Never Tear Us Apart - The Paula Yates Interview, 1998

Never Tear Us Apart - The Paula Yates Interview, 1998 from Spike EP on Vimeo.

The coroner, Paul Knapman, said the amount she snorted would not have killed an addict, but as "an unsophisticated taker of heroin" Miss Yates had no tolerance to the drug.

Recording a verdict of death by non-dependent abuse of drugs, he told the court: "The evidence does not point to this being a deliberate act of suicide. It seems most improbable that she would attempt to kill herself with her daughter in the house. Her behaviour was foolish and incautious."

Miss Yates, 41, died at her home in Notting Hill, west London, on September 17, after moving back from a break in Hastings.

The last adult to see her was a former heroin addict she had met at the Priory clinic, but her four-year-old daughter Heavenly Hiraani Tiger Lily, whose father Michael Hutchence died three years ago, was alone with her when she died.

Pathologist Iain West told the court he had found morphine in her blood, but no trace of alcohol or other illegal drugs.

"The powerful narcotic drug depressed the cells of the brain which basically stopped her breathing," he said.

Miss Yates's close friend Belinda Brewin, who visited her on the evening before her death, told the court: "She was slightly staggering, her eyelids were drooping, she was slightly incoherent. I could tell that she had been taking drugs.

"I said, 'What the hell are you doing this for after all this time?' She hadn't taken drugs, illegal drugs, for nearly two years. She said it was the pressure of being back in London."

After bathing Miss Yates because she had been sick, Mrs Brewin left the star in a "quite coherent" state. Unknown to Mrs Brewin, Charlotte Korshak, a former heroin addict, was upstairs throughout the visit and was the last person to see Miss Yates.

Miss Korshak, 21, told police that Miss Yates had taken heroin, cocaine, ecstasy and acid "from time to time".

But she said she did not see Miss Yates take any drugs on September 16 and when asked by the coroner if she had supplied Miss Yates with illegal drugs replied: "Absolutely not." She told the court she left her friend "fine, in a really good mood, happy".

Miss Yates's body was found by her longstanding friend Josephine Fairley Sams, who visited the house after trying to call her repeatedly. She was let in by Tiger Lily. "I rushed upstairs to tell Paula to wake up and took one look at her and knew she was dead," she told the court.

"She was naked, half-out of the bed. I touched her and she was very cold."

Miss Yates found fame in the 1980s as co-presenter of Channel 4 show The Tube, and as girlfriend and later wife of Sir Bob Geldof. They had three children - Fifi Trixibelle, 17, Peaches, 11, and Pixie, 10 - but in 1995 she left him for INXS singer Michael Hutchence. An acrimonious divorce and custody battle followed.

Amid a blaze of headlines she gave birth to Hutchence's daughter, Tiger Lily. But only 14 months later he was found hanged by a belt in his Sydney hotel room in November 1997. Miss Yates refused to accept the coroner's verdict of suicide. Her life was rocked again when it was revealed that her father was not the late TV presenter Jess Yates, as she had believed, but another TV personality, the late Hughie Green. Following Miss Yates's death Tiger Lily was made a ward of court and is being cared for by Sir Bob, who already had custody of his three children.

After the inquest Miss Yates's solicitor, Anthony Burton, read a statement on behalf of her friends. "An inquest tells you how someone died, not how they lived. It gives no clue to the fullness and joy of Paula's life. Her friends will always remember her as loving, affectionate and witty."

Why is John Lydon Still Alive...?

"The King is gone, but he's not forgotten,

This is the story of Johnny Rotten..."

Yes, but Brother Lydon makes the classic mistake of confusing voting with democracy.

And by the way - why DID he and his wife miss boarding flight Pan-Am Flight 103, exactly....?

It wasn't just him, though.

Someone also felt the need to warn the Four Tops, Kim Cattrell, the heir to the Spanish Throne, and every US State Dept. official and every US Serviceman in serving Europe that Christmas not to board that flight, either.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Am_Flight_103#People_booked_who_did_not_board

It's especially obvious that The Four Tops are lying : 

"The R&B singing group The Four Tops had been scheduled to board Pan Am Flight 103 to return to the United States for Christmas after completing their European tour, but were late getting out of a recording session and overslept."

Which is all well and good. But which is it?

Late getting out of a recording session, or oversleeping?

Considering that takeoff time was at around 6pm from Heathrow...?

The Baphomet

As Above, So Below

2. THE BAPHOMET   (Translated from Hungarian)

Now I really thought that I reached all the wishful ultimate goals. A warrior’s order came to the monastery, which now can spend my days without any problems. Food and drink was provided; things and it was easy enough: bell-ringing three times a day, the church kept clean dishes, and clothes worn for mass in stow. Throughout the day in prayerful contemplation I have to myself. Elias is also having won the knights of the Trust, it was the full name that the red-bearded warriors picked for me. Oh, I named Eliezer. While throughout Poland myself, it took a half year, so that the red monastery raised friends soon after followed by the holy week. Do not conceal your worries ABOVE Elias knight before that perchance the holy week here will be enforced with the same pious solemnity, the whole Catholic world which celebrated are used, they’ll be on very weak assistance, since the ceremonies are not taught in childhood: raised heretics, and not I’m old neophyte.

- Do not worry, fellow Eliezer – encouraged the knights – every day of the holy week, the night before tests will be next in line "Passion" apparitions, you can even learn the tasks for yourself.

I am so very comforted in this, and they were anxious to come to the Maundy Thursday, which started preparations for the night of the holy  ceremonies. Evening as the bell after the doors closed, Elias Knight that gave me a commandment, to buy a lantern in my hand, I go to church with him, he should wait until the clock strikes twelve, you will hear three toasts to the crypt. Open to all without hesitation, and then fitting the honor to receive the guests, who will be the tomb for me to come and put what they will command. I have my eyes not only squinting in this particular assignment. I was never a weak-hearted, and even something prickling curiosity to know what could be one of the guests who walk through the vault for a visit.

Point came after the midnight stroke of the triple toasts to the crypt. I hastened to reveal it, and a great surprise I saw that the tomb is lit up the stairway, and from all kinds of wear old woman walked in shapes, as fashion, only to see pictures of the church, the grand palaces. The women who had painted his face and very white, red, one black, the eyebrows were drawn, and the other míniommal, there were also one with the eyebrows was gilded. Each of their hands was a gaudy wax. They just were not ghosts, whom I had been very scared. Young blood in me, seeing that women semi-dressed quickly, even if such persons are also otherworldly. However, they noticed that the old is not old sexton to go, and they saw me more appropriate presentation. 

The first said: - I’m Jezebel, King Achab woman, whom the dogs licked up his blood on the street. Get me to the baptismal. I want to wash.

The second said: - I am Salome, daughter of Herod, who asked for a gift of John the Baptist’s head. Bring me the golden pyx. Let him serve.

The third said: - I’m Bathsheba, who because of King David sinned. Bring me the Cruets. Putty to my hair.

The fourth said: - I’m Delilah, who betrayed Samson. Bring me the victim. I want to drink.

The fifth said: - I’m Astarte, who is intrigued by the children of Israel Kanahánban. Bring me the incense. I want to be fragrant.

The sixth said: - I’m Thámár, who because of his brother Absalom, Amnont killed. Bring me the holy-holder, let’s tomb filled with tears. And in what he said, it cleared the altar, and put them in my lap. I just looked at what would happen to it. Commandment to obey everything was for the guests.

Week ago. The seventh of a high-crowned figure was golden expensive clothes, which lead to long-drawn barge. This was the back. It sounded like a struck bell.

- I’m Mylitta, Queen of Sheba, who took the treasures of King Solomon, and took him in exchange for wisdom. Bring me the monstrance. This word was shocked. Sacred vessels, equipment and leave the ceremony, but the monstrance! The artifact-infested body of the Savior, which itself is only the Pontifical knees approaching: who would dare to get the location? Considered to be the beautiful nightmare hesitation. It is a wrong with his hand on my shoulder, that the whole body pieced together, and such is said that the whole chapel was filled with sound. - What hesitating! I knew that such an otherworldly beings should not be contradictory to say, and he lifted the monstrance to the altar.

- Follow us! - Then commanded the Queen of Sheba, and he once again behind the back, the other six otherworldly footsteps of a woman of winding stairs which led up somewhere in the chapel, walked in front of me, but once in a gaudy gold-plated iron door, the procession reached. The pop-up, and a hitherto unknown to me, a large vaulted hall open to the monastery, which was not any window, but the lights were mysterious cablight in the room glory. Full of gold and silk-covered walls. And the room from the depths of a tent covered with heavy curtains from the old world all in one by one pacing knights, Turks, Romans, Persians, Chaldeans, Egyptians dressed, who had just arrived in the week she called their names. - Hail, Ahasvér!

- Baal you, Nebuchadnezzar!

- Bless Osiris, Pharaoh! Line and thus, to Herod, Pilate, who, by Nero, who Sardanapal: both counts on the knights.

You’re on the red-bearded patron was Judas Iscariot. Well, this is a nice company, I can tell. The church babies in suffering of my hand, and put in place a long table. At this point, I cried my red beard: - Málkhus! Setting to the back who he was. - Just cut off the ears of the garden of Gethsemane, that you do not hear? You know that I am the Málkhus. Well, there you hold your ears – and commanded me to the patron, whose name Iscariot was the night, and the mine Málkhus, the famous sheriff, who first raised his hand Idvezítőre. - You hold your ears, I say, because I find if I cut it, it is not the glue there Nazarene Ben Hanocri. Even though I did not know what they mean by that name. The red-bearded page you this word in front of the Grand Master, who is now heard addressed as Nebuchadnezzar. In his hair and beard a string of pearls were merged together, as the old Persian sculptures you see. It asks:  – What is the merit Málkhus that Baphomet is picked for service? Iscariot did it for me. - Heretics was atheist Latvian, robbers with wars, killed people, forged álorcás was adulterous husband and his wife, finally condemned prisoner who escaped from prison, and who at the end of every town there is a good friend: the gallows.

