Acting-out

"I could comment more about Borderline Personality Disorder -- I think I have enough mental energy to DO that tonight....

So, technically speaking it's often considered the Female-variant of Antisocial-Personality Disorder.

So it's classified or it's classified in the domain of externalising disorders; Acting-out disorders - 

And I think what happens....

We don't understand Borderline personality disorder very WELL : and it's characterised by tremendous impulsivity, radical confusion of identity and then this pattern of idealisation of people with whom the person afflicted with the disorder, is associating with :

Radical Idealisation of those people, and then radical devaluation of them --

And then there's another theme that sort of weaves along with it, which is : the proclivity of people with Borderline Personality Disorder, to PRESUME that they will be ABANDONED; --

and then to ACT in a manner that MAKES such abandonment, virtually CERTAIN -- 

And so, it's a very complicated disorder, but that, I think gets at The Crux of it..."

Autism and Policing in Northern Ireland

Autism and Policing in Northern Ireland

The Clown at Midnight

The Clown at Midnight

".....well, it's about Time --"

[makes Goat-noises]

-- The Third Policeman

Blue Alert

Star Trek Voyager : Blue Alert | AI UPSCALE ( 4K )

Cardinal Virtues

….and The Fifth Direction,

The Vertical Direction,

which is in Us.

Cardinal Virtues

The four principal virtues upon which the rest of the moral virtues turn or are hinged.

Those who recite the Divine Office find constantly recurring what seems to be the earliest instance of the word cardinal as applied to the virtues. St. Ambrose, while trying to identify the eight Beatitudes recorded by St. Matthew with the four recorded by St. Luke, makes use of the expression: "Hic quattuor velut virtutes amplexus est cardinales". A little later we find cardinal employed in like manner by St. Augustine (Common of Many Martyrs, third nocturn, second series; also Migne, P.L., XV, 1653; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-II.79.1 ad 1). That St. Jerome also uses the term is a statement which rests on a treatise not written by him, but published among his works; it is to be found in Migne, P.L., XXX, 596.

The term cardo means a hinge, that on which a thing turns, its principal point; and from this St. Thomas derives the various significations of the virtues as cardinal, whether in the generic sense, inasmuch as they are the common qualities of all other moral virtues, or in the specific sense, inasmuch as each has a distinct formal object determining its nature. Every moral virtue fulfils the conditions of being well judged, subserving the common good, being restrained within measure, and having firmness; and these four conditions also yield four distinct virtues.

The fourfold system

The origin of the fourfold system is traceable to Greek philosophy; other sources are earlier, but the Socratic source is most definite. Among the reporters of Socrates, Xenophon is vague on the point; Plato in "The Republic" puts together in a system the four virtues adopted later, with modifications by St. Thomas. (In "The Laws", Bk. I, 631, Plato recurs to his division: "Wisdom is the chief and leader: next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice. These four virtues take precedence in the class of divine goods".) Wishing to say what justice is, the Socratic Plato looked for it in the city-state, where he discovered four classes of men. Lowest was the producing class—the husbandmen and the craftsmen; they were the providers for the bodily needs, for the carnal appetites, which require the restraint of temperance (sophrosúne). Next came the police or soldier class, whose needful virtue was fortitude (’andreía). In this pair of cardinal virtues is exhibited a not very precise portion of Greek psychology, which the Scholastics have perpetuated in the division of appetites as concupiscible and irascible, the latter member having for its characteristic that it must seek its purpose by an arduous endeavour against obstacles. This is a Scholastic modification of tò ’epithumetikòn and tó thumoeidés, neither of which are rational faculties, while they are both amenable to reason (metà lògou); and it is the latter of them especially which is to help the reason, as leading faculty (tò ‘egemonikón), to subdue the concupiscence of the former. This idea of leadership gives us the third cardinal virtue, called by Plato sophía and philosophía, but by Aristotle phrónesis, the practical wisdom which is distinguished from the speculative. The fourth cardinal virtue stands outside the scheme of the other three, which exhaust the psychological trichotomy of man; tò ’epiphumetikón, tò thumoeidés, tò logikón. The Platonic justice of the "Republic", at least in this connexion, is the harmony between these three departments, in which each faculty discharges exactly its own proper function without interfering in the functions of the others. Obviously the senses may disturb reason; not so obviously, yet clearly, reason may disturb sense, if man tries to regulate his virtues on the principles proper to an angel without bodily appetites. In this idea of justice, viz., as concordant working of parts within the individual's own nature, the Platonic notion differs from the Scholastic, which is that justice is strictly not towards self, but towards others. Aristotle, with variations of his own, describes the four virtues which Plato had sketched; but in his "Ethics" he does not put them into one system. They are treated in his general discussion, which does not aim at a complete classification of virtues, and leaves interpreters free to give different enumerations.

