Friday, 1 November 2013

JFK50 - Frank Sinatra



Assuming a role that clearly strays far from his acting comfort zone, Ole' Blue Eyes himself, Frank Sinatra portrays a pint-sized low-level mob hoodlum hired to carry out a paid hit.

The assassination of the President of the United States by rifle fire from an upstairs window using a high-velocity rifle with mounted scope on the presidential motorcade during a hastily arranged whisltestop tour.

This was produced in 1954, by the way.


Dorothy Kilgallen, New York Journal American  (26th February, 1956)

"Success has not changed Frank Sinatra. When he was unappreciated and obscure, he was hot-tempered, egotistical, extravagant, and moody. Now that he is rich and famous, with the world on a string and sapphires in his cufflinks, he is still hot-tempered, egotistical, extravagant, and moody."

Lee Israel, Kilgallen  (1979)

"There had been some snide little items about her (Dorothy Kilgallen) in the columns, an occasional short profile in the magazines, and frequent strafing from television performers. 

Jack Paar led the pack in 1960, taking up Sinatra's slack. 

That tempestuous round began when Dorothy swiped at him in the column over his impassioned support of Fidel Castro. 

She was violently opposed to the new Cuban leader and peppered her column with anti-Castro items, many of which appear to have been fed to her by Miami-based exiles or CIA fronts on an almost daily basis. 

Paar retaliated on his prime-time, high-rated television show."




Frank Sinatra - Richard Nixon' 73 from Spike1138 on Vimeo.


"My resignation left me literally destitute. I lost not only my salary but my riight to a substantial government pension, and soon thereafter , my means of earning a living as a lawyer.

Soon after I satisfied the ten-thousand dollar maximum fine imposed on me, the IRS contacted me and demanded a hundred and fifty thousand dollars in back taxes, interest and penalties. I said I had no money. They told my lawyer I should get it out of my "shoe box" - which of course did not exist,

The IRS agents said, "If you don't pay this, we will go to court and lift your passport." As I was even then arranging to go overseas to try to develop some international business, I had to have that passport. I was desperate.

So I called Frank Sinatra's lawyer, Mickey Rudin, of Beverley Hills, California, to see if he had any ideas that might let me keep my passport and gain some time. He said he would think about it.

The next day, Mickey called me and said, "Frank thinks you should pay."

"Well, dammit, Mickey," I said, "I don't have the money; I can't pay."

"What is your bank and account number?" Mickey asked. "Frank has directed me to put two hundred thousand dollars in your account.".

I couldn't believe my good fortune, or that anyone could be so considerate and generous.

"That's wonderful," I exclaimed. "But where is the promissory note?"

Mickey laughed and said "Don't insult the man. I wouldn't even dare ask him about that. He knows you will pay him back when you can. That's all he needs."

The day after I resigned, Frank had sent me thirty thousand dollars to pay my ten-thousand dollar fine and my family expenses until I could find some way to make a living. As time went by, and my business improved through my numerous trips overseas, I earned an adequate income and paid back the last of the Sinatra loans in 1978.

Former Vice-President Spiro T.Agnew,
"GO QUIETLY... or else",
William Morrow and Company, 1980


Coming Soon - October Surprise 1973: Go Quietly... Or Else... from Spike1138 on Vimeo.

"Agnew says, that Al Haig came to him one day, and said, 'If you don't leave, I will kill you...' "


The Kidnapping of Frank Sinatra Jr.

MYSTERIOUS FINANCIER:
Dean Torrence and the Kidnapping of Frank Sinatra Jr.
By Mark A. Moore 

The Perfect Crime

Barry Keenan
By October 1963, Barry Keenan was only 23 years old, but was down and feeling sorry for himself. The University High School graduate was from a broken home, already divorced, a failed salesman, and had dabbled in the stock market without sustained success. Keenan also had a criminal record, with previous arrests for burglary and petty theft. On top of everything else, he was abusing prescription medication, and saw himself as facing financial ruin. He began to feel desperate, allowing his drug-addled mind to hatch a wild scheme to kidnap the son and namesake of Hollywood royalty — Frank Sinatra Jr.

When you have a problem, even if you're delusional, you ask your friends for help. So Keenan approached his best friend and laid his cards on the table — calculated, efficient, with a detailed plan in writing, and a request for money to get things started. Barry was a clever fellow, and reveled in having friends (or at least a friend) in high places.



Career-wise (and mentally at the time) Dean Torrence was light years removed from his best friend, Barry Keenan. Dean was a rock star, half of Jan & Dean, a duo whose music and physical attributes personified the golden era of Southern California's allure — beaches, girls, surfing, carefree living, and the culture of the automobile. By late '63, Jan & Dean were flying high with songs co-written and produced by Jan Berry. "Surf City" had hit #1 nationally that summer, "Honolulu Lulu" cracked the Cash Box Top 10 in October (#11 on Billboard), and the Surf City LP went Top 40. Jan & Dean were on the radio, on television, Surf Cityand they drove expensive sports cars. Barry Keenan wanted the same kind of money and power (and maybe a political position). He just wanted a jumpstart, a finish line without running.



Dean met with Keenan on the campus of the University of Southern California (USC), where 23-year-old Torrence was a student in the school's design and architecture program. While hitting it big in the music business, both Jan Berry and Dean were fulltime college students. Go-getters who got things done. Jan Berry was accepted to medical school at the California College of Medicine (now UC Irvine) in March 1963.

Whatever problems Keenan was having, he and Dean were still tight, brothers even. Former classmates at Uni High (along with Jan Berry and Nancy Sinatra), they had invested in the stock market together. If Barry wanted to talk, Dean would listen. Why not? And he certainly got an earful — details of a "perfect crime," a foolproof scheme where failure was not an option, not even to be considered. Easy as 1, 2, 3.

Dean began lending money to Keenan.


The Grab

News broke quickly in the aftermath of the kidnapping on a Sunday night, December 8, 1963. Frank Jr. had been snatched at gunpoint from a motel room at Harrah's Club at Lake Tahoe — a flashy casino strip in Stateline that straddles the border between California and Nevada, on the lake's south shore. In an age when rock 'n roll ruled, 19-year-old Frank Jr. was following in dad's footsteps, on the crooner circuit, touring with a revamped Tommy Dorsey Orchestra (his old man's former outfit, led by Sam Donahue). At the time of the grab, the band was on day six of a three-week gig at Harrah's.

Frank Sinatra Jr. Kidnapping Newsreel
The case is infamous, and the tale has been told in vivid detail. Bungling criminals, agitated mastermind, insanely good luck at road blocks, a thoughtful and cooperative captive, one suspect's numerous stints in the trunk of the getaway car, Sinatra Sr.'s command post at the Mapes Hotel in Reno, the phone calls, the $240,000 ransom drop, and Junior's release near his mother's home in Bel Air. In all, a harrowing seven days in December.

The saga has been presented as comic farce. Indeed, it was a sensational case with big headlines — a poster caper for the word bizarre. The suspects (Keenan and two accomplices) were dubbed "rank amateurs" by the prosecuting attorney. The country (suspects included) was still reeling from the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November. Jack Ruby had shot and killed Kennedy's assassin on live television two days later, and the Sinatra kidnapping headlines followed less than a month after. In this uncertain and turbulent climate, many thought America was falling apart, her citizens losing their minds.

Frank Sinatra Sr.
And through it all, 46-year-old tough-guy Frank Sinatra Sr. was more than just angry. From his sleepless, chain-smoking, coffee-swilling vigil at the Mapes, through the ransom calls, money drop, and Junior's safe release, Big Frank was scared. He had feared for his young son's life, and rightly so. Pop was immediately in touch with Attorney General Bobby Kennedy and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. The Feds were on it.

Yet Time magazine did a spread on the case in late December, and was among the first to comment on suspicious thinking: "As the drama continued to unfold, there were rumors that it was all a publicity stunt or some other sort of hoax, and indeed that was one of the first avenues of investigation probed by the FBI. Then, too, there was the matter of Frank Sr.'s genial flirtation with a kind of shadow Clan of his own, consisting of high-echelon hoods. No one figured out the connection, if any, but many were prepared to view the kidnapping as something less than the real thing. They were wrong."



The Trial

The hapless suspects were brought to trial in short order, just two months after the crime. Three days before opening arguments, a list of 27 names — including both Sinatras and Junior's mother — was given to the U.S. Attorney's office at the end of a pre-trial conference. Not surprisingly, Dean Torrence was on the list, as was partner Jan Berry.


The defense witnesses (not including the Sinatras) were ordered to appear in U.S. Judge William G. East's courtroom at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, February 10, 1964. Jan Berry, though not connected to the crime in any way save association with Dean, had been ordered to "bring written contracts, notes, memorandum as between yourself and others pertaining to arrangements made for the alleged removal of Frank Sinatra Jr., records of monies received and to be received for the alleged removal of Frank Sinatra Jr." Not all of the subpoena requests were actually served. But this was scary stuff, and Berry was none too pleased about it.

Headlines flashed after the opening day of the trial: Staged With Consent, Defense Says — Jury Told Unnamed Singer Financed 'Publicity Scheme'

Defense attorney George A. Forde declared, "We intend to show that certain people financed the alleged kidnapping, which I would call an advertising venture." In his opening statement, Forde argued that Frank Sinatra Jr. agreed to his own kidnapping — a plot financed by a "mystery man" . . . a "mysterious financier" . . . in an effort to win fame and money like his movie star father. The "kidnapping" was masterminded and financed by an unnamed singer who has "cut two million records." Yes, a prominent singer — not Sinatra Sr. — financed the kidnap activities including rental of cars and houses involved in the plot. "If this was a kidnapping," scoffed Forde, "I'll be on the next moon-shot."

Forde also pointed out that Sinatra Jr.'s career had been on the upswing since the incident, appearing on The Ed Sullivan Show, "preceding the Beatles," and was booked for a tour of Europe.



Next up was defense attorney Gladys Towles Root, a well-known and outlandish figure in Los Angeles legal circles. The New York Times later noted : "Mrs. Root, who began to practice law in 1929, became known for her attire, including furs, feathers, outsize costume jewelry and towering hats that sometimes were festooned with flashingGladys Towles Root lights." Based on photos taken during the trial, Root looked like she could have stepped out of Jan & Dean's yet-to-be-written Bach-inspired classic, "The Anaheim, Azusa & Cucamonga Sewing Circle, Book Review and Timing Association."



Root was the first to name the "mystery singer," arguing that Dean Torrence shared a safety deposit box with Barry Keenan, and that $1,870 of the ransom money was found in the box by federal agents. This was the first evidence presented tying Dean to the ransom money.

Dean admitted having the deposit box, but said it was all Keenan's idea. After the three defendants were arrested, FBI agent Timothy Donovan accompanied Dean to the Century City Branch of the California Bank. Dean watched Donovan pull an envelope out of the box, but testified that he didn't know there was any money in it at the time. If he wasn't already, Dean was no doubt starting to get nervous.

Another witness, Theodore M. Beck, explained that the FBI found an undisclosed amount of money in his closet after a visit from Keenan, who spent the night at Beck's apartment on December 11, three days after the crime. But Beck denied knowing it had been left there, or knowing of any plan to abduct Frank Jr. Under cross examination, however, Beck admitted to being acquainted with Dean Torrence. Dean must have been loosening his collar.

Lou Adler, Jan & Dean's manager, emphasized that Dean had "nothing to do with the case other than that he is a friend of Keenan." Adler also said he believed the deposit box was for some stocks purchased by Keenan for Torrence.



The bold Mrs. Root declared: "This was a Lou Adlerplanned contractual agreement between Frank Sinatra and others connected with him . . . Was this the publicity he had been looking for to make ladies swoon over him like poppa?"



Root would later pay a price for her defensive zeal.