- This is our man!- Mumble this Nebuchadnezzar, before the dispute arose between the knights, that this just now I swore the ophiticus diagram before initiating secrets? They agreed that it is unnecessary, since I’m such a notorious villain, that wherever he is turning to the betrayal of secrets in order, the first would be my neck, which is the loop caught. Now starting to have an inkling as to why I was an unwelcome guest in this place. I then removed the frock, and dressed in Rome Liktor its quality, the first task was a niche that I had lying sarcophagus stress the kőfedelet. Kőkoporsóban those who saw it was not other than my Lord Jesus Christ, as we used to see him in the coffin of the sarcophagus taking off, his body five bleeding wounds honeycomb, thorns on the forehead. The entire wax figure was pieced. The knights then stood around the coffin, and began the discussion above, who was Jesus Christ? Latin argued that language was quite well understood.

One of the knight says that this is an old god, whose name Jaldabaoth an Aeon, a pneumatic Messiah, who was sent to the ground, that his eternal enemy, the Ophiomorphosszal battle, but when Jesus was not enough courage to order Jaldabaoth punishment tension crucified him. This was demonstrated by the Prophet Valentinus, the Gnostics. In contrast, the other knight says that Basilides of Alexandria, as evidence, and Bards confirm that the so-called Jesus Christ was non other than that, whose real name is Ben Jozua Hanocri and cross tension was very well-deserved punishment. Circled the world to me these words. If emotions were bad, but the Saints had a strong reverence for my heart. The two hands in my ear I did not hear what they say. But I’ve heard yet.

The third knight says that the whole story of Jesus Christ is nothing more than an empty tale. This figure has never existed, nor was, nor died. A symbol of the whole, a symbol, which was not his body, just like Brahma or Isis, and only the shape of a human idol, as Baal or Dagon. I thought it was already more terrible blasphemy can not be issued for the human mouth, but the fourth knight reviews convince me that there is hyperbola also superlative. It was Nebuchadnezzar himself.

This proves the Scriptures that Jesus Christ is the demiurgus, who is tormented by the laws of humanity so that everyone miserable and unhappy with, prohibits what is good for our body’s own, and the ordering of nature in spite of all persons bound by the rule that it is an act, which is beneficial for the neighbor, even though the man’s work, to make it, which is itself good, is not given to anyone else whether or not the problem.  Annálfogva everyone who Jaldabaoth, the creator understands the law, the profession that demiurgus commands defiance, and they act against everything. Fraud, robbery, murder, falsehood, mockery, lust, drunkenness, not only allowed, but a duty, and who forced slavery on the virtues of humanity, from Aeon was like demiurgus or Ben Hanocri, even Jesus Christ, solemnized and whipped. This and all agreed then, and I was horrified to see that all the presents and the mantles long, thorn-shaped needles are involved in, the coffin lying statue of Jesus over his heart had been stabbed into it.

- What was the true Messiah? - Then Nebuchadnezzar exclaimed.

- The Baphomet! The Baphomet! - Shouting the whole congregation unanimously. This is a great gong which Nebuchadnezzar struck with his fist, and his voice set up in the curtains of the room behind the tent in the top. The bright future lighting from above stood a magnificent altar saw two idols, which among the better was the addition of Baphomet.

As two of the idol’s face was a male and a female, and the whole shape of half-man, half woman. Winding it through a giant snake, and this was a ring of twelve in the zodiac of twelve celestial fölvésve ticket. One was in the hands of the day, the other the moon. The two were in the earth beneath the feet. Of a crocodile resting. This was left to the statue with another idol. In the Mylitta was. A naked female figure, sitting on a boar, a brilliant crown on her head, which is full of rubies and carbuncles was loaded. The knights and ladies come one after the other to the two idols, and Baphometnek the shoulders, the knees Mylitta kissed one by one. Then he was brought in the two idol among the monstrance, and excluding from the holy wafer, we were all laughing leköpdösték large and scattered on the ground, they began to dance and walk over it, their hands around the two shall idols and around the monstrance, the women are the ones who kicked the monstrance. Towards the feet that kneeling also exposed to the appealing robe below, during a language unknown to me singing east infernal chanting. Meanwhile, I had the office to the church filling communion wine, which was prepared in large pots, and served with dancing to those who drank the Baphometic Áldomás. Salem was also great, but even more curiosity, what would happen to light of all. The big jugs empty very quickly, and this Iscariot has commanded me to go down to the cellar, and bring them back full. What is returned to the pitcher plant, even then the knights and ladies at the table and sat in a way that the Queen of Sheba sat on Nebuchadnezzar’s lap. As their hands held victim dedicated to re-fill, the Queen of Sheba said to me:

– Go, Malkhus! – Go, Malkhus! This is the very confines of the crown on my head: go down to church, get me out of the Nazarene her crown. It ran me from head to toe in cold horror. The church was a majestic altar, the statue of Our Madonna; on its head was a magnificent crown, leaning on each other pearls full of tires and loaded with diamonds, the gift of votive no later Prince. The sacred statue wandering tent holidays throughout the devout people of the region, and it was a bet cumulating the ingredients of any expensive gifts and gratitude. And I now this holy figure, take off the crown of the head, this pious relic, a wanton woman’s hideous animals disheveled locks deck it?  After all, if God is not the mother had also Nazareth Mary, but just an ordinary, honest people of the mother, even wickedness that would shame him to commit!

I hesitated – I did not want to meet the crazy things – and if not then the red-bearded patron was struck in the back of the iron so that my soul will be torn out, and shouted at me: - Did you hear the command? Go to the Galilee, woman, and tell him that the Queen of Sheba, Astarte, the Mylitta governess to the crown! Hurry up! I had to do what they said, otherwise they would kill me. I thought all the saints and plinth me cry, when I committed the sacrilege, and shepherd, great books, heaven cut my head, to hell right wave. Even the statue of Our Lady, it seemed as if the eyebrows puckered, when I take off the crown of the head, and a little crown in my hand was so hard that the earth bent under my feet, when one with him. When the winding stairs he came to the Baphomet-worship hall, you have all the demons loose in the orgy, sinful women of the past millennium, bacchant negligee, wild dancing chord the Pilatus and Herod. Astarte, as soon as he saw me, grabbed my hand to the crown of Mary, and swung it setting locks, and began with the frenetic dance of priestesses Mylitta walk by Nebuchadnezzar Phrygian dance accompanied by goat gambol; Astarte hair flying around him, stretched wide, as the wind rose in the spokes, and as fast as you spin around me seemed as though he has had two faces, as Baphomet, the idol. Nebuchadnezzar only once and then fell to the feet, and stood on his knees and hands, and began to weighing out eyes, and a miserable bogota, that I thought I was the second time it will happen to the miracle that changed ox. A bőgéséből removable, to „Malkhust” cry. The bőgéséből kivehettem that "Malkhust" shouts. Is a grass tufts are made of this to him? Want to graze? No, I just want kérőzni. The baron, if satisfied, kérőzik, man, if damn Latvian, also kérőzik. Bring the baptismal "- screaming at me. And the hideous animal beundokította the holy temple dish that I had to keep him. The outbreak after a moment he seemed to depart.

- Pull up the dishes, clean up and take back the points. The sanctuariumot set at the usual place. Put the hosts in the chalice. Then go to sleep.

Astarte waltzing and dizzy fell to the ground, and as head six Nebuchadnezzar threw his shoulder, the crown fell to the head of the Virgin Mary, and there feet. I picked it up and broke it. - You can put back into place! - Ökrendezett Nebuchadnezzar. - First drink!- Said to Astarte, a hoarse, tired voice, and a pretty extreme blistering down the side of gourd, and he odatartá in my mouth. This beautiful gourd struck gold work was richly paved with turquoise and bustard. - "This wine is made to the spoken that Noah planted kőurnája, which is my grandmother, there is the sarcophagus under Nivinében Semiramis. ” Drink up! " And since my reluctant, grabbed the neck of one arm, ther him on the head, then pulled one of the gourds and odaszorítva with the lips of my lips, I am drinking your own wine in his mouth. Never on the sweeter, intoxicating, firey wine is not drunk in my whole life.

- Who hit me slap in the face now? - Cried the Queen of Sheba this up, setting wild about her.

- No, I have a drink! - Odanyújtva said the bottle again.

I took it in my mouth, but the first kortynál noticed that it is not the wine you drank the first. This bitter taste and a strange smell, which összeborzasztott. I did not drink more than one sip only shown if more sipping it. Thanks, returned to the canteen, he was already enough. - Keep it! I will give you a souvenir – he said this, the pagan queen, and throw it also include the other church vessels, which, at the same time that take it away, I was forced to both the large christening feeder. He started the drunken demons antagonize the candles, and I hastened to escape from the beam caught in the temple, lest they prevented them in the dark.

I then washed three times in the temple vessels and clean water, and the seats restored, restored to the monstrance on the altar, and the crown of the Virgin Mary image I asked her forehead, but not without that kiss the hem of his robe, asking for forgiveness. The robe is a beautiful piece of work, the great Prince himself has created, and the image of the twelve apostles who was beautifully embroidered with silk and gold-colored it to silver.  – Well, where do I put this – I say to myself, looking at the canteen was a gift – that he does not steal from me? Believe it is worth if I sell a whole or a peasant more mill. But perhaps this is only a dream, and when I woke up and will no longer be in my hands? - I do that because the ear balteusom szíjára connection (I still Liktor), there can not be lost.

