independence tensions between the Congolese and the remaining Belgians.
a position that was made official in July 1960 when Lumumba became prime minister. Not long after that Mobutu was appointed army chief of staff with the rank of colonel.
“There is nothing in the Exhortation that cannot be found in the social Doctrine of the Church. I wasn’t speaking from a technical point of view, what I was trying to do was to give a picture of what is going on. The only specific quote I used was the one regarding the “trickle-down theories” which assume that economic growth, encouraged by a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and social inclusiveness in the world. The promise was that when the glass was full, it would overflow, benefitting the poor. But what happens instead, is that when the glass is full, it magically gets bigger nothing ever comes out for the poor. This was the only reference to a specific theory. I was not, I repeat, speaking from a technical point of view but according to the Church’s social doctrine. This does not mean being a Marxist.”
On the church and politics:
Question: What is the right relationship between the Church and politics?
“The relationship needs to be parallel and convergent at the same time. Parallel because each of us has his or her own path to take and his or her different tasks. Convergent only in helping others. When relationships converge first, without the people, or without taking the people into account, that is when the bond with political power is formed, leading the Church to rot: business, compromises… The relationship needs to proceed in a parallel way, each with its own method, tasks and vocation, converging only in the common good. Politics is noble; it is one of the highest forms of charity, as Paul VI used to say. We sully it when we mix it with business. The relationship between the Church and political power can also be corrupted if common good is not the only converging point.”
"The VIP section was where Obama and dozens of other dignitaries sat, including former Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. This area was protected by a short pane of protective glass that covered only those in the first row of seats. Obama and his wife were several rows back.
Large crowds were allowed to gather in front of where Obama sat, with no visible security nearby.
When Obama made his way to the stage to deliver his speech, a South African sign-language interpreter stood an arm's length away. This man later described himself as schizophrenic with violent tendencies, and he reportedly was accused of murder 10 years ago, according to the national eNCA TV news station in South Africa.
Secret Service officials say the South African government was responsible for the decision to place interpreter Thamsanqa Jantjie just inches from some of the most powerful people in the world during a four-hour memorial service."
Nevertheless, an effective political substitute for war would require "alternate
enemies," some of which might seem equally farfetched in the context of the current
war system. It may be, for instance, that gross pollution of the environment can
eventually replace the possibility of mass destruction by nuclear weapons as the
principal apparent threat to the survival of the species.
Poisoning of the air, and of the
principal sources of food and water supply, is already well advanced, and at first glance
would seem promising in this respect; it constitutes a threat that can be dealt with only
through social organization and political power. But from present indications it will be
a generation to a generation and a half before environmental pollution, however severe,
will be sufficiently menacing, on a global scale, to offer a possible basis for a solution.
It is true that the rate of pollution could be increased selectively for this purpose; in
fact, the mere modifying of existing programs for the deterrence of pollution could
speed up the process enough to make the threat credible much sooner. But the pollution
problem has been so widely publicized in recent years that it seems highly improbably
that a program of deliberate environmental poisoning could be implemented in a
politically acceptable manner.
However unlikely some of the possible alternate enemies we have mentioned may
seem, we must emphasize that one must be found, of credible quality and magnitude, if
a transition to peace is ever to come about without social disintegration. It is more
probably, in our judgement, that such a threat will have to be invented, rather than
developed from unknown conditions.
For this reason, we believe further speculation
about its putative nature ill-advised in this context. Since there is considerable doubt, in
our minds, that any viable political surrogate can be devised, we are reluctant to
compromise, by premature discussion, any possible option that may eventually lie open
to our government.
15 PETER NORMAN The order of the day having been read for the resumption of the debate on the motion of Dr Leigh— That this House:
Question—That the amendment be agreed to—put and passed. |
I was briefed shortly after I became president, by the surgeon general, who was then heading the program ... a man in whose integrity I still have the highest faith. The briefing essentially said that the program was aimed at developing our defensive capability against chemical warfare ... I was told that we had reached the stage where we could start to wind down the program, to privatize the front companies that were involved ... and I authorized that. I said that's the direction we should go, we want to become part of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention, we want to play our full role within the framework of my policy that we return to the international community. One must remember that I was the first and up to now the only head of a government and state that decided to destroy our nuclear capability--we had seven devices--in order to accede to the non-proliferation treaty ... in the same spirit, on the chemical side, we wanted to become fully part of the international community's approach towards this problem.
Within the framework of the assurances that I had been given--that it was never intended to be used aggressively--it didn't bother me so much. Within the framework of the assurances that I was given that everything would be destroyed and that the data would be properly put under a net of security, I was happy that we were doing the right thing at that time. ...
Why did you commission a state report? What was it that worried you?
What really triggered it was ... the discovery by Judge Goldstone, whom I appointed to investigate allegations of unacceptable criminal behavior by undercover agents of the military intelligence and the police, which made me believe that there was some truth in many of the allegations.
