Here's the big news in conservation, energy and sustainable development : Cold Fusion works.
And the Americans are REFUSING to develop it, because it will destroy the oil, coal and nuclear industry.
If the so-called Green Party actually care about these things (and its not just posturing), why aren't they demanding an immediate crash program to develop Cold Fusion energy sources and High Energy Physics...?
"Derrida is the sort of philosopher who gives bullshit a bad name." - Foucault
"Deconstructionists are like the cynics and skeptics of the ancient world in that they, like Diogenes and Pyrrho, refuse to profess or affirm a doctrine of their own, but only negate the ideas of others. " - Tarpley
No mo' po-mo.
Challenge to Deconstructionism by Webster G. Tarpley
[Excerpts, from the August 9, 1993, issue of "The New Federalist" ]
Currently, education and intellectual life in the United States and many other countries are being destroyed by the triple plague of political correctness, postmodernism, and deconstructionism. After the collapse of Marxism in much of the world, the forces of evil in philosophy and epistemology are now increasingly arrayed under the banner of deconstructionism, which offers a place of regroupment for fascists, communists, irrationalists, and bankrupt ideologues of every sort. If you were wondering what the face of the enemy looked like after the fall of the Berlin Wall, this is it.
The leading purveyor of deconstructionism, the Frenchman Jacques Derrida, is now unquestionably the most celebrated and influential academic philosopher in the world today. As I will try to show, the continued intellectual hegemony of deconstructionism in schools and universities amounts to a death sentence for human civilization as we have known it. Deconstructionism in the academy and in government is a direct threat to the lives of a very large portion of the 5.3 billion human beings now inhabiting this planet.
1. The modern campus is now the bastion of euphemism and absurd circumlocution. Karl Marx had demagogically promised that his philosophy would change the world; the deconstructionists only want to change all the names. There is no more right or wrong, good or evil, only appropriate and inappropriate.
Language is supposedly being purged of ableism, ageism, borealocentrism, ethnocentricity, Eurocentricity, hegemonism, heightism, logocentrism, lookism, phallocentrism, racism, sexism, scentism and smellism.
Nobody is fat; they only possess an alternative body image.
The bald must be called "follicularly challenged" or "differently hirsute."
To be dirty is to be "hygienically challenged," to be tall is to be "vertically endowed." If you're old, you become "chronologically gifted."
It will be noted that this supposed rebellion afflicts language with all of the horrors of the worst Pentagon bureaucratic prose. Think of "collateral damage" when targets were "serviced" during the Gulf war, killing innocent civilians. "Ethnic cleansing" is a politically correct term for genocide.
Thus, political correctness offers no hope to the homeless, but it demands they be called "underhoused," "involuntarily undomiciled," or "houseless." The jobless become "non-renewed."
Political correctness is radical nominalism, in which the verbal signs take the place of ideas and things. As always, this radical nominalism is never very far from paranoid schizophrenia, where the victim believes that by changing the name or sign, he has altered reality itself. As the experience of Baroque Europe (Lyly, Marino, etc.) shows, such ways of talking go together with the collapse of civilization.
2. Political correctness insists that everything in human affairs can be reduced to race, sex (or "gender"), socioeconomic class, and choice of sexual perversion (sometimes called "sexual orientation").
*The New York Times* now recognizes a minimum of five sexes - yes, five - the coprophiles and sadomasochists are insisting on their rights.
The pessimistic P.C litany is all strictly determinist, denying humanity any freedom: You are, they say, what your race, sex, class, and [sexual orientation] make you.
You are a slave to that; there is no freedom... Here there can be no imagovivaDei to express the creative faculties that all human beings share.
3. Countries that permit deconstructionists to assume power over the government (and this has gone quite far in the U.S.A.) are not likely to survive.
Political correctness attempts to define a "canon" of what is to be studied, seeking to purge the Dead White European Males (DWEMS) in favor of Rigoberta Menchu, Franz Fanon, Jean Genet, or Antonin Artaud
[BR -- Note, Artaud wrote an interesting essay titled "Van Gogh, the Man Suicided by the Society," which I previously posted in 2 parts. I may do a rerun of the Artaud essay in the future]...
This [elimination of DWEMS] is a demand to wipe out the progress made by science in western continental Europe, especially Germany, France, Italy, Holland, etc., since the Italian Golden Renaissance of the 1400s.
If Nicholas Cusanus, Leonardo da Vinci, Kepler, Leibniz, Monge, Gauss, Pasteur, Riemann, Cantor, and other Platonics were wiped out, we could no longer maintain the survival of the 5.3 billion human beings of today. Without the scientific achievement of these DWEMS, the relative potential population density of the world would fall back to the levels of the 1300s, to the time of the Bubonic Plague. We might go all the way back to the Roman Empire. Most of the 5.3 billion who manage to hang on today would be doomed.
-+- Postmodernism -+-
Many people who observe the lunatic pageant of the modern campus may conclude that the professors and administrators are all crazy. So they are. But there is a definite method in the madness, a philosophical system or doctrine which dictates the specific policy demands of political correctness.
One generic name for this is postmodernism, which claims that the raving irrationalists Voltaire, Rousseau, and the rest of the enlightenment were the Age of Reason, but that now the Age of Unreason is upon us.
[Deconstructionism] began its triumphal march through American universities in 1966, when Derrida appeared at Johns Hopkins University to tell American academics that the structuralism of Levi-Strauss was dead and that the future belonged to deconstruction. Derrida is now stronger in the U.S.A. and the Anglo-American sphere than in France, and dominant in much of Ibero-America, Francophone Africa and the Middle East, and eastern Europe. If you want tenure, an endowed chair, a foundation grant, government financing, you have to learn to talk the pedantic deconstructionist gibberish.
Deconstructionists are like the cynics and skeptics of the ancient world in that they, like Diogenes and Pyrrho, refuse to profess or affirm a doctrine of their own, but only negate the ideas of others.
Deconstruction is very eclectic. Derrida's world of ideas can be compared to a great sewer into which empty the various gutters and waste waters of the past two or three centuries. Each of these channels contributes to the great Cloaca Maxima of deconstruction. Note that we are here reviewing the disastrous state of human knowledge as we go towards the year 2000.