And so I did, because he is to relay the dream, it is not looking at where to sleep, but elámolyogtam somewhere, and I do not know how long I slept. All I know is that someone pulled my ears because when woke me, and also kicked to the corners of my pages. I was a patron of the red. - Well no, Iscariot, and then once I get up! - Mumble, half asleep. - Oh, trifurcifer! Even appoint Iscariot! Wait, then I’ll be sobering! He took a large pot of water, and it through. Indeed, until I came to this. - No, you’re kind silenus! It is also well tolerated yourself! – The knight got cross. - That I have commanded you to wait for the kriptaajtóban, while guests arrive, and you confused the crypt with the cellar door: then pulled up from the tap. I did not know what world you are. - Well, my dear flask, which was subject to ax belt? But there was no longer entrust no canteen, no wine, but the old was wearing a cilice, which left me dead sexton. - No, do not dream now, but hurry to the chapel, screw the kelepelőt, the Mass begins immediately.

I was so alive before I saw everything! As soon as I entered the church through the sacristy, I found everything in its place, as the day before.

The breasts was erected in the holy bier, around candles, and I have the same image of Christ before I saw the coffin, which was the last night of the Baphomet-worshipers thorns gather. But this did not seem there was no sign of red-backed. The church was full of awful people, which fininte procession came and went, the mourning delight. Then came forth a long line of the Knight of the Order, cilice gray and bare knees towards the coffin approached the Savior, one by one and kissed the marble coffin which fölvezettek.

And I saw the night that the main man, hooked a crown on his head, which was four wrens, spat in the face of Christ is holy, and he said it was to cheat! And now, kiss his feet. People! And these others, who argued over whether he "Aeon" was whether or Jaldabaoth his son, who is backed Ophiomorphostól or "no?" Now and humiliated people approached her, beaten their breasts with fists, and when the inclangorium cheated and cheated again, they all worship the earth, and not a sigh halls people packed the church, as the master lifts the body of Christ high: the devil urged me back to elkiáltsam myself in this great silence, "Man! Christians! Do not kneel! In the cup there is a wafer, which was trampled on in the corner by Astarte when the white wings of a dove, would not the mouth.

Ez Astarte hangja. Megzendül then the organ and singing in the church, and I hear women’s voices in the "Miserere", "De Profundis" rebel song, which I forwarded to the same voices were singing last night to "come in rose, come on!" This Astarte’s voice. This Delilah! Jezebel this deep bell-ringing! You came up I saw the crypt! You went up the winding stairs one after another! - But where? - It is not anywhere in spiral. - In the place where I went up and came down to three, there’s no door, no stairs, but the order Grand Masters the dead knight Arminius the solid marble tomb is there, lying on top of the knight statue, hands, chest complex, full ornatum. Anyway, this is all a dream. Have relieved my heart from the very high burden, which is so excessively pushed. Ihattam a lot of imagination to hevülve was the fault. - So no one’s fault. So accordingly, it is not for that I took off the crown of the head of the Virgin Mary, Queen of Sheba is in your head and making the idolator’s dance profaned. When the celebration was over, and I normally come to the statue of Our Lady, the constant burning lamp, which stood in front of her feet, pour oil, as it hemisphere only immersed of admiration. The sacred crown in front of the statue’s head was the size of a peanut pearl, also a rear and a large ruby.

Always on the opposite part of the pearl used to be. Now the ruby glowed on his forehead. This crown is turned one! And so it was not a dream. But what then? That day, I say, Good Friday was a day of general jejunium. The thorn "so strictly kept the fast, even to this day a patient is lying novitiusnak death was not in the medicine, because the manna was decoctumban, and Pilula hydromat were dying, and the manna and the dish can be Hydromat already. Hunger myself all day. And as a sort of broad human conscience, is very sorry that the last great feast at night (if you do not really dream of) egynémely three thousand years before the quail have not been stuck in the leg today. But then where to stick it?  The Latvian was also there where the water bottle. As the evening, the bell instead of the Good Friday rattle finished the three verses, the red-bearded knight again waited in the sacristy of the lantern, and he said: - Well, here again today, you’ll wait for the guests of the crypt, but then again it is not the time to sleep than last night. I thought to myself: "Well I’ll be that you do not sleep." - Today before they will come.

It is also in Latvian. Hardly the clock struck eleven, I was the toast of the crypt, and as soon as I opened it, my old-world beginning beauties who are no longer needed to me presented themselves. We knew each other. Also today, handing out the same command to you yesterday, that the sacred vessels wear them. But the way we go into the wall here? It was very curious. Then, when the Queen of Sheba, click it to do is to play the altar compartment saints, the Queen said to me:

- Do not Look Back, it will take you to the devil! Do not backward looking, but as soon as I came to the sacred golden cup flat roof, he is a bright page provided to me by way of a perfect mirror. Kilestem so on, that walks up to the Jezebel, the Tomb of Arminius, a lying lovagszobornak head turns, and that whole marble sink, and then turn up the talapjával. The lost tomb, then there seems to be winding staircase at the entrance, while compiling the base of the statue is one of the initial part of the staircase before. I did not see such a thing. Then all the women.

This time, last seen in the Great Hall of the mysteries was not furnished. The tables are laden with all kinds of expensive roast, pies from the East and fruits. Good Friday evening meat! When all the orthodox, even in the Calvinist and ciberelevest eat too fast, hungry and thirsty, or turning pages of prayer, and seeking to find which of their own comfort, we repent and hunger whacked? And this great festival at the eleventh hour to begin drumming, right hearty! But what is right hearty! It was as if all the guests and farmers in the two-indeed, a thousand years, he ate and drank nothing would. - Was not persuaded them to the elevators to the wine cellar, and roasted fölszeletezni. The same scenes followed, which last night, but human assets cogitate rank.

Queen of Sheba was even more foolish than yesterday. Once he has said: - Warm me this suit. Go, Malkhus, bring me to the Galilee, the mantle of her, the good will be cool. - How would you Dejanira-köntössé this robe! – I say to myself, desperately. But an Iscariot six convince me that must be obeyed, and I just repeated the sacrilegious attack yesterday. When the mantle back, even then it was a great need Astarte, the boar riding druszájától simulacrum is nothing different. So that on the front of my eyes I was forced to look down. Astarte who said - Come, come, here Malkhus! –Inviting laughing. - Here is the gourd. Drink it. As I drink. I drink Baphometért to you Astarte. And he drank his first in the gourd. The same vesicular művű Golden Age was the last of which was judged. I realized I have the hang of the joke. I heard once that there are artistic flasks, tagged dual core is, one kind of drink can be filled, the other another. Then the gourd’s neck when the top man is detached it turns right, the one where the left and the other beverages will be provided. I noticed the way the bottle top juicer, the pagan queen, when you drink.  Well, then pull to the right. When you gave me here, then left. – I then, almost imperceptibly, moved it back to the right again. And the really good sweet, juicy wine came out of it.I drank from it and took seriously.

- Well, do not you, it was good? - Asked the queen of lies. And I like money I paid him back. - Slightly bitter - I say. And pushed the number of fintorgást. Astarte ignores the confidence of his fingers under my nose, laughing and said: - The good unto Thee. This masculine ceiling remaining wine."Lord" did, then just drink. This will give you the bottle well. Put the other side. And all the company’s infernal laugh. - And now wear the wine,- Nebuchadnezzar commanded – and then onto the spirit Vinit! I megundokított again berated the church drágaságokat, and then brought up from the cellar at the kőkorsóban spiritus Vinit. The demons did not have enough of the intoxication of wine, brandy had them, whether they wanted more drinks.

I then thought something. The brandy in a real Russian kőkorsóban make was. It was a smart plug that has only been able to pull it, the secret of who it was who interfered. I also once learning curve. I opened the jar in the basement, emptied some of it, and then I gave it to me gourd cram for litter. With the plug shit again.

- I drank with him, Malkhus? – Herod called me. - Baphometic I swear that I did not drink.

- You open the pot! - Pilate commanded.  Last Achab then snatched from my hand, and that he could not get along with him, stand the silver jug to the middle of the sword hilt struck before the broken jug, and the pool was filled with its contents. Then Bathsheba to Thámár (a good housekeeper, famous biblical both!), Figs, raisins and orange peel thrown into, while Delilah-coil lit candles in a large bowl krampampulit the whole, and at the same time all other lights extinguished.

Then, when the wine spirit burning, the table of Nebuchadnezzar, the holy-swing asperges immersed in the burning wine, shared with the group of believers around the hot drink, the odatartott calixa onto what they are like infernal river of fire taken to the lips. The fire, etc Four-king, the fire sup nightmare, blue and green flag in the middle flickering Basin coroner sápasztva, a grouping indicated, which was put to shame all have seen pictures from the danse macabre. You’re the Queen of Sheba was the green lighting, damned as a naked soul, a sacred mantle of the neck, face, lips no redness, just a flashing black eyes show that he was alive. - Howling and all the hateful tone of blasphemy. Fire in the mouth, fire in the mouth.

I fled the Sanhedrin hell. Now, I was certain about it, not dreaming. I was determined to accesses from here. If these demons, devils can be so very stupid: even though they can not keep themselves from their own trap into them a poor devil like myself. After all, if drinking the litter and I made my decision, I will have a sleep in tomorrow so I do not know by whom in ceremony of Resurrection? Scapegoat slipped to idolatry, and then said to myself, reasoning: If they are human beings (because they do not like others) through the crypt I came here, the crypt catacomb something to be kept in the open, where a secret door where the woman’s animals were. That way I can escape from here. I took the lantern, I went with him to the tomb, and as to the long passes through the vault, the two lines between the carrier, which is buried here memorial was loaded, a "Ptolomeus named knight of the cist félretolva found in front of the memorial. It was not marble, but made of tin, which marble was lacquered. This car was not cist, but a narrow climbing entrance. I went up the stairs. They also led to a steep staircase going up. Seventeen steps counted. The seventeenth found – not a door, but a sacred statue. Tied to a tree was a statue of St. Sebastian, arrows diagonal as the godless Diocletian martyrs put to death by the hero.