A third defender, Charles Crouch, called the kidnapping "a comedy of errors . . . like a movie script." Jurors, he argued, must "decide whether a crime has been committed . . . We'll show that Frank Jr. was involved in chicanery from start to finish."

On the witness stand, Frank Sr. and the young Sinatra both emphatically denied that the kidnapping was a hoax or stunt.

By Friday, February 14, the defense had begun a blistering and aggressive cross-examination of Frank Jr., who was asked why he didn't cry out at the roadblock, and why he hadn't tried to escape when several opportunities had presented themselves. In other words, how can you say you're a victim here?

Frank Jr., now 20, answered: "It's a terrible experience to go through what I did and then find that I am on trial — and not the defendants . . . It's a mark on my integrity and guts that will stay with me for the rest of my life." Junior said he had cooperated with his abductors out of fear for his personal safety, and for the safety of others (like maybe a cop at a roadblock in a snowstorm). Keenan was unstable and had a gun. True enough, and one can be sure that Big Frank was seething.



Dean's Testimony

Monday, February 24, sparked the first explosive headlines of the trial: Perjury Confessed by Rock 'n' Roll Singer; Singer 'Knew' of Kidnapping — Rock 'n' Roller Startles Court with Sinatra Statement; Rock 'n Roll Singer Changes His Tune; Reverses Self

Why? Because Dean Torrence took the stand during the morning session and lied to the federal prosecutor trying the case.

Dean Torrence Perjury Headline
Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas R. Sheridan was "bespectacled and scholarly," 34 years old, and spoke with a thick Boston accent. He had also been appointed a special assistant to U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (brother of the late president) in 1962. If facing the wrath of Frank Sinatra wasn't enough, the defendants were being tried by a prosecutor with ties to the Kennedy family (which in itself, was another tie to Sinatra).

In the morning session Dean denied having any advance knowledge of the kidnapping plot. But he did acknowledge that he and Keenan had been best friends for six years. "He was my best friend and he didn't have a cent," explained Torrence. He lent Keenan money "so he could eat — he didn't have any money at all." Dean said that Keenan owed him $1,200.

Sheridan hammered Dean with questions: "Did you lend money to defendant Barry Worthington Keenan for the purpose of financing the abduction of Frank Sinatra Jr.? . . . Did you discuss it (the kidnapping) with anyone prior to Dec. 8? . . . Did Mr. Keenan give you $25,000 in a paper sack, hand it to you on the lawn, on Dec. 11? . . . Did Mr. Keenan tell you he went to Tijuana to buy the guns?" All of Dean's answers were variations of "no sir" and "I did not."

Dean said Keenan came to his house on December 11 and offered to pay off his debts. Dean said he didn't accept any money, and told Keenan he could repay him later. "I was suspicious of how he accumulated all that money in that short a time," explained Torrence.

A lighter moment occurred when Dean was asked by defense attorney Forde about his profession: "'We bake . . . we make records [as Jan & Dean]' . . . Later, he explained he was using the word 'fake' rather than 'bake' . . . 'Do you sing?' Forde asked. 'Yes,' sighed Torrence, 'but I wish I were a better singer' . . . He described the 'fake' process as dubbing one sound track over another to get a special effect."

Another more ominous result of that morning's testimony? The defense won a motion "to have both Frank Sinatra Sr. and the young kidnap victim make command performances on behalf of the three defendants." At this point, Dean was really feeling the pressure, and a return of the Sinatras probably didn't help his state of mind.

During the mid-afternoon recess, Dean approached Sheridan, and the prosecutor in turn conferred with Judge East. This set the stage for an afternoon that would soon have everyone talking.

With court back in session, Torrence took the stand and "startled judge, jurors, and attorneys."

Sheridan said to Dean: "I understand you want to make an amendment to your testimony."

Dean: "Yes, I do . . . I'm afraid I made up some stories. I did know about the so-called kidnapping and I did get some money and I gave it back."

The place was abuzz, and Judge East, age 55 and silver-haired, grumbled: "I'm conscious of the fact that I've had perjury committed in this courtroom and I am desperately concerned by it . . . disturbed about it. The matter, of course, will have to be dealt with . . . It will have to be dealt with later." As in after the kidnapping trial.

Dean Torrence Perjury Headline
Dean testified that he had lied about prior knowledge of the plan. Sheridan asked the "soft spoken . . . sandy haired singer" when he did first hear about the wild scheme.

Dean: "About October, from Barry Keenan. He said he was going to be involved in a crime and would like to tell me about it. I let him talk. He told me his whole plan — how he was going to abduct him [Frank Jr.] and things of that sort." Torrence said this conversation had probably taken place at his home.

Sheridan: "He said he was going to abduct Frank Sinatra, Jr.? Did he say where?

Dean: "I don't think he said where. I don't think he'd thought of that . . . I didn't think it was such a good idea." Keenan, in fact, had a long written (perhaps fluid) plan in place. Torrence then said Keenan came back over a few days later and described some new ideas he'd added to the plan.

Dean: "Probably a few days later he said he had new ideas about how — just things of the whole operation . . . He went into detail. He told how the operation was to go off. He said he'd probably buy a house and how he'd have the phones installed."

Sheridan: "Did he tell you anyone was involved with him?" Dean said, "No."

Sheridan: "Well, now, did you loan him money for the kidnap? . . . Was there any indication that the money you were lending him was to be used in this connection (with the kidnapping)?"

Dean: "Well, at first I loaned him money just as a friend. I guess that would be the way it was up to the time he told me about the plan . . . Several days later he came back for more money. I was glad to lend him money to keep him living. I offered to get him a job. He said he didn't want a job. This was what he was going to do. He said, 'I'd rather be dead than not do this.'"

The L.A. Times reported that Torrence appeared "near tears as his story unfolded."

Dean explained that Keenan brought a paper sack containing approximately $25,000 (significantly more than the $1,200 he owed Torrence) and left it in the shower at Dean's house on December 11. "I didn't count it," Dean said of the money. Of all the hiding places, Keenan somehow decided on the shower at the Torrence family home at 2145 Benecia Ave. in West L.A., where Dean lived with his parents. After Keenan stashed the money, Dean's mom Natalie made breakfast for her son's friend; and then Keenan split.

Dean Torrence during the TRial
Dean: "I left it (the money) there all day and tried to get in touch with him." He finally reached Keenan two days after he'd dropped off the money.

Dean said, "Friday I told him I'd like to give it back." They met in a restaurant parking lot in Culver City (Keenan was accompanied by a friend named Dennis Gray) and Dean said: "I gave him back the money . . . told him I was sorry the whole thing happened. I've been such a fool. He said, 'I'm a fool, too.' I said, 'If there's anything possible I can do for you I'll do it."

Sheridan: "Did Keenan tell you it was a publicity stunt or a hoax?" Dean said, "No."

Sheridan: "Your position is that now you have told the full truth?"

Dean: "Yes . . . It bothered me and doesn't seem real. I never thought I'd be here. It's like a fantasy . . . When you have all sorts of lies thrown at you the only thing you can do is come back . . . You feel like everybody's lying and what can you do? . . . It doesn't seem so involved until you get here. Once I got down here I realized how serious this was. I decided to 'fess up. You get involved in lies. So many people threw lies at me . . . You just get caught in lies."

Sheridan: "When you spoke of lies being thrown at you is it your opinion that any agent of the FBI or I or anybody in my office lied to you?" Dean said, "No."

On cross examination, defense attorney George Forde asked Dean if anyone on the defense's side had lied to him. "No," retorted Dean, "but you've made accusations that were not proper."

Forde pressed Dean on his knowing about the plot beforehand. Dean answered that Keenan "didn't say like he needed money to pull it off, the kidnapping or anything like that."

The press noted: "The defense, moving rapidly once he [Torrence] made his admission, was unable to draw any statement to confirm its longstanding argument — that Frank Sinatra, Jr. consented to be kidnapped."

Dean: "I just thought it was a story. Not many people go around and kidnap Frank Sinatra Jr. . . . It all seems like a story book. When someone comes up to you and tells you he's going to kidnap someone, you don't really believe it."

Dean Torrence during the TRial
Forde asked Torrence if he had seen Keenan's 27-page booklet outlining detailed plans for the abduction.

Dean: "Basically, yes. I looked at it. I only saw a couple of hand written pages."

During a terse cross examination, Dean was accused of saying: "If things get hot, all you have to do is bring Frank Sinatra Jr. into our home and everything will be allright [sic]." Torrence flatly denied saying this. The defense also brought up the fact that the Torrence home on Benecia was only two blocks from Frank Jr.'s apartment at 1940 Beverly Glen Blvd. But Dean insisted he didn't know where Frankie lived.

The L.A. Times noted: "Although his story changed, Torrence insisted all day that he had no knowledge of a hoax or publicity stunt . . . Torrence said he hadn't told his story to anyone, including the FBI, before his surprise return to the witness chair."

Judge East said he was "gratified" that Torrence had decided to come back to the witness stand and tell the "full truth." . . . "Torrence said his conscience bothered him after his earlier testimony."

The Associated Press reported Dean's confession as "rocking" the trial . . . "electrifying a federal courtroom," and that Torrence was the "star witness." United Press International called Dean's confession "one of the most dramatic moments of the trial . . . a surprising admission."

According to the L.A. Times, Dean "was casual and almost flippant during testimony."

"After a stiff cross-examination," continued the Times, "Torrence left the Federal Building and told newsmen he'd been cleared by federal authorities . . . The statement was disputed by the U.S. attorney's office, which said it was studying Torrence's sudden reversal . . . [Co-defendant Joe] Amsler, as he was being led in chains from the courtroom, smiled broadly and said [of Dean's testimony], 'At last, the truth is coming out' . . . And Amsler's attorney, Morris Lavine, said, 'It's a break for the truth. We've got the fourth man who financed the deal' . . . Torrence said he changed his story because, 'I promised my parents I'd always tell the truth.'"

With testimony from defendants Joe Amsler and John Irwin (Keenan's accomplices) set for early March, it wouldn't be the last time the court would hear the name Dean Torrence.



Letter, Statement, and a Confident Defense

On Wednesday, February 26, a letter written by Barry Keenan was introduced into evidence after being found by the FBI in a safety deposit box — the very box Keenan held jointly with Dean Torrence. The letter was found on December 17, 1963. So not only was a tiny portion of the ransom money found in the box, but also "the biggest single bombshell of the trial."

Keenan's long and rambling missive betrayed his mental instability, his shallow values, and erased any doubt about the hoax theory:

"To my parents and loved ones . . . If you read this letter, I am either dead or under arrest for felony kidnapping . . . Why? As you all know, money has always been of utmost importance to me. Oftentimes it has brought trouble of one kind or another upon me . . . After realizing that I was incapable of earning enough money to keep up with all my debts and high living I decided to take a carefully calculated risk by undertaking a major crime. . . If I had succeeded I would have netted approximately $100,000 which would have enabled me to become a millionaire in 10 or 15 years, barring a war or depression . . . Kidnapping seemed to offer the least risk for the money, so I set to work planning a perfect crime. Naturally if you are reading this, the crime was unperfect . . . You will see that this was not a spur of the moment action. I wanted to do the things that needed doing. I hoped that I might have helped you all gain a little happiness. I would have paid off all my bills — slowly enough not to raise suspicion . . . I wanted my mother to have a new kitchen and a color TV . . . By the way, I would have explained the money as gambling winnings, and that for the past year and a half I had been constantly broke because I could never hit a winning streak. Now I had finally hit a winning [streak] and cleaned up . . . My dad's family would have been a greater problem as they need more help than anything else . By hoping that I could sell my dad on my gambling story, I would help him get back on his feet financially, mentally and physically . . . The few real friends that I have would have received very nice Christmas gifts . . . With the rest of the money I would have set about slowly making semi-conservative investments in stocks, bonds, and a small business or two . . . Well, this note is not too clear, but it is being written with the thought in mind that it will never be read. I love you all. Please try not to be upset. Love again, Barry."

