cement of affection and kindness, which unites all the members of the Masonic family, wheresoever dispersed over the globe, into one companionship of Brotherly Love and an old custom in an Oxford Lodge, England, gave it prominence as a jewel, and as a symbol it goes back to the practice of the Ancient.

Today this implement is considered the appropriate working-tool of a Master Mason, because, in Operative Masonry, while the Apprentice is engaged in preparing the rude materials, which require only the Gage and Gavel to give them their proper shape. the Fellow Craft places them in their proper position by means of the Plumb, Level, and Square; but the Master Mason alone, having examined their correctness and proved them true and trusty, secures them permanently in their place by spreading, with the trowel, the cement that irrevocably binds them together. The Trowel has also been adopted as the jewel of the Select Master. But its uses in this Degree are not symbolical. They are simply connected with the historical legend of the Degree.


- Source: Mackey's Encyclopedia of Freemasonry

Dave is On the Square.

Upright and True.


LeBron James vs. The House of Windsor


They're at it again...


Question : Is not the Daily Telegraph breaking Royal Protocol by (still) filing her press clippings under "Kate Middleton" and not "HRH The Dutchess of Cambridge"...?

Does the house organ of MI6 know something is coming which we don't...?

She is a born commoner, after all...








Ethiopian charity scam. Millions of dollars in Western aid for victims of the Ethiopian famine of 1984-85 was siphoned off by rebels to buy weapons, a BBC investigation finds. Former rebel leaders told the BBC that they posed as merchants in meetings with charity workers to get aid money. They used the cash to fund attempts to overthrow the government of the time. One rebel leader estimated $95m (£63m) - from Western governments and charities including Band Aid - was channelled into the rebel fight.

The CIA, in a 1985 assessment entitled Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought, also alleged aid money was being misused. Its report concluded: "Some funds that insurgent organisations are raising for relief operations, as a result of increased world publicity, are almost certainly being diverted for military purposes."

 
Death Aid : Prince Philip from Spike EP on Vimeo.

Oh, I can guess.... But I hardly need to.

"Thus even though it is quite true that any radical eugenic policy will be for many years politically and psychologically impossible, it will be important for UNESCO to see that the eugenic problem is examined with the greatest care, and that the public mind is informed of the issues at stake so that much that now is unthinkable may at least become thinkable.

 - Julian Huxley, UNESCO: It's Purpose and Philosophy, 1946



Of course they do. 

Well, tonight Thank God it's them instead of you...



Monday 8 December 2014

Ashton Carter - Warmonger



Just sketch for me what the situation was in June 1994.

In June 1994, North Korea was preparing to remove some fuel rods from a research reactor which they'd been operating at Yongbyon. [The] fuel rods contained five or six bombs' worth of weapons-grade plutonium. They were going to take those fuel rods and extract the plutonium from them.

That's reprocessing?

So-called "reprocessing." We felt that that would bring a potentially hostile nation to the United States across the nuclear finish line, and that that wasn't acceptable to us. We were not, by any means, confident that we could talk them out of taking that step. Therefore we looked into the possibility of compelling them by force to set back their nuclear program. We designed a strike of conventional precision munitions on Yongbyon, which we were very confident would destroy the reactor, entomb the plutonium and that we could mount such a strike and carry it out without causing the reactor to create a Chernobyl-like radiological plume downwind, which was an obviously important concern.

It is a Chernobyl model plant. Correct?

It is graphite-moderated like the Chernobyl plant. It's a smaller scale, but it does have flammable graphite in it. So you need to worry that a fire could start that would sweep all this radioactive junk up from the core and cause a radiological problem downwind. We were very confident we could avoid that.

So this was bombers going in and hitting it with missiles?

You could do it with tactical aircraft, you could do it with strategic aircraft, and you could do it with cruise missiles. Depending on the circumstances, we could have used any one of those or a combination of the three. We analyzed each building at Yongbyon, particularly the reactor, as I've said, but also the fuel fabrication plant, the reprocessing plant, the reactors under construction. We figured out where, if a precision munition is delivered on that structure, you will destroy the structure -- the objective being to set back their program many years. As I said, we were absolutely confident that we could have carried out a strike which would have been surgical within its own frame.

So why not do it?

The larger consequences would be far from surgical. North Korea maintains a million men on the DMZ. Thousands of artillery tubes are trained on Seoul, and Scud missiles are trained on South Korea. That's a large and antiquated army. We've had a war plan jointly devised with the forces of South Korea, called Op Plan 5027, which has been in existence for many years -- constantly updated for the defense of South Korea against North Korea, in the event that those million men and the artillery all spill over the DMZ.

