Tuesday 21 November 2017

THE STATE OF THE DEAD



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CHAPTER XXII.

THE STATE OF THE DEAD.

AMONG all the problems with which man has busied himself, none so appeals to his hopes and fears as that of the future life. Is there a farther shore, and if so, shall we reach it? Few races, if any, have doubted the existence of a future state, but their conceptions of it have differed greatly. But of all the races of antiquity, outside Egypt, the Celts seem to have cherished the most ardent belief in the world beyond the grave, and to have been preoccupied with its joys. Their belief, so far as we know it, was extremely vivid, and its chief characteristic was life in the body after death, in another region. 1 This, coupled with the fact that it was taught as a doctrine by the Druids, made it the admiration of classical onlookers. But besides this belief there was another, derived from the ideas of a distant past, that the dead lived on in the grave--the two conceptions being connected. And there may also have been a certain degree of belief in transmigration. Although the Celts believed that the soul could exist apart from the body, there seems to be no evidence that they believed in a future existence of the soul as a shade. This belief is certainly found in some late Welsh poems, where the ghosts are described as wandering in the Caledonian forest, but these can hardly be made use of as evidence for the old pagan doctrine. The evidence for the latter may be gathered

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from classical observers, from archaeology and from Irish texts.

Cæsar writes: "The Druids in particular wish to impress this on them that souls do not perish, but pass from one to another (ab aliis ... ad alios) after death, and by this chiefly they think to incite men to valour, the fear of death being overlooked." Later he adds, that at funerals all things which had been dear to the dead man, even living creatures, were thrown on the funeral pyre, and shortly before his time slaves and beloved clients were also consumed. 1 Diodorus says: "Among them the doctrine of Pythagoras prevailed that the souls of men were immortal, and after completing their term of existence they live again, the soul passing into another body. Hence at the burial of the dead some threw letters addressed to dead relatives on the funeral pile, believing that the dead would read them in the next world." 2 Valerius Maximus writes: "They would fain make us believe that the souls of men are immortal. I would be tempted to call these breeches-wearing folk fools, if their doctrine were not the same as that of the mantle-clad Pythagoras." He also speaks of money lent which would be repaid in the next world, because men's souls are immortal. 3 These passages are generally taken to mean that the Celts believed simply in transmigration of the Pythagorean type. Possibly all these writers cite one common original, but Cæsar makes no reference to Pythagoras. A comparison with the Pythagorean doctrine shows that the Celtic belief differed materially from it. According to the former, men's souls entered new bodies, even those of animals, in this world, and as an expiation. There is nothing of this in the Celtic doctrine. The new body is not a prison-house of the soul in which it must expiate its former sins, and the soul receives it not in this world but in another. The real point of

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connection was the insistence of both upon immortality, the Druids teaching that it was bodily immortality. Their doctrine no more taught transmigration than does the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. Roman writers, aware that Pythagoras taught immortality via a series of transmigrations, and that the Druids taught a doctrine of bodily immortality, may have thought that the receiving of a new body meant transmigration. Themselves sceptical of a future life or believing in a traditional gloomy Hades, they were bound to be struck with the vigour of the Celtic doctrine and its effects upon conduct. The only thing like it of which they knew was the Pythagorean doctrine. Looked at in this light, Cæsar's words need not convey the idea of transmigration, and it is possible that he mistranslated some Greek original. Had these writers meant that the Druids taught transmigration, they could hardly have added the passages regarding debts being paid in the other world, or letters conveyed there by the dead, or human sacrifices to benefit the dead there. These also preclude the idea of a mere immortality of the soul. The dead Celt continued to be the person he had been, and it may have been that not a new body, but the old body glorified, was tenanted by his soul beyond the grave. This bodily immortality in a region where life went on as on this earth, but under happier conditions, would then be like the Vedic teaching that the soul, after the burning of the body, went to the heaven of Yama, and there received its body complete and glorified. The two conceptions, Hindu and Celtic, may have sprung from early "Aryan" belief.

This Celtic doctrine appears more clearly from what Lucan says of the Druidic teaching. "From you we learn that the bourne of man's existence is not the silent halls of Erebus, in another world (or region, in orbe alio) the spirit animates the members. Death, if your lore be true, is but the centre of a

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long life." For this reason, he adds, the Celtic warrior had no fear of death. 1 Thus Lucan conceived the Druidic doctrine to be one of bodily immortality in another region. That region was not a gloomy state; rather it resembled the Egyptian Aalu with its rich and varied existence. Classical writers, of course, may have known of what appears to have been a sporadic Celtic idea, derived from old beliefs, that the soul might take the form of an animal, but this was not the Druidic teaching. Again, if the Gauls, like the Irish, had myths telling of the rebirth of gods or semi-divine beings, these may have been misinterpreted by those writers and regarded as eschatological. But such myths do not concern mortals. Other writers, Timagenes, Strabo, and Mela, 2 speak only of the immortality of the soul, but their testimony is probably not at variance with that of Lucan, since Mela appears to copy Cæsar, and speaks of accounts and debts being passed on to the next world.

This theory of a bodily immortality is supported by the Irish sagas, in which ghosts, in our sense of the word, do not exist. The dead who return are not spectres, but are fully clothed upon with a body. Thus, when Cúchulainn returns at the command of S. Patrick, he is described exactly as if he were still in the flesh. "His hair was thick and black ... in his head his eye gleamed swift and grey.... Blacker than the side of a cooking spit each of his two brows, redder than ruby his lips." His clothes and weapons are fully described, while his chariot and horses are equally corporeal. 3 Similar descriptions of the dead who return are not infrequent, e.g. that of Caoilte in the story of Mongan, whom every one believes to be a living warrior, and that of Fergus mac Roich, who reappeared in a beautiful form, adorned with brown hair and

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clad in his former splendour, and recited the lost story of the Táin1 Thus the Irish Celts believed that in another world the spirit animated the members. This bodily existence is also suggested in Celtic versions of the "Dead Debtor" folktale cycle. Generally an animal in whose shape a dead man helps his benefactor is found in other European versions, but in the Celtic stories not an animal but the dead man himself appears as a living person in corporeal form. 2Equally substantial and corporeal, eating, drinking, lovemaking, and fighting are the divine folk of the síd or of Elysium, or the gods as they are represented in the texts. To the Celts, gods, síde, and the dead, all alike had a bodily form, which, however, might become invisible, and in other ways differed from the earthly body.