I saw on this day is enough for a statue at the monastery, but it was outside the wall, and looking out, standing in a booth. It is certain that he knows the secret of the curfew, otherwise I would not be in here.

- Oh, St. Sebastian! - I beg it all with humility – have a look that I am Moravian on my mother’s side, you have national or got my back, and teach him how you came in here through the wall that I was the same output. Because there seemed no opening behind him. I started to look for the opening. The heroic martyr’s body is three lined arrows, the arrows they are copper. Oh what a damned reckless and would think of that tortured to death in the holy reversible the cram arrow wound? And I noticed that the three arrows, one brighter than the other two, as if it was touching. I stood up to the shelf, and tried to turn the arrows. And as the arrow gave with the finger pressure of a pen, the whole statue, together with the cab began to turn, and in a minute I saw the starry sky above. St. Sebastian together was outside the monastery walls.

- Come, Now let me back again, my dear get me back – I say, and vice versa arrow back again, returned to the catacomb entrance. So this is the secret of the walking ghosts. I went back again to the tomb, and with a degree of care, looking for something. They also found him. Namely, that the tomb sinks Arminius hung over my head, the vault aláfordulva, the statue of the dead master, which was wrapped up in his neck. What if I do locate the head, what would it do? The Latvian it, that it rose and turned again to the tomb, and when I went up the stairs to the chapel, there was already in place, out of the reach of the Baphomet idol-steps Gádor Handler’s room, as you won’t see it. Now you are well! The Christ-deniers, not only will be anaesthatized, and who knows when and when not they will wake up, but they can not come out yet of  the devil temple, with no doors, no windows, unless you break the wall somewhere. Tomorrow no one will know where you are. Whilst I was seventh country overstock myself. Decided to set itself the objective. I’m going to the Archbishop of Aachen, and impeach the Baphomet-worshiper rendlovagokat. And assertions that perfect get credibility, I carry with me the beundokított, infected temple jars. No! The devout Christian church does not drink the Salome and Delilah by clear communion baptized in the pool, which Nebuchadnezzar vomits fit not receive holy water from the asperges, which divided the rest of the főördög flaming hell – as long as they inaugurated pious hands again not devoted to, and not released to the magic. I’m taking all this in front of the archbishop, before the council, before the Holy Inquisition, to provide proof, and exorcision.

(- Although I did wisely, my son! True Christian way thing – he cried up to the Grand Duke, until the fölháborodva "thorn" has over wickedness, which the mere listens also very much the kind of people you feel that you need to give absolution — did you honestly!) (- I told you, right? – Sprang up in the Soltesz, lecsapva the judicial wand on the table. – Even it is a Church kibeszélő you that even praised it, and uttered the phrase "well done, son!") Above this then the Duke and Soltesz összekaptak so that fölugráltak chairs, and beat his fist on the table to the candlestick, skull, crucifix and stamen just danced, and even after all this day had to be interrupted in half the interrogations. The villain was gallows again one day, and just laughing to himself inside. Then the next day, when the judges again hush fölgerjedésüket, in the left pending cause continues more.

(- Where he left, Reus?) Engaged the accused. - In the sacristy, I find a great Boris, all interlaced into the temple of gold and silver, in which the unholy orgies were held , bearing in mind the crown of the Virgin Mary either.

When Isaac picked up on my shoulder, and then broken off the bottom, so it was difficult, and I could not do turns to the other shoulder, because of the known white dove. Entwined the aid of the holy statue and then got out of the wall outside the monastery. Even then only a high bastion had to descend. I found the rope ladder, with the aid of the unclean heathen women came up here, and I took advantage, and then I started to iszákba their treasures quickly trotted away to the port. (- Stop now! "- Interrupted the soltész. – Here hold and convince. And this will be the criterion that was sinful or pious act, this is what occurred? – Why did you go to the church, gather babies and go to the port where the anchoring of vessels were ready to depart, and not to the town hall, where would you find the mayor or reeve of the proposed and denounced been requested by the order perceived sacrilege and the offender, while sinful dreams were surprised, in flagranti spleen would have if it is true that it was?) (- No, villain, this cadence find him now – the Grand grumbled.) - A very simple thing to explain, my gentlemen – said the question of the ex-Tripodi reus – and if I say a word, just so they will understand everything. In the name of the city where this happened, Stettin. This town, you know, it’s time that Gustav could, in the sectarian leaders who not only did not bother with that of the Catholic monasteries, which they themselves have desecrated every time, with Baphometic worship, and hold this festival Mylitta, but what is more, they lived a very good alliance with the "thorn" by those who united with Sweden, valiantly fought against the imperial army siege, and the faithful-arms were heretics. Accusatory though there I had: I would have been wrong. So I decided to escape to a country of pious German wall whose game you can listen to, and the inquisition plenty of power will stand up and be faithful to this terrible incident deserves to be someone to launch a campaign for him. And as the sea may have the least investigated, so I tried to reach the port of Stettin. (- Habe rectum! Rectissimum! – Reviews say the Duke was in a hurry. – The Swedish heretics can not be judges in this spiritual matter. Deleted the bunsen the "sacrosanctorum growing in vertical clusters.") (- I’ll bet that the entire line engross Register is also a bitch! – Rumbling among the proposed beard. – No, but now comes the "Homicide!")

Source: http://mek.oszk.hu/00800/00830/html/  From the book, "A Notorious Adventurer Of The 17th Century" by Jokai Mor.

The Sacred Geometry of the Web of Fear

ARNOLD: Well I don't see as I can put it any clearer, sir. We're here at Goodge Street, right? And the fungus has gone all the way round the Circle Line. 

CHORLEY: Yes, I know that, man, but these other tunnels, the Northern Line, the Central Line, I mean, they're not filled, are they. 

ARNOLD: No, sir 

CHORLEY: They must be on a different level to the Circle Line. I mean, Wait a minute, it's absolutely simple. We go out under the stuff. 

ARNOLD: Now look, sir. You know we've already lost two men trying to do that. The influence of this fungus extends through the earth, both downwards and up. Believe me, sir, we're trapped. 

As Above, So Below

KNIGHT: Moving? Are you sure it was moving? 

EVANS: Well of course I'm sure, sir. Sounds daft, I know, but it seemed to be following a Yeti that had a kind of pointed glass thing in its hands. 

JAMIE: Was it shaped like a pyramid? 

EVANS: Well, I suppose it was, really. 

[Actually, it's a TETRAHEDRON]

JAMIE: Well, that's it. Smash the pyramid, and you put the Intelligence out of action. 

KNIGHT: What Intelligence? 

ARNOLD: Whereabouts did you say this happened? 

EVANS: Kings Cross, Staff. 

KNIGHT: What? 

ARNOLD: Headquarters, sir. HQ may be in danger. 

KNIGHT: Yes. We'd better get back as soon as we can. 

JAMIE: No, look. 

ARNOLD: You heard what the officer said. Now come on. 

JAMIE: Look, I came down here to find the Doctor. I'm not going back till I have. 

ARNOLD: Now look here 

JAMIE: No, I'm not going. And if I get a chance to smash that pyramid, I will...

TRAVERS: The sphere. It's gone. It's disappeared! Look, you must let me have the Yeti back, Julius. Oh, make him understand, Anne...

"Everything in our reality possesses a star tetrahedral energy field, and planets are no exception.  The points of the bases of the two tetrahedrons in the star tetrahedron touch an enclosing sphere at 19.47  degrees. At each planet’s 19.47  degree latitudes we have the intersection between the light body of the planet and its surface, and since light-bodies have the ability to connect us to other dimensions, at these latitudes we have an energetic predisposition for inter-dimensional experience. 

Hence at these latitudes we find the massive volcanoes on Mars, the great red spot of Jupiter, two volcanoes on Venus, a dark spot on Neptune, dark cloud bands on Saturn, sun spots on the sun, and the volcanoes of Hawaii.

The Star Tetrahedral form of the Merkaba is an immense science that is being studied everywhere throughout the world. "

I quote The Enemy:

"Henry Lincoln is best known for being one of the co-authors of the controversial 1982 best-seller The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail. During the mid-1970s, while Lincoln was lecturing at a summer school, he met Richard Leigh, an American fiction writer. Leigh introduced him to Michael Baigent, a New Zealand photo-journalist who had been working on a project about the Knights Templar. The three discovered that they shared a common interest in the Knights Templar, and between them later developed a theory that Jesus Christ had started a bloodline that had later intermarried with the Frankish Merovingian royal dynasty.

The three of them took their theory on the road during the 1970s in a series of lectures that later developed into the 1982 book, The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail, which became a best-seller and popularised the theory that Jesus had fathered a still extant and powerful bloodline (the true Holy Grail), and was all tied together by a fake secret society known as the Priory of Sion. These ideas were later used as the basis of Dan Brown's novel The Da Vinci Code.

The book has been described as "a work thoroughly debunked by scholars and critics alike". Arthurian scholar Richard Barber has commented, "It would take a book as long as the original to refute and dissect The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail point by point: it is essentially a text which proceeds by innuendo, not by refutable scholarly debate". 

Dan Brown lawsuit

Some of the ideas presented in The Holy Blood and the Holy Grail, were incorporated in the best-selling American novel The Da Vinci Code, by Dan Brown.

In March 2006, Baigent and Leigh filed a lawsuit in a British court against Brown's publisher, Random House, claiming copyright infringement. On 7 April, High Court judge Peter Smith rejected the copyright-infringement claim, and Dan Brown won the court case.