We were also confident in 1994 -- and I'm sure we're very confident today -- that we would, within just a few weeks, destroy North Korea's armed forces if they started that war, and we would destroy then their regime.

We reckoned there would be many, many tens of thousands of deaths: American, South Korean, North Korean, combatant, non-combatant. So the outcome wasn't in doubt. But the loss of life in that war -- God forbid that kind of war ever starts on the Korean Peninsula. The loss of life is horrific.

Everyone could appreciate the magnitude of the damage that North Korea could do, if it chose to respond to a strike on Yongbyon [by attacking South Korea]. Now, if we did it properly, if it came to this option, one would say to the North Koreans in advance, "Yes, you can lash out at South Korea after we mount this attack. That will be the end of your regime." So after the strike on Yongbyon, the ball's in their court.

Now what we couldn't do was assure anyone, and I'm sure the secretary of defense couldn't assure the president, that North Korea would not, irrationally lash out and begin that war. They say they would. So we would be calling their bluff. Therefore, there were substantial risks associated with carrying that out that attack, although it would surely set back their nuclear program. That was a risk that I certainly felt at the time, and feel now, was worth running in light of the enormous risks to our security associated with letting North Korea go nuclear.

So you thought it was feasible to go to war?

It is such a disaster for our security in many ways to allow North Korea to go nuclear that we needed to run then -- and I think we need to run now -- substantial risks to avoid the greater danger of a nuclear North Korea.

But you're not saying, are you, that we should consider striking them now?

No. I think President Bush has said we're seeking a diplomatic resolution to the situation now, which means trying to talk the North Koreans out of going down the nuclear path. Now, to be successful at doing that, one needs to make it persuasive to them that they're better off without nuclear weapons than they are with nuclear weapons.

Was the Agreed Framework a good deal?

The Agreed Framework did one thing which was very important to us, which was to freeze North Korea's plutonium program at Yongbyon right up until just a few months ago. Had that not been frozen, by now North Korea would have several tens of nuclear weapons. So by that standard, it certainly did our security a service. It didn't do everything. It did not address ballistic missiles, which we have a serious problem with respect to North Korea. It did not address adequately, clearly, a uranium-based nuclear weapons program, because we now know that North Korea embarked on a uranium-based program at the same time.

Is it fair to say that what the Agreed Framework accomplished was getting them off of a fast-track at Yongbyon to a slow track towards getting nuclear weapons?

At Yongbyon, they were stopped in their tracks. That is, they never took those fuel rods and reprocessed them to get the plutonium.

But that was a potential fast track.

That was. They remained a few months away from reprocessing those rods, but they didn't reprocess those rods for eight long years. During that time, we could all rest more easily. At the same time the plutonium program was frozen, we now know that they began experimenting with, and then embarking upon a program involving the other metal that you can make nuclear weapons out of -- namely, uranium. Now they're not very far along in that. So it doesn't present a clear and present danger in the way that the plutonium program still does.

The plutonium program can lead to five or six bombs within a few weeks. The uranium program won't lead to bombs for many, many months. But the uranium program proves any undertaking you make with North Korea you better verify.

The Agreed Framework muddles along. Opposition sets in from Congress, and by 1998, it's in trouble. There's a missile firing over Japan. The Perry Review process comes in, and you jump into this.

Yes. President Clinton -- I think, to his credit -- recognized in 1998 that the United States had fallen asleep on the North Korea issue. So great had the relief been in 1994 that we'd managed to freeze the plutonium program at Yongbyon, everybody went off and worked on other things.

Why'd they fall asleep?

Bosnia, Kosovo, other [pressing] events, Haiti, Somalia -- I mean, go down the list of issues of the 1990s that seemed so important at the time. So in 1998, when the North Koreans fired this ballistic missile, everybody in the region and the United States woke up and said, "Boy, we haven't been paying attention to them. But they've been sure been paying attention."

So President Clinton asked then-former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to lead an effort to review our policy and put a whole package together about this odd little place. Bill Perry asked me to be his senior advisor, sort of deputy, in this effort. We looked very hard at the possibility of, was there some way that we could undermine the North Korean regime or get rid of it? We looked very hard at that. That didn't look very promising, and ultimately we set that aside. But it's worth asking why.