-+- Hatred of Reason -+-
Deconstructionism is an attack on Judaeo-Christian western European civilization powered above all by rage. Derrida hates and resents reason and creativity, which he identifies with the "epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality." (*Of Grammatology*, p. 13). Western European culture is guilty of logocentrism, says Derrida. The western cultural paradigm always aspired to be based on reason.
This must be rejected.
The western cultural paradigm also gives priority to speech, to the spoken word, with most literature made to be read aloud or even sung, from Plato's dialogues to Dante and Chaucer to Shakespeare and Schiller. This is the hated "phonocentrism" which Derrida also wants to get rid of. Derrida delves into Plato in an attempt to show that the overtones of the Logos are exclusively paternal and male dominated, giving rise to the further charge of phallologocentrism, which soon enough gives rise to the notion of "phallocentrism" assailed by the maenads of feminist literary theory.
[Derrida concludes that] the real problem with the West is that our culture is entirely permeated by what he calls "metaphysics. "... For Derrida, metaphysics evidently means anything that cannot be boiled down to sense certainty. Derrida sees "metaphysics" as the principal enemy to be destroyed. Under the heading of metaphysics he lumps God, the self or soul or individual, causality, substance, essence, action, and most other concepts of any importance. They must go, for reasons that are never remotely explained.
For Derrida, the author is dead, by definition. He never existed. The human self and ego have collapsed into an X marking the spot where they once were...
All that Derrida will talk about is a text, a written text of black on white, with punctuation, type faces, paragraphs, margins, colphons, logos, copyrights and so forth...
Everything is a written text in the sense that every thought, utterance or "discourse" is a story that we tell each other about something which exists in the most detached way in a written form. Therefore, says Derrida, there is nothing outside of the text. Everything is a text. There are no more works of art. All black writing on white paper is a text -- Shakespeare, the telephone book, Mickey Mouse, the racing form... all are texts, each one equivalent to the other.
-+- Deconstructionism's Targets -+-
Deconstructionists can target any of the written documents which are constituve of civilization itself. Take theology... Deconstructionist theology is quite a feat, since the ban on metaphysics means that this will be a theology without God.
[Deconstructionist theologian Mark C. Taylor overcomes this difficulty as follows:]
"One of the distinctive features of deconstruction is its willingness to confront the death of God squarely if not always directly...it would not be too much to suggest that deconstruction is the 'hermeneutic' of the death of God." Taylor calls for "the death of God, erasure of the self, and [an] end to history."
Since deconstruction sees all writing as the same, it can also be unleashed in the field of law, with devastating effect. Listen to Clare Dalton of the Critical Legal Studies group at Harvard Law School: "Law," she writes, "like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority."...
Sanford Levinson, professor of constitutional law at the University of Texas at Austin, chimes in: "The death of 'constitutionalism' may be the central event of our time, just as the death of God was that of the past century..."
The Clinton White House is redolent of deconstructionism and political correctness. The Clinton Cabinet is dysfunctional, but it certainly respects the distributive requirements of race/sex/class/sexual [orientation]... Donna Shalala of HHS helped to promulgate a code on offensive speech at the University of Wisconsin...
Vice President Gore's favorite book is reportedly Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, which has become a manual for New Age paradigm shifters. We appeal to all of those who share our regard for the potential of the human mind to join us in exposing and defeating the deconstructionists.
The War of the League of Cambrai, Paolo Sarpi and John Locke
Webster G. Tarpley, Ph.D. From ICLC Conference panel titled: “The Axioms of the American System,” Feb. 18, 1996; appeared in New Federalist, March 18, 1996
Every person, whether he knows it or not, is a philosopher. Each of us necessarily develops a theory of how the world works. This theory is expressed as a set of axioms. The axioms are self-evident ideas that are recognized and accepted by everybody in sight. The axioms define human nature, the content of history, the workings of economics, the purpose of government, the goals of life. Today’s American population operates according to axioms which are false, oligarchical – and suicidal. A dictatorship or a monarchy can get by with slaves or subjects, but a republic demands educated and capable citizens. Without citizens, a republic cannot survive. The most dangerous force in American life today is public opinion itself. In today’s crisis, public opinion rejects out of hand all the urgent measures needed to promote national survival. This public opinion is stupefied by television and spectator sports and crassly manipulated by the news media. This depraved public opinion reflects not so much the admitted failure of political leadership as the degradation of the intellectual life of the average citizen. In the face of this kind of public opinion, world civilization as we have known it cannot long survive.
Is there a remedy? It must be to uncover the false axioms, uproot them, and replace them with the truth. History and philosophy are two powerful weapons in this fight against false axioms. The crisis of the citizen needs to be seen in a long historical perspective – we need to look at the five hundred years since the Italian Renaissance opened the modern era.
Before the Renaissance started about 1400, there was a discouraging sameness in most known forms of human society. Some were better, some were worse, but they were generally two-class systems: ruling elite and mass. The mass made up 95% of the population. They were peasants, serfs, and slaves, almost always laboring on the land, almost always illiterate and benighted. Their lives were nasty, brutish, and short. Over these peasants and serfs commanded a feudal aristocracy. Monarchy is bad enough, but most of the pre-Renaissance societies were something worse: they were small ruling classes called oligarchies. The aristocrats had military retainers, priests, scribes, and lackeys, making up at most 5% of the population. Under these conditions, world population potential was measured in the hundreds of millions, and even these were decimated by frequent plagues and famines.
Now and then a good ruler might appear, and did appear, along with excellent philosophers and scientists. But the oligarchy was always present, waiting to drag the society down again. Usury, constant warfare, slavery, racism, Aristotelian philosophy – these are the trademarks of oligarchy. Oligarchs come in many forms: the Roman senate, the barons of the dark ages, the Russian boyars, east European magnates, the French frondeurs, the princes of the Holy Roman Empire. Most of these feudal aristocrats were very ignorant, brutal, and crude. The medieval feudal aristocrats were easily manipulated by the Venetians, who had inherited the methods of Babylon, Rome, and Byzantium. From about 1000 AD until about 1600, the leading center of oligarchy in Europe and nearby Asia was Venice.