Lincoln was not involved in the proceedings, reputedly because of illness; however, in the Channel Five documentary Revealed... The Man behind the Da Vinci Code Lincoln stated that he did not wish to take part in the proceedings because the ideas brought forth in Holy Blood were not even original themselves, and Brown's actions could only be described as, "a bit naughty." An earlier novel had already used the theme of a Jesus bloodline: The Dreamer of the Vine, by Liz Greene, published in 1980. Greene is Richard Leigh's sister and was Michael Baigent's girlfriend at that time; she was not sued for plagiarism."

http://www.henrylincoln.co.uk/geometry.php

	WHY I AM SURE THAT THE GEOMETRY OF  RENNES-LE-CHÂTEAU IS BEYOND QUESTION In 1971, when I began work on my first film about Rennes-le-Château, I thought that I was introducing the English-speaking world to a fascinating, essentially unimportant, little local French mystery. Before that film was completed, I already knew that there was much more to the story of Bérenger Saunière and his little village. I had begun with Gérard de Sède’s account in Le Trésor Maudit and I soon began to realise that he was not telling the whole story. Geometry had begun to raise its head and it was ten years before I grasped the full significance of what I was beginning to uncover. Facts began to appear which were hard to accept and which took yet more years of careful work before I could show the world what I had found. Bérenger and his treasure remained a wonderful mystery, but behind it lay something else ... the extraordinary nature of the backdrop to his story. Now with the passing of another thirty years there remains no shadow of doubt and I find it strange that the truth is still uncomfortable for some people who insist that the geometry of Rennes-le-Château can be found anywhere and in any landscape. But this is a wilful misunderstanding of the special nature of the Rennes-le-Château phenomenon. Certainly, it is true that shapes can be traced ... hexagons, pentagons, triangles ... by drawing lines through churches anywhere. And the same can be done with public telephones – letter-boxes – even municipal rubbish tips. But these are arbitrary designs. They are not – like Rennes – controlled by a fixed, precise and repeated measure. (Those of you interested in looking for yourselves will find that on a map of scale 1:25000 the measure is a whisker less than 188 mm.) When the discovery was first made, I was obliged to calculate that distance laboriously, using my utterly inadequate knowledge of mathematics. Only much later did I discover that the measure is already defined by the mountains. It is repeated many times between structures marked upon our local map. It is, for example, the distance between the churches of Arques and Terroles; of Arques and Peyrolles; of Esperaza and Coustaussa; of Esperaza and Granès – and many, many more. So how was this astonishing discovery made? To answer this question, I must return to the beginning of my quest. In 1971 I was intrigued to find that, behind the curious writing of the famous parchments supposedly discovered by Saunière, lay hidden another mysterious layer ... a five-pointed star. It was my first glimpse of geometry. And it meant nothing to me. I could do no more than note the oddity and file it in the back of my mind. At the same time I was trying to make sense of the Poussin painting, The Shepherds of Arcadia. Once more I found geometry – and it was Prof Cornford of London’s Royal Academy of Art who proved that, again, we were confronting the five-pointed star. We were both astonished - and puzzled. And then Prof Cornford suggested that I look in the landscape. It was thus that the awe-inspiring pentagon of natural mountain peaks was discovered ... Blanchefort, La Soulane, Bezu, Serre de Lauzet and Rennes-le-Château with La Pique marking the centre. But still there remained the question: What can be the significance of this amazing wonder? The answer lay in yet another aspect of Rennes-le-Château’s mystery. The answer to another question. Why was Saunière’s church dedicated to St Mary Magdalene? In centuries past when that dedication was made, Mary Magdalene, the first to see the risen Christ, was looked upon as the “Medium of the Secret Revelation��? and she was honoured with a symbol in the Heavens. That symbol was the planet Venus. Yet another question: why Venus? And here lay the secret. Venus is special. She conceals a marvel in her movements across the firmament. Each planet, as it circles, traces a pattern in the sky. A pattern formed by the number of times that it creates an alignment of Planet ... Sun ... Earth. Mars shows us an irregular four-sided figure in its four alignments. Mercury traces a great irregular triangle. Each planet aligns a different number of times and so forms an irregular geometric figure. But Venus is different. Alone among the circling planets, Venus creates a perfect, regular and powerful symbol in the Heavens. In exactly eight full years she aligns five times. A pentacle. The five-pointed star ... the embodiment of the Divine Proportion. Professor Cornford said of this geometric figure, that ... ‘it enjoyed immense prestige and excited nothing short of reverence ... since very ancient times.’ As Above – So Below The Magdalen – whose symbol is Venus – the goddess who traces that magical shape across the sky. The shape traced by Rennes-le-Château’s Pentacle of Mountains.    Terribilis est Locus Iste ... Truly, This Place is Awesome.    The wonder in the Heavens is reflected here upon the Earth.  For our ancestors this was indeed a Holy Place. And for us ... ... ... ?

Eavesdropping, Reasonable Search & Seizure and The "Right to Privacy"

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), is a United States Supreme Court case discussing the nature of the "right to privacy" and the legal definition of a "search". 

The Court's ruling refined previous interpretations of the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to count immaterial intrusion with technology as a search, overruling Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States. 

Katz also extended Fourth Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy".

"The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." – Justice Stewart

Regardless of the location, a conversation is protected from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a "reasonable expectation of privacy".  

Wiretapping counts as a search (physical intrusion is not necessary). [NONSENSE]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

If I could agree with the Court that eavesdropping carried on by electronic means (equivalent to wiretapping) constitutes a "search" or "seizure," I would be happy to join the Court's opinion. For on that premise my Brother STEWART sets out methods in accord with the Fourth Amendment to guide States in the enactment and enforcement of laws passed to regulate wiretapping by government. In this respect today's opinion differs sharply from Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 , decided last Term, which held void on its face a New York statute authorizing wiretapping on warrants issued by magistrates on showings of probable cause. The Berger case also set up what appeared to be insuperable obstacles to the valid passage of such wiretapping laws by States. The Court's opinion in this case, however, removes the doubts about state power in this field and abates to a large extent the confusion and near-paralyzing effect of the Berger holding. Notwithstanding these good efforts of the Court, I am still unable to agree with its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

My basic objection is twofold: 

(1) I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today's decision, and 

(2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order "to bring it into harmony with the times" and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable. 

[389 U.S. 347, 365]  

While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution. The Fourth Amendment says that

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The first clause protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized. In addition the language of the second clause indicates that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can be seized but to something already in existence so it can be described. Yet the Court's interpretation would have the Amendment apply to overhearing future conversations which by their very nature are nonexistent until they take place. How can one "describe" a future conversation, and, if one cannot, how can a magistrate issue a warrant to eavesdrop one in the future? It is argued that information showing what [389 U.S. 347, 366]   is expected to be said is sufficient to limit the boundaries of what later can be admitted into evidence; but does such general information really meet the specific language of the Amendment which says "particularly describing"? Rather than using language in a completely artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping.

Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized, "an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 168. In those days the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse." 388 U.S., at 45 . 

There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. No one, it seems to me, can read the debates on the Bill of Rights without reaching the conclusion that its Framers and critics well knew the meaning of the words they used, what they would be understood to mean by others, their scope and their limitations. Under these circumstances it strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment's language the eavesdropping meaning the Court imputes to it today.

I do not deny that common sense requires and that this Court often has said that the Bill of Rights' safeguards should be given a liberal construction. This [389 U.S. 347, 367]   principle, however, does not justify construing the search and seizure amendment as applying to eavesdropping or the "seizure" of conversations. The Fourth Amendment was aimed directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates. The Amendment deserves, and this Court has given it, a liberal construction in order to protect against warrantless searches of buildings and seizures of tangible personal effects. But until today this Court has refused to say that eavesdropping comes within the ambit of Fourth Amendment restrictions. 

See, e. g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).

So far I have attempted to state why I think the words of the Fourth Amendment prevent its application to eavesdropping. It is important now to show that this has been the traditional view of the Amendment's scope since its adoption and that the Court's decision in this case, along with its amorphous holding in Berger last Term, marks the first real departure from that view.

The first case to reach this Court which actually involved a clear-cut test of the Fourth Amendment's applicability to eavesdropping through a wiretap was, of course, Olmstead, supra. In holding that the interception of private telephone conversations by means of wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, this Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, examined the language of the Amendment and found, just as I do now, that the words could not be stretched to encompass overheard conversations:

"The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is [389 U.S. 347, 368]  that it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. . . .

. . . . .

"Justice Bradley in the Boyd case [Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 ], and Justice Clark[e] in the Gouled case [Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 ], said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of liberty. But that can not justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight." 277 U.S., at 464 -465.

Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 , is an even clearer example of this Court's traditional refusal to consider eavesdropping as being covered by the Fourth Amendment. There federal agents used a detectaphone, which was placed on the wall of an adjoining room, to listen to the conversation of a defendant carried on in his private office and intended to be confined within the four walls of the room. 

This Court, referring to Olmstead, found no Fourth Amendment violation.

It should be noted that the Court in Olmstead based its decision squarely on the fact that wiretapping or eavesdropping does not violate the Fourth Amendment. As shown, supra, in the cited quotation from the case, the Court went to great pains to examine the actual language of the Amendment and found that the words used simply could not be stretched to cover eavesdropping. That there was no trespass was not the determinative factor, and indeed the Court in citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 , indicated that even where there was a trespass the Fourth Amendment does not automatically apply to evidence obtained by "hearing or [389 U.S. 347, 369]   sight." The Olmstead majority characterized Hester as holding "that the testimony of two officers of the law who trespassed on the defendant's land, concealed themselves one hundred yards away from his house and saw him come out and hand a bottle of whiskey to another, was not inadmissible. While there was a trespass, there was no search of person, house, papers or effects." 277 U.S., at 465 . 

Thus the clear holding of the Olmstead and Goldman cases, undiluted by any question of trespass, is that eavesdropping, in both its original and modern forms, is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.