History, human nature, would tell you that the North Korean regime, can't go on like this forever -- this very odd Stalinist throwback government, unable to feed itself. While that's true, there was no evidence that we could deduce that you could go into a president of the United States and say, "I don't think they're going to make it much longer." They have amazing staying power. Nor were we able to identify any cracks in the facade into which we could put a crowbar. Most defectors from North Korea, when asked, "Did you ever discuss your feelings about the regime with anyone else?" will tell you no, and so we didn't have a situation like Afghanistan.

In other words, they never discussed dissatisfaction with the leadership.

Right. There was never a conspiracy, never a tremendous fear. This is a society which is now in its third generation of severe political repression, so that children in North Korea have several hours of political education a day. Their parents did, and their grandparents did.

If you take the other extreme, which is Afghanistan, where you go in and you stir the pot a little bit and everybody rises up against the Taliban -- there [is] no evidence that we could deduce that we had any such prospect in North Korea. Additionally, an undermining strategy was, at best, a long-term proposition, and we needed a short-term way of addressing the weapons of mass destruction.

That remains true today. I don't know how long the North Korean regime can last. But we can't just wait for them to collapse, because in the meantime, they can do lasting damage to our security.

Another possibility was to encourage reform in North Korea, and to suggest that Kim Jong Il take the path of China's Deng Xiaoping -- open up the country, open up the economy. That, too, one could hope for, but we didn't feel that we could recommend it as a strategy, because, for starters, Kim Jong Il doesn't seem to want to open up.

If Kim Jong Il embarks on the path of reform and he is looking out on the spectrum of post-communist leaders, and he's saying, "Where am I going to end up? Am I going to end up like Deng Xiaoping, a hero? Am I going to end up like Gorbachev, reviled by my people, but alive? Or is the end of the road of a reform path for me more like what happened to Nicolai Ceausescu being shot in a revolution?"

He doesn't show any signs of confidence that he can end up like Deng Xiaoping. So we can hope that he'll take that path. But hope and strategy are two different things. You can't go into a president of the United States and say, "Well, let's sit back and let him do whatever he wants with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and hope that he's going to reform," when he doesn't show any evidence of wanting to reform.

So both undermining and hoping for reform, didn't, to us, address the urgent problem we had, which is nuclear and ballistic missiles in the hands of this government. That's why we wrote in the report -- an unclassified version of which has been released -- that we have to deal with the North Korean regime as it is, not as we might wish it to be. That remains true today as well. Unless somebody knows how to hasten this regime on in history, it can do a lot of damage to our security while it exists.

After the Perry report came out, we began to talk to them.

Yes. Coming out of the North Korea policy review, President Clinton sent Secretary Perry to Pyongyang. I went with him, and we laid out the results of our review. We described for them two paths. We said, "Here is a path in which you knock it off with weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and ballistic missiles. On that path, we can see a situation where we keep on keeping on in the current way. We don't like you. From listening to your radio broadcasts, you don't like us either. But we have a stable situation here on the Korean Peninsula, where if you attack southward, you know that the certain result of that will be your destruction. But you know that we know that's a very violent war and therefore, we're not going to provoke it either. That's a stable situation, in which you can keep running this odd little country, and we're prepared to live with that. We're not prepared to live with you upsetting that situation, and the whole world, with weapons of mass destruction."

These talks are pretty serious. This is tense, I imagine.

Very tense, and particularly when we met with the military leaders, they are very tense. Now, we're expecting that, and that was not a problem for us. We delivered those messages. Secretary Perry and I then left office, and the Clinton administration then went on. I was then not part of the sequel to that. But what happened was, some small steps were taken on that path -- reversible steps. I don't know whether North Korea would have continued up that path and taken progressively larger steps. Maybe, maybe not. We don't know. Now we're in a rather different situation.

A lot of work that you and Dr. Perry had undertaken went sort of by the by, with the change of administrations.

I hope that the North Koreans understand that the conclusions that we came to are conclusions that are embedded in America's security situation.

They're permanent?

They're permanent.

But our policy changes all the time.

If our policy is really going to protect American interests, it's going to have to draw the line at a nuclear North Korea. No American government can tolerate a nuclear North Korea. That's a major disaster for our security, and a setback for us.

To be successful, any American strategy in that part of the world has to have some degree of consensus with at least our allies, the South Koreans and the Japanese. We have to have that. Any American strategy has to come to grips with the fact that, much as they seem odd to us, to put it mildly, the North Koreans don't seem to be going anywhere. They seem to be able to get by, year in and year out.