The Latins, as represented by Cicero, repeated Plato and Aristotle: "Each man should so conduct himself that fortitude appear in labours and dangers: temperance in foregoing pleasures: prudence in the choice between good and evil: justice in giving every man his own [in suo cuique tribuendo]" (De Fin., V, xxiii, 67; cf. De Offic., I, ii, 5). This is a departure from the idea prominent in Platonic justice, and agrees with the Scholastic definition. It is a clearly admitted fact that in the inspiration of Holy Scripture the ministerial author may use means supplied by human wisdom. The Book of Wisdom is clearly under Hellenic influence: hence one may suppose the repetition of the four Platonic virtues to be connected with their purpose. In Wis., viii, 5, 6, 7, occur sophía or phrónesis, dikaiosúne, sophrosúne, ’andreía. The same list appears in the apocryphal IV Mach., v, 22, 23, except that for sophía is put e’usébeia. Philo compares them to the four rivers of Eden.

Doctrine of St. Thomas

St. Thomas (Summa Theol., I-II, Q. lxi, aa. 2 and 4) derives the cardinal virtues both from their formal objects or the perceived kinds of rational good which they generally seek, and from the subjects, or faculties, in which they reside and which they perfect. The latter consideration is the more easily intelligible. In the intellect is prudence; in the will is justice; in the sensitive appetites are temperance restraining pleasure, and fortitude urging on impulses of resistance to fear which would deter a person from strenuous action under difficulties; also checking the excesses of foolhardy audacity, as seen in some who gratuitously courted martyrdom in times of persecution. On the side of the formal object, which in all cases is rational good, we have the four specific variations. The rational good as an object for the action of intellect demands the virtue of prudence; inasmuch as the dictate of prudence is communicated to the will for exertion in relation to other persons, there arises the demand for justice, giving to every man his due. So far the actions are conceived; next come the passions: the concupiscible and the irascible. The order of objective reason as imposed on the appetite for pleasures demands the virtue of temperance; as imposed on the appetite which is repelled by fear-inspiring tasks, it demands fortitude. St. Thomas found four cardinal virtues in common recognition and he tried to give a systematic account of the group as far as it admitted of logical systematization. In so doing he naturally looked to the faculties employed and to the objects about which they were employed. He found it convenient to regard the action of reason, prudence, and the two passions of the sensitive appetite, lust and fear, as internal to the agent; while he regarded the action of the will as concerned with right order in regard to conduct towards others. As one exponent puts it: "Debitum semper est erga alterum: sed actus rationis et passiones interiores sunt: et ideo prudentia quæ perficit rationem, sicut fortitudo et temperantia quæ regulant passiones, dicuntur virtutes ad nos." Thus with three virtues ad intra and one ad extra were established four cardinal virtues, contrary to Plato's scheme, in which all were directly ad intra, referring to the inner harmony of man.

If it be urged against the cardinal virtues being moral, that all moral virtues are in the rational will and only justice among the four cardinal is so seated, St. Thomas replies that prudence is practical, not speculative; and so it has regard to the will, while the two passions, the concupiscible and the irascible, receiving in their own department, at the dictate of reason, the improving qualifications or habits which are the effects of repeated acts, are thereby rendered more docile to the will, obeying it with greater promptness, ease, and constancy. Thus each cardinal virtue has some seat in the will, direct or indirect. At times Aristotle seems to imply what the Pelagians taught later, that the passions may be trained so as never to offer temptation; as a fact, however, he fully allows elsewhere for the abiding peccability of man. Those whose passions are more ordered may in this regard have more perfect virtue; while from another standpoint their merit is less than that of those who are constant in virtue by heroic resistance to perpetual temptations of great strength.

In the above account of the doctrine propounded by St. Thomas, a number of his nice abstractions are left out : for example, he distinguishes prudence as concerned with means to good ends, which it belongs to another virtue to assign: "ad prudentiam pertinet non præstituere finem virtutibus moralibus, sed de his disponere quæ sunt ad finem." He relies on synderesis, or synteresis, for primary, universal principles; on wisdom for knowledge of the Divine; on counsel for judging what prudence is to dictate; on what he calls "the potential parts" of the cardinal virtues for filling up the description of them in various departments under cognate names, such as appear in the relation of modesty, meekness, and humility to temperance.