The first sustained breakout from this 2-class model came with the movement starting with Dante and Petrarch and culminating in Cusanus, Leonardo, and the Italian Renaissance of the 1400′s. The high point of the early Renaissance was the Council of Florence in 1439, convened under the sponsorship of the Medici rulers of Florence. In addition to briefly re-uniting the Christian world, this council embraced the theology of the filioque. In political terms filioque meant that each and every human being is made in the image of God, similar to God, by virtue of possessing God-like qualities of intellectual creativity in the form of a human soul. Therefore the dignity of the human person had to be respected. The human mind was capable of scientific discovery, and also capable of creating the modern nation-state.
The impulse from the Council of Florence reached around the world with Columbus and the Florentine Amerigo Vespucci, the Medici envoy who gave his name to the new continents of the Americas. The same impulse of human progress reached into France, where King Louis XI used Florentine methods to create the first modern national state. This was a matter first of all of breaking the power of the turbulent feudal aristocracy. This was done with taxation, which also financed the beginnings of the modern administration. Louis XI had a social base in the commercial and manufacturing classes of the cities and towns – the origins of the modern middle class. As King between 1461 and 1483, Louis promoted industry and commerce, protected the rights of labor, enacted public health statutes, built infrastructure, drained swamps, and built up a national army. The population and prosperity of France increased accordingly. France was the first nation to reach the take-off point into the modern age.
French military power also grew. This was soon noticed by the new Tudor regime in England, as well as by the rulers of Spain. It was clear that the future belonged to the larger nation-states that were smart enough to imitate the methods of Louis XI. If the Louis XI model were to prevail everywhere, there was the hope that the oligarchs as a class might be crushed. The momentum of the Renaissance art, science, and statecraft might overwhelm all resistance and become unstoppable.
The Venetians, who had been waging their own war against Florence and the other Italian Renaissance states for a century, studied events in France carefully. Venice was essentially a city-state with an inland empire in northern Italy and a marine empire in the Mediterranean. At first the Venetians thought they could survive as a great power by playing off the new nation-states one against the other. As soon as Louis XI was dead, the Venetians invited his unworthy and inferior heir Charles VIII to conquer Milan. The French conquered Naples, Florence, and Milan, but their presence also drew in the forces of Spain. It was a time of rapidly shifting alliances. Before long, the main powers had all been antagonized by Venetian perfidy and geopolitics. For the Venetians had been filching territory on all sides, grabbing for every fly that flew by them.
What followed was the War of the League of Cambrai, the great world war that marked the opening of the modern era. If Venice had been destroyed in this war, the European oligarchy would have been deprived of its command center and is likely to have perished. Without Venice, we would have been spared the wars of religion, including the Thirty Years’ War; we would have been spared the British Empire and most of its wars, including the American Civil War and the two world wars of this century. The same goes for most of the depressions and economic crises of these years.
At the heart of the League of Cambrai was the joint commitment in 1508 by King Louis XII of France and Maximilian, the Holy Roman Emperor, to divide the territory of Venice between them. The King of Spain joined in because he wanted to take Venetian possessions in southern Italy. A little later Pope Julius II della Rovere also joined the League. Julius II della Rovere was a professional soldier and an oligarch. He was called the papa terribile; his portrayal by Rex Harrison in the movie The Agony and the Ecstasy is much too kind.
But now the Venetians, the masters of geopolitics and encirclement, were faced in 1509 by a league of virtually all the European states with the exception of Hungary and England. In Venice, the Council of Ten assumed emergency powers. The program of the League of Cambrai was to expropriate all Venetian territory except for the city itself in its lagoon. By this time Venetian wealth derived more from its land possessions than from its ocean trade, so a loss of the land empire, or terrafirma, would have been a fatal blow. Among the French there were those who wanted to go further: the French general Bayard, whose courage is proverbial in France until this day, proclaimed his desire to destroy the Venetian oligarchy because of their opulent contempt for God and Christendom.
In the spring of 1509, a French army of 20,000 soldiers left Milan and crossed the Adda River into Venetian territory. On May 14, 1509 this French force met and destroyed an evenly matched Venetian mercenary army. The Venetians gave up Verona, Bergamo, Brescia, Vicenza, and even Padova, retreating into the natural fortress of their lagoons. The entire Venetian land empire had been lost in a single day. In one battle, Venice had dropped off the list of European great powers. The Venetians called it a “second Cannae.” The Florentine secretary Machiavelli exulted that in one day the Venetians had lost the fruits of 800 years of aggression. The Venetians were able to retake Padova, but had to defend it against the German Emperor and 100,000 troops. The modern era had indeed begun.
Only twice before had the Venetians been in such dire straits. They had been besieged in the lagoons in 810 AD by King Pepin of France, the heir of Charlemagne, and again by the Genoese during the war of Chioggia in 1379.
To multiply the catastrophe, a few months before, the Venetians had received news of the naval battle of Diu in which an Egyptian fleet supported by Indian princes had been wiped out by the Portuguese navy. The old Venetian monopoly in the spice trade with the east was now a dead duck.
At first the Venetians, now under siege in their lagoons, were totally isolated. Then it turned out that they did have a friend: the new King of England, Henry VIII. Advised by Cardinal Woolsey and the Cecils, Henry VIII urged Pope Julius to betray the League of Cambrai, and ally with Venice. When Julius first found that Henry VIII was supporting Venice, he was furious. Julius told the English ambassador: “You Englishmen are all scoundrels.” But soon it was clear that Julius was not so far from Henry’s position. Henry also offered the Venetians a loan, and signed a friendship treaty with them.
Julius II della Rovere now switched sides, and by February, 1510 Julius was the ally of Venice in exchange for territorial cessions and some bribes. In the summer of 1510 the French and Imperial forces reached the lagoons a second time, but their flank was attacked by Julius, and Venice was preserved. Julius II must bear the historical responsibility of permitting the survival of Venice and thus of oligarchy into the modern world.
1511 brought a third Franco-Imperial offensive, which once again reached the shores of the lagoons. Now Spain followed Julius and joined the Venetian-Papal alliance against France and the Empire. Henry VIII also joined this Holy League as a pretext for attacking France.
In the spring of 1512 came a new shift: the Emperor Maximilian decided to join Venice, the Pope, and Spain against the French. The Venetians took advantage of this, re-occupying their battered land empire for the third time.
In February, 1513 Julius II della Rovere, who had made possible the survival of oligarchy into the modern world, finally died. About a month later the Venetians, desperately maneuvering to avoid being despoiled by their nominal allies, sealed an alliance with France. Venice now faced the attacks of the Spanish general Cardona. From the top of their bell towers the Venetians watched as the Spaniards burned the towns along the edge of the lagoon, and fired their cannon toward the city itself. Venice was on the verge of perdition for the fourth time, but Cardona had to retreat.