Therefore, if we're going to protect our security in the face of that reality, and we don't have any realistic strategy for changing that reality, or way to get rid of them short of war, then the only thing we can do is to try to deal with them as they are. That means compelling them and persuading them that the path of going nuclear is a path that will inevitably bring us to confrontation, and that there's another path for them.

We can try to talk North Korea out of taking the path to nuclear weapons. I'm not confident, at this point, that we'll succeed. A year ago, I may have had more confidence. But the North Koreans have moved now forward quite a ways, unresisted by us. They've moved the fuel rods. They're restarting the reactor at Yongbyon. I'm concerned now that they think that, if they just dash across the finish line to nuclear status while we're busy, understandably, with other things -- Al Qaeda, Iraq -- that they can create a fait accompli, an irreversible situation before we get our strategy together.

Nevertheless, I think that a diplomatic try is worth trying. I think we have to look at it as an experiment.

You're saying that the Bush administration has done nothing on North Korea, and that this situation, perhaps, is beyond repair?

Well, the situation has been getting progressively worse. It's been unraveling now for well over a year. ... The North Koreans take progressive steps towards a nuclear status, and we have not articulated, at least, an overall strategy for dealing with this situation. What is our approach? Are we going to let it happen? Sit back and watch? Are we going to try to talk them out of it? If we're going to try to talk them out of it, when are we going to start talking?

Are we going to go to a military option, which one can talk about at this stage, but doesn't really become realistic in terms of our relations with the others in the region -- our South Korean allies, who would bear the brunt of an assault from North Korea? That option isn't really realistic unless and until we can show that we gave a diplomatic approach a try, and that try failed. Then we can turn to the military option, and we would have the support and assistance we needed to carry that out.

So while I can't be confident that a diplomatic approach will succeed now, it seems to be clear that that's a step we need to take. It's an experiment we need to run, and we need to embark upon it soon, because the North Koreans are creating facts on the ground that my children and my children's children will have to live with. The half-life of plutonium 239, which is what they're going to get out of those fuel rods, is 24,400 years. I don't know how long the North Korean regime is going to last. But it's not going to last 24,400 years. So while this rather odd regime is in power, perhaps just for a few fleeting years, they can create a lasting danger to us and to humanity.

The problem isn't only nuclear weapons in the hands of the North Korean regime as it is. It's what happens after the North Korean regime. Where do those nuclear weapons end up?

You've seen the intelligence. Is there any information that leads you to believe that the North Koreans are assisting Middle Eastern countries such as Iran or others in getting nuclear weapons?

What information I have on that subject I can't share. But what I can say is that North Korea has clearly, in the past, assisted Iran in its ballistic missile program. The Iranian Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which they call the Shahab-3, is a North Korean missile. The North Koreans call it a Nodong. Same thing.

They've helped the Pakistanis with missiles?

That's right.

They've helped the Iranians with missiles, the Libyans with missiles?

Yes.

The Syrians with missiles? Egypt?

Many countries in the Middle East. Almost anybody who will buy them, and they're out hawking them all the time.

Are there North Koreans helping the Iranians with nuclear programs?

Wouldn't surprise me to find the technical underbellies of these weapons of mass destruction programs in constant communication with one another and working with one another.

It wouldn't surprise you to find out that the North Koreans were helping the Iranians develop a nuclear bomb?

No, it wouldn't surprise me.

Syrians or Libya?

Would not surprise me, no, and it's fine as long as they're only trading blueprints. But when they've got the metal, the plutonium that can make those blueprints real, then you really have to be worried.

This is important, because this is, as I understand it, a major piece of their gross national product -- missile sales.

In the past, it has been a substantial source of hard currency earnings to them. I think the market has tapered off a little bit for them.

All the more reason to sell something bigger and better?

That's much more valuable.

Ed. Note: More about North Korea's missile trade

How much do you sell a nuclear warhead for, or five pounds of plutonium? Enough to make a big warhead?

There is mercifully no market in that. No test has been done. I believe it's the case that there were rumors 25 years ago, that Gadhafi offered India to relieve its entire foreign debt in return for one nuclear weapon.

How much was that?

I don't know, but it must have been billions and billions and billions of dollars. And remember that countries that choose the proliferation path spend an enormous amount reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium. It's expensive to make nuclear weapons. It's a hassle. There are large facilities involved, and you get caught building them. They're facilities that can be bombed, like Yongbyon. So if you're intent upon getting nuclear weapons, by far the easier path is to buy the material -- even more so if you're a terrorist who doesn't have a country in which he can build a reprocessing facility or build a uranium enrichment facility.