The archæological evidence of burial customs among the Celts also bears witness to this belief. Over the whole Celtic area a rich profusion of grave-goods has been found, consisting of weapons, armour, chariots, utensils, ornaments, and coins. 3 Some of the interments undoubtedly point to sacrifice of wife, children, or slaves at the grave. Male and female skeletons are often in close proximity, in one case the arm of the male encircling the neck of the female. In other cases the remains of children are found with these. Or while the lower interment is richly provided with grave-goods, above it lie irregularly several skeletons, without grave-goods, and often with head separated from the body, pointing to decapitation, while in one case the arms had been tied behind the back. 4 All this

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suggests, taken in connection with classical evidence regarding burial customs, that the future life was life in the body, and that it was a replica of this life, with the same affections, needs, and energies. Certain passages in Irish texts also describe burials, and tell how the dead were interred with ornaments and weapons, while it was a common custom to bury the dead warrior in his armour, fully armed, and facing the region whence enemies might be expected. Thus he was a perpetual menace to them and prevented their attack. 1 Possibly this belief may account for the elevated position of many tumuli. Animals were also sacrificed. Hostages were buried alive with Fiachra, according to one text, and the wives of heroes sometimes express their desire to be buried along with their dead husbands. 2

The idea that the body as well as the soul was immortal was probably linked on to a very primitive belief regarding the dead, and one shared by many peoples, that they lived on in the grave. This conception was never forgotten, even in regions where the theory of a distant land of the dead was evolved, or where the body was consumed by fire before burial. It appears from such practices as binding the dead with cords, or laying heavy stones or a mound of earth on the grave, probably to prevent their egress, or feeding the dead with sacrificial food at the grave, or from the belief that the dead come forth not as spirits, but in the body from the grave. This primitive conception, of which the belief in a subterranean world of the dead is an extension, long survived among various

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races, e.g. the Scandinavians, who believed in the barrow as the abiding place of the dead, while they also had their conception of Hel and Valhalla, or among the Slavs, side by side with Christian conceptions. 1 It also survived among the Celts, though another belief in the orbis alius had arisen. This can be shown from modern and ancient folk-belief and custom.

In numerous Celtic folk-tales the dead rise in the body, not as ghosts, from the grave, which is sometimes described as a house in which they live. They perform their ordinary occupations in house or field; they eat with the living, or avenge themselves upon them; if scourged, blood is drawn from their bodies; and, in one curious Breton tale, a dead husband visits his wife in bed and she then has a child by him, because, as he said, "sa compte d'enfants" was not yet complete. 2 In other stories a corpse becomes animated and speaks or acts in presence of the living, or from the tomb itself when it is disturbed. 3 The earliest literary example of such a tale is the tenth century "Adventures of Nera," based on older sources. In this Nera goes to tie a withy to the foot of a man who has been hung. The corpse begs a drink, and then forces Nera to carry him to a house, where he kills two sleepers. 4 All such stories, showing as they do that a corpse is really living, must in essence be of great antiquity. Another common belief, found over the Celtic area, is that the dead rise from the grave, not as ghosts, when they will, and that they appear en masse on the night of All Saints, and join the living. 5

As a result of such beliefs, various customs are found in

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use, apparently to permit of the corpse having freedom of movement, contrary to the older custom of preventing its egress from the grave. In the west of Ireland the feet of the corpse are left free, and the nails are drawn from the coffin at the grave. In the Hebrides the threads of the shroud are cut or the bindings of feet, hands, and face are raised when the body is placed in the coffin, and in Brittany the arms and feet are left free when the corpse is dressed. 1 The reason is said to be that the spirit may have less trouble in getting to the spirit world, but it is obvious that a more material view preceded and still underlies this later gloss. Many stories are told illustrating these customs, and the earlier belief, Christianised, appears in the tale of a woman who haunted her friends because they had made her grave-clothes so short that the fires of Purgatory burnt her knees. 2

Earlier customs recorded among the Celts also point to the existence of this primitive belief influencing actual custom. Nicander says that the Celts went by night to the tombs of great men to obtain oracles, so much did they believe that they were still living there. 3 In Ireland, oracles were also sought by sleeping on funeral cairns, and it was to the grave of Fergus that two bards resorted in order to obtain from him the lost story of the Táin. We have also seen how, in Ireland, armed heroes exerted a sinister influence upon enemies from their graves, which may thus have been regarded as their homes--a belief also underlying the Welsh story of Bran's head.

Where was the world of the dead situated? M. Reinach has shown, by a careful comparison of the different uses of the

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word orbis, that Lucan's words do not necessarily mean "another world," but "another region," i.e. of this world. 1 If the Celts cherished so firmly the belief that the dead lived on in the grave, a belief in an underworld of the dead was bound in course of time to have been evolved as part of their creed. To it all graves and tumuli would give access. Classical observers apparently held that the Celtic future state was like their own in being an underworld region, since they speak of the dead Celts as inferi, or as going ad Manes, and Plutarch makes Camma speak of descending to her dead husband. 2 What differentiated it from their own gloomy underworld was its exuberant life and immortality. This aspect of a subterranean land presented no difficulty to the Celt, who had many tales of an underworld or under-water region more beautiful and blissful than anything on earth. Such a subterranean world must have been that of the Celtic Dispater, a god of fertility and growth, the roots of things being nourished from his kingdom. From him men had descended, 3 probably a myth of their coming forth from his subterranean kingdom, and to him they returned after death to a blissful life.

Several writers, notably M. D'Arbois, assume that the orbis alius of the dead was the Celtic island Elysium. But that Elysium never appears in the tales as a land of the dead. It is a land of gods and deathless folk who are not those who have passed from this world by death. Mortals may reach it by favour, but only while still in life. It might be argued that Elysium was regarded in pagan times as the land of the dead, but after Christian eschatological views prevailed, it became a kind of fairyland. But the existing tales give no hint of this, and, after being carefully examined, they show that Elysium

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had always been a place distinct from that of the departed, though there may have arisen a tendency to confuse the two.

If there was a genuine Celtic belief in an island of the dead, it could have been no more than a local one, else Cæsar would not have spoken as he does of the Celtic Dispater. Such a local belief now exists on the Breton coast, but it is mainly concerned with the souls of the drowned. 1 A similar local belief may explain the story told by Procopius, who says that Brittia (Britain), an island lying off the mouth of the Rhine, is divided from north to south by a wall beyond which is a noxious region. This is a distorted reminiscence of the Roman wall, which would appear to run in this direction if Ptolemy's map, in which Scotland lies at right angles to England, had been consulted. Thither fishermen from the opposite coast are compelled to ferry over at dead of night the shades of the dead, unseen to them, but marshalled by a mysterious leader. 2 Procopius may have mingled some local belief with the current tradition that Ulysses' island of the shades lay in the north, or in the west. 3 In any case his story makes of the gloomy land of the shades a very different region from the blissful Elysium of the Celts and from their joyous orbis alius, nor is it certain that he is referring to a Celtic people.

Traces of the idea of an underworld of the dead exist in Breton folk-belief. The dead must travel across a subterranean ocean, and though there is scarcely any tradition regarding what happens on landing, M. Sébillot thinks that formerly "there existed in the subterranean world a sort of centralisation of the different states of the dead." If so, this must have been founded on pagan belief. The interior of the earth is

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also believed to be the abode of fabulous beings, of giants, and of fantastic animals, and there is also a subterranean fairy world. In all this we may see a survival of the older belief, modified by Christian teaching, since the Bretons suppose that purgatory and hell are beneath the earth and accessible from its surface. 1

Some British folk-lore brought to Greece by Demetrius and reported by Plutarch might seem to suggest that certain persons--the mighty dead--were privileged to pass to the island Elysium. Some islands near Britain were called after gods and heroes, and the inhabitants of one of these were regarded as sacrosanct by the Britons, like the priestesses of Sena. They were visited by Demetrius, who was told that the storms which arose during his visit were caused by the passing away of some of the "mighty" or of the "great souls." It may have been meant that such mighty ones passed to the more distant islands, but this is certainly not stated. In another island, Kronos was imprisoned, watched over by Briareus, and guarded by demons. 2 Plutarch refers to these islands in another work, repeating the story of Kronos, and saying that his island is mild and fragrant, that people live there waiting on the god who sometimes appears to them and prevents their departing. Meanwhile they are happy and know no care, spending their time in sacrificing and hymn-singing or in studying legends and philosophy.