Defendant John Irwin also issued a statement outlining his involvement in the plot. Both the letter and statement were read into evidence under vigorous objection by the defense. But over the weekend, the defense was outwardly exuding confidence. Attorney Morris Lavine said of the Keenan letter and Irwin statement: "It's all part of the script. The [Keenan] brochure was written way back in October. Even the Barry Keenan letter was part of the script. It was written way back in October . . . There have been no surprises to us — only to the government."

Lavine, Forde, and Crouch said, "they feel the government's case suffered" when Dean Torrence "first denied knowing about the plot and later admitted it . . . Torrence, 24, a rock 'n' roll singer, faces possible action from U.S. Judge William G. East, who declared the witness had committed perjury."

"The FBI did not solve this alleged kidnapping," boasted Gladys Towles Root. "John Irwin is the one who solved it for them" — by having released Frank Jr. of his own accord, near the boy's mother's house.



Testimony of Joe Amsler and John Irwin

Joseph Clyde Amsler was the first of the accused kidnappers to take the stand, and his testimony brought more headlines referencing Dean Torrence: Defendant Says Singer Financed Sinatra Kidnap.

Theresa Gray, age 22 ("the pretty housewife"), of 10709 Northgate Ave. in Culver City, had shed light on Amsler's activities after the crime. She testified that the kidnappers had come to her apartment on the night of December 12. In fact, they spent the night. She said she walked in on her husband — Dennis Gray, who had been with Keenan when Dean Torrence returned money in the restaurant parking lot — as he was celebrating with Keenan and Amsler. "The money was all over the place," she said. "The boys were throwing it at each other. They took off their shoes and were walking around in it barefooted. They began playing football with it." She said someone asked her for a Monopoly game, so they could play with "real money," but she didn't have one. Dennis Gray soon became suspicious; and Theresa said Amsler described the abduction, and that he'd once thought of killing himself because he was so nervous and scared.

Amsler had been arrested in Culver City on December 14, 1963. J. Edgar Hoover said $168,927 of the ransom money was recovered at Amsler's apartment. Like Keenan, Amsler had a record, having been nabbed three times for "violating the alcoholic beverage control act of trespassing." Joe had also attended University High with Torrence. In fact Amsler, along with Keenan and other familiar names like Jan Berry, Arnie Ginsburg, and Jim Bruderlin (actor James Brolin), had been a member of the Hi-Y school club The Barons. He had also briefly dated Jill Gibson, who was now Jan Berry's longtime love interest and sometime songwriting partner. During the trial, Joe was described as a handsome shellfish or abalone diver. He was also described as a former amateur boxer — a claim that angered some boxers for giving the sport a bad name.

The Barons
Keenan had approached Amsler in September 1963 and told him he had "the perfect crime, a kidnapping," and Joe testified that Keenan had told him Dean Torrence was financing the operation.

Amsler: "Keenan had a script for this operation and he said it was foolproof because the victim was to know beforehand — and the victim was Frank Sinatra, Jr."

When they were driving to Tahoe en route to the kidnapping site, Amsler asked Keenan how they were going to pay for a motel room. "He [Keenan] said, 'If we need money we can get in touch with the backers . . . the financier of the operation.' . . . I asked him who that was and he said, 'You know, Dean' . . . He commented that Dean was the financier. This shocked me . . . I said 'You mean Dean Torrence?' and he said 'yes'."

When Joe asked Keenan how many other people were involved, Keenan said that "Dean Torrence, Johnny Weismuller, Dennis Gray and Donnie Bray and some other people I didn't know were in on it." (Dean had earlier testified that he knew who Amsler was, but not John Irwin.)

During the abduction, "I stood around dumbfounded," confessed Amsler. "It didn't seem right to me. It shocked me." Amsler testified that he thought he and Keenan were going skiing in Tahoe, until Keenan said they were there to grab Frank Jr. At various stages Joe said he was "shaken up . . . in a state of shock . . . nearly losing my mind . . . in tears."

John Irwin, Joe Amsler, Barry Keenan
John Irwin, described as a 42-year-old "husky house painter," was the next defendant to testify. Irwin had dated Keenan's divorced mother for six months after meeting her in La Paz, Mexico in 1958. Irwin had a criminal record dating back to 1947. Previous charges against him had included assault and battery, desertion, nonsupport, and drunk and disorderly conduct. Iwrin's violations had occurred in New Jersey, Maine, Massachusetts and California. Irwin's brother had turned him in after John spilled the beans. James Irwin choked back tears as he described calling the San Diego FBI office around 8:15 a.m. on Friday, December 13, 1963 — at his brother's request.

Irwin: "I always had a paternal feeling about Barry. He was about 18 when I first met him. Then last fall he called me and said he had an idea for a perfect crime." Under questioning from defense attorney Root, Irwin said, "I laughed and told [Barry] I didn't believe there was any such thing as a perfect crime . . . I was shocked — It shook me up — and was a pretty big idea."

Keenan had rented a home at 8143 Mason Ave. in Canoga Park. This was the hideout where Frank Jr. was brought after being abducted from Tahoe. Ronald Bray, 21, another classmate of Keenan's, helped the mastermind buy furniture for the place and helped scope out a route for the ransom drop. Bray even accompanied Keenan on an unsuccessful trip to Tijuana, Mexico, to buy guns. Keenan finally bought a small handgun from a dealer in Phoenix, Arizona.

Irwin: "Barry and I went down to Arizona in October [1963] to look at Frank Jr., who was appearing at the Arizona State Fair . . . On the way back from Arizona, Barry brought up the name of Jan and Dean and told me Dean is one of the backers of this plan . . . It didn't mean much to me, as I had never heard of Jan and Dean, except I figured they were in show business." Irwin also said that Dean had put up the money to finance the "jaunt to Arizona."

Irwin: "Barry said Dean didn't know Frank Jr. but he knew a lot of his personal habits. He said he would arrange a meeting between Dean and me. But I couldn't believe Dean knew any more about this scheme than Keenan . . . It was no perfect scheme. It couldn't possibly succeed, and I wanted no part of it."

In November 1963, Keenan took Irwin to meet Dean. "On the way over, explained Irwin, "we saw a small sports car. Keenan stopped and so did the other car. Dean was in the other car and he asked, 'Where are you going?' . . . Barry said, 'We are going to look over the job'." Irwin said Dean then took off, and they [Irwin and Keenan] went over to case Frankie's apartment.

Not only had they followed Frank Jr. to Phoenix, but Keenan and Irwin were also casing the boy's movements around Hollywood. According to the L.A. Times, Irwin said he and Keenan witnessed Frank Jr. leaving the Cocoanut Grove with Dean Martin, and also saw him in a car with actress Jill St. John. Irwin also said there were several unsuccessful attempts to nab Frank Jr. outside of his apartment in West L.A. (1940 Beverly Glen Blvd.) All along, Irwin said he was accompanying Keenan in hopes of talking him out of the plot.

After their last unsuccessful attempt, "I thought the whole plan was over," explained Irwin. "I was relieved and Joe [Amsler] was also." But a few days later, on December 9, Irwin got a phone call from Keenan saying that Frank Jr. was in custody — and Keenan asked him to make the ransom calls.

Irwin: "I went to his hideout in Canoga Park and Barry asked me to go in and talk with Frank Jr. because he would not tell them how to get in touch with his father or mother . . . Frank Jr. was lying on a bed with a black sleeping mask over his eyes. He would not give me any information, in fact he was indignant about it . . . I could see Barry and Joe were emotionally fatigued and I was afraid some harm would come to Frank Sinatra Jr. . . . Barry said he would give me $30,000. I said if I'm going to get in, I want $50,000. Barry agreed . . . Later Barry became agitated because I was going to get $50,000 just for making some phone calls."

Irwin: "Frank Jr. and I talked for hours at the Canoga Park house where Barry had put him. He told me how his mother, of Italian ancestry, had reared him strictly. He said people could learn a lot from his mother, who believed in the use of a $2 hair brush instead of paying money for psychiatrists . . . He talked about his father — nothing derogatory — but that he didn't see him much because his father was so busy . . . The more we talked, the more nervous and upset I became. Finally, I had to tell Frank Jr. that I was under the impression that he knew of this thing — what I assumed to be a publicity stunt . . . He had said nothing about it so I felt I had to bring it up myself . . . Frank told me I shouldn't talk about it but get him out of there. He felt that Joe and Barry were getting out of hand . . . I told him that I didn't believe my wife would believe this to be anything else but a major crime. Frank said he would talk to my wife when he got released."



Convictions

Barry Worthington Keenan was arrested by the FBI at Imperial Beach, just a few miles from the Mexican border, on December 13, 1963. J. Edgar Hoover said Keenan had $47,938 of the ransom money with him.

The "mastermind" had not testified, and the jury of nine men and three women rejected the defense's hoax theory. Keenan and Amsler were both convicted — on all six counts of a grand jury indictment — and sentenced to life plus 75 years. They were convicted of the actual abduction at gunpoint. The sentencing occurred 30 minutes after the verdict was read.

Judge East ordered that both Keenan and Amsler undergo a three-month mental evaluation at the Springfield Center for Psychiatric Study in Missouri.

John Irwin was convicted on five counts, but was found innocent on a sixth count — that of aiding and abetting Keenan and Amsler on the December 8 abduction. Irwin's sentencing was continued indefinitely (facing a maximum term of 75 years).

Conviction
Amsler's wife, 20-year-old Bette, was five months pregnant at the time of her husband's sentencing. She burst into tears on her way out of the building. Keenan's father hung his head.

The jury had deliberated for 6 hours and 53 minutes, after a trial that lasted 20 days. The verdict was returned at 4:45 p.m., less than one full day after the jury had received the case.

All defense attorneys said they would appeal.

In congratulating the jury, Judge East said that Keenan and Amsler had been "lying to protect themselves."

East: "I can't help but feel that you felt as I did when the hallmark of the defendants' case was struck by the witness Torrence, who, of his own free will, came back to change his testimony . . . Ladies and gentlemen, that was the hallmark of the case . . . He [Torrence] said the whole thing didn't seem real until he got into court and then he realized that everybody was lying to protect themselves and that he first thought that he would do the same thing . . . That was the hallmark of the defendants' case. And I'm glad that you saw it as I did."

And . . . that's how Dean Torrence emerged unscathed from the trial — or did he?

In a public statement, Frank Sinatra Sr. said, "The jury has rendered a just verdict and we are happy that they and the court were not confused by the false statements and innuendoes made during the trial and elaborated on by the press . . . At this time, I would like to personally thank the FBI as well as Asst. U.S. Atty. Thomas R. Sheridan for the dignified and workmanlike manner in which they conducted the investigation and the trial . . . I think the public will now realize that if any persons were attempting to obtain publicity from these tragic events, the blame should be placed on the defense . . . We hope that this will put an end to what was a very painful incident in our lives."

When reached for comment after the verdict, Frank Jr. was in Cherry Hill, New Jersey (near Philly), for a performance at the Latin Casino. He said, "The whole business is over with. Let's forget it."

But forgetting would not be easy for Jan & Dean . . . and the government had ideas of its own for keeping this debacle in the news.



The Consequences

Dorothy Kilgallen
You don't fuck with Frank Sinatra . . . and rumors were already flying. On March 7, 1964, Dorothy Kilgallen's syndicated "Voice of Broadway" column dished on the recent court proceedings:

"Since singer Dean Torrence gave his sensational testimony at the Frank Sinatra Jr. kidnapping trial, he's been given 'the chill' by booking agents and producers. So obviously the word is out. Not many people in show business want to incur the wrath of Frank Sinatra Sr. — his tentacles reach into too many branches of the industry, from movies to records and you-name-it."