The theological virtues are so thoroughly supernatural that to treat them as they might appear in the order of nature is not profitable: with the cardinal virtues the case is different. What has been said above about them makes no reference to grace: the remarks are confined to what may belong simply to natural ethics. There is a gain in the restriction, for a natural appreciation of them is exceedingly useful, and many characters suffer from a defective knowledge of natural goodness. St. Thomas introduces the discussion of cardinal virtues also as gifts, but much that he says omits reference to this aspect.

The cardinal virtues unite the intellectual element and the affective. Much has been said recently of heart going beyond intellect in virtue; but the cardinal virtues, while concerned with the appetitive or affective parts, place prudence as the judge over all. Similarly the theological virtues place faith as the foundation of hope and charity. There is thus a completeness about the system which may be asserted without the pretence that essentially these four virtues must be marked off as a quartet among virtues. If the Greeks had not written, perhaps the Church would not have had exactly this fourfold arrangement. Indeed the division of good conduct into separate virtues is not an instance of hard and fast lines. The solidarity of the virtues and their interplay must always be allowed for, while we recognize the utility of specific differentiations. Within limits the cardinal virtues may be said to be a scientifically arranged group, helpful to clearness of aim for a man who is struggling after well-ordered conduct in a disordered world, which is not prudent, just, brave, temperate.

Sources

PLATO, Republic, Bk. IV, 427-434; IDEM, Laws, Bk. I, 631; IDEM, Theætetus, 176B; ARISTOTLE, Ethics, VI, 5; V, 1; III, 7 and 10; PETER LOMBARD, Sent., Pt. III, Dist. xxxiii, with the various commentators on the text; ST. THOMAS, Summa Theol., I-II, Q. lxi; WAFFELAERT, Tractatus de Virtutibus Cardinalibus (Bruges, 1886).

From Beneath You, it Devours

*ghieh-

Proto-Indo-European root meaning "to yawn, gape, be wide open." 

It forms all or part of: chaos; chasm; dehiscence; gap; gasp; gawp; hiatus; yawn.

It is the hypothetical source of/evidence for its existence is provided by: Sanskrit vijihite "to gape, be ajar;" Greek khainein, Latin hiare "to yawn, gape;" Old Church Slavonic zinoti "to open (one's mouth);" Russian razinut', Serbo-Croatian zinuti, Lithuanian žioju, žioti, Czech zivati "to yawn;" Old English ginian, gionian "open the mouth wide, yawn, gape," Old Norse gina "to yawn," Dutch geeuwen, Old High German ginen "to be wide open," German gähnen "to yawn."

Entries linking to *ghieh-

chaos (n.)

late 14c., "gaping void; empty, immeasurable space," from Old French chaos (14c.) or directly from Latin chaos, from Greek khaos "abyss, that which gapes wide open, that which is vast and empty" (from *khnwos, from PIE root *ghieh- "to yawn, gape, be wide open").

The meaning "utter confusion" (c. 1600) is an extended sense from theological use of chaos in the Vulgate version of "Genesis" (1530s in English) for "the void at the beginning of creation, the confused, formless, elementary state of the universe." The Greek for "disorder" was tarakhē, but the use of chaos here was rooted in Hesiod ("Theogony"), who describes khaos as the primeval emptiness of the Universe, and in Ovid ("Metamorphoses"), who opposes Khaos to Kosmos, "the ordered Universe." Sometimes it was personified as a god, begetter of Erebus and Nyx ("Night").

Meaning "orderless confusion" in human affairs is from c. 1600. Chaos theory in the modern mathematical sense is attested from c. 1977.

chasm (n.)

1590s, "deep crack in the earth," from Latin chasma, from Greek khasma "yawning hollow, gulf," related to khaskein "to yawn," and thus to chaos. In English in 17c. often spelled chasma. Figurative use, in reference to a great interruption or wide breach of any kind, is from 1640s. Related: Chasmy (1786); chasmal (1842, Poe); chasmic (1885). The bloody chasm (1868) was an old rhetorical phrase for the American Civil War.

dehiscence

gap

gasp

gawp

hiatus

yawn

gum

See all related words (9) >

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gap

early 14c., "an opening in a wall or hedge; a break, a breach," mid-13c. in place names, from Old Norse gap "chasm, empty space," related to gapa "to gape, open the mouth wide," common Proto-Germanic (cognates: Middle Dutch, Dutch gapen, German gaffen "to gape, stare," Swedish ga

hiatus

1560s, "a break or opening" in a material object, especially in anatomy, from Latin hiatus "opening, aperture, rupture, gap," from past-participle stem of hiare "to gape, stand open" (from PIE root *ghieh- "to yawn, gape, be wide open"). The sense of "gap or interruption in event