Plutarch has obviously mingled Celtic Elysium beliefs with the classical conception of the Druids. 3 In Elysium there is

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no care, and favoured mortals who pass there are generally prevented from returning to earth. The reference to Kronos may also be based partly on myths of Celtic gods of Elysium, partly on tales of heroes who departed to mysterious islands or to the hollow hills where they lie asleep, but whence they will one day return to benefit their people. So Arthur passed to Avalon, but in other tales be and his warriors are asleep beneath Craig-y-Ddinas, just as Fionn and his men rest within this or that hill in the Highlands. Similar legends are told of other Celtic heroes, and they witness to the belief that great men who had died would return in the hour of their people's need. In time they were thought not to have died at all, but to be merely sleeping and waiting for their hour. 1 The belief is based on the idea that the dead are alive in grave or barrow, or in a spacious land below the earth, or that dead warriors can menace their foes from the tomb.

Thus neither in old sagas, nor in Märchen, nor in popular tradition, is the island Elysium a world of the dead. For the most part the pagan eschatology has been merged in that of Christianity, while the Elysium belief has remained intact and still survives it a whole series of beautiful tales.

The world of the dead was in all respects a replica of this world, but it was happier. In existing Breton and Irish belief--a survival of the older conception of the bodily state of the dead--they resume their tools, crafts, and occupations, and they preserve their old feelings. Hence, when they appear on earth, it is in bodily form and in their customary dress. Like

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the pagan Gauls, the Breton remembers unpaid debts, and cannot rest till they are paid, and in Brittany, Ireland, and the Highlands the food and clothes given to the poor after a death, feed and clothe the dead in the other world. 1 If the world of the dead was subterranean,--a theory supported by current folk-belief, 2--the Earth-goddess or the Earth-god, who had been first the earth itself, then a being living below its surface and causing fertility, could not have become the divinity of the dead until the multitude of single graves or barrows, in each of which the dead lived, had become a wide subterranean region of the dead. This divinity was the source of life and growth; hence he or she was regarded as the progenitor of mankind, who had come forth from the underworld and would return there at death. It is not impossible that the Breton conception of Ankou, death personified, is a reminiscence of the Celtic Dispater. He watches over all things beyond the grave, and carries off the dead to his kingdom. But if so he has been altered for the worse by mediæval ideas of "Death the skeleton" 3 He is a grisly god of death, whereas the Celtic Dis was a beneficent god of the dead who enjoyed a happy immortality. They were not cold phantasms, but alive and endowed with corporeal form and able to enjoy the things of a better existence, and clad in the beautiful raiment and gaudy ornaments which were loved so much on earth. Hence Celtic warriors did not fear death, and suicide was extremely common, while Spanish Celts sang hymns in praise of death, and others celebrated the birth of men with mourning, but their deaths with joy. 4 Lucan's words are thus the truest expression of Celtic eschatology--"In another

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region the spirit animates the members; death, if your lore be true, is but the passage to enduring life."

There is no decisive evidence pointing to any theory of moral retribution beyond the grave among the pagan Celts. Perhaps, since the hope of immortality made warriors face death without a tremor, it may have been held, as many other races have believed, that cowards would miss the bliss of the future state. Again, in some of the Irish Christian visions of the other-world and in existing folk-belief, certain characteristics of hell may not be derived from Christian eschatology, e.g. the sufferings of the dead from cold. 1 This might point to an old belief in a cold realm whither some of the dead were banished. In the Adventures of S. Columba's Clerics, hell is reached by a bridge over a glen of fire, 2 and a narrow bridge leading to the other world is a common feature in most mythologies. But here it may be borrowed from Scandinavian sources, or from such Christian writings as the Dialogues of S. Gregory the Great. 3 It might be contended that the Christian doctrine of hell has absorbed an earlier pagan theory of retribution, but of this there is now no trace in the sagas or in classical references to the Celtic belief in the future life. Nor is there any reference to a day of judgment, for the passage in which Loegaire speaks of the dead buried with their weapons till "the day of Erdathe," though glossed "the day of judgment of the Lord," does not refer to such a judgment. 4 If an ethical blindness be attributed to the Celts for their apparent lack of any theory of retribution, it should

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be remembered that we must not judge a people's ethics wholly by their views of future punishment. Scandinavians, Greeks, and Semites up to a certain stage were as unethical as the Celts in this respect, and the Christian hell, as conceived by many theologians, is far from suggesting an ethical Deity.


Footnotes

333:1 Skene, i. 370.

334:1 Cæsar, vi. 14, 19.

334:2 Diod. Sic, v. 28.

334:3 Val. Max. vi. 6. 10.

336:1 Phars. f. 455f.

336:2 Amm. Marc. xv, 9; Strabo, iv. 4; Mela, iii. 2.

336:3 Miss Hull, 275.

337:1 Nutt-Meyer, i. 49; Miss Hull, 293.

337:2 Larminie, 155; Hyde, Beside the Fire, 21, 153; CM xiii. 21; Campbell, WHT, ii. 21; Le Braz 2, i. p. xii.

337:3 Von Sacken, Das Grabfeld von Hallslatt; Greenwell, British Barrows; RC x. 234; Antiquary, xxxvii. 125; Blanchet, ii. 528 f.; Anderson, Scotland in Pagan Times.

337:4 L'Anthropologie, vi. 586; Greenwell, op. cit. 119.

338:1 Nutt-Meyer, i. 52; O'Donovan, Annals, i. 145, 180; RC xv. 28. In one case the enemy disinter the body of the king of Connaught, and rebury it face downwards, and then obtain a victory. This nearly coincides with the dire results following the disinterment of Bran's head (O'Donovan, i, 145; cf. p. 242, supra).

338:2 LU 130aRC xxiv. 185; O'Curry, MC i. p. cccxxx; Campbell, WHT iii. 62; Leahy, i. 105.

339:1 Vigfusson-Powell, Corpus Poet. Boreale, i. 167, 417-418, 420; and see my Childhood of Fiction, 103 f.

339:2 Larminie, 31; Le Braz 2, ii. 146, 159, 161, 184, 257 (the rôle of the dead husband is usually taken by a lutin or follet, Luzel, Veillées Bretons, 79); Rev. des Trad. Pop. ii. 267; Ann. de Bretagne, viii. 514.

339:3 Le Braz 2, i. 313. Cf. also an incident in the Voyage of Maelduin.

339:4 RC x. 214 f. Cf. Kennedy, 162; Le Braz 2, i. 217, for variants.

339:5 Curtin, Tales, 156; see p. 170supra.

340:1 Curtin, Tales, 156; Campbell, Superstitions, 241; Folk-Lore, xiii. 60; Le Braz 2, i. 213.

340:2 Folk-Lore, ii. 26; Yeats, Celtic Twilight, 166.

340:3 Tertullian, de Anima, 21.

341:1 Reinach, RC xxii. 447.

341:2 Val. Max. vi. 6; Mela, iii. 2. 19; Plut. Virt. mul 20.

341:3 See p. 229supra.

342:1 Le Braz 2, i. p. xxxix. This is only one out of many local beliefs (cf. Sébillot, ii. 149).

342:2 Procop. De Bello Goth. vi. 20.

342:3 Claudian, In Rufin. i. 123.

343:1 Sébillot, i 418 f.