After the furor of the trial had abated, Kilgallen also shot a few barbs at Frank Jr., saying that since the headlines had cooled off, Frankie's shows were losing money and poorly attended.

What's interesting about this is that, since at least 1956, Kilgallen had been engaging in a running feud of sorts with Big Frank. She often jabbed Old Blue Eyes in her writings. In return Sinatra joked about Kilgallen, in a negative way, in his nightclub act. No love lost there.

Kilgallen was well connected, and had been writing "The Voice of Broadway" since 1939. She had other outlets, as well. She was the first journalist to correctly report in 1959 that the CIA and Mafia were plotting to assassinate Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, and FBI director J. Edgar Hoover started keeping a file on her. In early August 1962, she had been the first journalist to call attention to President John F. Kennedy's relationship with Marilyn Monroe — and within days, Monroe was found dead. In 1965, Kilgallen herself was found dead, under mysterious circumstances, at the age of 52. It is not known whether her prescription drug-related death was accidental, suicide, or murder. Her cause of death was officially listed as undetermined. But she had recently interviewed Jack Ruby, and had been threatening to break the Kennedy assasination case "wide open."

A regular panelist on What's My Line?, Kilgallen had a proven knack for gaining secret information about famous people. So if Sinatra put the word out on Dean Torrence (and by extension Jan & Dean) she was in a position to hear about it. She did — and she was right.

The first casualty for Jan & Dean was a television pilot they'd shot in the fall of 1963 called Surf Scene. With news of the kidnap breaking that December, the pilot did not sell because of Dean's involvement in the crime. Lew Irwin, Surf Scene's producer and director, confirmed the fact to this author.

Surf Scene - Jan & Dean
The next axe to fall was more timely, chopping Jan & Dean out of their expected roles in Columbia Pictures' new film Ride the Wild Surf, starring Fabian, Tab Hunter, Peter Brown, Shelley Fabares, Barbara Eden, and Susan Hart.

Ride the Wild Surf
By March 1964, when the Sinatra trial ended, location shooting for the film was underway on the island of Oahu in Hawaii. Though their roles in the film were cut, Jan & Dean still sang the title track (co-written and produced by Jan Berry).

On March 15, columnist Mike Connolly spelled it out: "The TV interviews are tripping all over each other trying to tag the singing team of Jan and Dean to talk their heads off on the panel shows. The reason, of course, is the notoriety the team received when their names came up in the Frank Sinatra Jr. kidnapping trial. Columbia Pictures, coincidentally, 'released' them from the cast of the new Fabian movie, 'Ride the Wild Surf.' But the sales of their latest longplay album since the Sinatra trial have soared to 25,000 a day!"

Ride the Wild Surf - Film
Jan & Dean's latest album at the time was Drag City, and it became their highest charting LP. It first hit the album charts in January 1964. It reached #17 on Cash Box on February 15 (#22 Billboard), and stayed in the Top 40 through the first week of March — all during the trial. Drag City stayed on the Cash Box charts for 22 weeks (through May) and for 14 weeks on Billboard.

Drag City
The duo's "Drag City" single had peaked at #10 on both singles charts on January 18 — 41 days after the kidnapping and 23 days before the trial started. News headlines about the case were everywhere during this period, and the peak for Dean's public association was February 25 through the end of the trial in March.

Jan & Dean's hit single "Ride the Wild Surf" — written by Jan Berry, Brian Wilson, and Roger Christian — and the LP of the same name were released in August to coincide with the film's debut. The single bowed on September 19, and peaked at #16 on Halloween, staying in the Top 40 for five weeks.

The Ride the Wild Surf LP debuted on Cash Box October 10, reaching #26 during the first week in November (but halting at #66 on Billboard). In the interim, the pair had scored two Top-10 blockbusters with "Dead Man's Curve" (in the Top 40 for 11 weeks) and "The Little Old Lady (from Pasadena)," (in the Top 40 for 10 weeks) — the latter also headlining a Top 40 album.

Ride the Wild Surf LP
Yes, 1964 — to quote the Chairman — "was a very good year" for Jan & Dean; at least on the musical end of the spectrum. The media noted the pair was "red-hot" at the time of the trial. But their film and television projects virtually disappeared when — as a Jersey boy might say — Frank Sinatra gave Jan & Dean "the horns." That, and the natural inclination of film and television producers (especially in that era) to avoid negative publicity.

As much as their songs had been going gangbusters in '64, the music scene was changing. The pace slipped in '65 and bad things began happening to Jan & Dean — especially to Jan Berry.

Train Wreck
With Surf Scene and Ride the Wild Surf behind them, Jan & Dean had scored their own feature film. Easy Come, Easy Go — a wild comedy starring Berry and Torrence — was to be a Paramount release and a Dunhill production. It was also aptly titled, because the project ended almost before it began. On August 5, Jan was seriously injured in a train accident on the set — on the first day of filming. A camera crew was on a flatcar, filming an oncoming engine. It wasn't a matter of yelling "cut." The engine never stopped coming. It rammed and upended the flatcar, sending members of the film crew flying. Luckily, Dean had gotten off before the crash. About 17 people were injured, including director Barry Shear. Jan tried to jump before impact, but the leap still cost him a bloody compound fracture of his left leg. Doctors considered amputation, but were able to save the appendage. Jan was in a leg-length cast for months, and didn't fully recover until early 1966.

Instead of rescheduling, the film was cancelled. So . . . why didn't the engine stop? Did the brakes go out? Was it an accident? A coincidence?

Things were looking up again in late '65 and early '66, when Jan & Dean shot yet another television pilot called On the Run; and this time it sold. It was picked up by ABC to air in early '66. Penned by veteran screenwriter Ruth Brooks Flippen, and directed by the legendary William Asher (of Bewitched and Twilight Zone fame), On the Run was a strange comedy featuring Jan & Dean's exploits on tour and in the classroom. It had potential . . .

On the Run - Jan & Dean
But dark clouds began to loom again. In early April 1966, a knockoff wheel broke loose from Jan's new Stingray while he was driving. Scary stuff. He avoided a serious accident and injury, but it was an ominous sign.

The following week, he wasn't so lucky. On April 12, Jan Berry suffered brain damage and partial paralysis when he lost control of his speeding Corvette and slammed into a parked truck on Whittier Dr. in Beverly Hills. He was in a coma for a month and suffered residual consequences for the rest of his life.

Had someone tampered with Jan's car in early April? Is that why the knockoff wheel had loosened, or was that simply an accepted hazard with knockoff wheels in general? Did "they" finally succeed on April 12? Did the wrong people know that Dean was living with Jan just before the accident? Could someone have been expecting Dean to possibly drive that Corvette (owned by Jan)? Or was one guy just as good as the other? . . . breaking up the team no matter what? Let's understand that Jan Berry was hell-for-leather and drove like a maniac. But these are questions that made the rounds among Jan's family members, inner circle, and friends.

Wild speculation and unsubstantiated rumors — the kind of stuff conspiracy theorists love to ponder.



1966 Stingray - Jan Berry WreckBut whatever troubles Jan & Dean may have run into, they weren't alone. By the summer of 1964, four months after the Sinatra kidnapping trial ended, two of the defense attorneys were in plenty of hot water.





Epilogue — Defense Attorneys On Trial

In the wake of the three kidnapping convictions, defense attorneys Gladys Towles Root and George Forde found themselves back in court — this time on the wrong side of the tables, under federal indictment. Based on their "hoax" and "publicity stunt" defense of Keenan, Amsler, and Irwin, the two defense attorneys were charged with two counts of inducing their clients to commit perjury during the kidnapping trial. Root and Forde were also charged on one count of obstructing the government and influencing witnesses — "conspiracy and subordination of perjury."

The prosecutor? Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas R. Sheridan — who else? The guy who had been appointed special assistant to Attorney General Bobby Kennedy in '62. The same guy who had tried and convicted the kidnappers for the government. Now he was going after the lawyers who had represented the convicts, on the grounds of their defense strategy . . . Wow.

Root and Forde pleaded innocent, and Judge Peirson Hall dismissed the charges that fall, for lack of specifics. But that was only Round One.

On December 10, Root and Forde pleaded innocent to new charges (which were the same as the old charges). A second grand jury indictment — on five counts. One count of conspiracy, two counts of subordination of perjury, and two counts of obstruction of justice.

On June 29, 1965, Judge Hall dismissed the charges for a second time, for the same reasons. The U.S. attorney's office (Sheridan again) said it would study the ruling and think about serving a new indictment.

December 1967 — Judge Hall agreed to hear a motion to dismiss yet another indictment against Gladys Towles Root (no Forde this time). A five count indictment. She was accused of fabricating the "hoax" story during the kidnapping trial. When the judge agreed to hear her motion, Root wept openly in court. She was accused of inventing a story that a "Mr. West" or "Wes" was the mastermind of the kidnapping plot (based on trial blather from defendant Barry Keenan.)

In May 1967, Amsler and Irwin appealed their convictions, and their cases were reversed by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Amsler and Irwin were re-tried, pleaded guilty, and were both put on 5 years' probation. Keenan did not appeal, and was still serving a reduced 12-and-half-year sentence.

In April 1968, after hearing motions and enduring stalling tactics by prosecutors, Judge Hall — for a third and final time — dismissed the charges against Mrs. Root for lack of evidence. She was near tears with relief. Root and Forde had been put through the legal ringer for defending their clients (with force and bravado, we might add for context). And Root herself wasn't out of the woods until '68, some four years after the kidnapping trial!

You don't fuck with Frank Sinatra.

But defendants Joe Amsler and John Irwin ended up serving a tiny fraction of their original sentences. Barry Keenan, the drug-addled mastermind, served his reduced sentence, regained his right mind, and became a millionaire real estate developer.

  

Mark A. Moore  is currently researching the life of Jan Berry and Jan & Dean. He wrote the liner notes for Capitol Records' digital re-issues of the Jan & Dean catalog (2010-2011); co-wrote the liner notes  for Jan & Dean's Carnival of Sound (Rhino Handmade, 2010); wrote the liners for the Memorial Edition of Jan Berry's Second Wave (2004); and has written related articles for Dumb Angel Gazette, Endless Summer Quarterly, and the Official Jan Berry Website. Moore was also the consulting historian for the Jan & Dean episode of A&E's Biography (2002).

© 2010 Mark A. Moore. All rights reserved.

Thursday, 31 October 2013

Wellstone vs. The New World Order



"What kind of a peace I mean, and what kind of a peace do we seek...?"

"What kind of Victory will it be...?

Senator Paul Wellstone - July 21, 1944 – October 25, 2002

Happy Hallowe'en

Benghazi: Arnold Lewis Raphel - The US Ambassador Killed in an ElectionYear by George H.W. Bush


Failure of Basic Fact-Checking:


I quote The Enemy:

"Operation Cyclone was one of the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations ever undertaken;funding began with $20–30 million per year in 1980 and rose to $630 million per year in 1987.

Funding continued after 1989 as the Mujahideen battled the forces of Mohammad Najibullah's PDPA during the Civil war in Afghanistan (1989–1992).

The program leaned heavily towards supporting militant Islamic groups that were favored by neighboring Pakistan, rather than other, less ideological Afghan resistance groups that had also been fighting the Marxist-oriented Democratic Republic of Afghanistan regime since before the Soviet intervention. "




"Raphel held a variety of positions throughout his career until his death in 1988. He was mainly a politician and diplomat for the US Government.

In 1979, Raphel was a key member of the State Department's Special Operations Group set up to free the American hostages seized by Iranian militants at the United States Embassy in Teheran."


So, this man is a Democrat.

It goes on:

"Raphel was nominated by President Ronald Reagan and succeeded Dean Roesch Hinton as US Ambassador to Pakistan in January 1987."