The war dragged on through 1514. In September, 1515 the French and the Venetians finally won the key battle of Marignano. After that only Verona remained in the hands of the German Imperial forces, and Venice and the Emperor Maximilian finally signed a peace in 1517. In the same year of 1517, a desperate Venetian wartime operation masterminded by Gasparo Contarini bore fruit when Luther nailed his theses to the door of Wittenberg cathedral. From this point on, religious conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and elsewhere would begin to relieve the immediate pressure on Venice. Venice was 5 million ducats in debt. For 8 years Venice had been devastated by the endless maneuvers of huge armies. Only the wars of religion, reformation and counter- reformation, saved Venice from being finally crushed.
Venice had survived. There remained the question as to how this small and weak state could hope to impose its oligarchical axioms on future humanity. Part of the answer was the metastasis of the Venetian oligarchical cancer to take over a large modern state. For this the Venetians eventually chose England, the power that had been most friendly during the late war.
But the roots of Venetian and Byzantine influence in England were much deeper. The Danish Viking invaders who opposed Alfred were instruments of the Byzantine Empire, whose influence reached Scandinavia along the Varangian way through Russia. The Norwegian army that invaded England in 1066 was commanded by a Byzantine general, Harold Hardrada. During the 1200′s Henry III of England was bankrupted by loans masterminded by the Venetians. When Edward III started the Hundred Years’ War against France around 1340, he was an instrument of Venice, since the Venetians wanted to prevent France from interfering with their wars against Genoa. The Wars of the Roses had been fought by factions manipulated by the Venetians, who viewed Wat Tyler’s rebellion and Wycliff’s Lollards as a dress rehearsal for Luther. Venetian factions were dominant at the court of Henry VIII. So the Venetians moved their family fortunes and their characteristic world outlook to England.
But the move to England and the creation of a British Empire were only part of the answer. As long as the forward motion of Renaissance science continued, the Venetians, the British, and all the others would be forced to imitate it and duplicate it, on pain of being militarily defeated. But the irrational domination of oligarchs could not coexist with continuous progress in science and technology. The Venetians could not simply attack science from the outside. They needed to seize control of science and corrupt science from within.
This task fell to the Venetian intelligence leader Paolo Sarpi, who lived from 1552 to 1623. Sarpi became one of the most famous persons in Europe through his role as Venetian propaganda boss during the Pope’s Interdict against Venice in 1606-1607. Sarpi authored the assassination of King Henry IV of France in 1610. And, with the help of his assets at the court of Frederick V in Heidelberg, Sarpi was decisive in starting the Thirty Years’ War, which killed half of the population of Germany and one third of the population of Europe as a whole.
Yet, Sarpi’s most lasting achievement is the launching of the European Enlightenment, including both the Bacon- Hobbes- Locke- Newton- Berkeley- Hume English empiricism and the Descartes- Voltaire- Rousseau- French Encyclopedia school. Sarpi was one of the greatest corrupters of science and philosophy.
Sarpi was a Servite monk of modest origins who rose to be number two in his order. Early in life, he became an admirer of William of Ockham, one of the stupidest of the medieval nominalist philosophers. Sarpi was also a follower of Pomponazzi, the Venetian professor who argued that man has no soul.
Sarpi lived in Rome and knew the main personalities of the Counter- Reformation, including Carlo Borromeo, Roberto Bellarmino, Pope Sixtus V, and the future Pope Urban VII. Sarpi soon became a creature of the Contarini and Morosini families, who were committed to the Venetian metastasis into northern Europe. The Contarini- Morosini faction, called the Giovani party, became dominant in Venice during the 1580′s. Sarpi became, in the words of the papal nuncio, the boss of half of Venice, and ran a salon for Calvinists and libertines which the Vatican attacked as an “academy of errors.”
The leading British authority on Sarpi is H.R. Trevor-Roper, now Lord Dacre, who calls the friar an “indefatigable polymath” or master of all the sciences. In reality, Sarpi was the chief corrupter of modern science, the greatest charlatan of all time. It is his doctrines which are taught in the universities today.
In astronomy and physics, Sarpi was the case officer who directed the work of the Padua professor Galileo Galilei. Galileo wrote that Sarpi was a mathematician unexcelled in Europe, and contemporaries recognized that Sarpi had been the adviser, author, and director of Galileo’s telescope project. Galileo’s observations were done from Sarpi’s monastery. The telescope itself had been invented by Leonardo. Galileo was until the end of his life a paid agent of the Sarpi group.
Sarpi also tried to build up a reputation as an expert on magnetism, which fascinated him because of its magical overtones. In this he was praised by G.B. della Porta, the author of Magia Naturalis. Sarpi was also famous as a mathematician, and probably wrote a treatise of mathematics which was lost when his monastery burned in 1769. Sarpi had studied the French mathematician Francois Viete. In anatomy, the Venetians attempted to prove for many years that Sarpi had been the first to discover the valves in human veins, and even that he had been the first to describe the circulation of the blood, well before Harvey.
Sarpi wrote A History of the Council of Trent, and his influence on historiography has been immense. John Milton is the English author who praises Sarpi at the greatest length. Milton used Sarpi as a major source, and praised him as the “great unmasker” of the papacy. Edward Gibbon, the author of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, was the leading historian of the British Venetian Party during the eighteenth century. In his great tome, Gibbon wrote: “Should Rome and her religion be annihilated, [Sarpi's] golden volume may still survive, a philosophical history and a salutary warning.” Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, the Venetian Party historian of the nineteenth century, was also an admirer of Sarpi. For today’s Lord Dacre/Trevor- Roper, Sarpi was simply the greatest among all Catholic historians. So Sarpi was indeed a prodigy among oligarchs.
But what of Sarpi the philosopher? Sarpi never published a work of philosophy, but the Venetian archives were found to contain his philosophical manuscripts, the “Art of Thinking Well” (Arte di Ben Pensare) and the “Thoughts” (Pensieri), which were published in 1910 and again more fully in 1951. Here we find that Sarpi created the basis of modern empiricism. His method was to assert that scientific truth was to be found not in Aristotle, but rather written in mathematical characters in the great book of life. The way to get this truth was to use sense certainty, exactly as Aristotle had recommended. Many of Aristotle’s specific conclusions could be junked, but his method and thus his overall domination could be preserved.
Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes both understood Italian. They and their protector, the Earl of Devonshire, corresponded with Sarpi and his group, with Hobbes doing the translation. Hobbes visited Venice in September, 1614 and probably met Sarpi. Bacon’s inductive method is simply a bowdlerization of Sarpi.
Hobbes belonged to the Sarpi networks all his life. The plan for Hobbes’ career as a writer emerged from his meeting with Galileo in 1636, when Galileo suggested that Hobbes write a book of ethics according to the mathematical- geometrical method. All his life Hobbes went around blathering that motion was the only thing that mattered. One of Sarpi’s Pensieri reads: “From the weakness of man derives his characteristic of living in society, but from man’s depravity derives the need to live under a supreme authority….” [405] This, along with Sarpi’s favorite theme of church-state conflict, is the substance of Hobbes’ Leviathan. When Hobbes lived in Paris during the English civil war, he rubbed elbows with Venetian assets like Mersenne, Descartes, and Gassendi. Hobbes and Descartes quarreled, but also partied together.
Then there is the question of Locke. Lord Macauley and other English writers treat Sarpi as one who anticipated Locke. In reality, Locke was a plagiarist of Sarpi. And for this we have the testimony of no less a personage than a mid-eighteenth century doge of Venice, Marco Foscarini. The doge writes that Sarpi’s “Art of Thinking Well” is “the original from which Locke copied.”
Locke’s first book argues that the mind is a blank slate without any inborn or innate ideas. This meshes exactly with Sarpi, who with Aristotle and Pomponazzi tries to show that nothing enters the mind except through the senses. The corollary of this is that there is no human soul.
“Every body which moves operates on what it touches,” is Sarpi’s point of departure. Sarpi “shows how external objects operate on our senses, distinguishing between the object which creates the sensation and the sensation itself.” The sensations we feel are not qualities of the objects, but phenomena of our intellect. The senses deliver the sensations through the nervous system. Then discursive reasoning or the active intellect comes into play with ideas of number and size. The discursive reasoning orders, combines, and compares sense-ideas which have been stored in memory.
This is all closely parallel to Locke’s second book. In “Art of Thinking Well,” Sarpi writes that “knowledge by experience is of greater certainty than knowledge through reason, and no reason can ever manage to equal experience.” Locke’s second book states that all our knowledge is founded on and derives itself from experience. Experience comes from sensation or from reflection, reflection on the sense impressions already stored in the brain. Sarpi also discusses reflection, distinguishing between cognition and later reflection on that same cognition.
Sarpi admits compound ideas, made up of more than one simple sense impression, and so does Locke. Sense impressions in general do not err, says Sarpi, although sometimes impaired vision and the like will cause distortions, and discursive reasoning can become confused. Locke’s second book has similar remarks, with a discussion of color blindness. Both devote space to methods for fixing mistakes in processing sense ideas.
Sarpi argues that the intellect orders ideas according to notions of genus, species, and essence. For Locke, “all the great business of genera and species, and their essences… amounts to no more than this: That… men… enable themselves to consider things in bundles….” [II.31] From these bundles, Sarpi goes on to definitions and then to axioms (ipolipsi). Locke prefers to address axioms as maxims, and he argues that they are of limited utility, serving mainly to win debates. Sarpi is even more pessimistic, asserting that knowledge is actually harmful, and that animals are better off in their natural ignorance than we are.
Sarpi and Locke also agree on the value of syllogisms, which they also consider to be quite limited. Sarpi warns that syllogisms can often be perverse in form. Locke, wanting to show that he is fully modern and in no way a scholastic or schoolman, also denies every claim made for the syllogism – although he hastens to add that this does not in the least diminish the prestige of Aristotle.
Sarpi ends with some notes on language, saying that words were invented not to identify things, but rather the ideas of the speaker. Locke reproduces this argument in toto, stating that “…all words… signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker.” [II.32] Sarpi regards words as sources of confusion and errors, as does Locke.
Most of Locke’s modern editors and biographers make no mention of Sarpi. But the catalogue of Locke’s library shows a lively interest in the Venetian. Locke owned Sarpi’s works in 6 volumes, Sarpi’s histories of the Council of Trent and of the Inquisition, Sarpi’s Italian letters, his history of Pope Paul IV, plus Micanzio’s first biography of Sarpi, for a total of 13 books
Sarpi uses 22 pages, while Locke requires just short of 1000. But there is no doubt that Sarpi, whatever his obscurity, is the founder of modern British empiricism and as such the chief philosophical charlatan of the British Empire and the English- speaking peoples, including many Americans today. In this way, Sarpi has become the most popular and influential thinker of the modern world. The dead hand of Paolo Sarpi is reaching out of his sarcophagus once again, threatening to throttle world civilization.
"Derrida is the kind of philosopher that gives bullshit a bad name"
Foucault
"In the winter of 1989, during Bush’s first hundred days in office, Fukuyama delivered a lecture to the Olin Foundation which was later published in The National Interestquarterly under the title of “The End of History?” Imperial administrator Fukuyama had studied under the reactionary elitist Allan Bloom, and was conversant with the French neo-enlightenment semiotic (or semi-idiotic) school of Derrida, Foucault, and Roland Barthes, whose zero degree of writing Fukuyama may have been striving to attain. Above all, Fukayama was a follower of Hegel in the interpetation of the French postwar neo-Hegelian Alexandre Kojeve." - Tarpley
Giovanna Borradori: September 11 [le 11 septembre] gave us the impression of being a major event, one of the most important historical events we will witness in our lifetime, especially for those of us who never lived through a world war. Do you agree?