343:2 de Defectu Orac. 18. An occasional name for Britain in the Mabinogion is "the island of the Mighty" (Loth, i. 69, et passim). To the storm incident and the passing of the mighty, there is a curious parallel in Fijian belief. A clap of thunder was explained as "the noise of a spirit, we being near the place in which spirits plunge to enter the other world, and a chief in the neighbourhood having just died" (Williams, Fiji, i. 204).

343:3 de Facie Lunæ, 26.

344:1 See Hartland, Science of Fairy Tales, 209; Macdougall, Folk and Hero Tales, 73, 263; Le Braz 2, i. p. xxx. Mortals sometimes penetrated to the presence of these heroes, who awoke. If the visitor had the courage to tell them that the hour had not yet come, they fell asleep again, and he escaped. In Brittany, rocky clefts are believed to be the entrance to the world of the dead, like the cave of Lough Dearg. Similar stories were probably told of these in pagan times, though they are now adapted to Christian beliefs in purgatory or hell.

345:1 Le Braz 2, i, p. X1, ii. 4; Curtin, 10; MacPhail, Folk-Lore, vi. 170.

345:2 Seep. 338, supra, and Logan, Scottish Gael, ii. 374; Folk-Lore, viii. 208, 253.

345:3 Le Braz 2, i. 96, 127, 136 f., and Intro. xlv.

345:4 Philostratus, Apoll. of Tyana, v. 4; Val. Max. ii. 6. 12.

346:1 Le Braz 1, ii. 91; Curtin, Tales, 146. The punishment of suffering from ice and snow appears in the Apocalypse of Paul and in later Christian accounts of hell.

346:2 RC xxvi. 153.

346:3 Bk. iv. ch. 36.

346:4 Erdathe, according to D'Arbois, means (1) "the day in which the dead will resume his colour," from dath, "colour"; (2) "the agreeable day," from data, "agreeable" (D'Arbois, i. 185; cf. Les Druides, 135).


Next: Chapter XXIII. Rebirth and Transmigration

Sunday 19 November 2017

Dormammu, I've Come To Bargain

Herein lies the paradox of the Faustian Folly - if Lucifer would grant any favour, turn the Whole World upside down and dance to the tune of one man for four and twenty years in exchange for just one human soul....?

Of what True value is a man's soul...?

Because you are holding a Royal Flush - 
he is trying to bluff you whilst holding Two Pair.

And Faustus choked and folded.

I

bargain (n.)





mid-14c., "business transaction or agreement; negotiations, dealing," also "that which is acquired by bargaining," from Old French bargaine"business, trade, transaction, deal," from bargaignier (see bargain (v.)). Meaning "article priced for special sale, something bought or sold at a low price" is from 1899; a bargain basement (1899) originally was a basement floor in a store where bargains were displayed. Into the bargain "over and above what was stipulated," hence "moreover," is from 1630s.

bargain (v.)




c. 1400, "engage in business transactions, discuss or arrange terms of a transaction; to vend or sell," from Old French bargaignier "to haggle over the price" (12c., Modern French barguigner), perhaps from Frankish *borganjan "to lend" or some other Germanic source, ultimately from Proto-Germanic *borgan "to pledge, lend, borrow" (source also of Old High German borgen; Old English borgian; from PIE root *bhergh- (1) "to hide, protect;" compare borrow).

Diez and others suggest that the French word comes from Late Latin barca "a barge," because it "carries goods to and fro." There are difficulties with both suggestions. Related: Bargainedbargaining. To bargain for "arrange for beforehand" is from 1801.

her

Saturday 18 November 2017

Why is a Mouse When it Spins?







The Ancient One: 
You cannot beat a river into submission - you have to surrender to its currents, and use it's power as your own.

Dr. Stephen Strange: 
I control it by surrendering control? 
That doesn't make any sense. 

The Ancient One: 
Not everything does. 
Not everything has to.

Your intellect has taken you far in life, but it will take you no further.

Surrender, Stephen - Silence your ego, and your power shall rise.


I tell people that all the time. 


All the time. 

Especially Scientists, Engineers, Mechanics, anyone who works with money, stocks, or bonds and processes financial transactions; anyone whose dominant patterns of thought are largely preoccupied with numbers, weights and measures and the axioms of classical Euclidian Geometry - they never have a clue what that means, what I just said or what the hell I am even talking about. 

All that they know is The Mathematics, Angles and Ratios, that's all they are able to see and that's all that they think exists. 

Whereas, I fail dismally when it comes to The Mathematics - I understand The Physics. 


I understand The Dead Cat.

Justification


They're Justified, and They're Ancient,
And They like to roam The Land.

just roll it from the top

They're Justified, and They're Ancient,
I hope you understand.

to the bridge, to the bridge, 
to the bridge now

They called me up in Tennessee
They said "Tammy, stand by The JAMs"
But if you don't like what they're going to do,
You better not stop them 'cause they're comin' through --

bring the beat back!



INQUISITOR
Well. Kryten - 

Justify Yourself.

KRYTEN
I'm not sure I can.

INQUISITOR
But surely Your Life is replete with Good Works.  
There can be few individuals who have lived a more selfless life.

KRYTEN
But I am programmed to Live Unselfishly.  
And therefore, any Good Works I do come not out of fine motives, but as a result of a series of binary commands I am compelled to obey.

INQUISITOR
Well then, how can any mechanical justify himself?


KRYTEN
Perhaps only if he attempted to break his programming and conduct his life according to a set of values he arrived at independently.

INQUISITOR
Your Argument invites Deletion.

KRYTEN
The Rules are yours, not mine.

INQUISITOR
Do you wish to be erased?

KRYTEN
Well, I am programmed not to wish for anything.  

I Serve.

INQUISITOR
In a Human, this behaviour might be considered stubborn.

KRYTEN
But I am not Human.
And neither are you.  

And it is not Our Place to Judge Them -
....I wonder why you do.

The INQUISITOR closes his mask.

INQUISITOR: 
(In The INQUISITOR Voice)
 Enough!



Justification

(Latin justificatio; Greek dikaiosis.)

A biblio-ecclesiastical term; which denotes the transforming of the sinner from the state of unrighteousness to the state of holiness and sonship of God

Considered as an act (actus justificationis), justification is the work of God alone, presupposing, however, on the part of the adult the process of justification and the cooperation of his free will with God's preventing and helping grace (gratia praeveniens et cooperans). 


Considered as a state or habit (habitus justificationis), it denotes the continued possession of a quality inherent in the soul, which theologians aptly term sanctifying grace. 


Since the sixteenth century great differences have existed between Protestants and Catholics regarding the true nature of justification. 


As the dogmatic side of the controversy has been fully explained in the article on GRACE, we shall here consider it more from an historical point of view.

The Protestant doctrine on justification

The ideas on which the Reformers built their system of justification, except perhaps fiduciary faith, were by no means really original. They had been conceived long before either by heretics of the earlier centuries or by isolated Catholic theologians and had been quietly scattered as the seed of future heresies


It was especially the representatives of Antinomianism during the Apostolictimes who welcomed the idea that faith alone suffices for justification, and that consequently the observance of the moral law is not necessary either as a prerequisite for obtaining justification or as a means for preserving it. 