While my reading of the Olmstead and Goldman cases convinces me that they were decided on the basis of the inapplicability of the wording of the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping, and not on any trespass basis, this is not to say that unauthorized intrusion has not played an important role in search and seizure cases. This Court has adopted an exclusionary rule to bar evidence obtained by means of such intrusions. As I made clear in my dissenting opinion in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 , I continue to believe that this exclusionary rule formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , rests on the "supervisory power" of this Court over other federal courts and is not rooted in the Fourth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, concurring opinion,338 U.S. 25, 39 , at 40. See also Mapp v. Ohio, concurring opinion, 367 U.S. 643, 661 -666. This rule has caused the Court to refuse to accept evidence where there has been such an intrusion regardless of whether there has been a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As this Court said in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 -439, "The Court has in the past sustained instances of `electronic eavesdropping' against constitutional challenge, when devices have been used to enable government agents to overhear conversations which would have been beyond the reach of the human ear [citing [389 U.S. 347, 370]  Olmstead and Goldman]. It has been insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Silverman v. United States."

To support its new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which in effect amounts to a rewriting of the language, the Court's opinion concludes that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been . . . eroded by our subsequent decisions . . . ." But the only cases cited as accomplishing this "eroding" are Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 , and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 . Neither of these cases "eroded" Olmstead or Goldman. Silverman is an interesting choice since there the Court expressly refused to re-examine the rationale of Olmstead or Goldman although such a re-examination was strenuously urged upon the Court by the petitioners' counsel. Also it is significant that in Silverman, as the Court described it, "the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners," 365 U.S., at 509 , thus calling into play the supervisory exclusionary rule of evidence. As I have pointed out above, where there is an unauthorized intrusion, this Court has rejected admission of evidence obtained regardless of whether there has been an unconstitutional search and seizure. The majority's decision here relies heavily on the statement in the opinion that the Court "need not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls." (At 511.) Yet this statement should not becloud the fact that time and again the opinion emphasizes that there has been an unauthorized intrusion: "For a fair reading of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners." (At 509, emphasis added.) "Eavesdropping [389 U.S. 347, 371]   accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions . . . ." (At 509, emphasis added.) "Here . . . the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners' house or office . . . ." (At 511, emphasis added.) "[D]ecision here . . . is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion . . . ." (At 512, emphasis added.) "We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch." (At 512, emphasis added.) As if this were not enough, Justices Clark and Whittaker concurred with the following statement: "In view of the determination by the majority that the unauthorized physical penetration into petitioners' premises constituted sufficient trespass to remove this case from the coverage of earlier decisions, we feel obliged to join in the Court's opinion." (At 513, emphasis added.) As I made clear in my dissent in Berger, the Court in Silverman held the evidence should be excluded by virtue of the exclusionary rule and "I would not have agreed with the Court's opinion in Silverman . . . had I thought that the result depended on finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . ." 388 U.S., at 79 -80. In light of this and the fact that the Court expressly refused to re-examine Olmstead and Goldman, I cannot read Silverman as overturning the interpretation stated very plainly in Olmstead and followed in Goldman that eavesdropping is not covered by the Fourth Amendment.

The other "eroding" case cited in the Court's opinion is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 . It appears that this case is cited for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies to "intangibles," such as conversation, and the following ambiguous statement is quoted from the opinion: "The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." 387 U.S., at 304 . But far from being concerned [389 U.S. 347, 372]   with eavesdropping, Warden v. Hayden upholds the seizure of clothes, certainly tangibles by any definition. The discussion of property interests was involved only with the common-law rule that the right to seize property depended upon proof of a superior property interest.

Thus, I think that although the Court attempts to convey the impression that for some reason today Olmstead and Goldman are no longer good law, it must face up to the fact that these cases have never been overruled or even "eroded." It is the Court's opinions in this case and Berger which for the first time since 1791, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, have declared that eavesdropping is subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and that conversations can be "seized." * I must align myself with all those judges who up to this year have never been able to impute such a meaning to the words of the Amendment. [389 U.S. 347, 373]  

Since I see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to apply to eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. In interpreting the Bill of Rights, I willingly go as far as a liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage. I will not distort the words of the Amendment in order to "keep the Constitution up to date" or "to bring it into harmony with the times." It was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make us a continuously functioning constitutional convention.

With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy. By clever word juggling the Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that can neither be searched nor seized. Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another. Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court's language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution's language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of privacy. As I said in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 , "The Court talks about a constitutional `right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the `privacy' [389 U.S. 347, 374]   of individuals. But there is not." (Dissenting opinion, at 508.) I made clear in that dissent my fear of the dangers involved when this Court uses the "broad, abstract and ambiguous concept" of "privacy" as a "comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against `unreasonable searches and seizures.'" (See generally dissenting opinion, at 507-527.)

The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

[ Footnote * ] The first paragraph of my Brother HARLAN'S concurring opinion is susceptible of the interpretation, although probably not intended, that this Court "has long held" eavesdropping to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore "presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant." There is no reference to any long line of cases, but simply a citation to Silverman, and several cases following it, to establish this historical proposition. In the first place, as I have indicated in this opinion, I do not read Silverman as holding any such thing; and in the second place, Silverman was decided in 1961. Thus, whatever it held, it cannot be said it "has [been] long held." I think my Brother HARLAN recognizes this later in his opinion when he admits that the Court must now overrule Olmstead and Goldman. In having to overrule these cases in order to establish the holding the Court adopts today, it becomes clear that the Court is promulgating new doctrine instead of merely following what it "has long held." This is emphasized by my Brother HARLAN'S claim that it is "bad physics" to adhere to Goldman. Such an assertion simply illustrates the propensity of some members of the Court to rely on their limited understanding of modern scientific subjects in order to fit the Constitution to the times and give its language a meaning that it will not tolerate. [389 U.S. 347, 375]  

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is a landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution protected a right to privacy. The case involved a Connecticut statute that prohibits any person from using "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." By a vote of 7–2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on the grounds that it violated the "right to marital privacy".

Although the Bill of Rights does not explicitly mention "privacy", Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority that the right was to be found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of other constitutional protections, such as the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. The right to privacy is seen as a right to "protect[ion] from governmental intrusion." [NONSENSE] Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion in which he used the Ninth Amendment in support of the Supreme Court's ruling. Justice Arthur Goldberg and Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote concurring opinions in which they argued that privacy is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Byron White also wrote a concurrence based on the due process clause.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, dissenting.

I agree with my Brother STEWART'S dissenting opinion. And like him I do not to any extent whatever base my view that this Connecticut law is constitutional on a belief that the law is wise or that its policy is a good one. In order that there may be no room at all to doubt why I vote as I do, I feel constrained to add that the law is every bit as offensive to me as it is to my Brethren of the majority and my Brothers HARLAN, WHITE and GOLDBERG who, reciting reasons why it is offensive to them, hold it unconstitutional. There is no single one of the graphic and eloquent strictures and criticisms fired at the policy of this Connecticut law either by the Court's opinion or by those of my concurring Brethren to which I cannot subscribe - except their conclusion that the evil qualities they see in the law make it unconstitutional.

Had the doctor defendant here, or even the nondoctor defendant, been convicted for doing nothing more than expressing opinions to persons coming to the clinic that certain contraceptive devices, medicines or practices would do them good and would be desirable, or for telling people how devices could be used, I can think of no reasons at this time why their expressions of views would not be [381 U.S. 479, 508]   protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee freedom of speech. Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 . But speech is one thing; conduct and physical activities are quite another. See, e. g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 -555; Cox v. Louisiana,379 U.S. 559, 563 -564; id., 575-584 (concurring opinion); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 ; cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 -164. The two defendants here were active participants in an organization which gave physical examinations to women, advised them what kind of contraceptive devices or medicines would most likely be satisfactory for them, and then supplied the devices themselves, all for a graduated scale of fees, based on the family income. Thus these defendants admittedly engaged with others in a planned course of conduct to help people violate the Connecticut law. Merely because some speech was used in carrying on that conduct - just as in ordinary life some speech accompanies most kinds of conduct - we are not in my view justified in holding that the First Amendment forbids the State to punish their conduct. Strongly as I desire to protect all First Amendment freedoms, I am unable to stretch the Amendment so as to afford protection to the conduct of these defendants in violating the Connecticut law. What would be the constitutional fate of the law if hereafter applied to punish nothing but speech is, as I have said, quite another matter.

The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times and places with respect to certain activities. Such, for example, is the Fourth[381 U.S. 479, 509]   Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures." But I think it belittles that Amendment to talk about it as though it protects nothing but "privacy." To treat it that way is to give it a niggardly interpretation, not the kind of liberal reading I think any Bill of Rights provision should be given. The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth. He simply wants his property left alone. And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home.

One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning. This fact is well illustrated by the use of the term "right of privacy" as a comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against "unreasonable searches and seizures." "Privacy" is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept which can easily be shrunken in meaning but which can also, on the other hand, easily be interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches and seizures. I have expressed the view many times that First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from a failure of the courts to stick to the simple language of the First Amendment in construing it, instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted for those the Framers used. See e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (concurring opinion); cases collected in City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 , n. 1 (dissenting opinion); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 865. For these reasons I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right of privacy" as an emanation from [381 U.S. 479, 510]  one or more constitutional provisions. 1 I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision. For these reasons I cannot agree with the Court's judgment and the reasons it gives for holding this Connecticut law unconstitutional.

This brings me to the arguments made by my Brothers HARLAN, WHITE and GOLDBERG for invalidating the Connecticut law. Brothers HARLAN 2 and WHITE would invalidate it by reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but Brother GOLDBERG, while agreeing with Brother HARLAN, relies also on the Ninth Amendment. I have no doubt that the Connecticut law could be applied in such a way as to abridge freedom of [381 U.S. 479, 511]   speech and press and therefore violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. My disagreement with the Court's opinion holding that there is such a violation here is a narrow one, relating to the application of the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this particular case. But my disagreement with Brothers HARLAN, WHITE and GOLDBERG is more basic. I think that if properly construed neither the Due Process Clause nor the Ninth Amendment, nor both together, could under any circumstances be a proper basis for invalidating the Connecticut law. I discuss the due process and Ninth Amendment arguments together because on analysis they turn out to be the same thing - merely using different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive.