Jacques Derrida: Le 11 septembre, as you say, or, since we have agreed to speak two languages, "September 11." We will have to return later to this question of language. As well as to this act of naming: a date and nothing more. When you say "September 11" you are already citing, are you not? You are inviting me to speak here by recalling, as if in quotation marks, a date or a dating that has taken over our public space and our private lives for five weeks now. Something fait date, I would say in a French idiom, something marks a date, a date in history; that is always what's most striking, the very impact of what is at least felt, in an apparently immediate way, to be an event that truly marks, that truly makes its mark, a singular and, as they say here, "unprecedented" event. I say "apparently immediate" because this "feeling" is actually less spontaneous than it appears: it is to a large extent conditioned, constituted, if not actually constructed, circulated at any rate through the media by means of a prodigious techno-socio-political machine. "To mark a date in history" presupposes, in any case, that "something" comes or happens for the first and last time, "something" that we do not yet really know how to identify, determine, recognize, or analyze but that should remain from here on in unforgettable: an ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar, that is, a supposedly universal calendar, for these are—and I want to insist on this at the outset—only suppositions and presuppositions. Unrefined and dogmatic, or else carefully considered, organized, calculated, strategic—or all of these at once. For the index pointing toward this date, the bare act, the minimal deictic, the minimalist aim of this dating, also marks something else. Namely, the fact that we perhaps have no concept and no meaning available to us to name in any other way this "thing" that has just happened, this supposed "event." An act of "international terrorism," for example, and we will return to this, is anything but a rigorous concept that would help us grasp the singularity of what we will be trying to discuss. "Something" took place, we have the feeling of not having seen it coming, and certain consequences undeniably follow upon the "thing." But this very thing, the place and meaning of this "event," remains ineffable, like an intuition without concept, like a unicity with no generality on the horizon or with no horizon at all, out of range for a language that admits its powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it's talking about. We do not in fact know what we are saying or naming in this way: September 11, le 11 septembre, September 11. The brevity of the appellation (September 11, 9/11) stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. The telegram of this metonymy—a name, a number—points out the unqualifiable by recognizing that we do not recognize or even cognize that we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do not know what we are talking about.
• • •
Borradori: Where were you on September 11?
Derrida: I was in Shanghai, at the end of a long trip to China. It was nighttime there, and the owner of the cafe I was in with a couple of friends came to tell us that an airplane had "crashed" into the Twin Towers. I hurried back to my hotel, and from the very first televised images, those of CNN, I note, it was easy to foresee that this was going to become, in the eyes of the world, what you called a "major event." Even if what was to follow remained, to a certain extent, invisible and unforeseeable. But to feel the gravity of the event and its "worldwide" implications it was enough simply to mobilize a few already tested political hypotheses. As far as I could tell, China tried during the first few days to circumscribe the importance of the event, as if it were a more or less local incident. But this organized interpretation, informed by the current state of U.S.-China relations (diplomatic tensions and incidents of various sorts), ended up having to yield to other exigencies: CNN and other international media outlets have penetrated Chinese space, and China too, after all, has its own "Muslim" problem. It thus became necessary to join in some way the "antiterrorist" "coalition." It would be necessary to analyze, in the same vein, the motivations and interests behind all the different geopolitical or strategico-diplomatic shifts that have "invested," so to speak, "September 11." (For example, the warming in relations between Bush and Putin, who has been given a freer hand in Chechnya, and the very useful but very hasty identification of Palestinian terrorism with international terrorism, which now calls for a universal response.) In both cases, certain parties have an interest in presenting their adversaries not only as terrorists—which they in fact are to a certain extent—but only as terrorists, indeed as "international terrorists" who share the same logic or are part of the same network and who must thus be opposed, it is claimed, not through counterterrorism but through a "war," meaning, of course, a "nice clean" war. The "facts" clearly show that these distinctions are lacking in rigor, impossible to maintain, and easily manipulated for certain ends.
Borradori: A radical deconstruction of the distinction between war and terrorism, as well as between different types of terrorism (such as national and international), makes it very difficult to conceive of politics in a strategic sense. Who are the actors on the world stage? How many of them are there? Isn't there here the risk of total anarchy?
Derrida: The word "anarchy" risks making us abandon too quickly the analysis and interpretation of what indeed looks like pure chaos. We must do all that we can to account for this appearance. We must do everything possible to make this new "disorder" as intelligible as possible. The analysis we sketched out earlier tried to move in that direction: an end of the "Cold War" that leaves just one camp, a coalition, actually, of states claiming sovereignty, faced with anonymous and nonstate organizations, armed and virtually nuclear powers. And these powers can also, without arms and without explosions, without any attacks in person, avail themselves of incredibly destructive computer technologies, technologies capable of operations that in fact have no name (neither war nor terrorism) and that are no longer carried out in the name of a nation-state, and whose "cause," in all senses of this word, is difficult to define (there's the theological cause, the ethnic cause, the socioeconomic cause, and so on). On no side is the logic of sovereignty ever put into question (political sovereignty or that of the nation-state—itself of ontotheological origin, though more or less secularized in one place and purely theological and nonsecularized in another): not on the side of the nation-states and the great powers that sit on the Security Council, and not on the other side, or other sides, since there is precisely an indeterminate number of them. Everyone will no doubt point to existing international law (the foundations of which remain, I believe, perfectible, revisable, in need of recasting, both conceptually and institutionally). But this international law is nowhere respected. And as soon as one party does not respect it the others no longer consider it respectable and begin to betray it in their turn. The United States and Israel are not the only ones who have become accustomed to taking all the liberties they deem necessary with UN resolutions.
To answer your question more specifically, I would say that the United States is perhaps not the sole target, perhaps not even the central or ultimate target, of the operation with which the name "bin Laden" is associated, at least by metonymy. The point may be to provoke a military and diplomatic situation that destabilizes certain Arab countries torn between a powerful public opinion (which is anti-American if not anti-Western, for countless reasons stemming from a complex, centuries old history, but then also, in the aftermath of an era of colonialism or imperialism, from poverty, oppression, and ideologico-religious indoctrination) and the necessity of basing their nondemocratic authority on diplomatic, economic, and military ties with the United States. First on the list here would be Saudi Arabia, which remains the privileged enemy of everything that might be represented by a "bin Laden" (a name I use always as a synecdoche) or a Saddam Hussein. Yet Saudi Arabia (an important family and an important oil-producing power), while maintaining its ties with its American "protector," "client," and "boss," fuels all the hotbeds of Arab Islamic fanaticism if not "terrorism" in the world. This is one of the paradoxical situations, once again autoimmunitary, of what you called "total anarchy": the movements and shifts in the strategic oil alliances between the United States (self-styled champion of the democratic ideal, of human rights, and so on) and regimes about which the least that can be said is that they do not correspond to this model. Such regimes (I used the example of Saudi Arabia, though it would be necessary to speak of the equally serious case of Pakistan) are also the enemies or targets of those who organize so-called "international terrorism" against the U.S. and, at least virtually, their allies. That makes for more than one triangle. And with all the angling going on between these triangles, it is difficult to disentangle the real from the alleged motivation, oil from religion, politics from economics or military strategy. The "bin Laden" type of diatribe against the American devil thus combines such themes as the perversion of faith and nonbelief, the violation of the sacred places of Islam, the military presence near Mecca, the support of Israel, and the oppression of Arab Muslim populations. But if this rhetoric clearly resonates with the populations and even the media of the Arab and Muslim world, the governments of Arab Muslim states (the majority of which care about as much for human rights and democracy as bin Laden does) are almost all hostile in principle, as "governments," to the "bin Laden" network and its discourse. One thus has to conclude that "bin Laden" is also working to destabilize them…
Borradori: Which would be the standard objective of terrorists, to overturn but not take over, to destabilize the current situation.