For this reason St. Augustine (De fide et operibus, xiv) was of the opinion that the Apostles James, Peter, John, and Jude had directed their Epistles against the Antinomians of that time, who claimed to have taken their doctrines — so dangerous to morality — from the writings of St. Paul. Until quite recently, it was almost universally accepted that the epistle of St. James was written against the unwarranted conclusions drawn from the writings of St. Paul


Of late, however, Catholic exegetes have become more and more convinced that the Epistle in question, so remarkable for its insisting on the necessity of goodworks, neither aimed at correcting the false interpretations of St. Paul's doctrine, nor had any relation to the teaching of the Apostle of the Gentiles. On the contrary, they believe that St. James had no other object than to emphasize the fact — already emphasized by St. Paul — that only such faith as is active in charity and good works (fides formata) possesses any power to justify man(cf. Galatians 5:61 Corinthians 13:2), whilst faith devoid of charityand good works (fides informis) is a dead faith and in the eyes of Godinsufficient for justification (cf. James 2:17 sqq.). According to this apparently correct opinion, the Epistles of both Apostles treat of different subjects, neither with direct relation to the other. For St. James insists on the necessity of works of Christian charity, while St. Paul intends to show that neither the observance of the Jewish Lawnor the merely natural good worksof the pagans are of any value for obtaining the grace of justification (cf. Bartmann, "St. Paulus u. St. Jacobus und die Rechtertigung", Freiburg, 1897).

Whether Victorinus, a neo-Platonist, already defended the doctrine of justification by faithalone, is immaterial to our discussion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in the Middle Ages there were a few Catholictheologians among the Nominalists(Occam, Durandus, Gabriel Biel), who went so far in exaggerating the value of good works in the matterof justification that the efficiency and dignity of Divine grace was unduly relegated to the background. Of late, FathersDenifle and Weiss have shown that Martin Luther was acquainted almost exclusively with the theology of these Nominalists, which he naturally and justly found repugnant, and that the "Summa" of St. Thomas and the works of other great theologians were practically unknown to him. Even Ritschl ("Christliche Lehre von der Rechfertigung und Versohnung", I, 3rd ed., Bonn, 1889, pp. 105, 117) admits that neither the Church in her official teaching nor the majority of her theologians ever sanctioned, much less adopted, the extreme views of the Nominalists. Nevertheless it was not a healthy reaction against Nominalism, but Luther's own state of conscience that caused his change of views. Frightened, tormented, worn out by constant reflections on his own sinfulness, he had finally found, even before 1517, relief and consolation only in the thought that man cannot overcome concupiscence, and that sin itself is a necessity. This thought naturally led him to a consideration of the fall of man and its consequences. Original sin has so completely destroyed our likeness to God and our moralfaculties in the natural order, that our will has lost its freedom regarding works morally good or bad, and we are consequently condemned to commit sin in every action. Even what we consider good works are nothing but sin. Since, according to Lutherconcupiscence, of which death alone shall free us, constitutes the essence of original sin, all our actions are corrupted by it. Concupiscence as an intrinsically evil disposition, has instilled its deadly poison into the soul, its faculties, and its action (cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 6). But here we are forced to ask: If all our moralactions be the outcome of an internal necessity and constraint, how can Luther still speak of sin in the true meaning of the word? Does not original sin become identical with the "Evil Substance" of the Manichæans, as later on Luther's follower, Flacius Illyricus, quite logically admitted?

Against this dark and desolate background there stands out the more clearly the mercy of God, who for the sake of the Redeemer'smerits lovingly offers to despairingman a righteousness (justitia) already complete in itself, namely the exterior righteousness of Godor of Christ. With the "arm of faith" the sinner eagerly reaches out for this righteousness and puts it on as a cloak of grace, covering and concealing therewith his misery and his sins. Thus on the part of God, justification is, as the Formulary of Concord (1577) avows, a mere external pronouncement of justification, a forensic absolution from sin and its eternal punishments. This absolution is based on Christ'sholiness which God imputes to man's faith. Cf. Solid. Declar. III de fide justif., sec. xi: "The term justification in this instance means the declaring just, the freeing from sin and the eternal punishment of sin in consideration of the justice of Christ imputed to faith by God."

What then is the part assigned to faith in justification? According to Luther (and Calvin also), the faiththat justifies is not, as the CatholicChurch teaches, a firm belief in God's revealed truths and promises (fides theoretica, dogmatica), but is the infallible conviction (fides fiducialis, fiducia) that God for the sake of Christ will no longer impute to us our sins, but will consider and treat us, as if we were really justand holy, although in our inner selves we remain the same sinners as before. Cf. Solid. Declar. III, sec. 15: "Through the obedience of Christ by faith the just are so declared and reputed, although by reason of their corrupt nature they still are and remain, sinners as long as they bear this mortal body." This so-called "fiduciary faith" is not a religious-moral preparation of the soul for sanctifying grace, nor a free act of cooperation on the part of the sinner; it is merely a means or spiritual instrument (instrumentum, organon leptikon) granted by God to assist the sinner in laying hold of the righteousness of God, thereby to cover his sins in a purely external manner as with a mantle. For this reason the Lutheran formularies of belief laygreat stress on the doctrine that our entire righteousness does not intrinsically belong to us, but is something altogether exterior. Cf. Solid. Declar., sec. 48: "It is settled beyond question that our justice is to be sought wholly outside of ourselves and that it consists entirely in our Lord Jesus Christ." The contrast between Protestantand Catholic doctrine here becomes very striking. For according to the teaching of the Catholic Church the righteousness and sanctity which justification confers, although given to us by God as efficient cause (causa efficiens) and merited by Christ as meritorious cause (causa meritoria), become an interior sanctifying quality or formal cause(causa formalis) in the soul itself, which it makes truly just and holy in the sight of God. In the Protestantsystem, however, remission of sin is no real forgiveness, no blotting out of guilt. Sin is merely cloaked and concealed by the imputed merits of Christ; God no longer imputes it, whilst in reality it continues under cover its miserable existence till the hour of death. Thus there exist in man side by side two hostile brothers as it were — the one justand the other unjust; the one a saint, the other a sinner; the one a child of God, the other a slave of Satan — and this without any prospect of a conciliation between the two. For, God by His merely judicial absolution from sin does not take away sin itself, but spreads over it as an outward mantle His own righteousness. The Lutheran(and Calvinisticdoctrine on justification reaches its climax in the assertion that "fiduciary faith", as described above, is the only requisite for justification (sola fides justificat). As long as the sinner with the "arm of faith" firmly clings to Christ, he is and will ever remain regenerated, pleasing to God, the child of God and heir to heaven. Faith, which alone can justify, is also the only requisite and means of obtaining salvation. Neither repentance nor penance, neither love of God nor good works, nor any other virtue is required, though in the just they may either attend or follow as a result of justification. (Cf. Solid. Declar, sec. 23: "Indeed, neither contrition nor love nor any other virtue, but faith alone is the means by which we can reach forth and obtain the grace of God, the merit of Christ and the remission of sin.") It is well known that Luther in his German translation of the Biblefalsified Romans 3:28, by interpolating the word "alone" (by faith alone), and to his critics gave the famous answer: "Dr. Martin Luther wants it that way, and says, 'Papist and ass are the same thing: sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas'."