The due process argument which my Brothers HARLAN and WHITE adopt here is based, as their opinions indicate, on the premise that this Court is vested with power to invalidate all state laws that it considers to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular state law under scrutiny has no "rational or justifying" purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fairness and justice." 3 If these formulas based on "natural justice," or others which mean the same thing, 4 are to prevail, they require judges to determine [381 U.S. 479, 512]   what is or is not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body. Surely it has to be admitted that no provision of the Constitution specifically gives such blanket power to courts to exercise such a supervisory veto over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and to hold unconstitutional those laws which they believe unwise or dangerous. I readily admit that no legislative body, state or national, should pass laws that can justly be given any [381 U.S. 479, 513]   of the invidious labels invoked as constitutional excuses to strike down state laws. But perhaps it is not too much to say that no legislative body ever does pass laws without believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise and justifiable purpose. While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, and subsequent cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes, state or federal, that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I do not believe that we are granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our own notions of "civilized standards of conduct." 5 Such an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation is an attribute of the power to make laws, not of the power to interpret them. The use by federal courts of such a formula or doctrine or whatnot to veto federal or state laws simply takes away from Congress and States the power to make laws based on their own judgment of fairness and wisdom and transfers that power to this Court for ultimate determination - a power which was specifically denied to federal courts by the convention that framed the Constitution. 6   [381 U.S. 479, 514]  

Of the cases on which my Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG rely so heavily, undoubtedly the reasoning of two of them supports their result here - as would that of a number of others which they do not bother to name, e. g., [381 U.S. 479, 515]   Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 , Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 , and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 . The two they do cite and quote from, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , were both decided in opinions by Mr. Justice McReynolds which elaborated the same natural law due process philosophy found in Lochner v. New York, supra, one of the cases on which he relied in Meyer, along with such other long-discredited decisions as, e. g., Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 , and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra. Meyer held unconstitutional, as an "arbitrary" and unreasonable interference with the right of a teacher to carry on his occupation and of parents to hire him, a [381 U.S. 479, 516]   state law forbidding the teaching of modern foreign languages to young children in the schools. 7 And in Pierce, relying principally on Meyer, Mr. Justice McReynolds said that a state law requiring that all children attend public schools interfered unconstitutionally with the property rights of private school corporations because it was an "arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference" which threatened "destruction of their business and property." 268 U.S., at 536 . Without expressing an opinion as to whether either of those cases reached a correct result in light of our later decisions applying the First Amendment to the State through the Fourteenth, 8 I merely point out that the reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy which many later opinions repudiated, and which I cannot accept. Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG also cite other cases, such as NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 , and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , which held that States in regulating conduct could not, consistently with the First Amendment as applied to them by the Fourteenth, pass unnecessarily broad laws which might indirectly infringe on First Amendment freedoms. 9See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. [381 U.S. 479, 517]   Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8. 10 Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG now apparently would start from this requirement that laws be narrowly drafted so as not to curtail free speech and assembly, and extend it limitlessly to require States to justify any law restricting "liberty" as my Brethren define "liberty." This would mean at the [381 U.S. 479, 518]  very least, I suppose, that every state criminal statute - since it must inevitably curtail "liberty" to some extent - would be suspect, and would have to be justified to this Court. 11  

My Brother GOLDBERG has adopted the recent discovery 12 that the Ninth Amendment as well as the Due Process Clause can be used by this Court as authority to strike down all state legislation which this Court thinks [381 U.S. 479, 519]   violates "fundamental principles of liberty and justice," or is contrary to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." He also states, without proof satisfactory to me, that in making decisions on this basis judges will not consider "their personal and private notions." One may ask how they can avoid considering them. Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to take a Gallup Poll. 13And the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the "[collective] conscience of our people." Moreover, one would certainly have to look far beyond the language of the Ninth Amendment 14 to find that the Framers vested in this Court any such awesome veto powers over lawmaking, either by the States or by the Congress. Nor does anything in the history of the Amendment offer any support for such a shocking doctrine. The whole history of the adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights points the other way, and the very material quoted by my Bother GOLDBERG shows that the Ninth Amendment was intended to protect against the idea that "by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power" to the Federal Government, "those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government [the United States], and were consequently [381 U.S. 479, 520]   insecure." 15 That Amendment was passed, not to broaden the powers of this Court or any other department of "the General Government," but, as every student of history knows, to assure the people that the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication. If any broad, unlimited power to hold laws unconstitutional because they offend what this Court conceives to be the "[collective] conscience of our people" is vested in this Court by the Ninth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution, it was not given by the Framers, but rather has been bestowed on the Court by the Court. This fact is perhaps responsible for the peculiar phenomenon that for a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was ever made that the Ninth Amendment, enacted to protect state powers against federal invasion, could be used as a weapon of federal power to prevent state legislatures from passing laws they consider appropriate to govern local affairs. Use of any such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of this Court's members a day-to-day constitutional convention.

I repeat so as not to be misunderstood that this Court does have power, which it should exercise, to hold laws unconstitutional where they are forbidden by the Federal Constitution. My point is that there is no provision[381 U.S. 479, 521]   of the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws because of the Court's belief that the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the country. Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments would, I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution plainly intended them to have. 16   [381 U.S. 479, 522]  

I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good enough for me. And so, I cannot rely on the Due Process Clause or the Ninth Amendment or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down this state law. The Due Process Clause with an "arbitrary and capricious" or "shocking to the conscience" formula was liberally used by this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early decades of this century, threatening, many people thought, the tranquility and stability of the Nation. See, e. g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 . That formula, based on subjective considerations of "natural justice," is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than those about economic rights. I had thought that we had laid that formula, as a means for striking down state legislation, to rest once and for all in cases like West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ; Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assn., 313 U.S. 236 , and many other [381 U.S. 479, 523]   opinions. 17 See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).

In Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 , this Court two years ago said in an opinion joined by all the Justices but one 18 that

"The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws."

And only six weeks ago, without even bothering to hear argument, this Court overruled Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 , which had held state laws regulating ticket brokers to be a denial of due process of law.19 Gold [381 U.S. 479, 524]   v. DiCarlo, 380 U.S. 520 . I find April's holding hard to square with what my concurring Brethren urge today. They would reinstate the Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns line of cases, cases from which this Court recoiled after the 1930's, and which had been I thought totally discredited until now. Apparently my Brethren have less quarrel with state economic regulations than former Justices of their persuasion had. But any limitation upon their using the natural law due process philosophy to strike down any state law, dealing with any activity whatever, will obviously be only self-imposed. 20  

In 1798, when this Court was asked to hold another Connecticut law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell said:

"[I]t has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually, framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people of the United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the [381 U.S. 479, 525]   general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice." Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399 (emphasis in original).

I would adhere to that constitutional philosophy in passing on this Connecticut law today. I am not persuaded to deviate from the view which I stated in 1947 in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90 -92 (dissenting opinion):

"Since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, was decided, the practice has been firmly established, for better or worse, that courts can strike down legislative enactments which violate the Constitution. This process, of course, involves interpretation, and since words can have many meanings, interpretation obviously may result in contraction or extension of the original purpose of a constitutional provision, thereby affecting policy. But to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because of application of `natural law' deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution is another. `In the one instance, courts proceeding within clearly marked constitutional boundaries seek to execute policies written into the Constitution; in the other, they roam at will in the limitless [381 U.S. 479, 526]   area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness and actually select policies, a responsibility which the Constitution entrusts to the legislative representatives of the people.' Federal Power Commission v. Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 , 601, n. 4." 21 (Footnotes omitted.)

The late Judge Learned Hand, after emphasizing his view that judges should not use the due process formula suggested in the concurring opinions today or any other formula like it to invalidate legislation offensive to their "personal preferences," 22 made the statement, with which I fully agree, that:

"For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I [381 U.S. 479, 527]  knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." 23  

So far as I am concerned, Connecticut's law as applied here is not forbidden by any provision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution was written, and I would therefore affirm.

[ Footnote 1 ] The phrase "right to privacy" appears first to have gained currency from an article written by Messrs. Warren and (later Mr. Justice) Brandeis in 1890 which urged that States should give some form of tort relief to persons whose private affairs were exploited by others. The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. Largely as a result of this article, some States have passed statutes creating such a cause of action, and in others state courts have done the same thing by exercising their powers as courts of common law. See generally 41 Am. Jur. 926-927. Thus the Supreme Court of Georgia, in granting a cause of action for damages to a man whose picture had been used in a newspaper advertisement without his consent, said that "A right of privacy in matters purely private is . . . derived from natural law" and that "The conclusion reached by us seems to be . . . thoroughly in accord with natural justice, with the principles of the law of every civilized nation, and especially with the elastic principles of the common law. . . ." Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 194, 218, 50 S. E. 68, 70, 80. Observing that "the right of privacy . . . presses for recognition here," today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a court of common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with "privacy."

[ Footnote 2 ] Brother HARLAN'S views are spelled out at greater length in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 -555.

[ Footnote 3 ] Indeed, Brother WHITE appears to have gone beyond past pronouncements of the natural law due process theory, which at least said that the Court should exercise this unlimited power to declare state acts unconstitutional with "restraint." He now says that, instead of being presumed constitutional (see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 123 ; compare Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 544 ), the statute here "bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment."