Our nightmare, any of us, which would change the way we lived our lives, was if we thought that any moment Al Qaeda might detonate a nuclear weapon in a city anywhere in the world, because we learned that they had gotten hold of some plutonium from the North Koreans by sale, or when the North Korean regime collapsed, somebody smuggled it out.

People talk about "containment" of North Korea. Well, you can contain North Korea in many ways, but it's not believable to me that we can put a hermetic seal around North Korea that will guarantee us that a little piece of metal this big of plutonium can't get out of North Korea. That's completely incredible.

How worried are you about the way that this is being handled now?

I'm very worried about the fact that the situation just gets progressively worse, and North Korea will not check itself. It will keep plunging forward. So unless we show it the limits of the conduct that we're willing to accept, the North Koreans will just keep going. They won't sit on the back burner. It's not in their nature. The one thing this place is expert at is getting off the back burner. They're the masters of provocations, of ratcheting up pressure, of playing these kind of games. If you don't want them driving the train, them pacing events -- that's what they've been doing; they've been making them worse and they've been calling the shots -- you have to get out in front of them and begin to drive the train yourself.

That requires a strategy. It requires that we come, as a government, to some view, and there can be disagreements about what that view ought to be. But you have to come to some strategy for dealing with North Korea. You need to share that with your allies, Japan and South Korea, and then you need to go to the North Koreans and say, "Listen. This is the way it's going to be."

That's what they say they're doing. They're talking to South Korea. They're talking to China and Japan. Everybody's trying to get on the same page.

I think, so far, we have been saying to South Korea, China and Japan, Russia, "You go talk to the North Koreans." That's a good thing to do. They need to recognize that their interests are at stake, and it's not entirely up to us to save their bacon by stopping North Korea. So they're an important part of the choreography. But I don't think we can outsource our security to them. I don't think we can say, "We're not going to do anything about the North Koreans. But if you guys want to do something about the North Koreans, go ahead." That's not safe, either.

But I hear the administration saying they're going to talk to them, but they want to engage everyone in the region, all the players in those talks.

I think that's the right approach, and we need to get that going now, because what is occurring, as we speak, and as the weeks go by, is a situation that is unraveling. Our options for that diplomacy are narrowing, and North Korea is progressively creating, on the ground, irreversibly, a fait accompli that will be harder for us to deal with in the future.

So there's some urgency to getting around to pulling our strategy together; coordinating it with all of our partners; getting them to join in a common diplomatic onslaught against North Korea; and test the proposition that North Korea can be talked out of its nuclear ambitions. As I said before, I'm not sure it can be.

And if it's not able to be talked out of it, what does the United States have to do?

On that, I think you have to then go back to where we were in 1994, where you're looking at the use of force to achieve your objectives.

If they cross the line and decide to become a nuclear power, we can only face war with them, is what you're saying?

The alternative of letting North Korea go nuclear -- just sitting back, and allowing that to happen -- causes us to run such grave risks, in the near term and in the far term once they've made that plutonium that lasts a long time, that in order to avert that risk, we do have to be prepared to run substantial risks in the near term. They will have presented us with that situation. But we're not there yet. We might get there, if a diplomatic approach fails -- which it may well.

In 1999, you met with Vice Foreign Minister Kang and other North Korean officials. What sense did you have of these men, and what they stood for, and what their goals were?

In the North Korean system, the person who really counts, of course, is Kim Jong Il. So when you're talking to other officials of the government, you know that you're talking to someone who is unable to make commitments that they don't refer first to Kim Jong Il. The general belief -- everyone says this, and I think it's absolutely true -- is that the paramount objective of the North Korean regime is survival of itself.

The North Koreans see themselves as a miniature Soviet Union. They believe in socialism. But they believe even more in being proud Koreans, and "proud Koreans" means, in their view of history, that they've always been kicked around, by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Russians, the Americans.

It's true.

That causes their ideology to be one of absolute and total and iron self-reliance, as they call it. Autarchy. They want to sit there all by themselves, and not have to count on anybody.

The Juche philosophy.

Exactly, and if you say to the North Koreans, "Come on in. Join the wider world," which is an argument we've used in other countries and other situations to break down repressive regimes, to cause a change of political strategy in other governments -- that's not attractive to them. It's a very tough nut to crack when the definition of their state is one that is arrayed against a hostile world.