The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb

Newly Declassified Documents Disclose Carter Administration's Unsuccessful Efforts to Roll Back Islamabad's Secret Nuclear Program

Nationalistic Pakistani Officials Insisted That Their Country had an "Unfettered Right to do what It Wishes"

Washington, D.C., December 21, 2010 - The Wikileaks database of purloined State Department cable traffic includes revelations, published in the Washington Post and the New York Times about tensions in U.S.-Pakistan relations on key nuclear issues, including the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the disposition of a stockpile of weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium. (Note 1) These frictions are not surprising because the Pakistani nuclear weapons program has been a source of anxiety for U.S. policymakers, since the late 1970s, when they discovered that Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan had stolen blueprints for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. U.S. officials were alarmed that a nuclear Pakistan would bring greater instability to South Asia; years later, the rise of the Pakistani Taliban produced concerns about the nuclear stockpile's vulnerability to terrorists. Since 2002-2004 the discovery that the A.Q. Khan's nuclear supply network had spread nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, and elsewhere raised apprehensions even more. (Note 2) Last week, before the Wikileaks revelations, the recently disclosed North Korean gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant raised questions about the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology by the Khan network. (Note 3)

Recently declassified U.S. government documents from the Jimmy Carter administration published today by the National Security Archive shed light on the critical period when Washington discovered that Pakistan, a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] hold-out, had acquired key elements of a nuclear weapons capability. Once in power, the Carter administration tried to do what its predecessor, the Ford administration, had done: discourage the Pakistani nuclear program, but the CIA and the State Department discovered belatedly in 1978 that Islamabad was moving quickly to build a gas centrifuge plant, thanks to "dual use" technology acquired by Khan and his network. The documents further disclose the U.S. government's complex but unsuccessful efforts to convince Pakistan to turn off the gas centrifuge project. Besides exerting direct pressure first on President Zulkifar Ali Bhutto and then on military dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Washington lobbied key allies and China to induce them to pressurize Islamabad, but also to cooperate by halting the sale of sensitive technology to Pakistan.

Declassified government documents show that the Carter administration recognized that export controls by industrial countries could not sufficiently disrupt Pakistan's secret purchases of uranium enrichment technology, so it tried combinations of diplomatic pressure and blandishments to dissuade the Pakistanis and to induce them to reach an understanding with India. Washington's efforts met with strong resistance from top Pakistani officials; seeing a nuclear capability as a matter of national survival, they argued that Pakistan had an "unfettered right" to develop nuclear technology. The Indians were also not interested in a deal. Senior US officials recognized that the prospects of stopping the Indian or the Pakistani nuclear programs were "poor"; within months arms controller were "scratching their heads" over how to tackle the problem.

Among the disclosures in the documents:

▪ U.S. requests during mid-1978 by U.S. diplomats for assurances that Pakistan would not use reprocessing technology to produce plutonium led foreign minister Agha Shahi's to insist that was a "demand that no country would accept" and that Pakistan "has the unfettered right to do what it wishes."

▪ By November 1978, U.S. government officials, aware that Pakistan was purchasing technology for a gas centrifuge enrichment facility, were developing proposals aimed at "inhibiting Pakistan" from making progress toward developing a nuclear capability.

▪ By January 1979, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pakistan was reaching the point where it "may soon acquire all the essential components" for a gas centrifuge plant.

▪ Also in January 1979, U.S. intelligence estimated that Pakistani would have a "single device" (plutonium) by 1982 and test a weapon using highly-enriched uranium [HEU] by 1983, although 1984 was "more likely".

▪ On 3 March 1979, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke in "tough terms" with General Zia and Foreign Minister Shahi; the latter claimed that the U.S. was making an "ultimatum."

▪ On 23 March 1979, senior level State Department officials suggested to Secretary of State Vance possible measures to help make the "best combination" of carrots and sticks to constrain the Pakistani nuclear program; nevertheless, "prospects [were] poor" for realizing that goal.

▪ The decision in April 1979 to cut off aid to Pakistan because of its uranium enrichment program worried State Department officials, who believed that a nuclear Pakistan would be a "new and dangerous element of instability," but they wanted to maintain good relations with that country, a "moderate state" in an unstable region.

▪ During the spring of 1979, when Washington made unsuccessful attempts to frame a regional solution involving "mutual restraint" by India and Pakistan of their nuclear activities, Indian prime minister Morarji Desai declared that "if he discovered that Pakistan was ready to test a bomb or if it exploded one, he would act at [once] 'to smash it.'"

▪ In July 19799, CIA analysts speculated that the Pakistani nuclear program might receive funding from Islamic countries, including Libya, and that Pakistani might engage in nuclear cooperation, even share nuclear technology, with Saudi Arabia, Libya or Iraq.

▪ By September 1979 officials at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said that "most of us are scratching our heads" about what to do about the Pakistani nuclear program.

▪ In November 1979, ambassador Gerard C. Smith reported that when meeting with senior British, French, Dutch, and West German officials to encourage them to take tougher positions on the Pakistani nuclear program, he found "little enthusiasm … to emulate our position."

▪ In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when improving relations with Pakistan became a top priority for Washington, according to CIA analysts, Pakistani officials believed that Washington was "reconciled to a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability."

Like the Israeli bomb, the Pakistan case illustrates how difficult it is to prevent a determined country, especially an ally, from acquiring and using nuclear weapons technology. It also illustrates the complexity and difficulty of nuclear proliferation diplomacy: other political and strategic priorities can and do trump nonproliferation objectives. The documents also shed light on a familiar problem: a US-Pakistan relationship that has been rife with suspicions and tensions, largely because of Washington's uneasy balancing act between India and Pakistan, two countries with strong mutual antagonisms, a problem that was aggravated during the Cold War by concerns about Soviet influence in the region. (Note 4)

The Pakistani nuclear issue was on Jimmy Carter's agenda when he became president in early 1977 because he brought a significant commitment to reducing nuclear armaments and to checking nuclear proliferation. His initial, though unrealized goal, of deep cuts of strategic nuclear forces, and his support for the comprehensive test ban treaty were of a piece with his support for the long-term abolition of nuclear weapons, suggesting that his concerns about proliferation were not the usual double standard of "what's good for us is bad for you." Carter made the danger of nuclear proliferation one of his campaign themes and during his presidency government agencies and Congress tightened up controls over nuclear exports; this led to the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, whose unilateral features were controversial with some allies, especially Japan and West Germany. The administration also engaged in a protracted, but generally successful, attempt to curb the Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs, although the effort to tackle South Africa's met with less short-term success. Another tough challenge was a West German contract to sell uranium enrichment and reprocessing plants to Brazil, although technical problems would ultimately undercut the agreement. (Note 5)

Pakistan's successful drive for a nuclear arsenal was perhaps the most significant frustration for the Carter administration's nonproliferation policy. Five years before Carter's inauguration, following Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war with India, President Bhutto made a secret decision to seek nuclear weapons which he followed up in 1973 with negotiations to buy a nuclear reprocessing facility (used for producing plutonium) from a French firm. (Note 6) Apparently U.S. intelligence did not seriously examine the prospects for a Pakistani bomb until after India's May 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion." In the following months, the authors of Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] NIE 4-1-74, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," expected Pakistan to "press ahead" with a nuclear weapons program, which they projected as "far inferior to its prime rival, India, in terms of nuclear technology." (Note 7) In August 1974, US intelligence estimated that Pakistan would not have nuclear weapons before 1980 and only as long as "extensive foreign assistance" was available. Over a year later, however, a new prediction emerged: that Pakistan could produce a plutonium–fueled weapon as early as 1978, as long as it had access to a reprocessing plant.

By 1978 Pakistan did not have a reprocessing plant or the bomb. Nevertheless, that same year a pattern of suspicious purchases detected by British customs officials led to the discovery that Pakistan was secretly acquiring technology to produce highly-enriched uranium as an alternative path to building the bomb. The "extensive foreign assistance" postulated by the SNIE turned out to be the theft of plans for a gas centrifuge enrichment technology from the Uranium Enrichment Corporation [URENCO] in the Netherlands. The perpetrator was metallurgist Abdul Q. Khan who founded a worldwide network to acquire sensitive technology for his country's nuclear project and later for providing nuclear technology to Pakistan's friends and customers. (Note 8)

Recent studies of the U.S.–Pakistan nuclear relationship see moments during the mid-to-late 1970s when it may have been possible to bring the Pakistani program to a halt by preventing Khan from acquiring sensitive technology. The Dutch may have had the best chance in 1975 when they suspected that Khan was a spy; whether the U.S. and British governments had similar opportunities to nip the Pakistani nuclear effort in the bud remains a matter of debate. (Note 9) For example, when British officials learned that Khan and his associates were trying to purchase high frequency electrical inverters needed to run centrifuges, they acted too late to stop the Pakistani from acquiring this technology, which they soon learned how to copy and manufacture. So far declassified documents do not shed light on when the British told the U.S. government about this development and how Washington initially reacted to it, or what else U.S. intelligence may have been learning from other sources. In any event, some of the documents in this collection suggest that the U.S. intelligence establishment may have had a mindset that prevented it from acquiring, or looking for, timely intelligence about the Pakistani secret enrichment program.

A significant problem was U.S. intelligence's assumption during 1974-1978 that Pakistan would take the plutonium route for producing the bomb. SNIE 4-1-74, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (published by the National Security Archive in January 2008) and two documents in this collection, a "Memorandum to Holders" of SNIE 4-1-74 and a 1978 CIA report, shed some light on the former assumption. Both documents give virtually exclusive emphasis to the plutonium route for acquiring the fissile material required for building the bomb. Thus, intelligence analysts assumed that countries like Pakistan would try to try to acquire reprocessing technology so that they could chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel rods taken from nuclear power reactors. This was a reasonable premise because plutonium has played a central role in modern nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, during the early 1960s, U.S. intelligence had assumed that China would first build and test a plutonium weapon, but as it turned out, Beijing found it more expedient to produce highly-enriched uranium for the nuclear device which it tested in October 1964. This surprised Washington, but if the intelligence community conducted any postmortems, they did not yield long-lasting lessons. (Note 10)

That Pakistan could try to acquire and develop advanced gas centrifuge enrichment technology was not an element in intelligence analysis. While the authors of SNIE 4-1-74 recognized the possibility that interested nations could secretly undertake a gas centrifuge enrichment program for producing highly-enriched uranium, they posited that it was "highly unlikely" that it could be undertaken "without our getting some indications of it." The possibility that "indications" might come too late was not discussed, but the tight secrecy controls over the gas centrifuge technique may have created a certain confidence that it would not leak out. Thus, the "Memorandum to Holders" did not include any discussion of what it would require for a country to build a gas centrifuge plant by purchasing "dual use" or "gray area" technology; no doubt its authors assumed that poor countries such as Pakistan were unlikely to pull off such a stunt. Indeed, according to some accounts, U.S. intelligence analysts dismissed Pakistan's competence to take the enrichment route. (Note 11) Whether such thinking may have made U.S. intelligence somewhat less watchful when Khan and his associates were creating their network will require more information than is presently available.

So far no U.S. government reports on the actual discovery of the enrichment program and the Khan network have emerged, although a few declassified CIA items in this collection include estimates how far Pakistan could go with the stolen technology. Most of the documents published today reflect the thinking of State Department officials— ambassadors and assistant secretaries--who worried about the Pakistani bomb, but were less than wholehearted supporters of a rigorous nuclear nonproliferation agenda because it might interfere with securing Pakistan's cooperation on regional issues. This collection does not tap the resources of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, but several documents at the National Security Council-level provide insight into high-level policy debates and strategy discussions. A few items provide some insight into President Carter's thinking because they include his observations in handwritten marginalia (see documents 2 and 36). No documents from the files of the former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are yet available, although a few forceful memoranda by special ambassador on nonproliferation Gerard C. Smith may have dovetailed with ACDA views.