yawn

c. 1300, yenen, yonen, from Old English ginian, gionian "open the mouth wide, yawn, gape," from Proto-Germanic *gin- (source also of Old English giwian, giowian, giwan "to request," Old Norse gina "to yawn," Dutch geeuwen, Old High German ginen "to be wide open," German gähnen "t

enthusiasm

c. 1600, from French enthousiasme (16c.) and directly from Late Latin enthusiasmus, from Greek enthousiasmos "divine inspiration, enthusiasm (produced by certain kinds of music, etc.)," from enthousiazein "be inspired or possessed by a god, be rapt, be in ecstasy," from entheos "

address

early 14c., "to guide, aim, or direct," from Old French adrecier "go straight toward; straighten, set right; point, direct" (13c.), from Vulgar Latin *addirectiare "make straight" (source also of Spanish aderezar, Italian addirizzare), from ad "to" (see ad-) + *directiare "make s

badminton

outdoor game similar to lawn tennis but played with a shuttlecock, 1874, from Badminton House, name of Gloucestershire estate of the Duke of Beaufort, where the game first was played in England, mid-19c., having been picked up by British officers from Indian poona. The place name

figure

c. 1200, "numeral;" mid-13c., "visible appearance of a person;" late 14c., "visible and tangible form of anything," from Old French figure "shape, body; form of a word; figure of speech; symbol, allegory" (10c), from Latin figura "a shape, form, figure; quality, kind, style; figu

convenience

late 14c., "agreement, conformity, resemblance, similarity," also "state or condition of being suitable, adaptation to existing conditions," from Latin convenientia "a meeting together, agreement, harmony," from convenien-, present-participle stem of convenire "to come together,

notorious

1540s, "publicly known and spoken of," from Medieval Latin notorius "well-known, commonly known," from Latin notus "known," past participle of noscere "come to know," from PIE root *gno- "to know." Middle English had notoire (mid-14c. in Anglo-French), from Old French, "well-know

citizen

c. 1300, citisein (fem. citeseine) "inhabitant of a city or town," from Anglo-French citesein, citezein "city-dweller, town-dweller, citizen" (Old French citeien, 12c., Modern French citoyen), from cite (see city) + -ain (see -ian). According to Middle English Compendium, the -s-

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dehiscence (n.)

"a gaping," in botany, "the discharge of seeds or pollen," 1828, from Modern Latin dehiscentia, from dehiscentem (nominative dehiscens), present participle of dehiscere "to gape, open, split down" (of the earth, etc.), from de- (see de-) + hiscere, inchoative of hiare "to yawn" (see yawn (v.)). Related: Dehisce (1650s); dehiscent (1640s).

also from 1828

Entries linking to dehiscence

yawn (v.)

c. 1300, yenen, yonen, from Old English ginian, gionian "open the mouth wide, yawn, gape," from Proto-Germanic *gin- (source also of Old English giwian, giowian, giwan "to request," Old Norse gina "to yawn," Dutch geeuwen, Old High German ginen "to be wide open," German gähnen "to yawn"), from PIE root *ghieh- "to yawn, gape, be wide open." Modern spelling is from 16c. Related: Yawned; yawning.

de- 

active word-forming element in English and in many verbs inherited from French and Latin, from Latin de "down, down from, from, off; concerning" (see de), also used as a prefix in Latin, usually meaning "down, off, away, from among, down from," but also "down to the bottom, totally" hence "completely" (intensive or completive), which is its sense in many English words.

As a Latin prefix it also had the function of undoing or reversing a verb's action, and hence it came to be used as a pure privative — "not, do the opposite of, undo" — which is its primary function as a living prefix in English, as in defrost (1895), defuse (1943), de-escalate (1964), etc. In some cases, a reduced form of dis-.

*ghieh- 

Proto-Indo-European root meaning "to yawn, gape, be wide open." 

It forms all or part of: chaos; chasm; dehiscence; gap; gasp; gawp; hiatus; yawn.

It is the hypothetical source of/evidence for its existence is provided by: Sanskrit vijihite "to gape, be ajar;" Greek khainein, Latin hiare "to yawn, gape;" Old Church Slavonic zinoti "to open (one's mouth);" Russian razinut', Serbo-Croatian zinuti, Lithuanian žioju, žioti, Czech zivati "to yawn;" Old English ginian, gionian "open the mouth wide, yawn, gape," Old Norse gina "to yawn," Dutch geeuwen, Old High German ginen "to be wide open," German gähnen "to yawn."

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Trends of dehiscence

adapted from books.google.com/ngrams/. Ngrams are probably unreliable.