That was the Lim Don Won and Kim Dae Jung policy, though, "Sunshine."

Yes. The South Korean government under Kim Dae Jung was trying to suggest to North Korea that it could have survival in a less truculent mode than it was accustomed to, and that if they wanted to keep on keeping on, that was OK with South Korea. If you were South Korean, this would be a very reasonable point of view. Remember, if unification ever occurs on the Korean Peninsula, for South Korea, that means that 22 million poor people move into their house.

That's a much bigger deal than it was in Germany. The East German population was smaller in relation to the West German population than is the North Korean population to the South Korean. And the income differential between North and South Korea is much greater than it was between East and West Germany. So for South Korea, reunification has a mixed complexion. On one hand, "We're one people, and it would be nice to be reunified." On the other hand, the economic penalties would be huge.

So the South Koreans, like, in many ways, the United States, were trying to show North Korea a path where it could survive without taking actions that would necessarily provoke us into coming after it. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are the kind of action -- we can't leave them alone if they do that.

The case to make to them is, "We can leave you alone if you don't. But we can't leave you alone if you do. So you think that nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are your protection, but they're not."

But they have felt threatened ever since Truman and Eisenhower threatened the use of nuclear weapons against them at times, correct? And now, we have a president who repeatedly insults the leader, Kim Jong Il. It seems to be part of the policy. Axis of evil. He's called Kim Jong Il a pygmy. He's said he detests him, or loathes him. This feeds, it seems to me, a paranoia, or a sense of needing security, therefore driving sort of a self-fulfilling policy.

Unless you have a plan -- and I'm not aware of any realistic plan -- to change the government of North Korea, which looks pretty entrenched to me, then it's counterproductive to suggest to the North Koreans that you're out to get them -- if you don't really have any way of being out to get them.

Well, perhaps regime change is actually in fact the policy.

I looked at the possibility of regime change in some detail, and short of conquest -- which, of course, we can do because we have the military power, without question, to do that -- there is little evidence indeed of a situation or a crack in the armor of the North Korean regime into which we could stick a crowbar and bring them down. There's no evidence that I'm aware of that a strategy of unhorsing the regime is a realistic strategy. It's a hope. The president can hope that, if he wants. But hope and a strategy are two different things. You have to have a plan for how you're going to achieve this, and it can't be a long-term plan, because the North Koreans are capable of doing damage to our security in the short term.

When you were working with the North Koreans with Dr. Perry, was there a particular moment that jumps out, where the lights went on and you realized what the options had to be, or who you were dealing with here? You've been on the ground. So I'm talking to you as someone who might be able to give us some insight into who these guys are, what they're like.

Remember, the North Koreans have a very heated rhetoric, and a very heated way of talking to foreigners, including Americans. They talk about how they're going to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. They're going to turn Tokyo into a sea of fire. They'll ask you, "Where are you from?" And when you tell them where you're from, they'll say, "Well, we're going to turn that into a sea of fire."

They asked you where you were from?

They asked Bill Perry where he was from. He's from San Francisco, and they [said], "Well, we can turn San Francisco into a sea of fire." They have a level of rhetoric that takes your breath away.

I remember in 1994, when we were dealing with North Korea, the intelligence experts would come in, and they would say, "That's a very interesting statement by the North Koreans. It's rather conciliatory." I'd say, "How can you tell that's conciliatory?" And they would say, in effect, "Well, you know, it doesn't say anything about your mother." In North Korean terms, that's conciliatory.

So it's a whole level of paranoia, overheated rhetoric, which is the results of three generations of Stalinist indoctrination. There's no question that it's a very strange place. The situation of children and old people is heartbreaking in North Korea, and therefore, one has to realize that you're dealing with about the most dangerous situation you can imagine -- of isolated, repressive government and a people that has suffered in unimaginable ways.

You've seen the suffering firsthand?

No. Of course, when you visit there as an American, you're in Pyongyang. Pyongyang is a model city, so they're not showing you the places where there's truly suffering. But I've talked to humanitarian aid workers who have seen the real North Korea, which I never saw. There's a generation of children there, who are not just physically stunted, but in all likelihood, we understand, neurologically stunted because they didn't get enough food when they were young.

So it really is a heartbreaking situation, and when President Bush says he finds that very upsetting, it's very, very easy to share his view. I think he's absolutely right. Now on top of that situation, you have a headlong run to nuclear weapons. You've got about the strangest and most dangerous situation you can imagine.

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