[ Footnote 4 ] A collection of the catchwords and catch phrases invoked by judges who would strike down under the Fourteenth Amendment laws which offend their notions of natural justice would fill many pages. Thus it has been said that this Court can forbid state action [381 U.S. 479, 512]   which "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 , sufficiently to "shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution," Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (concurring opinion). It has been urged that States may not run counter to the "decencies of civilized conduct," Rochin, supra, at 173, or "some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , or to "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples," Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (concurring opinion), or to "the community's sense of fair play and decency," Rochin, supra, at 173. It has been said that we must decide whether a state law is "fair, reasonable and appropriate," or is rather "an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into . . . contracts," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 . States, under this philosophy, cannot act in conflict with "deeply rooted feelings of the community," Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (separate opinion), or with "fundamental notions of fairness and justice," id., 607. See also, e. g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 ("rights . . . basic to our free society"); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 ("fundamental principles of liberty and justice"); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 ("arbitrary restraint of . . . liberties"); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462("denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539(dissenting opinion) ("intolerable and unjustifiable"). Perhaps the clearest, frankest and briefest explanation of how this due process approach works is the statement in another case handed down today that this Court is to invoke the Due Process Clause to strike down state procedures or laws which it can "not tolerate." Linkletter v. Walker, post, p. 618, at 631.

[ Footnote 5 ] See Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958) 70:

"[J]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before them; they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives such as `arbitrary,' `artificial,' `normal,' `reasonable,' `inherent,' `fundamental,' or `essential,' whose office usually, though quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it a derivation far more impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision." See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (concurring opinion). But see Linkletter v. Walker, supra, n. 4, at 631.

[ Footnote 6 ] This Court held in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, that this Court has power to invalidate laws on the ground that they exceed [381 U.S. 479, 514]   the constitutional power of Congress or violate some specific prohibition of the Constitution. See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87. But the Constitutional Convention did on at least two occasions reject proposals which would have given the federal judiciary a part in recommending laws or in vetoing as bad or unwise the legislation passed by the Congress. Edmund Randolph of Virginia proposed that the President

". . . and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by [original wording illegible] of the members of each branch." 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand ed. 1911) 21.

In support of a plan of this kind James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that:

". . . It had been said that the Judges, as expositors of the Laws would have an opportunity of defending their constitutional rights. There was weight in this observation; but this power of the Judges did not go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the Legislature." 2 id., at 73.

Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts "did not see the advantage of employing the Judges in this way. As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public measures." Ibid.

Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts likewise opposed the proposal for a council of revision:

". . . He relied for his part on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of their Rights & interests. It [the proposal] was [381 U.S. 479, 515]   making the Expositors of the Laws, the Legislators which ought never to be done." Id., at 75.

And at another point:

"Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it [the proposed council of revision], as they will have a sufficient check agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. . . . It was quite foreign from the nature of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of public measures." 1 Id., at 97-98.

Madison supported the proposal on the ground that "a Check [on the legislature] is necessary." Id., at 108. John Dickinson of Delaware opposed it on the ground that "the Judges must interpret the Laws they ought not to be legislators." Ibid. The proposal for a council of revision was defeated.

The following proposal was also advanced:

"To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there shall be a Council of State composed of the following officers - 1. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall from time to time recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the U.S. as may in his opinion be necessary to the due administration of Justice, and such as may promote useful learning and inculcate sound morality throughout the Union. . . ." 2 id., at 342. This proposal too was rejected.

[ Footnote 7 ] In Meyer, in the very same sentence quoted in part by my Brethren in which he asserted that the Due Process Clause gave an abstract and inviolable right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children," Mr. Justice McReynolds also asserted the heretofore discredited doctrine that the Due Process Clause prevented States from interfering with "the right of the individual to contract." 262 U.S., at 399 .

[ Footnote 8 ] Compare Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S., at 543 -544 (HARLAN, J., dissenting).

[ Footnote 9 ] The Court has also said that in view of the Fourteenth Amendment's major purpose of eliminating state-enforced racial discrimination, this Court will scrutinize carefully any law embodying a racial classification to make sure that it does not deny equal protection of the laws. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 .

[ Footnote 10 ] None of the other cases decided in the past 25 years which Brothers WHITE and GOLDBERG cite can justly be read as holding that judges have power to use a natural law due process formula to strike down all state laws which they think are unwise, dangerous, or irrational. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, upheld a state law forbidding minors from selling publications on the streets. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 , recognized the power of Congress to restrict travel outside the country so long as it accorded persons the procedural safeguards of due process and did not violate any other specific constitutional provision. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 , held simply that a State could not, consistently with due process, refuse a lawyer a license to practice law on the basis of a finding that he was morally unfit when there was no evidence in the record, 353 U.S., at 246 -247, to support such a finding. Compare Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , in which the Court relied in part on Schware. See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 . And Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , merely recognized what had been the understanding from the beginning of the country, an understanding shared by many of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the whole Bill of Rights, including the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, was a guarantee that all persons would receive equal treatment under the law. Compare Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 -241. With one exception, the other modern cases relied on by my Brethren were decided either solely under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or under the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, some of the latter group involving the right of association which this Court has held to be a part of the rights of speech, press and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. As for Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 , I am compelled to say that if that decision was written or intended to bring about the abrupt and drastic reversal in the course of constitutional adjudication which is now attributed to it, the change was certainly made in a very quiet and unprovocative manner, without any attempt to justify it.

[ Footnote 11 ] Compare Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting):

"The earlier decisions upon the same words [the Due Process Clause] in the Fourteenth Amendment began within our memory and went no farther than an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to follow the ordinary callings. Later that innocuous generality was expanded into the dogma, Liberty of Contract. Contract is not specially mentioned in the text that we have to construe. It is merely an example of doing what you want to do, embodied in the word liberty. But pretty much all law consists in forbidding men to do some things that they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from law than other acts."

[ Footnote 12 ] See Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955). Mr. Patterson urges that the Ninth Amendment be used to protect unspecified "natural and inalienable rights." P. 4. The Introduction by Roscoe Pound states that "there is a marked revival of natural law ideas throughout the world. Interest in the Ninth Amendment is a symptom of that revival." P. iii.

In Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People"?, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor Redlich, in advocating reliance on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to invalidate the Connecticut law before us, frankly states:

"But for one who feels that the marriage relationship should be beyond the reach of a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives, the birth control case poses a troublesome and challenging problem of constitutional interpretation. He may find himself saying, `The law is unconstitutional - but why?' There are two possible paths to travel in finding the answer. One is to revert to a frankly flexible due process concept even on matters that do not involve specific constitutional prohibitions. The other is to attempt to evolve a new constitutional framework within which to meet this and similar problems which are likely to arise." Id., at 798.

[ Footnote 13 ] Of course one cannot be oblivious to the fact that Mr. Gallup has already published the results of a poll which he says show that 46% of the people in this country believe schools should teach about birth control. Washington Post, May 21, 1965, p. 2, col. 1. I can hardly believe, however, that Brother GOLDBERG would view 46% of the persons polled as so overwhelming a proportion that this Court may now rely on it to declare that the Connecticut law infringes "fundamental" rights, and overrule the long-standing view of the people of Connecticut expressed through their elected representatives.

[ Footnote 14 ] U.S. Const., Amend. IX, provides:

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

[ Footnote 15 ] 1 Annals of Congress 439. See also II Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th ed. 1891): "This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others. The maxim, rightly understood, is perfectly sound and safe; but it has often been strangely forced from its natural meaning into the support of the most dangerous political heresies." Id., at 651 (footnote omitted).

[ Footnote 16 ] Justice Holmes in one of his last dissents, written in reply to Mr. Justice McReynolds' opinion for the Court in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 , solemnly warned against a due process formula apparently approved by my concurring Brethren today. He said:

"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. Yet I can think of no narrower reason that seems to me to justify the present and the earlier decisions to which I have referred. Of course the words `due process of law,' if taken in their literal meaning, have no application to this case; and while it is too late to deny that they have been given a much more extended and artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great caution shown by the Constitution [381 U.S. 479, 522]   in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the State may pass." 281 U.S., at 595 . See 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters (Howe ed. 1941) 267-268.

[ Footnote 17 ] E. g., in Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 , this Court held that "Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."

Compare Gardner v. Massachusetts, 305 U.S. 559 , which the Court today apparently overrules, which held that a challenge under the Federal Constitution to a state law forbidding the sale or furnishing of contraceptives did not raise a substantial federal question.

[ Footnote 18 ] Brother HARLAN, who has consistently stated his belief in the power of courts to strike down laws which they consider arbitrary or unreasonable, see, e. g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 -555 (dissenting opinion), did not join the Court's opinion in Ferguson v. Skrupa.

[ Footnote 19 ] Justice Holmes, dissenting in Tyson, said:

"I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain." 273 U.S., at 446 .

[ Footnote 20 ] Compare Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , upholding a New York dog-licensing statute on the ground that it did not "deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law." And as I said concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe that faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a more permanent protection of individual liberty than that which can be afforded by the nebulous standards" urged by my concurring Brethren today.

[ Footnote 21 ] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , and similar cases applying specific Bill of Rights provisions to the States do not in my view stand for the proposition that this Court can rely on its own concept of "ordered liberty" or "shocking the conscience" or natural law to decide what laws it will permit state legislatures to enact. Gideon in applying to state prosecutions the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel followed Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 , which had held that specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, rather than the Bill of Rights as a whole, would be selectively applied to the States. While expressing my own belief (not shared by MR. JUSTICE STEWART) that all the provisions of the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, in my dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 , I also said:

"If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision applying some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I would choose the Palko selective process."

Gideon and similar cases merely followed the Palko rule, which in Adamson I agreed to follow if necessary to make Bill of Rights safeguards applicable to the States. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 .

[ Footnote 22 ] Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958) 70. See note 5, supra. See generally id., at 35-45.

[ Footnote 23 ] Id., at 73. While Judge Hand condemned as unjustified the invalidation of state laws under the natural law due process formula, see id., at 35-45, he also expressed the view that this Court in a number of cases had gone too far in holding legislation to be in violation of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Although I agree with his criticism of use of the due process formula, I do not agree with all the views he expressed about construing the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.