"The mob rage was primeval, primitive and brutal. It was the closest that the uprising came to an anti-Semitic pogrom, as the largely Jewish ÁVH officials were mercilessly winkled out of the boltholes where they fled."
- David Irving
"He watched in horror from the windows of his embassy as officers of the hated Hungarian security service were strung up from lampposts. Andropov remained haunted for the rest of his life by the speed with which an apparently all-powerful Communist one-party state had begun to topple. When other Communist regimes later seemed at risk – in Prague in 1968, in Kabul in 1979, in Warsaw in 1981, he was convinced that, as in Budapest in 1956, only armed force could ensure their survival."
- Christopher Andrew on Yuri Andropov's "Hungarian Complex"
THE mob besieged the Communist party headquarters on Budapest's Republic-square (Köztársaság Square);
as the remaining defenders emerged, they were mercilessly shot down and subjected to ritual degradation -- a spoon, a cigarette stub, a coin;
Communist party paybooks were tossed onto the corpses. (Original photos from the Irving collection)
CODED TELEGRAM
From Budapest Priority
From Budapest Priority
Top Secret
Not to be copied
Andropov Report from Budapest to Moscow
1 November 1956
Today, on November 1, at 7 p.m. I received an invitation to the inner cabinet meeting of the
Council of Ministers of the H[ungarian] P[eople’s] R[epublic]. Imre Nagy, who chaired the
meeting, informed the participants in a rather nervous tone that in the morning he had
addressed the Soviet Ambassador in connection with the Soviet troops crossing the Hungarian
border and advancing towards the heart of the country. Nagy “demanded” an explanation in
that matter. The way Nagy said all this suggested that he expected me to affirm that he had
really expressed his protests to me. Also, he kept looking at Zoltan Tildy all along, as if
expecting support. Tildy behaved with dignity. He spoke immediately after Imre Nagy, in a
tone that was much friendlier and calmer. He said that if the Soviet troops continued their
advance on Budapest, there would be a scandal and the Government would be forced to
resign. Tildy would like to prevent the workers’ anger turning against the Soviet Union. Tildy
said that he insisted that the Soviet troops—at least those which are not stationed in Hungary
under the terms of the Warsaw Pact—be withdrawn without delay. Kadar supported Nagy;
Haraszti and Ferenc Erdei spoke very nervously and in a manner unfriendly to us. Dobi
remained silent. After they spoke I offered my views—in keeping with the instructions I had
received. Nagy immediately replied that although he accepted that my statement was good, it
did not answer the Hungarian Government’s question. Nagy proposed that, since the Soviet
Government had not stopped the advance of the Soviet troops, nor had it given a satisfactory
explanation of its actions, they confirm the motion passed that morning regarding Hungary’s
giving notice of cessation of Warsaw Pact membership, a declaration of neutrality, and an
appeal to the United Nations for the guarantee of Hungary’s neutrality by the Four Great
Powers. In the event that the Soviet Government stopped the advance of the Soviet troops and
withdrew them beyond its own borders with immediate effect, (the Government of the
Hungarian People’s Republic will form a judgment on compliance on the basis of the reports of its own armed forces) the Hungarian Government would withdraw its request to the United
Nations, but Hungary would still remain neutral. Erdei and Losonczy strongly supported this
reply by Nagy. Tildy’s reponse was affirmative but more reserved, while Kadar’s reaction
was reluctant. Dobi remained silent. One hour later the Embassy received the note from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declaring that since a strong Soviet Army force had crossed the
border that day and had entered Hungarian territory against the firm protest of the Hungarian
Government, the Government was leaving the Warsaw Pact with immediate effect. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Embassy to notify the Soviet Government of this
decision immediately. They sent notes with a similar content to every embassy and diplomatic
mission in Budapest. Note: we have information that, at the instigation of the Social
Democrats, the workers of all the enterprises in Hungary have declared a two-week strike,
demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.
1.11.56
Andropov
"A historic decision confronts Khrushchev. He cannot risk a NATO presence in Hungary, nor can he delay his action too long: at any moment a final pogrom may liquidate the country's remaining funkies."
Irving
SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE
LONDON, Dec. 27— In a number of ways, the fortunes of Yuri V. Andropov have been linked to those of Hungary. Mr. Andropov, the new Soviet party leader, served in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest from 1953 to 1957, initially as a second-rank official, then as Ambassador.
Those were troubled times, marked by growing unrest, by the 1956 uprising and by the installation of Janos Kadar as head of the Hungarian Communist Party.
So were the years that followed. Mr. Kadar began evolving his program of economic decentralization, and Mr. Andropov, by then back in Moscow, was largely responsible for allowing him to develop the program in his position overseeing the Central Committee's dealings with Eastern Europe. Hungarians Willing to Talk
Mr. Andropov's tenure in Hungary gives his background a special quality. No other top Soviet leader since Lenin has ever lived outside the Soviet Union. And it offers the West a chance to learn something about the man. The Hungarians know him well, and they are willing to talk; people in the Soviet Union have usually found it prudent to say nothing, or to hew to a prearranged line, in discussing the country's leaders.