Derrida: The most common strategy consists always in destabilizing not only the principal, declared enemy but also, at the same time, in a kind of quasi-domestic confrontation, those much closer. Sometimes even one's own allies. This is another necessary consequence of the same autoimmunitary process. In all wars, all civil wars, all partisan wars or wars for liberation, the inevitable escalation leads one to go after one's rival partners no less than one's so-called principal adversary. During the Algerian War, between 1954 and 1962, what sometimes looked like "fratricidal" acts of violence between different insurrectional forces proved sometimes just as extreme as those between these groups and the French colonial forces.
This is yet one more reason not to consider everything that has to do with Islam or with the Arab Muslim "world" as a "world," or at least as one homogeneous whole. And wanting to take all these divisions, differences, and differends into account does not necessarily constitute an act of war; nor does trying to do everything possible to ensure that in this Arab Muslim "world," which is not a world and not a world that is one, certain currents do not take over, namely, those that lead to fanaticism, to an obscurantism armed to the teeth with modern technoscience, to the violation of every juridico-political principle, to the cruel disregard for human rights and democracy, to a nonrespect for life. We must help what is called Islam and what is called "Arab" to free themselves from such violent dogmatism. We must help those who are fighting heroically in this direction on the inside, whether we are talking about politics in the narrow sense of the term or else about an interpretation of the Koran. When I say that we must do this for what is called Islam and what is called "Arab," I obviously mean that we must not do any less when it comes to Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia!
Borradori: Earlier you emphasized the essential role of international organizations and the need to cultivate a respect for international law. Do you think that the kind of terrorism linked to the al- Qaeda organization and to bin Laden harbors international political ambitions?
Derrida: What appears to me unacceptable in the "strategy" (in terms of weapons, practices, ideology, rhetoric, discourse, and so on) of the "bin Laden effect" is not only the cruelty, the disregard for human life, the disrespect for law, for women, the use of what is worst in technocapitalist modernity for the purposes of religious fanaticism. No, it is, above all, the fact that such actions and such discourse open onto no future and, in my view, have no future. If we are to put any faith in the perfectibility of public space and of the world juridico-political scene, of the "world" itself, then there is, it seems to me, nothing good to be hoped for from that quarter. What is being proposed, at least implicitly, is that all capitalist and modern technoscientific forces be put in the service of an interpretation, itself dogmatic, of the Islamic revelation of the One. Nothing of what has been so laboriously secularized in the forms of the "political," of "democracy," of "international law," and even in the nontheological form of sovereignty (assuming, again, that the value of sovereignty can be completely secularized or detheologized, a hypothesis about which I have my doubts), none of this seems to have any place whatsoever in the discourse "bin Laden." That is why, in this unleashing of violence without name, if I had to take one of the two sides and choose in a binary situation, well, I would. Despite my very strong reservations about the American, indeed European, political posture, about the "international antiterrorist" coalition, despite all the de facto betrayals, all the failures to live up to democracy, international law, and the very international institutions that the states of this "coalition" themselves founded and supported up to a certain point, I would take the side of the camp that, in principle, by right of law, leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the "political," democracy, international law, international institutions, and so on. Even if this "in the name of" is still merely an assertion and a purely verbal commitment. Even in its most cynical mode, such an assertion still lets resonate within it an invincible promise. I don't hear any such promise coming from "bin Laden," at least not one for this world.
Borradori: It seems that you place your hopes in the authority of international law.
Derrida: Yes. In the first place, as imperfect as they may be, these international institutions should be respected in their deliberations and their resolutions by the sovereign states who are members of them and who have thus subscribed to their charters. I mentioned just a moment ago the serious failings of certain "Western" states with regard to these commitments. Such failings would stem from at least two series of causes.
First, they would have to do with the very structure of the axioms and principles of these systems of law and thus of the charters and conventions that institutionalize them. Reflection (of what I would call a "deconstructive" type) should thus, it seems to me, without diminishing or destroying these axioms and principles, question and refound them, endlessly refine and universalize them, without becoming discouraged by the aporias such work must necessarily encounter.
But second, such failings, in the case of states as powerful as the United States and Israel (which is supported by the U.S.), are not subject to any dissuasive sanctions. The United Nations has neither the force nor the means for such sanctions. It is thus necessary to do everything possible (a formidable and imposing task for the very long term) to ensure that these current failings in the present state of these institutions are effectively sanctioned and, in truth, discouraged in advance by a new organization. This would mean that an institution such as the UN (once modified in its structure and charter—and I'm thinking here particularly of the Security Council) would have to have at its disposal an effective intervening force and thus no longer have to depend in order to carry out its decisions on rich and powerful, actually or virtually hegemonic, nation-states, which bend the law in accordance with their force and according to their interests. Sometimes quite cynically.
I'm not unaware of the apparently utopic character of the horizon I'm sketching out here, that of an international institution of law and an international court of justice with their own autonomous force. Though I do not hold law to be the last word in ethics, politics, or anything else, though this unity of force and law (which is required by the very concept of law, as Kant explains so well) is not only utopic but aporetic (since it implies that beyond the sovereignty of the nation-state, indeed beyond democratic sovereignty—whose ontotheological foundations must be deconstructed—we would nonetheless be reconstituting a new figure, though not necessarily state-related, of universal sovereignty, of absolute law with an effective autonomous force at its disposal), I continue to believe that it is faith in the possibility of this impossible and, in truth, undecidable thing from the point of view of knowledge, science, and conscience that must govern all our decisions.