Since neither charity nor goodworks contribute anything towards justification — inasmuch as faithalone justifies — their absence subsequently cannot deprive the just man of anything whatever. There is only one thing that might possibly divest him of justification, namely, the loss of fiduciary faith or of faith in general. From this point of view we get a psychologicalexplanation of numerous objectionable passages in Luther'swritings, against which even Protestant with deep moral sense, such as Hugo Grotius and GeorgeBull, earnestly protested. Thus we find in one of Luther's letters, written to Melancthon in 1521, the following sentence: "Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe and rejoice in Christ more strongly, who triumphed over sin, death, and the world; as long as we live here, we must sin." Could anyone do more to degrade St. Paul's concept of justification than Luther did in the following blasphemy: "If adulterycould be committed in faith, it would not be a sin"? (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 16). The doctrineof justification by faith alone was considered by Luther and his followers as an incontrovertible dogma, as the foundation rock of the Reformation, as an "article by which the Church must stand or fall" (articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesia), and which of itself would have been a sufficient cause for beginning the Reformation, as the Smalkaldic Articles emphatically declare. Thus we need not wonder when later on we see Lutherantheologians declaring that the Sola-Fides doctrine, as the principium materiale of Protestantism, deserves to be placed side by side with the doctrine of Sola-Scriptura ("Bible alone", with the exclusion of Tradition) as its principium formale— two maxims in which the contrast between Protestant and Catholic teaching reaches its highest point. Since, however, neither maxim can be found in the Bible, every Catholic is forced to conclude that Protestantism from its very beginning and foundation is based on self-deception. We assert this of Protestantism in general; for the doctrine of justification as defended by the reformed Churches differs only in non-essentials from Lutheranism. The most important of these differences is to be found in Calvin's system, which taught that only such as are predestinedinfallibly to eternal salvation obtain justification, whilst in those not predestined God produces a mere appearance of faith and righteousness, and this in order to punish them the more severely in hell (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 12).

From what has been said it is obvious that justification as understood by Protestants, presents the following qualities: its absolute certainty (certitudo), its equality in all (aequalitas), and finally the impossibility of ever losing it (inamissibilitas). For if it be essential to fiduciary faith that it infallibly assures the sinner of his own justification, it cannot mean anything but a firm conviction of the actual possession of grace. If, moreover, the sinner be justified, not by an interior righteousness capable of increase or decrease, but through God's sanctityeternally the same, it is evident that all the just from the common mortal to the Apostles and the Blessed Virgin Mary possess one and the same degree of righteousness and sanctity. Finally if, as Luthermaintains, only the loss of faith(according to Calvin, not even that) can deprive us of justification, it follows that justification once obtained can never be lost.

Incidentally, we may here call attention to another significant fact, namely that it was Luther who laid the foundation for the separation of religion and morality. For, by stating that fiduciary faithalone suffices for obtaining both justification and eternal happiness, he minimized our moral faculties to such an extent that charity and good works no longer affect our relations with God. By this doctrineLuther opened a fundamental breach between religion and morality, between faith and law, and assigned to each its own distinct sphere of action in which each can attain its end independent of the other. Prof. Paulsen of Berlin was therefore justified in eulogizing Kant, who followed Luther in this matter, as the Philosopher of Protestantism". (Cf. Möhler, "Symbolik", sec. 25.)

The harshness, want of harmony, intrinsic improbability, and contradiction of Holy Writcontained in the system soon brought about a reaction in the very midst of Protestantism. Osiander (d. 1552), at once an enthusiastic admirer of Luther and an independent thinker, emphatically stated (in opposition to Luther and Calvin) that the justifying power of faith consists in a real, instrinsic union of Christ with the soul, an opinion for which, as being Catholic, he was censuredfreely. Butzer (d. 1551) likewise admits, in addition to an "imputed exterior righteousness", the idea of an "inherent righteousness" as a partial factor in justification, thus meeting Catholicism half way. Luther's most dangerous adversary, however, was his friend Melancthon, who, in his praiseworthy endeavour to smooth over by conciliatory modifications the interior difficulties of this discordant system, laid the foundation for the famous Synergisten-Streit (Synergist Dispute), which was so soon to become embittered. In general it was precisely the denial of man'sfree will in the moral order, and of the impossibility of his full cooperation with Divine grace that repelled so many followers of Luther. No sooner had Pfeffinger in his book, "De libero arbitrio" (Leipzig, 1555) taken up defence of man's free will than many theologians of Jena (e.g. Strigel) boldly attacked the Lutheran Klotz-Stock-und-Steintheorie (log-stick-and-stone theory), and tried to force from their adversaries the concession that man can cooperate with God's grace. The theological quarrel soon provedvery annoying to both parties and the desire for peace became universal. "The Half-Melanchtonians" had succeeded in smuggling Synergism into the "Book of Torgau" (1576); but before the "Formulary of Concord" was printed in the monastery of Bergen(near Magdeburg, 1557), the article in question was eliminated as heterodox and the harsh doctrineof Luther substituted in the symbols of the Lutheran Church. The new breach in the system by the Synergisten-Streit was enlarged by a counter movement that originated among the Pietistsand Methodists, who were willing to admit the fallible assurance of salvation — given by fiduciary faith— only in case that that assurance was confirmed by internal experience. But what probably contributed most of all to the crumbling of the system was the rapid growth of Socinianism and Rationalism which during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gained so many adherents among the Lutherans. Fiduciary faith was no longer considered a spiritual means to assist man in reaching out for the righteousness of God, but was identified with a disposition which is upright and pleasing to God. Latterly, A. Ritschl definedjustification as the change in the consciousness of our relation to God and amplified this idea by the statement that the certainty of our salvation is further determined by the consciousness of our union with the Christian community. Schleiermacher and Hengstenberg deviated still further from the old doctrine. For they declared contrition and penance as also necessary for justification, thus "coming dangerously near the Catholic system", as Derner expresses it ("Geschichte der protest. Theologie", Munich, 1867, p. 583). Finally the LutheranChurch of Scandinavia has in the course of time experienced a "quiet reformation", inasmuch as it now, without being fully conscious of the fact, defends the Catholic doctrineon justification (cf. Krogh-Tonning, "Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation", Christiania, 1894). The strict orthodoxy of the Old Lutherans, e.g. in the Kingdom of Saxony and the State of Missouri, alone continues to cling tenaciously to a system, which otherwise would have slowly fallen into oblivion.

The Catholic doctrine on justification

We have an authentic explanation of the Catholic doctrine in the famous "Decretum de justificatione" of the Sixth Session (13 Jan., 1547) of the Council of Trent, which in sixteen chapters (cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchir.", nn.793-810) and thirty-three canons (l.c., 811-43) gives in the clearest manner all necessaryinformation about the process, causes, effects, and qualities of justification.