The recollections of some Hungarians interviewed in Budapest afford little if any insight into Mr. Andropov's years as the head of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence and internal-security agency, and even less into the way he fought his way to the top of the Politburo. They also relate mainly to events of long ago. So the picture is limited, and perhaps somewhat distorted, but it is probably better focused than those that can be readily obtained in the Soviet Union.
On Nov. 1, 1956, with the streets of Budapest blackened from battle, with Soviet forces pouring into the country despite their agreed withdrawal from the capital, Imre Nagy, the leader of the Government, who sought to bring about change, found himself under pressure from all sides. He called Mr. Andropov to his office and denounced the troop movements.
The Soviet Ambassador said he knew nothing of this but promised to find out. Some time later, after what Hungarians close to the situation have described as a heated telephone conversation, he gave his word that the influx of Soviet troops would be halted.
But it was not. By 2 P.M. the Nagy Cabinet had made the fateful decision to pull out of the Warsaw Pact, and by 5 P.M. Mr. Nagy was reading a declaration of neutrality to Mr. Andropov. 'Hungary's Best Friends'
The next day, the new commander of the national guard, Gen. Bela Kiraly, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to look into the Ambassador's complaints that Hungarians were sacking it. Mr. Kir@aly, who now teaches at Brooklyn College, remembers that Mr. Andropov assured him, ''Believe me, general, the Soviet people are Hungary's best friends.'' He offered immediate negotiations to discuss a new withdrawal of the Soviet troops.
''Here was this man Andropov who clearly understood what was going on,'' Mr. Kiraly said bitterly, ''yet he pretended until the last moment to me and to the Prime Minister and to others that everything was business as usual. Even pirates, before they attack another ship, hoist a black flag. He was absolutely calculating.''
According to several Hungarian sources, Mr. Andropov had already begun to make his plans for the country's future. On Nov. 1, Mr. Kadar, First Secretary of the party, and Ferenc Munnich, the Minister of the Interior in the Nagy Government, stopped at the Soviet Embassy and talked for some time, apparently to the Ambassador. Miklos Vasarhelyi, Mr. Nagy's press aide, who later spent four years in prison, said, ''It was Andropov who talked to him first, and it was Andropov who persuaded Kadar to go over to the Soviet viewpoint.'' Negotiations With the Russians
From the embassy the two Hungarians were taken to the Tokol air base, outside Budapest, to Uzhgorod across the border in the Carpathian Ukraine and on to Moscow. In a speech in 1957, Mr. Kadar said he began negotiations with ''the Soviet comrades'' on Nov. 2; ''by Nov. 3, we were all set, and on Nov. 4, the offensive began'' - the closing of the Soviet pincers around Budapest.
It is widely believed in Budapest that Mr. Andropov was one of the key figures in persuading Nikita S. Khrushchev to install Mr. Kadar as Mr. Nagy's replacement. Khrushchev himself preferred Mr. Munnich, who had fought in the Russian Revolution and in the Red Army in World War II.
On the night of Nov. 2-3, however, Khrushchev was meeting President Tito of Yugoslavia at the latter's island retreat of Brijoni in the Adriatic Sea. According to the diary of a Yugoslav diplomat who was present, Tito argued strongly that Mr. Kadar would be more likely to attract a genuine popular following in Hungary, not least because he had served time in jail under the Stalinist Government of Matyas Rakosi.
''Andropov knew the opinion of Hungarian party leaders better than anyone else, and he knew the mood of the people,'' a close associate of Mr. Kadar said. ''When Tito opted for Kadar, Andropov was in position to support him.'' From 'Comrade' to 'Mr.'
Janos Berecz, the editor of Nepszabadsag, the Hungarian party's daily newspaper, has written extensively about the events of 1956 and their sequels. A trusted Kadar loyalist, he nevertheless has a reputation for plain speaking, and he has pointed views about the meaning of the new Soviet leader's experiences in Hungary.
Mr. Berecz said in an interview in his Budapest office, with a picture of Lenin, but none of Mr. Kadar, looking down from the wall: ''When the Government changed, he stopped being Comrade Andropov and started being Mr. Andropov. He learned from that experience. He knows perfectly well that the crisis here, and similar crises elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have nothing to do with Western imperialists arriving here and manufacturing difficulties. He knows that crises arise from within and have to be solved from within. That counts for a lot.''
According to Mr. Berecz, a former head of the foreign department of the Hungarian Central Committee, Mr. Andropov continued to monitor Hungarian affairs closely, even after he gave up direct responsibility for relations with Hungary. He met often, the editor said, with Mr. Kadar in Moscow, and supported his policies in the Politburo. Mr. Berecz and others left the strong impression that they were relieved that Mr. Andropov had come to power, though no one said so directly. 'Thinks Before He Talks'
''We ran the full text of Andropov's Nov. 22 speech,'' he said. ''In a way, it sounded like our speeches, and we think he is interested in reform. But of course one nation cannot copy another - he can't very well go to the Soviet public and say, 'Let's be like Hungary.' ''
The thing about Mr. Andropov that most impresses Hungarians who know him is the quality of his mind. Mr. Berecz described him as a man ''who thinks before he talks.'' Andras Hegedus, the Stalinist Prime Minister of Hungary in 1955 and 1956, speaks of ''an open mind, intelligent and not merely clever.''