Borradori: It might be said that this terrorist attack was, in one sense, an attack against the principle of sovereignty that the United States has over its own land, yet also an attack on the sovereign role the United States plays vis-Ã -vis the Western world, at once politically, economically, and culturally. Have these two attacks destabilized the concept of sovereignty as it has been developed by Western modernity?
Derrida: Those called "terrorists" are not, in this context, "others," absolute others whom we, as "Westerners," can no longer understand. We must not forget that they were often recruited, trained, and even armed, and for a long time, in various Western ways by a Western world that itself, in the course of its ancient as well as very recent history, invented the word, the techniques, and the "politics" of "terrorism." Next, one has to divide, or at least differentiate, all the "wholes" or "groups" to which we might be tempted to attribute responsibility for this terrorism. It's not "the Arabs" in general, nor Islam, nor the Arab Islamic Middle East. Each of these groups is heterogeneous, filled with tensions, conflicts, and essential contradictions, with, in truth, what we have been calling self-destructive, quasi-suicidal, autoimmunitary processes. The same goes for the "West." What is, to my eyes, very important for the future, and I will return to this later, is also a difference, indeed up to a certain point and within certain limits, an opposition, between the United States (or let's say, more honestly, so as not to be too unfair to American society, what dominates and even governs in the United States) and a certain Europe. And precisely in relationship to the problems we are discussing. For the "coalition" that has just formed around the United States remains fragile and heterogeneous. It is not only Western, and the "front" without front of this "war" without war does not pit the West against the East or against the Far East (indeed China ended up joining, in its own way, the coalition), or the Middle East, where every country condemned, more or less sincerely, the terrorism and agreed to fight it. Some are doing so with rhetoric alone, others by providing military and logistical support. As for the European nations and NATO, their commitment to the so-called "coalition" remains very complex; it varies from one country to the next and public opinion is far from being won over to the American initiatives. The shifts in these alliances, the warming in relations between Putin's Russia and Bush's United States, the at least partial solidarity of China in the same struggle, are changing the geopolitical landscape and strengthening, though also complicating, the American position, which needs all these agreements in order to act.
What would give me the most hope in the wake of all these upheavals is a potential difference between a new figure of Europe and the United States. I say this without any Eurocentrism. Which is why I am speaking of a new figure of Europe. Without forsaking its own memory, by drawing upon it, in fact, as an indispensable resource, Europe could make an essential contribution to the future of the international law we have been discussing. I hope that there will be, "in Europe," "philosophers" able to measure up to the task (I use quotation marks here because these "philosophers" of European tradition will not necessarily be professional philosophers but jurists, politicians, citizens, even European noncitizens; and I use them because they might be "European," "in Europe," without living in the territory of a nationstate in Europe, finding themselves in fact very far away, distance and territory no longer having the significance they once did). But I persist in using this name "Europe," even if in quotation marks, because, in the long and patient deconstruction required for the transformation to come, the experience Europe inaugurated at the time of the Enlightenment (Lumières, Aufklärung, Illuminismo) in the relationship between the political and the theological or, rather, the religious, though still uneven, unfulfilled, relative, and complex, will have left in European political space absolutely original marks with regard to religious doctrine (notice I'm not saying with regard to religion or faith but with regard to the authority of religious doctrine over the political). Such marks can be found neither in the Arab world nor in the Muslim world, nor in the Far East, nor even, and here's the most sensitive point, in American democracy, in what in fact governs not the principles but the predominant reality of American political culture. This final point is complex and tricky. For such a philosophical "deconstruction" would have to operate not against something we would call the "United States" but against what today constitutes a certain American hegemony, one that actually dominates or marginalizes something in the U.S.'s own history, something that is also related to that strange "Europe" of the more or less incomplete Enlightenment I was talking about.
America's Imperial War - The liberals who supported the bombing of Afghanistan have aligned themselves with a ruthless military machine, by George Monbiot, 2/12/02
Anti-nuclear nun, Dr. Rosalie Bertell, a Grey Nun for half a century, is an internationally recognized expert in the field of radiation, by Donna Jean MacKinnon, 5/3/98
The Federalist Society: From Obscurity to Power, The Right-Wing Lawyers Who Are Shaping The Bush Administration's Decisions On Legal Policies and Judicial Nominations, by People For the American Way Foundation, Aug 2001
Ken Saro-Wiwa statement excerpts; he was prevented from reading outloud at his trial before the Military Tribunal that sentenced him to death on October 31, 1995
911 - What Aren't We Being Told? Everything you wanted to ask but we're afraid to know - Analysis by John Judge, Mail archive, Sept 2001 to the present
Orange Alert for Civil Liberties, Beware of the "Domestic Security Enhancement Act", The Bush Administration Already Is At War -- Against Your Freedom, by ReclaimDemocracy.org
Plan of the Army in Chiapas, since 1994: create paramilitary groups, displace the population, destroy the support bases of the EZLN..., by Carlos MarÃn, 1/4/98
Chapter 1: Nuclear Reactors to Generate Electricity
Chapter 2: How Radiation from Atomic Energy Programs Gets to You--What it Does to You
Chapter 3: How Radiation Produces Disease and Hereditary Alterations
Chapter 4: Is Any Radiation "Safe"?
Chapter 5: Promises, Promises
Chapter 6: How Safe Are Nuclear Reactors?
Chapter 7: Nuclear Electricity and The Citizen's Rights
Chapter 8: The Nuclear Legacy--Radioactive Wastes and Plutonium
Chapter 9: Alternatives Available to Us
Chapter 10: What Can Citizens Do About Nuclear Electricity?
Chapter 11: Must We Hold Out for The "Cold Corpses"?
Chapter 12: Toward An Adversary System of Scientific Inquiry
Chapter 13: The Ultimate Issue -- Conversion or Ecocide
Chapter 1: Executive Summary of This Book
Chapter 2: Pre-1960 and Post-1960 Uses of Medical Radiation, and Its Carcinogenic Action
Chapter 3: PhysPops --- The Doses in Some Massive Studies of Dose-Response
Chapter 4: Mortality Rates --- The Responses in the Dose-Response Studies
Chapter 5: Dose-Response, Linear Regression, and Some Other Key Concepts in Our Analyses