The process of justification (processus justificationis)

Since justification as an application of the Redemption to the individualpresupposes the fall of the entire human race, the Council of Trentquite logically begins with the fundamental statement that original sin has weakened and deflected, but not entirely destroyed or extinguished the freedom of the human will (Trent, sess. VI, cap. i: "Liberum arbitrium minime extinctum, viribus licet attenuatum et inclinatum"). Nevertheless, as the children of Adam were really corrupted by original sin, they could not of themselves arise from their fall nor shake off the bonds of sin, death, and Satan. Neither the natural faculties left in man, nor the observance of the Jewish Lawcould achieve this. Since God alone was able to free us from this great misery, He sent in His infinite loveHis only begotten Son Jesus Christ, Who by His bitter passion and death on the cross redeemed fallen man and thus became the Mediatorbetween God and man. But if the grace of Redemption merited by Christ is to be appropriated by the individual, he must be "regenerated by God", that is he must be justified. What then is meant by justification? Justification denotes that change or transformation in the soul by which man is transferred from the state of original sin, in which as a child of Adam he was born, to that of graceand Divine sonship through Jesus Christ, the second Adam, our Redeemer (l.c., cap.iv: "Justificatio impii. . . translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adae, in statum gratiae et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam, Jesum Christum, Salvatorem nostrum"). In the New Law this justification cannot, according to Christ's precept, be effected except at the fountain of regeneration, that is, by the baptism of water. While in Baptisminfants are forthwith cleansed of the stain of original sin without any preparation on their part, the adult must pass through a moralpreparation, which consists essentially in turning from sin and towards God. This entire process receives its first impulse from the supernatural grace of vocation(absolutely independent of man'smerits), and requires an intrinsic union of the Divine and humanaction, of grace and moral freedom of election, in such a manner, however, that the will can resist, and with full liberty reject the influence of grace (Trent, l.c., can.iv: "If any one should say that free will, moved and set in actionby God, cannot cooperate by assenting to God's call, nor dissent if it wish. . . let him be anathema"). By this decree the Council not only condemned the Protestant view that the will in the reception of grace remains merely passive, but also forestalled the Jansenistic heresy regarding the impossibility of resisting actual grace. With what little right heretics in defence of their doctrine appeal to St. Augustine, may be seen from the following brief extract from his writings: "He who made you without your doing does not without your action justify you. Without your knowing He made you, with your willing He justifiesyou, but it is He who justifies, that the justice be not your own" (Serm. clxix, c. xi, n.13). Regarding St. Augustine's doctrine cf. J. Jausbach, "Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus", II, Freiburg, 1909, pp. 208-58.

We now come to the different states in the process of justification. The Council of Trentassigns the first and most important place to faith, which is styled "the beginning, foundationand root of all justification" (Trent, l.c., cap.viii). Cardinal Pallavicini*(Hist. Conc. Trid., VIII, iv, 18) tells us that all the bishops present at the council fully realized how important it was to explain St. Paul's saying that man is justified through faith. Comparing Bible and Tradition they could not experience any serious difficulty in showing that fiduciary faith was an absolutely new invention and that the faith of justification was identical with a firm belief in the truths and promises of Divine revelation (l. c.: "illumque [Deum] tanquam omnis justitiae fontem diligere incipiunt"). The next step is a genuine sorrow for all sin with the resolution to begin a new life by receiving holybaptism and by observing the commandments of God. The process of justification is then brought to a close by the baptismof water, inasmuch as by the graceof this sacrament the catechumenis freed from sin (original and personal) and its punishments, and is made a child of God. The same process of justification is repeated in those who by mortal sin have lost their baptismal innocence; with this modification, however, that the Sacrament of Penance replaces baptism. Considering merely the psychological analysis of the conversion of sinners, as given by the council, it is at once evident that faith alone, whether fiduciary or dogmatic, cannot justify man(Trent, l. c., can. xii: "Si quis dixerit, fidem justificantem nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae misericordiae, peccata remittentis propter Christum, vel eam fiduciamsolam esse, qua justificamur, a.s."). Since our Divine adoption and friendship with God is based on perfect love of God or charity (cf. Galatians 5:61 Corinthians 13James 2:17 sqq.), dead faith devoid of charity (fides informis) cannot possess any justifying power. Only such faith as is active in charity and good works (fides caritate formata) can justify man, and this even before the actual reception of baptism or penance, although not without a desire of the sacrament(cf. Trent, Sess. VI, cap. iv, xiv). But, not to close the gates of heavenagainst pagans and those non-Catholics, who without their fault do not know or do not recognize the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance, Catholic theologiansunanimously hold that the desire to receive these sacraments is implicitly contained in the serious resolve to do all that God has commanded, even if His holy willshould not become known in every detail.

The formal cause of justification

The Council of Trent decreed that the essence of active justification comprises not only forgiveness of sin, but also "sanctification and renovation of the interior man by means of the voluntary acceptation of sanctifying grace and other supernatural gifts" (Trent, l. c., cap. vii: "Non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum"). In order to exclude the Protestant idea of a merely forensic absolution and exterior declaration of righteousness, special stress is laid on the fact that we are justified by God'sjustice, not that whereby He himself is just but that whereby He makes us just, in so far as He bestows on us the gift of His gracewhich renovates the soul interiorly and adheres to it as the soul's own holiness (Trent, l. c., cap. vii: "Unica formalis causa [justificationis] est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab eo donati, renovamur spiritu mentis nostrae: et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes unusquisque suam"). This inner quality of righteousness and sanctity is universally termed "sanctifying (or habitual) grace", and stands in marked contrast to an exterior, imputed sanctity, as well as to the idea of merely covering and concealing sin. By this, however, we do not assert that the "justitia Dei extra nos" is of no importance in the process of justification. For, even if it is not the formal cause of justification (causa formalis), it is nevertheless its true exemplar (causa exemplaris), inasmuch as the soul receives a sanctity in imitation of God's own holiness. The Council of Trent (l. c. cap. vii), moreover, did not neglect to enumerate in detail the other causes of justification: the glory of God and of Christ as the final cause(causa finalis), the mercy of God as the efficient cause (causa efficiens), the Passion of Christ as the meritorious cause (causa meritoria), the reception of the Sacraments as the instrumental cause (causa instrumentalis). Thus each and every factor receives its full share and is assigned its proper place. Hence the Catholic doctrineon justification, in welcome contrast to the Protestant teaching, stands out as a reasonable, consistent, harmonious system. For further explanation of the nature of sanctifying grace, see SUPERNATURAL GRACE. Regarding the false doctrine of the Catholic theologian Hermes, cf. Kleutgen, "Theologie der Vorzeit", II (2nd ed., Munster, 1872), 254-343.

According to the Council of Trentsanctifying grace is not merely aformal cause, but "the only formal cause" (unica causa formalis) of our justification. By this important decision the Council excluded the error of Butzer and some Catholictheologians (Gropper, Scripando, and Albert Pighius) who maintained that an additional "external favour of God" (favor Dei externus) belonged to the essence of justification. The same decree also effectually set aside the opinion of Peter Lombard, that the formal cause of justification (i.e. sanctifying grace) is nothing less than the Person of the Holy Ghost, Who is the hypostatic holiness and charity, or the uncreated grace(gratia increata). Since justification consists in an interior sanctity and renovation of spirit, its formal causeevidently must be a created grace(gratia creata), a permanent quality, a supernatural modification or accident (accidens) of the soul. Quite distinct from this is the question whether the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, although not required for justification (inasmuch as sanctifying grace alone suffices), be necessary as a prerequisite for Divine adoption. Several great theologians have answered in the affirmative, as for instance Lessius("De summo bono", II, i; "De perfect. moribusque divin.", XII, ii); Petavius ("De Trinit.", viii, 4 sqq.); Thomassin ("De Trinit.", viii, 9 sqq.), and Hurter ("Compend. theol. dogmat.", III, 6th ed., pp. 162 sqq.). The solution of the lively controversy on this point between Fr. Granderath ("Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie", 1881, pp. 283 sqq.; 1883, 491 sqq., 593 sqq.; 1884, 545 sqq.) and Professor Scheeben ("Dogmatik", II, sec. 169; "Katholik", 1883, I, 142 sqq.; II, 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq.; II, 465 sqq., 610 sqq.) seems to lie in the following distinction: the Divine adoption, inseparably connected with sanctifying grace, is not constituted by the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost, but receives therefrom its full development and perfection.