Notes

1. Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, "WikiLeaks cables show U.S. focus on Pakistan's military, nuclear material," The Washington Post, 1 December 2010, and Jane Perlez et al., "Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance With Pakistan," The New York Times, 30 November 2010. For earlier coverage of the HEU stockpile issue, see Bryan Bender, "Pakistan, US Talks on Nuclear Security," Boston Globe, 5 May 2009. See also, Jeffrey Lewis, "Pakistan HEU Repatriation," www.armscontrolwonk.com, 2 December 2010.

2. For the Khan network and Libya, see David Albright, Libya: A Major Sale at Last, Institute for Science and International Security.
3. Joshua Pollock, "North Korea's Mixed Messages," www.armscontrolwonk.com 22 November 2010.

4. For background, see Robert J. McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

5. J. Samuel Walker, "Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy Over Nuclear Exports, 1974-1980," Diplomatic History 25 (Spring 2001): 235-249; William Glenn Gray, "Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The German-American Feud over Brazil, 1975-1977," SHAFR Conference Paper (provided by courtesy of the author); William Burr, ed., "U.S Opposed Taiwanese Bomb During the 1970s," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 221.

6. For background, see Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 326-332.

7. For background on India-Pakistan rivalry, see Joyce Battle, ed., "India and Pakistan -- On the Nuclear Threshold," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 6.

8. Besides Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 329-332, see the following major studies of the Khan network and the Pakistani nuclear project, David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010); David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2007), Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist (New York: Twelve, 2007), and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker and Company, 2007).

9. See books by Albright, Armstrong and Trento, Frantz and Collins, and Levy and Scott-Clark cited above, and a review of them (except Albright) by Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan's Bomb: Mission Unstoppable," Nonproliferation Review 15 (July 2008), 382-391.

10. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 161-162 and 168-169.

11. Albright, Peddling Peril, 41, and Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, 89-90.

12. For Kissinger's offer, see memorandum from the David Elliott and Robert Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, 12 July 1976, and memorandum of conversation, Washington, 17 December 1976, 3:20-4 p.m.
, both published in U.S. State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976.

13. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 408.

14. Ibid., 236.

15. See Albright, Peddling Peril, 46-50, and R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, "A Nuclear Power's Act of Proliferation," The Washington Post, 13 November 2009.

16. For oral histories by Hummel covering his years in Pakistan, see the Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection at the Library of Congress Web site.

17. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 235.

18. "U.S. To Renew Aid to Pakistan," The Washington Post, 25 August 1978.

19. See Albright, Peddling Peril, 41-42, for insights into these initial efforts.

20. Ibid, 34.

21. Armstrong and Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb, 78

22. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 409, note 38.

23. By 1983, Pakistan had enough HEU to make a nuclear weapon and during the next two years "cold tested" a device to see whether its components would work. See Albright, Peddling Peril, 50.

24. Richelson, Spying, 340; Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 236.

25. Levy and Clark, Deception, 65.

26. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 240.

27. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 341. For details on the Shahi-Vance-Smith talks, see Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 240-241.

28. Dennis Kux, Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941-1991 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 358-362 and 37, and Walker, "Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy Over Nuclear Exports, 1974-1980," 245-246.

29. For details on the Shahi-Vance-Smith talks, see Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 240-241.

30. Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 238-245.

31. Ibid, 250; Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 85-86; Levy and Clark, Deception, 85.

32. See for example, Albright, Peddling Peril, 41-44.




Part of the interactive feature designed to support the special report "Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA," this video features: Ashok Kapur, (Distinguished Professor Emeritus) University of Waterloo; and Matthew Bunn, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http://interactive.cigionline.org/iaea/

Guess what?

This was PROMIS Software and the BCCI.

The Bank of Credit and Commerce International was the funding conduit and money laundering operation for (amongst other things) the Mujaheddin Support Effort, the CIA Jihadi training camps built in Afghanistan by the Saudi Binladen Group (some destroyed by the Missile strikes of 1998), all of Oliver North's Iran Contra doings in his "Off the Shelf Enterprise", General Noreiega, Pablo Escobar's Medellin Cartel, the October Surprise, PROMIS Software, the Mena Connection, the post-Soviet Mujahiden trraining effort, (GLADIO-B), the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing (2/26) and much more besides.

Most crucially, in concert with PROMIS Software, BCCI was the covert mechanism by which then-Vice President Bush and the Kissingerites such as Al Haig could covertly aid and supply the Islamic Republic of Pakistan under Zia al-Huq with technology, technical assistantce and materiel for the Pakistani nuclear weapons program behind the backs of the Reagan White House.

Featuring candid on-camera interviews with: Zbignew Brzynski, Admiral Stansfield Turner,Benazhir Bhutto, Milt Beardon and others.


Father of the Islamic Bomb

William H. Sullivan - Last US Ambassador (NarcoBaron) to Iran Dies


NOTE: There was NO US Ambassador to Iran when the US Embassy was seized in November 1979.

President Carter FIRED William Sullivan in March 1979 for "Serial Insubordination".

His Immediate Predecessor in-post was Former Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Richard Helms; who puppet-mastered The Year of Watergate from Tehran.

Both were in the Heroin Trade in Laos and Iran up to their necks.




William H. Sullivan, a career diplomat who spent much of the 1960s and 1970s in volatile parts of the world — notably Laos, where he oversaw a secret bombing campaign, and Iran, where he was the last United States ambassador before militants took embassy employees hostage in November 1979 — died on Oct. 11 in Washington. He was 90.


William E. Sauro/The New York Times
After being held prisoner, Mr. Sullivan became president of the American Assembly.
He had been ill and in hospice care for many months, said his daughter Anne Sullivan, who confirmed the death.

Mr. Sullivan, a Navy gunnery officer in World War II whose ship, the U.S.S. Hambleton, was involved in the invasion of Normandy and the surrender of Japan, joined the Foreign Service in 1947 and spent the next several years moving through increasingly prominent State Department posts in Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

He worked under Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce in Rome. He was a close aide to the diplomat W. Averell Harriman during the Cuban missile crisis and talks with the Soviet Union about limits on nuclear testing. In 1973, he was a top adviser to Henry A. Kissinger during the Paris Peace Accords, which led to the United States’ withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.

These roles were in addition to his prominent and complicated turns as an ambassador in politically charged areas — first in Laos, then in the Philippines and, finally, in Iran. He was appointed by presidents of both parties.

In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson named Mr. Sullivan ambassador to Laos as tensions with neighboring Vietnam were rising there. Though Mr. Sullivan was a civilian, he oversaw a covert bombing campaign in Laos that targeted North Vietnamese forces traveling the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The bombings were conducted by the C.I.A., and Mr. Sullivan initially concealed them even from visiting members of Congress.

When lawmakers learned of the bombings in 1969, many questioned whether Mr. Sullivan and the executive branch had the authority and expertise to carry them out. An aid worker in Laos, Ronald J. Rickenbach, told a Senate subcommittee that many of the attacks appeared to be “indiscriminate bombing of population centers.”

Mr. Sullivan, who was called numerous times to testify before Congress, defended the covert bombings and insisted that his knowledge of Laos allowed him to monitor them closely and to minimize civilian casualties. He later said that civilian deaths rose after the military took control of the bombing campaign.

Mr. Sullivan left Laos in 1969 and spent much of the early ’70s as the deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. He worked closely with Mr. Kissinger in lengthy negotiations with North Vietnam that produced the Paris accords.

Even as Mr. Kissinger praised him for his assistance in Paris, it was disclosed that Mr. Sullivan had been one of 13 government officials and four journalists whose phones were wiretapped from 1969 to 1971 with the approval of President Richard M. Nixon. The stated goal was to halt leaks to the news media. Mr. Kissinger provided the list of those to be tapped; he later said that he did so only to prove that officials were not leaking information.

Also in 1973, President Nixon appointed Mr. Sullivan ambassador to the Philippines, where he negotiated with the government of President Ferdinand E. Marcos to handle the flow of refugees fleeing Vietnam and, later, to close two military bases. Four years later, in a move Mr. Sullivan said surprised him given his extensive experience in Southeast Asia, President Jimmy Carter named him ambassador to Iran. Within months after his arrival, a rebellion began growing against the government of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, whom the United States supported.

By the fall of 1978, debate was raging within the Carter administration over what to do about the volatile situation. Mr. Sullivan clashed with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president’s national security adviser, and complained that the administration was unresponsive to his repeated requests for clear instructions. Some criticized Mr. Sullivan for not seeing the seriousness of the threat to the shah, and thus to American political interests in the country. He argued later that the shah could have preserved power in a new coalition had the White House been more responsive.

In February 1979, a month after the shah had fled, the United States Embassy in Iran was briefly overtaken by Iranian militants, and Mr. Sullivan and several other Americans were taken prisoner. The Iranian government quickly freed them, but the episode prompted Mr. Sullivan to begin reducing the number of United States government employees in Iran, to fewer than 100 from more than 1,000.

Mr. Sullivan’s exchanges with the White House became increasingly bitter. In a 1981 memoir, “Mission to Iran,” he recalled receiving “a most unpleasant and abrasive cable” that “contained an unacceptable aspersion upon my loyalty.”

“When I was told by telephone from the State Department that the insulting message had originated at the White House,” he wrote, “I thought that I no longer had a useful function to perform on behalf of the president in Tehran.”

He left Iran that spring and retired from government service later that year. On Nov. 4, 1979, Iranian militants scaled the walls of the United States Embassy compound and took 66 Americans hostage, holding 52 of them until January 1981. The United States has not had an ambassador in Iran since Mr. Sullivan left.

William Healy Sullivan was born on Oct. 12, 1922, in Cranston, R.I. His father, Joseph, was a dental surgeon, and his mother, the former Sabina Foley, was a schoolteacher. He received his undergraduate degree from Brown University and, in 1947, a master’s degree in international law and diplomacy jointly from Harvard and the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

From 1979 to 1986, Mr. Sullivan was president of the American Assembly, a public affairs forum at Columbia University. After 1986, he served on the boards of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and other organizations.

In addition to his daughter Anne, his survivors include three other children, John, Mark and Peggy Sullivan, and six grandchildren. His wife of 62 years, the former Marie Johnson, died in 2010.



The October Surprise in Context

" The philosophical divide within the U.S. National Security establishment, especially the CIA, became quite serious in the aftermath of Watergate. To make matters worse, the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, his campaign promise to clean the "cowboy" elements out of the Central Intelligence Agency and his "human rights" policies alarmed the faction of the CIA loyal to George Bush. Bush was CIA director under Richard Nixon. Finally, the firing of CIA Director George Bush by Carter, and the subsequent "Halloween Massacre" in which Carter fired over 800 CIA covert operatives in 1977, angered the "cowboys" beyond all measure. That was Carter's October surprise, 800 firings on Halloween 1977.

Bush and his CIA coverts were well aware of the Shah's terminal cancer, unknown to President Carter. The team had an elaborate vested interest to protect. They were determined to keep Iran intact and communist-free and put George Bush in the White House.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Hence, the Islamic Fundamentalists were the only viable choice through which the Bush covert team could implement its own private foreign policy. The results: the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the fall of President Carter, and the emergence of something called the "New World Order." Mansoor's documents show step-by-step events:

1. In 1974, the Shah of Iran was diagnosed with cancer.

2. In 1975, former CIA director, and the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms learned of the Shah's cancer through the Shah's closest confidant, General Hossein Fardoust. The Shah, Helms and Fardoust had been close personal friends since their school days together in Switzerland during the 1930s.

3. On November 4, 1976, concurrent with Jimmy Carter's election as President, CIA Director George Bush issued a secret memo to the U.S. Ambassador in Iran, Richard Helms, asking:

"Have there been any changes in the personality pattern of the Shah; what are their implication pattern for political behavior? Identification of top military officers that most likely play key roles in any transference of power if the Shah were killed...who will be the leading actors? How will the Shah's pet projects, including the economic development program, be effected by his departure?"