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mealy-mouthed

"afraid to say what one really thinks," 1570s; first element perhaps from Old English milisc "sweet," from Proto-Germanic *meduz "honey" (see mead (n.1)), which suits the sense, but if the Old English word did not survive long enough to be the source of this, perhaps the first el

read

Middle English reden, ireden, "to counsel, advise," also "to read," from Old English rædan, gerædan (West Saxon), redan, geredan (Anglian) "to advise, counsel, persuade; discuss, deliberate; rule, guide; arrange, equip; forebode; to read (observe and apprehend the meaning of some

talent

late 13c., "inclination, disposition, will, desire;" c. 1300, "feeling, emotion, passion," senses now obsolete, from Old French talent (12c.), from Medieval Latin talenta, plural of talentum "inclination, leaning, will, desire" (11c.), in classical Latin "balance, weight; sum of

dwarf

Old English dweorh, dweorg (West Saxon), duerg (Mercian), "very short human being, person much below ordinary stature, whether of proportionate parts or not," also "supernatural being of subhuman size," from Proto-Germanic *dweraz (source also of Old Frisian dwerch, Old Saxon dwe

pistachio

1590s, "nut of the pistachio tree," from Italian pistacchio, from Latin pistacium "pistachio nut," from Greek pistakion "pistachio nut," from pistakē "pistachio tree," from Persian pistah "pistachio." Borrowed earlier in English as pystace, pistace (mid-15c.), from Old French pis

Rasputin

acquired name (Russian, literally "debauchee") of Grigory Yefimovich Novykh (c. 1872-1916), mystic and faith healer who held sway over court of Nicholas II of Russia. His nickname is from his doctrine of "rebirth through sin," that true holy communion must be preceded by immersio

palate

late 14c., "roof of the mouth of a human or animal; the parts which separate the oral from the nasal cavity," from Old French palat and directly from Latin palatum "roof of the mouth," also "a vault," which is perhaps of Etruscan origin [Klein], but de Vaan suggests an IE root me

appreciate

1650s, "to esteem or value highly," from Late Latin appretiatus, past participle of appretiare "to set a price to," from ad "to" (see ad-) + pretium "price" (see price (n.)). The meaning "to rise in value" (intransitive) is by 1787; the sense of "be fully conscious of" is by 1833

dauphin

title of the eldest son of the king of France (in use from 1349-1830), early 15c., from Old French dauphin, literally "dolphin" (see dolphin). Originally it was the title attached to "the Dauphin of Viennois," whose province (in the French Alps north of Provence) came to be known

experiment

mid-14c., "action of observing or testing; an observation, test, or trial;" also "piece of evidence or empirical proof; feat of magic or sorcery," from Old French esperment "practical knowledge, cunning; enchantment, magic spell; trial, proof, example; lesson, sign, indication,"

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Expiation

Anne's apartment. 

Lily is there waiting for her to return. She finds Buffy's stuffed duck and picks it up to stroke it. 

Buffy opens the door, 

comes in and closes it behind her.

Lily puts the duck down and steps closer to Buffy.

Lily: Did you find Rickie? I thought of--well, he likes to go to this movie house, you can get in around the back--

Buffy: (interrupting) Lily . . . I think he's dead.

Lily: (very sad and lost) But . . . he takes care of me.

Buffy: I'm sorry.

Lily: We're gonna get a place. His cousin can get him a job at the car wash.

Buffy: Lily, there's (exhales) there's something else. (sits on the bed) The, the person that I found . . . was old. He-he looked about eighty.

Lily: Well, that's not Rickie!

Buffy: I'm SURE it was. I, I don't know how, but . . . it was like something drained the life out of him.

Lily: Do you mean like a vampire?

Buffy: No. A vampire couldn't accelerate the aging process. Maybe it was something in his blood. (has a thought) When was the last time you guys gave blood together?

Lily: I don't understand. Maybe it's not Rickie, okay?

Buffy: (stands up) Lily, this is something you're just gonna have to deal with.

Lily: (flustered) But he didn't do anything wrong! Why would this happen to him?

Buffy: That's *not* the point. (Lily calms a bit) These things happen all the time. You can't just . . . close your eyes and hope that they're gonna go away.

Lily: Is it 'cause of you?

Buffy: (confused) What?

Lily: You know about . . . monsters and stuff. You could have brought this with you.

Buffy: (very annoyed) I didn't bring anything with me. And I didn't ask for you to come to me with your problems. I just wanted to be left alone. If you can't deal, then don't lay it off on me!

Lily can't take it. She holds up her hands to deny what she's hearing and walks out of the apartment. Buffy sighs, regretting raising her voice to Lily.