I then appointed [General Pierre] Styen in order to ensure that we root out any such elements. His report then resulted in me calling the head of the defense force and some of the senior generals together and confronting them with the essence of what Styen had briefed me about. I didn't have a written report from him at that stage. Taking immediate steps, [I asked] for the suspension and in some instances the firing of a whole list of people. I didn't supply the names, they, in interaction with Styen, came up with a list of names.
What was your reaction when you learned from his report that there were abuses of the biological warfare program?
It wasn't very detailed [in] his report, but it was part of what he said. I was deeply shocked to hear that we might have been involved in assassinations and the like. I've never been part of any policy decision that said it would be OK to commit these heinous crimes and gross violations of human rights. I was accused of overreacting by clamping down in the way in which I did ... today, I'm glad that I did it.
What was your reaction when you discovered in recent months that the project officer appeared to have abused the program? That papers that should have been destroyed were found in trunks in his home?
I was deeply shocked. I'm not in a position to test such allegations or such evidence. What happened with regard to the real program is that at a certain stage, General Knobel came to me with a letter in which he provided me with a key to a safe, which can only be unlocked by two keys and one of the two keys was given to me as president ... [He] assured me that nobody could get to that information without that formula for the safe and the key. I recently formally delivered that key and the formula to Deputy President Mbeki for further safe keeping. The real worry I think that existed was not so much about the scientific data as documented because I was satisfied that in terms of the arrangements that was under proper lock and key. The real worry, also from the American and the British government when they approached me shortly before the 1994 election, was the knowledge in the minds of people. The knowledge in the heads of certain specific individuals and whatever notes they might have made that were not put under control.
A specific name came to the fore, a certain Dr. Wouter Basson. He is in court at the moment in South Africa and I think it would not be proper for me to expand with regard to him personally.
London and Washington made official démarches to you because they were deeply worried about the biological warfare program. What did they demand?
They were initially quite aggressive. They had a long list of demands and I said that because I could give them certain assurances, that we could not accede to all sorts of demands; that I was concerned as they were that we should prevent the knowledge that had been achieved in South Africa to spread [and] be used elsewhere; that already preventative steps had been taken in that regard and that they could be assured, therefore, that we would deal with integrity within the framework of our sovereignty and we would not allow all sorts of inspections by representatives of other countries; [that] they must accept my word. I got the impression that they were actually quite happy, they knew by then that the program had been canceled, had been wound down ... but their main concern was the knowledge in the minds of certain individuals who might become ... loose cannons, using that information in other parts of the world.
There was a second démarche. How did that go?
The second démarche was after the election when President Mandela was then president of the country. I was one of the two deputy presidents, so the ball is really in his side of the court on this specific issue. But I was present at more than one briefing after I became deputy president where President Mandela was fully briefed ... and then from there onwards how the matter was handled was in the hands of the president, the two deputy presidents, the minister of justice, the minister of defense and they continued to ensure that this capacity would not be reawoken again.
When President Mandela was briefed on this program, what was his reaction?
We were in agreement. We never argued about the need that it should be managed to ensure that South Africa would be in step with the rest of the world on this issue. And I personally believe that chemical weapons are atrocious.
Biological weapons too?
Biological weapons. I'm against them ... I am so glad that we have succeeded in becoming fully part of the convention, that at the moment, according to my information, South Africa is playing a constructive, cooperative role and it is now in step with the rest of the world.
Certain people were relieved of their positions as a result of the Steyn Report, a report you took seriously and acted upon. Were you surprised when one of the key people was rehired by the new administration?
I was somewhat surprised, on the other hand there might have been a theory that [it] would be a way of ensuring that a person with intimate knowledge would remain sort of part of a system. At that stage, however, I also believe that the long investigations, which I ordered when I was still president, had not yet come up with sufficient evidence to provide sufficient grounds for a court case. Since then, there's been other developments and there are court cases pending now.
Do you think, in terms of biological warfare, the genie is out of the bottle now?
I think that what is happening across the world in this regard is extremely important I don't have any reason to believe that the research that has been done here has actually lead to transfer of full details to any source. We're back in the crowd together with the rest of the world in saying "no" to chemical warfare, in saying "no" to biological warfare. I'm quite happy that, in as far as it was possible, we are achieving as a country the goals which I've set for myself with regard to issues such as this, how do we join the rest of the world in preventing this type of warfare which no civil society can accept and support.
If it were to be sure that there was an abuse of the biological warfare program well before your presidency and that it had been used in border warfare on people, what would be your reaction?
I would be shocked. I would be extremely unhappy about it and I would distance myself from that.
Is it perhaps an inevitable outcome of having a biological warfare program that there might be some hemorrhage? Do you think you can control these things?
Well, we've had atom bombs in many countries and so far that has been fairly successfully controlled, so it is possible to control such things, but it is best not to have them.