4. By July 1977, anticipating trouble ahead, the Bush covert team issued preliminary script for the transition of power in Iran. According to John D. Stemple, a CIA analyst and Deputy Chief Political officer of the U.S. Embassy in Iran, 

"A ten page analysis of the opposition written by the embassy's political section in July 1977 correctly identified Bakhiar, Bazargan, Khomeini and Behesti as major actors in the drama that begin unfolding a year later."

5. Contrary to this analysis, in August 1977, the "official wing" of the CIA fed President Carter a 60-page Study on Iran which concluded:

"The Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life well into the 1980s...and there will be no radical changes in Iranian political behavior in the near future."

6. On October 31, 1977, president Carter made good on his campaign promise to clean the "cowboys" out of the CIA. He fired over 800 covert operatives from the Agency, many of whom were loyal to George Bush. Carter's presidency split the CIA. It produced in them, among whom were "many well-trained in political warfare, a concerted will for revenge." By the end of the 1970s many of these special covert operatives had allied themselves with George Bush's candidacy, and later with Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign.

7. On November 15, the Shah of Iran visited Washington, D.C. Carter toasted his guest, "If ever there was a country which has blossomed forth under enlightened leadership, it would be the ancient empire of Persia."

8. On November 23, Ayatollah Khomeini's elder son, Haji Mustafa, died mysteriously in Najaf, Iraq. According to professor Hamid Algar, he was "assassinated by the Shah's U.S.-instituted security police SAVAK...the tragedy inflamed the public in Iran." Ayatollah Khomeini placed an advertisement in the French Newspaper Le Monde which read: "thanking people for condolences that had been sent of the murder of his son". He also "appealed to the army to liberate Iran, and to the intellectuals and all good Muslims to continue their criticism of the Shah".

9. December 31, 1977, Carter visited the Shah in Iran. He toasted the Shah for maintaining Iran as "an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Ironically, that so-called stability evaporated before the champagne lost its fizz.

10. On January 7, 1978, an insidious article entitled Iran and the Red and Black Colonialism, appeared in the Iranian daily newspaper Ettela'at. It castigated the exiled Khomeini, and produced a massive protest riot in the Holy City of Qum the next day. The clergy had little choice but to rally to Khomeini's defense. The Qum incident shifted many of the clergy from a position of support for the Shah's monarchy to an active opposition. That "dirty trick" perpetuated by General Fardoust was the trigger that sparked Islamic movement participating in the anti-Shah democratic Revolution. John D. Stempel, characterized Fardoust's importance to the Alliance: "it is hard to over estimated the value of having a mole in the inner circle of the Shah."

11. On February 3, a confidential communiqué from the U.S. Embassy clearly reflected the vision of the Alliance: "Though based on incomplete evidence, our best assessment to date is that the Shia Islamic movement dominated by Ayatollah Khomeini is far better organized, enlighten and able to resist Communism than its detractors would lead us to believe. It is rooted in the Iranian people more than any western ideology, including Communism."

12. April 1978, Le Monde "identified Khomeini's Liberation Movement of Iran as the most significant force in the opposition followed by the Shi'ite Islam joins the reformist of progressive critics of the Shah on the same ground. In fact, this analysis was contrary to what Mohaammad Tavassoli, leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran, expressed to John D. Stempel on August 21, 1978: "The nationalist movement in Iran lacks a popular base. The choice is between Islam and Communism...close ties between the Liberation Movement of Iran and the religious movement was necessary. Iran was becoming split by Marxist and the religious."

13. On April 26, the confidential minutes of the U. S. Embassy Country team meeting welcomed Bush, Reagan and Thatcher.

14. On May 6, Le Monde became the first western newspaper to interview Khomeini in Najaf, Iraq. Khomeini acknowledged his compatibility with the strategic imperatives of the Bush covert team, "we would not collaborate with the Marxists, even to the overthrow of the Shah."

15. The same month, Khomeini's old ally from the failed 1963 coup (that resulted in Khomeini's arrest and major uprising in June 1963 and his subsequent exile to Iraq) General Valliollah Qarani sent his emissary to meet Khomeini in Najaf. Qarani had been a major CIA asset in Iran since the 1953 coup. Seeing another chance to gain power for himself, he advised Khomeini, according to former Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani-sader:

"if you settle for the Shah's departure and don't use anti-American rhetoric, Americans are ready to take him out."

16. In August, the Bush team sent its own point man to meet the exiled Ayatollah in Najaf. Professor Richard Cottam carried excellent credentials. During the 1953 coup, he had been in charge of the CIA's Iran Desk, also, he had been in close contact with Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi in the U.S. since 1975. Curiously, he admitted to Bani-sadr in 1987, that he had not been working for the Carter Administration. 

Cottam's visit must have had an impact, because Iran suddenly began to experience a series of mysterious catastrophes:

In Aberdeen, Fundamentalist supporters burned down a theater killing the innocent occupants, blaming it on the SAVAK and the Shah.

There were riots in Isfahan that resulted in martial law.

On August 27, one of Khomeini's rivals among the Shia Islamic faithful outside of Iran, Ayatollah Mosa Sadr mysteriously disppeared. According to an intelligence source he was killed and buried in Libya.

17. By late August, the Shah was totally confused. U.S. Ambassador Sullivan recorded the Shah's pleadings over the outbreak of violence:

"he said the pattern was widespread and that it was like an outbreak of a sudden rash in the country...it gave evidence of sophisticated planning and was not the work of spontaneous oppositionists...the Shah presented that it was the work of foreign intrigue...this intrigue went beyond the capabilities of the Soviet KGB and must, therefore, also involve British and American CIA. The Shah went on to ask 'Why was the CIA suddenly turning against him? What had he done to deserve this sort of action from the United States?"

18. September 8, the Shah's army gunned down hundreds of demonstrators in Teheran in what became known as the "Jaleh Square Massacre".

19. On September 9, President Carter phoned the Shah to confirm his support for the Shah, a fact that enraged the Iranian population.

20. A few days later, Carter's National Security aide, Gary Sick, received a call from Richard Cottam, requesting a discrete meeting between him and Khomeini's representative in the U.S., Dr. Yazdi. Sick refused.

21. Khomeini for the first time, publicly called for the Shah's overthrow.

22. In Mid-September, at the height of the revolution, "one of the handful of Khomeini's trusted associates", Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Beheshti, secretly visited the United States among others, he also meet with Yazdi in Texas. Beheshti was an advocate of the eye-for-an-eye school of justice.

23. In early October 1978, the agent for the Bush covert team arranged to force Khomeini out of Iraq.

24. October 3, 1978, Yazdi picked up Khomeini in Iraq and headed for Kuwait. According to Gary Sick, he received an urgent call from Richard Cottam, learning for the first time that Khomeini had been forced out of Iraq. Sick was told that Khomeini and his entourage were stuck in no man's land while attempting to cross the border. Cottam was requesting White House intervention to resolve the issue. Sick respond, "there is nothing we could do".

25. October 6, Khomeini's entourage, having gotten back through Baghdad, popped up in Paris. According to Bani-sadr, "it was Khomeini who insisted on going to Paris instead of Syria or Algeria". Whoever helped Khomeini out of the Kuwaiti border impasse had to have been on good terms with both the French and Saddam Hussein.

26. December 12, Yazdi made a trip to the U.S. to promote Khomeini and his Islamic Republic. Yazdi met secretly with Henry Precht on an unofficial capacity. Precht was the Director of the Iran Desk at the State Department and one of the Bush team's main choke points in the Carter Administration. Later Precht and Yazdi appeared together for televised discussion of Iran. Yazdi assured the American public that Khomeini had not really called for a "torrent of blood", and that the "election would be absolutely free". The Islamic Republic "would enjoy full freedom of speech and the press, including the right to attack Islam.

27. December 28, Cottam visited Khomeini in Paris where he noted that U.S. citizen Dr. Yazdi was the "leading tactician in Khomeini's camp" and apparent "chief of staff". Khomeini was not interested in the Mullahs taking over the government. Also noted that "Khomeini's movement definitely plans to organize a political party to draw on Khomeini's charisma. Cottam thinks such a party would win all Majlis seats."

28. Leaving Paris, Cottam slipped into Teheran, arriving the first week in January 1979, to prepare Khomeini's triumphal return to Iran.

29. January 4, 1979, Carter's secret envoy, General Robert Huyser arrived in Iran. His mission was to prevent the "fall of the Shah". According to Huyser, Alexander Haig, ostensibly a strong Shah supporter-inexplicably, "took violent exception to the whole idea." Huyser recalled that "General Haig never gave me a full explanation of his strong objections." Huyser also revealed that Ambassador Sullivan "had also expressed objections." 

Two pro-Shah advocates opposed to the prevention of the Shah's fall.

30. On January 14, President Carter finally "authorized a meeting between Warren Zimmerman and Ibrahim Yazdi. On the same day, Khomeini, in an interview on CBS claimed, "a great part of the army was loyal to him" and that "he will be in effect the strong man of Iran."

31. On January 16, in an exact repeat of the 1953 CIA coup, Bush's covert team ushered the "eccentric and weak" Shah out of Iran.

32. On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini staged his own version of a "triumphal return" in the streets of Teheran.

33. Khomeini moved quickly to establish his authority. On February 5 he named Mehdi Bazargan, a devoted Muslim and anti-communist, interim Prime Minister. Yazdi and Abbas Amir Entezam became Bazargan's deputies, Dr. Sanjabi Foreign Minister, and General Qarani was named military Chief of Staff.

34. On February 11, 1979, in seemingly a bizarre twist, General Qarani asked the Shah's "eyes and ears" General Hossien Fardoust for recommendations to fill the new top posts in Iran's armed forces. Outside of the Chief of SAVAK, all the other recommendations were accepted. Shortly after, General Fardoust became head of SAVAMA, Khomeini's successor to SAVAK.
35. On February 14, 1979, two weeks after Khomeini's return to Iran, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was seized by Khomeini supporters disguised as leftist guerrillas in an attempt to neutralize the left. 

U.S. hostages were seized, but to the chagrin of Khomeini's Fundamentalist, the Iranian coalition government restored order immediately. 

Ironically, in the same day in Kabul, Afghanistan, the U.S. Ambassador was also kidnapped by fanatic Islamic Fundamentalists disguised as leftist guerrillas and killed in the gunfight.

36. On February 14, soon after the order was restored at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, Khomeini's aide Yazdi supplied the Embassy with a group of Iranians for compound security. 

Ambassador Sullivan installed armed, and trained this Swat squad lead by SAVAK/CIA agent Mashallah Kahsani, with whom Sullivan developed a close working relationship.

37. By August, pro-Bush CIA official George Cave was visiting Iran to provide intelligence briefings to Khomeini's aides, especially Yazdi and Entezam. These intelligence exchanges continued until October 31, the day Carter fired Bush and the 800 agents. 

Then with all the Iranian officials who had restored order in the first Embassy seizure eliminated, the stage was set for what happened four days later.

38. On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy was taken again. 

Leading the charge was none other than Ambassador Sullivan's trusted Mashallah Kashani, the Embassy's once and former security chief.



With the evidence and documentation supplied by Mansoor, the alleged October Surprise would not have been necessary. President Carter was the target, in revenge for the Halloween Massacre, the night 800 CIA operatives and George Bush were fired by Carter. The man thrust, however, was to prevent a communist takover of Iran on the Shah's anticpated death."

The manipulation of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-80, and the role of American political figures in effecting it; the failure of the 'Desert One' hostage rescue attempt of April 1980 and the apparent 'October Surprise' deal to delay the release of the hostages and assure Carter's reelection defeat.