The effects of justification

The two elements of active justification, forgiveness of sin and sanctification, furnish at the same time the elements of habitualjustification, freedom from sin and holiness. According to the Catholic doctrine, however, this freedom from sin and this sanctity are effected, not by two distinct and successive Divine acts, but by a single act of God. For, just as light dispels darkness, so the infusion of sanctifying grace eo ipso dispels from the soul original and mortal sin. (Cf. Trent, sess. VI, can. xi: "Si quis dixerit, homines justificari vel sola imputatione justitiae Christi, vel sola peccatorum remissione, exclusa gratia et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur atque illis inhaereat. . ., a.s.") In considering the effects of justification it will be useful to compare the Catholic doctrine of real forgiveness of sinwith the Protestant theory that sinis merely "covered" and not imputed. By declaring the grace of justification, or sanctifying grace, to be the only formal cause of justification, the Council of Trentintended to emphasize the fact that in possessing sanctifying grace we possess the whole essence of the state of justification with all its formal effects; that is, we possess freedom from sin and sanctity, and indeed freedom from sin by meansof sanctity. Such a remission of sincould not consist in a mere covering or non-imputation of sins, which continue their existence out of view; it must necessarily consist in the real obliteration and annihilation of the guilt. This genuinely Biblical concept of justification forms such an essentialelement of Catholicism, that even Antonio Rosmini's theory, standing half way between Protestantismand Catholicism, is quite irreconcilable with it. According to Rosmini, there are two categoriesof sin

  • such as God merely covers and does not impute (cf. Psalm 31:1); 
  • such as God really forgives and blots out. 
By the latter Rosmini understood deliberate sins of commission (culpae actuales et liberae), by the former indeliberate sins (peccata non libera), which "do no harm to those who are of the people of God". This opinion was censured by the Holy Office (14 Dec., 1887), not only because without any reason it defended a twofold remission of sin, but also because it stamped indeliberate acts as sins (cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchir.", n.1925).

Although it is a Catholic dogmathat sanctifying grace and sin(original and mortal) do never existsimultaneously in the soul, there may be, nevertheless a diversity of opinion regarding the extent of this incompatibility, according as it is considered as either moral, physical, or metaphysical in character. According to the now universally rejected opinion of the Nominalists (Occam, Gabriel Biel) and the Scotists (Mastrius, Henno) the contrast between grace and sinis based on a free decree and acceptation of God, or in other words, the contrast is merely moral. This would logically imply in contradiction to the "unica causa formalis" of the Council of Trent, a twofold formal cause of justification (cf. Pohle, "Dogmatik", II, 4th ed., Paderborn, 1909, p. 512). Francisco Suárez (De gratia, VII, 20) and some of his followers in defending a physical contrast come nearer the truth. In their explanation graceand sin exclude each other with the same necessity as do fire and water, although in both cases God, by a miracle of his omnipotence, could suspend the general law and force the two hostile elements to exist peacefully side by side. This opinion might be safely accepted were sanctifying grace only a physical ornament of the soul. But since in reality it is an ethical formof sanctification by which even an infant in receiving baptism is necessarily made just and pleasing to God, there must be between the concepts of grace and of sin a metaphysical and absolutecontradiction, which not even Divine omnipotence can alter and destroy. For this last opinion, defended by the Thomists and the majority of theologians, there is also a solid foundation in Holy Writ. For the contrast between graceand sin is as great as between light and darkness (2 Corinthians 6:14Ephesians 5:8), between life and death (Romans 5:21Colossians 2:131 John 3:14), between Godand idols, Christ and Belial (2 Corinthians 6:15 sqq.), etc. Thus it follows from Holy Writ that by the infusion of sanctifying grace sin is destroyed and blotted out of absolute necessity, and that the Protestant theory of "covering and not imputing sin" is both a philosophical and a theologicalimpossibility. Besides the principal effect of justification, i.e. real obliteration of sin by means of sanctification, there is a whole series of other effects: beauty of the soul, friendship with God, and Divine adoption. In the article on GRACE these are described as formal effects of sanctifying grace. In the same article is given an explanation of the supernaturalaccompaniments — the three theological virtues, the moralvirtues, the seven gifts, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost. These, as freely bestowed gifts of God, cannot be regarded as formal effects of justification.

The qualities of justification

We have seen that Protestantsclaim the following three qualitiesfor justification: certainty, equality, the impossibility of ever losing it. Diametrically opposed to these qualities are those defended by the Council of Trent (sess. VI, cap. 9-11): uncertainty (incertitudo), inequality (inaequalitas), amissibility (ammisibilitas). Since these qualities of justification are also qualities of sanctifying grace, see GRACE.

Comments

Sources

PROTESTANT BELIEFS: Clasen, Die christliche Heilsgewissheit (1907); Haring, Dikaiosyne Theou bei Paulus (1896); cf. Denifle, Die abendlandischen Schriftausleger uber justitia Dei u. justificatio (Mainz, 1905); Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre (2nd ed., 1900); Nosgen, Der Schriftbeweis fur die evangelische Rechtfertigungslehre (1901); Schlatter, Der Glaube im N.T. (3rd ed., 1905); Feine, Das Gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus (1899); Idem, Jesus Christus u. Paulus (1902); Clemen, Paulus, sein Leben u. Wirken (2 vols., 1904); Gottschick, Die Heilsgewissheit des evangelishen Christen in Zeitschr. fur Theol. u. Kritik (1903), 349 sqq.; Denifle, Luther u. Luthertum in der ersten Entwicklung, I (Mainz, 1904); Ihmels, Die Rechtfertigung allein durch den Glauben, unser fester Grund Rom gegenuber in Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift (1904), 618 sqq.; Denifle and Weiss, Luther u. Luthertum etc., II (Mainz). Cf. also Harnack, Dogmengesch., III (4th ed., Freiburg, 1909); Ihmels in Herzog and Jauck, Realencycl. fur protest. Theol., s.v. Rechtfertigung.

CATHOLIC TEACHING: Vega, De justificatione doctrina universa, LL. XV absolute tradita (Venice, 1548); Bellarmine, De justificatione impii in Opp. omnia, VI (Paris, 1873); Nussbaum, Die Lehre der kathol. Kirche uber die Rechtfertigung (Munich, 1837); Wieser, S. Pauli doctrina de justificatione (Trent, 1874); Mohler, Symbolik (2nd ed., Mainz, 1890), secs. x-xxvii; Einig in Kirchenlex., s.v. Rechtfertigung; Rademacher, Die ubernaturliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen u. johanneischen Theologie (Freiburg, 1903); Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, II (Freiburg, 1900); Pohle, Dogmatik, II (4th ed., Paderborn, 1909), 484-5556; Hefner, Entstehungsgeach. des Trienter Rechtfertigungs-Dekretes (Paderborn, 1909); Prumbs, Die Stellung des Trid. Konz. zu der Frage nach dem Wesen der heilignachenden Gnade (Paderborn, 1910).

About this page

APA citation. Pohle, J. (1910).Justification. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved November 18, 2017 from New Advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08573a.htm

MLA citation. Pohle, Joseph."Justification." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 8. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910.18 Nov. 2017<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08573a.htm>.

Transcription. This article was transcribed for New Advent by Terry Wilkinson.

Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur.+John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

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