''We were Stalinist functionaries together,'' recalled Mr. Hegedus, who was trained as a sociologist. ''We traveled to villages and farms and factories, talking to peasants and workers about economic and social conditions. We sometimes went to Moscow on the same airplane.
''He was different from most Soviet diplomats I have known. Most of them think they know everything after they have read the papers, and they stay in Budapest. Not Andropov. He had a real passion to learn and to know - to understand - this country, and he was even willing to learn some Hungarian so that he could probe more deeply.
''Another point. His attitudes were clearly different from those of the Brezhnev generation. Like me, he grew up in postrevolutionary times. We shared a less doctrinaire approach to social problems. Once a much older Hungarian colleague and I were arguing in front of Andropov about the Marxist thesis that capitalism must end in absolute poverty. I insisted that the statistics didn't support the theory, and it was clear to me that Andropov agreed with what I said.'' An Unusual Promotion
A Western diplomat who served in Budapest in the 1950's said he thought that Mr. Andropov's eagerness to explore the real conditions in Hungary was the key to his success in the months and years after the uprising.
''When he came to Hungary, he was 40 years old, a junior functionary, not even a member of the Central Committee,'' said the diplomat, who is now living in retirement. ''Then he became Ambassador, which was in itself unusual, because few diplomats are ever promoted without changing posts. Then the country fell apart, which should have marked him for oblivion. Proc@onsuls who fail are usually marked for oblivion, like your Mr. Sullivan after the Iranian revolt.
''Andropov kept on moving up. His big contribution - the thing that made his masters in Moscow respect him -must have been tough, accurate appraisals of the situation in Budapest. The key lesson of that episode is not the arrival of the Soviet tanks, which was obviously decided upon at a much higher level than the embassy, but what came after the tanks.''
Miklos Molnar, a leading Budapest journalist at the time, who now teaches and writes at a university in Switzerland, supports that view. During a long talk in his book-littered study in Geneva recently, Mr. Molnar said, ''Those of us who were following events intensively heard very little of him until almost the end of the uprising, because the big decisions were in the hands of much larger Soviet personalities - especially Mikoyan and Suslov, who came to Budapest often that autumn.'' Anastas I. Mikoyan later became Soviet President; Mikhail A. Suslov was the party ideologist. A View of Andropov's Function
''I don't see a direct or demonstrable role for Andropov in deciding what to do about the uprising,'' Mr. Molnar added. ''He was not functioning as Moscow's gauleiter. He was the Kremlin's main source of information, but the policy was that of the Politburo.''
According to David Irving's book ''Uprising!'' published last year, Mr. Andropov had his doubts about the way the policy unfolded. Mr. Irving quoted Mr. Andropov as having told a group of aspiring diplomats in 1957, ''To blame the Hungarians themselves, let alone the Western powers, for the uprising, is not right.''
A minority view is that of Georg Heltai, then the Deputy Foreign Minister, now a history professor at the College of Charleston in South Carolina. While conceding that ''he was just a transmitter'' who had to ''clear with Moscow'' certain decisions, Mr. Heltai told the BBC recently: ''I'm sure that he had an absolutely free hand to deal with the revolutionaries, so the reign of terror in Hungary was the reign of terror of Yuri Andropov. It's bound to his name forever.''
The former Minister, who admired Mr. Andropov's coolness and his intelligence, said the Ambassador ''was the ultimate power who decided who and how many people should be executed.'' 'Rectify the Situation'
Ivan Boldizsar, the editor of The New Hungarian Quarterly, used to meet Mr. Andropov at receptions and sometimes chatted with him in English. He put the matter of the Kadar succession much more bluntly. Mr. Andropov, he said, ''proved conclusively to Suslov and through Suslov to Khrushchev that the Soviet management of Hungary had been misguided and that Kadar could best rectify the situation.''
''In the end,'' Mr. Boldizsar said, ''Andropov was a hard-liner. After all, the Soviets came in and crushed the rebellion. But they didn't do it until Nov. 4, and the outcome was much better than it might have been otherwise.''
Mr. Vasarhelyi, the former Nagy press aide, says it is pointless to describe Mr. Andropov as a hard-liner or a soft-liner. ''I have no illusions about the man,'' he said. ''He spent 15 years as the head of the K.G.B. He has had a long and successful career in the party. He is a tough man, but he is a realist. One can speak to him, especially on the subject of Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately for us, Eastern Europe is the one area where the Russian ruling class, which certainly includes Andropov, cannot afford to yield anything. In Cambodia, on arms, even Afghanistan, yes, but we are their forecourt. One can only hope that Andropov's investment in Kadar over all these many years will give us a bit of protection.''