Wednesday, 30 October 2013

JFK50: Shortest Verbal Proof of Conspiracy


The Warren Commission assert that Jack was shot in the head with a high-velocity rifle.

The Manlicher-Carcano is a low-velocity rifle.

Helen Thomas: LBJ and Obama Both Took Insults From Israel in Election Years



The venerable White House correspondent Helen Thomas, who died in July, was Mark Mondalek’s grandmother’s cousin. He says his interviews in 2011-2012 with Thomas, an Arab-American who resigned under pressure in 2010 because of comments she made about Israeli Jews, were the last she ever gave. At Middle East Monitor.
Some excerpts, focusing on the Israeli influence in American politics, LBJ’s ignoring the USS Liberty attack in an election year, Obama’s taking insults from Netanyahu, Israel trying to get us into an Iran war, etc. Re my headline, I’d note that no foreign country can sustain this degree of influence in our politics for so long, 44 years, without Americans waking up. It’s happening.
Q. The fight against terrorism has taken an interesting turn with regards to its shift toward places like Yemen and Pakistan now, too.
HT: Pakistan is a mess. Pakistanis protected bin Laden. Nobody knew where he was, baloney. They killed him. They should never have killed him.
Q. If they took him alive they could have maybe humanised him within the rule of law.
HT: Right. But they didn’t want him to be humanised, that’s for sure. They killed him. They had no right to do that. Under international law? Just to have these guys come and shoot him? The U.S. has lost its honour. They have no honour. They have no right to go kill people in their own country. They went into a foreign country and killed a man.
Q. What are your thoughts on Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech before Congress on May 24, 2011, in which he declared that “Israel will not return to the indefensible lines of 1967?”
HT: Congress demeaned us. They disgraced us. And Obama was disgraced, totally. He deserves it. [He was] scared to death.
Q.Why does Obama deserve it?
HT: He let these people insult us. We were insulted. He was scared. You don’t alienate [the Israelis] when you have an election coming up. He should have stood up for what’s just and said, “Look, I don’t like an aggressor.”
Q. It’s impossible to avoid coming back to the Six-Day War over and over again, isn’t it?
HT: Abba Eban went to the Pentagon a weekend before the Six-Day War started and got the maps for 25 airfields in the whole Arab world and they killed them all, they bombed them all. That’s how dirty the U.S. was. They gave them maps from the Pentagon. The U.S. has been rotten. I’m sorry. It’s been rotten.
Q. Then in the aftermath of the war-
HT: Well, the U.S. was helping the Israelis and has helped them with planes, with the money, with everything–with all the intelligence. And then when they bombed the USS Liberty in bright sunlight with the sun shining and there was no mistaking the American flags flying everywhere, they bombed the American intelligence ship. They killed 34 people and one sailor finally got to a phone to SOS the American fleets just barely nearby, they were coming to the rescue, and LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] called them off, called off a rescue for the people on the Liberty. He was running for election.
Q. What did they have to gain from that?
HT: LBJ thought he had a lot to cosy up to with the Israelis.
Q. But what did the Israelis get out of it then?
HT: Oh, they could wipe out an intelligence ship. Information. We had it all. We damn well knew what was happening in the Middle East. We betrayed ourselves. We betrayed every Arab. We allowed the Israelis to win that war and it was so rotten. And they killed our own people. People who are survivors of the Liberty are still damned mad. LBJ called off any rescue and the ships had to go back because he wanted to win an election and he wanted the Israelis to be on his side. He betrayed the world. He betrayed the U.S., in my opinion. He betrayed his own people. He saw his own people being killed–Americans being killed–and the Israelis were killing us. There was no mistake. It was bright sunlight, American flags flying.
Q. What do you think about the fear that the Arabs will lose interest in the Palestinian cause?
HT: They don’t have many people standing up for the Palestinians. People don’t understand their plight. The Arabs haven’t done enough for them. They don’t fight, long as they’re comfortable. But the cause is great and they’re very righteous. The Jews have no right to come from nowhere and say, “This is my home, God gave it to me.” Rabin said, “Where’s the deed?”…
Q. When is the next…
HT: Invasion? Iran. They’ll bomb Iran as soon as it gets the bomb.
Q. Does it matter if a Republican or a Democrat is in office?
HT: No. The Israelis have the influence over both parties. They put their money in both parties.
Q. Talk from Israel on a “pre-emptive” strike on Iran continues on unabated, also. Oh, yeah, they’re still building up, aren’t they? But the thing is, the U.S. has never told them to shut up. Get the hell out of it. Well, I hope that they don’t win. I hope that the Israelis don’t get us into this war.
Mondalek is a Detroit-area writer and contributing author at Boiling Frogs Post and is working on a book about the life of Helen Thomas. Here he is on Twitter.

Icke/Brand






"George Bush [Sr.] is a notorious paedophile."


This is true:





In late 2003, Troy Boner walked into a hospital in New Mexico screaming, 
"they're after me, they're after me because of this book."

The book Troy was waving was this book, The Franklin Cover-Up. Boner was "... mildly sedated and calmed down ... and put in a private room for 'observation.'"

When nurses came to check on him early next morning, Boner was sitting in a chair, bleeding from the mouth and quite dead.

Tuesday, 29 October 2013

October Surprise 1962 - The Mid-Terms of October


For George H.W. Bush, this is the ORIGINAL October Surprise - the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Spying



26 October 2013

UN Resolution Against US Spying


A sends:

http://www.voltairenet.org/article180703.html

Projet de résolution de l’Onu contre l’espionnage US

À l’initiative du Brésil, une vingtaine d’États préparent une proposition de résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies pour garantir la confidentialité des communications par Internet (voir brouillon ci-dessous).

Bien que la NSA n’y soit pas citée, cette initiative est dirigée contre les États-Unis dont l’espionnage de masse viole le Pacte des droits civils et politiques et la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l’homme. Elle fait obligation aux États-membres de prendre les mesures nécessaires à la protection de la vie privée de leurs ressortissants et demande au Secrétaire général de présenter des rapports sur l’application de ces mesures.

Le document insiste sur l’incompatibilité de ce type d’espionnage avec la notion même de démocratie.

Depuis 1948, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande se sont lancés dans un vaste programme d’espionnage de leurs alliés afin de les maintenir dans une situation de dépendance. Si ce dispositif est connu de très longue date, il n’a cessé de se développer avec les moyens de télécommunication numériques. Les révélations d’Edgard Snowden ont contribué à attirer l’attention du grand public sur cette surveillance de masse.

_____

UN Draft on Privacy

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and relevant international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural rights,

Reaffirming also the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,

Noting that the exercise of human rights, in particular the right to privacy on the Internet, is an issue of increasing interest and importance as the rapid pace of technological developmentenables individuals in all regions to use new information and communications technologies [A/HRC/RES/20/8], and at the same time enhances the capacity of Governments, companies and individuals for surveillance, decryption and mass data collection, which may severely intrudewith a person’s right to privacy,

Welcoming the report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression submitted to the Human Rights Council at its twenty third session, on the implications of the surveillance of private communications and the indiscriminate interception of the personal data of citizens on the exercise of the human right to privacy,

Reaffirming the human right of individuals to privacy and not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence, and the right to enjoy protection of the law against such interferences and attacks [new, based on article 17 of theICCPR] , and recognizing that the exercise of the right to privacy is an essential requirement for the realization of the right to freedom of expression and to hold opinions without interference, and one of the foundations of a democratic society [new, based on the report A/HRC/23/40 (para24) of the Special Rapporteur],

Noting that while concerns about national security and criminal activity may justify the gathering and protection of certain sensitive information, States must ensure full compliance with international human rights [statement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, NaviPillay, on September 20th, 2013],

Emphasizing that illegal surveillance of private communications and the indiscriminate interception of personal data of citizens constitutes a highly intrusive act that violates the rights to freedom of expression and privacy and threatens the foundations of a democratic society [new,based on the report A/HRC/23/40 (para 81) of the Special Rapporteur],

Deeply concerned at human rights violations and abuses that may result from the conduct of extra-territorial surveillance or interception of communications in foreign jurisdictions [new,based on the report A/HRC/23/40 (para 87) of the Special Rapporteur],

Recalling that States must ensure that measures taken to counter terrorism comply with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law [A/HRC/RES/19/19, OP1],

Stressing also the importance of the full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, including the fundamental importance of access to information and democratic participation [PP6 of A/HRC/RES/12/16, Freedom of opinion and expression],

1. Reaffirms the rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inparticular the right to privacy and not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence, and the right to enjoy protection of the law against such interference or attacks, in accordance with article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [new] ;

2. Recognizes the global and open nature of the Internet as a driving force in acceleratingprogress towards development in its various forms [OP2 of A/HRC/RES/20/8] ;

3. Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular the right to privacy, including in the context of the surveillance of communications [based onOP1 of A/HRC/RES/20/8] ;

4. Calls upon all States :

(a) To respect and ensure the respect for the rights referred to in paragraph 1 above [new, based on OP4a) of A/HRC/RES/12/16] ;

(b) To take measures to put an end to violations of these rights and to create the conditions to prevent such violations, including by ensuring that relevant national legislation complies with their international human rights obligations and is effectively implemented [new, based onOP4b) of A/HRC/RES/12/16] ;

(c) To review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding the extra-territorial surveillance of private communications and interception of personal data of citizens in foreign jurisdictions with a view towards upholding the right to privacy and ensuring the full and effective implementation of all their obligations under international human rights law [based on the reportA/HRC/23/40 (paras 64 and 83) of the Special Rapporteur] ;

(d) To establish independent oversight mechanisms capable to ensure transparency and accountability of State surveillance of communications [based on the report A/HRC/23/40 (para93) of the Special Rapporteur] ;

5. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to present an interim report on the issue of human rights and indiscriminate surveillance, including on extra-territorial surveillance, to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session, and a final report at its seventieth session, with views and recommendations, to be considered by Member States, with the purpose of identifying and clarifying principles, standards and best practices on the implications for human rights of indiscriminate surveillance [new] ;

6. Decides to examine the question on a priority basis at its sixty-ninth session, under the sub-item entitled "Human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" of the item entitled "Promotion and protection of human rights" [new] ."


Monday, 28 October 2013

Defence Secretary William S. Cohen and Earthquake Weaponry


Secretary Cohen and "Sunshine".



Q: Let me ask you specifically about last week's scare here in Washington, and what we might have learned from how prepared we are to deal with that (inaudible), at B'nai Brith.

A: Well, it points out the nature of the threat. It turned out to be a false threat under the circumstances. But as we've learned in the intelligence community, we had something called -- and we have James Woolsey here to perhaps even address this question about phantom moles. The mere fear that there is a mole within an agency can set off a chain reaction and a hunt for that particular mole which can paralyze the agency for weeks and months and years even, in a search. 

The same thing is true about just the false scare of a threat of using some kind of a chemical weapon or a biological one. 

There are some reports, for example, that some countries have been trying to construct something like an Ebola Virus, and that would be a very dangerous phenomenon, to say the least. 

Alvin Toeffler has written about this in terms of some scientists in their laboratories trying to devise certain types of pathogens that would be ethnic specific so that they could just eliminate certain ethnic groups and races; and others are designing some sort of engineering, some sort of insects that can destroy specific crops. Others are engaging even in an eco- type of terrorism whereby they can alter the climate, set off earthquakes, volcanoes remotely through the use of electromagnetic waves.

So there are plenty of ingenious minds out there that are at work finding ways in which they can wreak terror upon other nations. It's real, and that's the reason why we have to intensify our efforts, and that's why this is so important.



Secretary Cohen, Sunshine and The Family Stone

("Like following a cue-ball...")





Quick: How's Sunshine doing on that pick up man?

Bennie Wilson: Oh, he proposed to her four times already, said he would leave his wife and kids and convert from Catholic to Baptist. Now, you know that's some mean pussy to make a man change gods.